

EU Integration Process from East to East:
Civil Society and Ethnic Minorities in a Changing World.
Proceedings from a round table for young social scientists

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Proceedings from a round table for young social scientists

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Table of contents

Preface	
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From East to West

Tomasz Kapuśniak	
Europeanization of domestic policy towards immigration	
Monica Constantinescu	
The importance of reference system in international migration:	
The duality “origin country – destination country” or system perspective?	
Mălina Voicu	
Economic efficiency or ideology?	
Social support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe	
Raluca Andreea Popescu	
Fertility and social policies in Europe	

Civic society

Bogdan Voicu	
Social capital: Bonding or Bridging Europe?	
Horațiu Rusu, Raluca Bălășoiu (RO)	
Generalized trust – an imagined trust?	
Asta Ranonyte	
Civic Participation of Young People in EU: New Challenges and Opportunities	

Ethnic Identity and the EU

Mila Maeva	
Bulgarian Turks and European Union	
Monika Frejute-Rakauskiene	
The European Parliament Elections:	

Participation of the Political Parties of Ethnic Minorities in Lithuania	
Julija Moskvina	
Possibilities for developing social integration of ethnic minorities in Lithuania	

“Alterities”

Renáta Sedláková	
Presentation of the Roma ethnic minority in the Czech media	
Magdalena Lesińska	
The Multidimensional Process of Mobilization of the Polish Roma	
Around Holocaust Memory	
Tatyana Basina	
Jewish Minority in Ukraine: social networks and identity	

Transforming the post-communist societies

Ana Bleahu	
Romanian Integration in the European Union.	
Some Aspects regarding Rural Development	
Külliki Korts	
Defining post-socialist societies: relations between the individual, society and state, search for	
social integration.....	
Victor Cebotari	
Gateway to a New Modernity: Ruling Elites between Past, Present and Future.	
The Moldavian Case.....	
Simona Maria Vonica Răduțiu	
Romanian welfare state model	
between survival, reform and European Union Enlargement.....	

“Contemporary” Development Issues

Julius Mastilak (SK)

East-West Integration from Regional, Socio-Economic, Institutional Perspective:

Understanding Development of Bratislava-Vienna Metropolitan Region

Nadolu Bogdan (RO)

The Role of Information Technology in Social Development

Mariana Dan, Adrian Dan (RO)

Housing the poor: Homeless population in Romania. A preliminary assessment

Matúš Krištofik (SK)

A Family Affair – Housework cycle by Gabika Binderová

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Introduction

(Bogdan Voicu, Horațiu Rusu, Mălina Voicu, Külleki Korts, Andrei Gheorghică)

THE SIBIU ROUND-TABLE

This volume collects most of the papers presented in the conference on “EU Integration Process from EAST to EAST: Civil Society and Ethnic Minorities in a Changing World. A round table for young social scientists”, held between 17th and 19th December 2004, at the University “Lucian Blaga” (ULBS), in Sibiu, Romania. The conference was jointly organized by the Department of Sociology of the ULBS, and its partners, notably the Latvian Association of Sociology, and the Research Institute for Quality of Life (Romanian Academy of Science). Horațiu Rusu, Anita Kalnina and Bogdan Voicu were the main organizers.

The event gathered 35 young social scientists, from 10 former communist societies. The pretext of the conference was to discuss the postcommunist transformations, especially through the lenses of EU integration, civic society building, and ethnic identity issues. The round table was preceded by a similar one, in September 2003, held in Sibiu, too. The presentations from 2003 were collected in a volume similar to the current one, and are also available on the Internet¹. The long-run goal is to contribute to building a network connecting these people and other that share similar interests, facilitating their contacts, sharing experiences, discussing their works, contributing to the development of the local civil societies. A third event will probably confirm the formal set up of the planned network and will take place in Lejpaia, Latvia, in July 2005.

Special thanks should be addressed to the sponsors of the Sibiu round-table, who also supported the publishing of this volume. First of all, the Romanian branch of the Open Society Foundation, through the financial support of the East-East program, made everything possible. The “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu kindly offered the logistic support. The Romanian Ministry of Education, through the grant 140M/30.07.2004, partially supported the publishing activities, as well as the Psihimedia Publishing House did. The Research Institute

¹ Bogdan Voicu, Horațiu Rusu, eds. 2003. *Globalization, Integration, and Social Development in Central and Eastern Europe*, Sibiu: Psihimedia. For the electronic versions of the papers, see www.iccv.ro/romana/conf/conf.sibiu.2003/index.htm.

for Quality of Life (Romanian Academy of Science), in Bucharest, also offered some logistic support, and hosted the conference website. The electronic versions of the papers, the program and the list of participants are available on the respective web page².

The papers presented in Sibiu, in December 2004, were rather heterogeneous, but they probably represent an interesting collection which generally characterizes the writing and the interests of the young social scientists from the former communist area. The restriction imposed by the theme – EU Integration, with a special attention paid to Civic Society and Ethnic Identity, offered in fact the possibility to cover a broad range of topics, from a multifaceted perspective. Ethnic issues, social capital and civic society, social policy, democratization, current processes in the area, such as rural development, immigration towards West, etc. are analyzed through a variety of approaches. Integrative approaches and case studies, theoretical and empirical analysis, qualitative and quantitative research, comparative and monographic studies, very short, rather conceptual papers, and longer ones form all together this volume which deals with Eastern people moving towards West and the Western Europe enlarging towards East.

The European puzzle is presented here from the narrow perspective of a heterogeneous group of young scholars, which find their common background in the socialization in former communist societies, sharing a common ‘bloc culture’³, and which look at Europe having in mind the main issues of their origin countries. There is no common guideline, but the focus on the ex-communist societies. This makes the volume difficult to be read as a whole, but it facilitates the access to many entrances in the Central and Eastern European ‘neighborhood’ populated with its various ‘blocs’ which may or may not belong to the same architectural structure.

The ‘alleys’ of the volume are structured around six large domains, which also shaped the schedule of the round-table. First, there is a section dedicated mainly to cross-national perspectives and to immigration issues (cross-national through their nature). Some of the current trends in East are analyzed, including along with labor force migration, the support for democracy, the dynamics of inequality, and the changes in family and fertility patterns. The second section collects three papers dealing with civic society and social capital. The third and the fourth sections are dedicated to identity construction and the relations with specific

² www.iccv.ro/romana/conf/conf.sibiu.2003/index.htm.

³ See Sztompka, Piotr. (1999a). *Trust. A Sociological Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

minority groups. Ethnic identity and social inclusion on one side, and the traditional, perpetual “Stranger” – in Simmel’s terms – like the Gipsy and the Jew , on the other side, are the focus of the two sections dealing with identity. Some current changes in the postcommunist societies – rural development, value changes, class, and state design – are discussed in the fifth section of the book, as they formed a cluster of presentations during the Sibiu round-table, too. The final section is devoted to new issues for social development in the ex-communist area: cross-border and regional development, Information Technology, homelessness and feminism are discussed here.

The section ahead shortly reviews each paper in the light of the discussions that took place within each workshop. Before that, we should mention that the editors of the volume did not intervene on the initial texts, letting the full responsibility of the content to the authors. No further language proofing was performed by the editors or by the publisher, either. However, we have checked that the papers are ‘readable’, if the international English is clean enough to allow the reader to understand the meaning of the phrases. Otherwise, they represent and present to the reader a span of the writings of the young social scientists from the former communist area.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

From East to West (*Bogdan Voicu*)

Migration is one of the oldest phenomena in human history. Each époque had its own migrational patterns, and important movements of people from a place to another. Some of the main flows affecting the European space during the last centuries are mentioned in the beginning of Tomasz Kapuśniak’s paper, in this volume. Currently, an important East-West flow accompanies the process of EU enlargement. The two papers dealing with migration included in the current volume reveal different aspects of the phenomena: Tomasz Kapuśniak is interested the institutional side of the problem, while Monica Constantinescu is rather interested in the mechanisms that underlie the Eastern Europeans migration towards West.

The first paper focuses on the process of the Europeanization (the emergence and development of the European level actors) of domestic immigration policies. The author, *Thomasz Kapuśniak*, discusses the inter-relations between the national and EU common policies towards migration. The paper reviews the previous attempts of the recipient countries

to harmonize their policy, and looks for possible developments towards implementing common standards in the immigration field. Since no matter which migrant group is concerned (either people from the former colonies, labor migrants, asylum seekers or illegal immigrants), it has to face the respective regulations in order to migrate, the author often refers to the East-West flow.

The legal and institutional approach of Tomasz Kapuśniak proposes only one side of the story. A second piece of the present days migration puzzle is proposed by *Monica Constantinescu*'s analysis of migration networks. The paper is an attempt to conceptualize the East-West migration mechanisms, exemplified through Romanian migration to Spain. The author considers and discusses two conceptual approaches: the dual system of references (one sender/origin country – one receiver/destination country), and the system approach of the international migration (explaining how the migration flows are becoming stable in time). She argues that it is quite difficult to apply these sets of theories to the particular case of Romanian migration to Spain. The argument builds on several facts – specifically the “multiple destination”, the “cumulative effects of migrations”, and the “international circulation between destinations”, which are identified by the author as strains between the social reality and the existing theories. Romanian migration to Spain appears to be the byproduct of several factors – economic, cultural, the social networks etc. and it is a phenomena which continuously changes its shape, due to the change of the social conditions both in sender and destination communities, as well as due to the cumulative effects of the migration itself.

Mălina Voicu's paper changes the focus towards the differences between European societies with regard to social support for democracy. The author clearly delimitates social support (attitudes) and legitimacy (values). She considers the socialization theory, the economic efficiency theory, and the *lifetime learning model*⁴ as providing consistent explanations for differences in social support for democracy across European societies. Using EVS data, Mălina employed a regression model to show that Western Europeans are supporting more the democracy, and satisfaction for the current government. The paper rove that GDP growth rate has a positive impact on the support for democracy. The paper reveal that the difference between the western and the ex-communist space is shaped by the levels of satisfaction with former governments from the late 80s: for the Westerners, the more

⁴ Rose, Richard, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer. (1998). *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

satisfaction they have with their former regime, the more likely is to be satisfied with democracy, while for the ex-communist citizens, the more they reject the communist rule, the more satisfied with democracy they are. Generally speaking, the paper shows that a common pattern for supporting democracy is to be found across European societies, and the East-West differences are rather differences of development.

Raluca Popescu starts her discussion about the trends in changing fertility rates and the impact of social policy on the phenomena, by noticing that all over Europe legal marriage rate decreased over the last decades, and people started to have fewer and fewer children. The author also notices that the trend of having fewer children seems to stop and small increases are to be noticed during the late 90s, and report some convergence in this regard across the European societies. Considering the existing literature, the paper reviews the factors explaining the decrease in fertility rates. Then it focuses on the way in which social policies react to those changes. Utility (rational choice), risk assuming, increasing incidence of postmaterial values, new life styles and the emphasis of quality of life, gender values, human capital are mentioned as explanatory causes of the recent dynamics. The institutional factors are discussed in the context of social policy measures to increase fertility. The East-West cleavage, also present in the other papers from this first section of the current volume, is reflected at the level of fertility, too. Ex-communist citizens and their Western neighbors are said to differ in their manifestations, but they are similar from the point of view of the way in which they rapport themselves to the child bearing and the child rising. Recent history and differences in wealth shape the differences, but the trend is towards convergence.

As a major conclusion of this first part of the book, I would say that Europe is a very heterogeneous entity, both in terms of hot issues (such as international migration of labor), attitudes, policies, values etc. However, noticing this heterogeneity is a matter of using a common reading key. The possibility of using this reading key says much about the cultural and structural foundations of these countries, therefore about their relative homogeneity! In conclusion, it seems that the movement of some countries from East to West is not likely to reduce or to increase the diversity, but to make it ... nicer?

Civic society (*Mălina Voicu*)

Civic society and the related concepts – trust, social capital or civic participation – represent a ‘hot issues’ for the social sciences in the last decades. Thousands of studies are

trying to explain why in some societies people do trust each other and are involved in the community life, while in others the civic involvement is quite low, and how this could affect the general development of a particular society. The topic is of great interest in the post communist countries because the former regime planned to destroy the civic society, considered as a big enemy for the communist order. After the fall down of the communism, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe started re-building civic society and social capital. This gives social scientists additional incentives to pay a special attention to the topic. A sample of the various perspectives is included within the “Civic society” section of the current volume.

Bogdan Voicu focuses on the social capital searching to see if Europe, as a mixture of countries, is or is not homogenous and, secondly, how much is Europe different from the other countries. Another goal of the analysis is to investigate the impact of the variation in social capital within Europe on the EU enlargement. The paper reviews the mains studies dedicated to the topic, listing the main elements of bridging social capital: meeting friends, valuing friends, membership in voluntary associations, participation in mass protest actions, trust in people and trust in institutions. The empirical analysis is based on EVS / WVS data collected in 1999 – 2000. The author proposes cross-national comparisons for most of the European countries and contrasts Europe and the rest of the world.

Based on the mentioned data, the analysis has identified several consistent patterns, derived from the cleavages between ex-totalitarian versus consolidated democracies, and between Nordic and Southern – Mediterranean cultural heritage. According to the author, the 42 European societies considered in the analysis, can be clustered in four consistent groups: the Nordic, the Western, the Southern Ex-totalitarian and the Eastern Ex-totalitarian one. Bogdan Voicu stresses the idea that Europe lacks homogeneity, but it belongs to a similar cultural pattern. On the other hand, EVS/WVS data pointed out that Europe is not very different, especially when compared with its former colonies, but on average it imposes its patterns to the rest of the world. The conclusion is that far from being a homogenous bloc, the Old Continent has some particular features that individualize it among other societies.

Asta Ranonyte takes a different approach, discussing the civic participation of young people in European Union. The paper focuses on the civic participation in the context of EU enlargement and of democratization of the post-communist societies. Using data of the research ‘Youth in Europe 2003’, the chapter points out that the young generations relate their future with the European Union. In addition, the young cohorts from new EU members perceive the EU as a way to create a better future for their citizens.

Raluca Bălșoiu and *Horațiu Rusu* bring with a third different approach. Considering the generalized trust, the paper is rather a theoretical essay bringing a critical perspective on the topic. The first part of the essay is dedicated to the definition of trust, while the second approaches the types of trust and the third the source of trust. The authors point out that there are a lot of definitions of the generalized trust, but it is difficult to find an accurate one. Moreover, the measurement of the generalized trust reminds of an imagined community as long as the referent of trust is represented by an imagined community and therefore, one can speak about imagined trust.

Concluding this brief presentation, one may note that the three papers included in this section put together very different approaches of the topic related to the civic participation (social, capital, participation and generalized trust). However, the authors seems to point out a common thing: the great interest of the social scientists on this issue in the context of rebuilding the new society in Central and Eastern Europe, under the impact of democratization and of the EU enlargements. The chapters indicate that even if in Europe there are four different models of societies with respect to social capital, European countries will probably converge in the future to a quite similar model of civic participation.

Ethnic Identity and the EU (*Horațiu Rusu*)

The papers belonging to this section are concerned with issues related to ethnic revival (the case of Bulgarian Turks) and civic integration of ethnic minorities (the Lithuanian cases) in respect with the ongoing European Integration process.

Mila Maeva's paper is a fresco of the past and current situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria: images on minority status and identity issues during and post the communist period are combined with a short analysis of the current migration practices. The process of forced removal (through the “revival process” commanded in 1984 by BCP) and that of recover (after the fall of communism in November 1989) of identity markers could be seen and analyzed in Jenkins’ terms of “nominal” and “virtual” identity⁵. The restoration of rights is accompanied by an economic decline in the Turkish minority life, especially in areas where compact groups live. As a consequence the analysis focuses on the seasonal migration patterns mainly towards the EU countries, the importance of the networks in sustaining this

⁵ See Jenkins, Richard (1994). Rethinking ethnicity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 17:2, 1994, pp.197-223

process, and its impact on the economic life of the minority. Interesting aspects of identity negotiation are revealed too; the way the Turkish minority members use their Bulgarian “nominal” identity in order to avoid or to cope with the possible problems generated by their “virtual” Muslim identity: states border problems, European citizen’s perceptions, etc. The article ends with an optimistic tone illustrating the hopes of the Turkish minority in respect with EU integration process: economic advantages, minority rights, etc.

Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė’s paper presents the case of the failure of the political coalition “Together we are strong” in Lithuania in respect to the European Parliament elections and tries to find its explanations. The coalition “Together we are strong” is a formed by the most representative parties of the Polish and Russian minorities’ in Lithuania⁶. Although their apparent goal is to gain representation in the European Parliament the coalition parties seem to be more interested to test the strategy of alliance between minorities’ parties. The author shows the attempt of the coalition to express European issues and the electorate behavior. The paradigm of the “second-order” elections explains from the her perspective the failure of the coalition and the most important reasons are: the lack of interest of the electorate, the bigger importance given to the national elections, the incapability of the coalition to raise European but not domestic issues, the lack of mobilization of the Russian electorate, the incoherence of the Russian party ideology and program which determined a lack of specific issues representation in the coalition program, etc.

Juliya Moskvina presents the situation of the national minorities in Lithuania. The paper is structured in three main parts. The first part presents the ethnic composition of the Lithuanian population, the legal status of the minorities and their situation in respect with participation in non-governmental organizations, the educational status and the labor market. In the second part, the author indicates that the general position of the minorities in Lithuania is favorable and tries to identify and explain some of the reasons that are impeding a better social integration and can lead to disparities. Among these can enumerated: the passive role of the non-governmental organizations especially in solving social problems of minority groups; the structural changes of economy that led to some disparities between employment/unemployment rates of minorities, assimilation through the language of instruction – Lithuanian – or the lack of language abilities (which seems to be the author’s favorite explanatory factor) etc. The third part of the paper is a guide of best practices and

⁶ Out of the 115 nationalities living in Lithuania, the Polish and Russian minorities are the most representative (each one approx. 6% of the population)

strategies in developing social integration: special programs of instruction for bilingual children, higher employment levels of ethnic minorities, invigoration of non-governmental organizations, etc.

“Alterities” (*Horățiu Rusu*)

The Roma and Jewish populations always constituted an integrant part of the eastern societies and their existence here is deep embedded in the collective memories of the eastern nations. They were a piece of the important “inner” alterities, omnipresent in Eastern Europe, in the continuous process of construction and reconstruction of ethnic and cultural identities of the autochthon populations. The people here learned during the history to interact with these minorities, to permanently discover the similarities and differences they share or not with them and to accept or reject them in various degrees. This section contains very interesting studies on identity construction of these traditional minorities in the current time (Roma population in Poland and the Czech Republic and the Jewish population in Ukraine).

Renáta Sedláková’s presents in a comparative manner (using the method of content analysis) the interesting results of two surveys focused on the presentation of the Roma minority in the Czech media in five countrywide daily newspapers and two television channels. The paper can also be regarded as a description of the boundary creation and maintenance mechanism through media as an agent that consciously constructs images of surrounding reality. The author aims to identify the general trends in portraying the Roma minority, indicates the non-concordances between the written and visual media constructions and explains the reasons of these differences. The indicators of the images are: the news values (based on the theory of Galtung and Ruge, 1973), the thematic context and the information resources. She observes that the topics of the reports (mainly on migrations and crime related events) contribute to the stereotyping of the Roma, the amount of information on Roma is very small, the Roma issues are oversimplified, etc. The results of the study can be summed in that the reports on Roma are from the non-Roma society’s point of view.

Magdalena Lesińska examines the process of mobilization of the Roma organizations in Poland around the Holocaust memory. Theoretically the paper makes uses of both the instrumentalist and constructivist stances.. The Holocaust commemoration is a new Roma tradition (or instrument) constructed by Roma leaders with important international support and should be seen as a part of three broader interrelated processes: the strive to construct a

common ethnic identity; efforts of the political leaders of Roma to achieve the nation status on an international level; and the competition of the leaders for power and prestige on local level among Roma and external bodies. The author makes use of some examples of activities concerning the Holocaust commemoration and explains the reasons behind (on ideological and political level) following the next questions: why the holocaust has become a political issue now, what are the factors laying in the background and what are the reasons of the Roma leaders to engage in such a process.

Tatyana Basina is concerned with the Ukraine's process of nation building after the USSR dissolution. She is focusing on the identity building process at the level of grass root non-governmental organizations that are promoting national and cultural values of Ukraine and of various ethnic minorities. The author focuses on the special (successful) case of the Jewish community (extensively supported by the worldwide Jewish community and state of Israel) that has developed a wide network of organizations all over Ukraine. A comparison of the Jewish and non-Jewish youth's role in Ukrainian non-governmental organizations is done.

Transforming the post-communist societies (*Andrei Gheorghiuță*)

By the end of the 20th century, the breakdown of communist regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe unlocked the path to radical and severe transformations in every aspect of their societies. Despite the diversity of topics included under the generous title of the panel (or, maybe, because of it), the papers presented can be described in terms of an unexpectedly high complementarity of subjects. Elites, societies, and policies in post-communism – these are the linked topics covered by the authors included in this section, ranging from behavioural to structuralist perspectives⁷.

Victor Cebotari's paper investigates the sources of the deep crisis Moldavian politics is facing nowadays. He identifies the causes of such crisis in the post-Soviet reconfiguration of elites, that generated a so-called *pluralism by default*. It is a state of affairs defineable in terms of extreme fragmentation of elites. On the one side, there are the former ruling Russian elites, dealing with three strategic choices in reaction to the new independent status of Moldova: (a) separatism, (b) sub-elitisation, as a shift towards minoritarian politics, or (c) withdrawal. On the other side, the author emphasizes the divisions inside the newly-born

⁷ Unfortunately, this volume is deprived of one of the papers presented in the panel, that of Norbert Petrovici.

Moldavian first rank elite, split along communist, Romanian national or Moldavian national ideals. However, the author's conclusions are far from being pessimistic, as Moldavia's social destiny is more and more related to the regionalization, globalization, and internationalization processes.

Külliki Korts discusses the capacity of post-socialist states to produce social integration, in order to preserve the identity bases of their societies. In a general discourse placed on the grounds of the theories of modernity, the author focuses on the unfitness of socialist societies to the modernist project, mainly in the fields of social reflexivity and capacity for individual action. The author challenges the thesis of an efficient suppression of the reflexive capacities in the communist societies, placing the deficiency in the area of the institutionalisation of such capacities into state structures. However, the author considers that such missing links in the individual-society-state triangle might form the bases for the emergence of new forms of social integration, independent of the existing state structures.

Simona Vonica Răduțiu's paper is a shift towards a longitudinal policy-oriented perspective on the reconfiguration of Romanian welfare policies during the post-communist transition. It is a rather descriptive paper, focusing on the impact of administrative actors, strategies, and state regulations on the evolution of social policies. The author stresses the lack of coherence and efficiency defining post-communist welfare policies, in a general context of severe and prolonged economic crisis. However, the Romanian pattern is not substantially different to other social policy patterns in the region. The author invests confidence in the institutional reform designed during the negotiation process among Romanian authorities and the European Union.

Ana Bleahu's paper is a manifesto for a knowledge-based integrated rural development in Central and Eastern Europe. It is a rather retrospective paper, focusing both on international actors and strategies modeling rural development at different moments of time. The main goal of the paper is a didactic one – post-communist transformation of the agricultural sector (generally characterised by severe poverty) has to learn from the experience of the Western societies, in order to avoid dramatic mistakes. The author pleads in favour of sustainable development of the agricultural sector, based on the principles of a multifunctional agriculture, connected to market necessities, able to implement knowledge, preserve the environment, and conserve rural heritage.

“Contemporary” Development Issues (*Külliki Korts*)

The papers presented in the final section constitute perhaps the best examples of how the social phenomena in the post-communist societies are interlinked with the developments in the wider world, defined in social science literature as symptomatic to late or postmodern societies.

The themes covered include regionalisation, digitalisation, marginalisation and feminist critique of the “phallogocentric system of representation” in modernist culture.

In the first paper, *Julius Mastilak* describes through the close-examined example of the Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan region, how the main units of the modern world order - national states - are loosing its functions to territorial entities of different- both sub- and supranational - level. Such entities are visibly becoming rather independent actors in the globalised market, creating bi- or multilateral ties beyond state-boundaries, first in economy, but in longer perspective also in other spheres.

In his short overview, *Bogdan Nadolu* discusses different aspects of another distinctively global phenomenon in our contemporary life - the digitalization of the every-day life, or the penetration of different IT-devices into our everyday practices, but also the flip-sides of the coin. He warns us of the threat that if in the national programs of IT and internet development, only technical aspects are considered, but other social and cultural aspects accompanying such developments are overlooked, this can create a new type of social exclusion, namely digital exclusion - an increasing gap between those with access to computers and virtual networks and those with no or limited access - thus deepening social cleavages within societies and between them.

The darker side of our contemporary societies is also the main topic of *Mariana and Adrian Dan*, namely homelessness. In their primarily methodological account they draw our attention to the challenges faced by social scientist in gathering adequate data on the phenomena poorly recorded in the official records. After careful analyses of the partial and often unreliable data, they propose and test a formula for computing a most probable figure of roofless people in Romania.

A fully postmodern analysis is offered – not only in terms of topic, but also in terms of employed research tools - by *Matúš Krištofik*. Drawing primarily on primarily feminist and psychoanalytic approaches, he focuses in his essay on the role of the body, as it is represented in the feminist art. Juxtaposing the analysis of the Housework cycle by a Slovak artist Gabika Binderová with the self-reflective interview with the artist herself, he discusses the two

themes present in the series: artist's perception of the character of housework and family life and the positioning of an embodied subject within such a framework. Special focus is placed on the special (and deliberate) mode of depicting the body always in an already represented (i.e. picture in picture) manner, a technique that can be found also in other feminist artists' works.

TOMASZ KAPUŚNIAK

Towards a common European Union immigration policy

“History shows us that sealing
the borders does not work”

Ruud Lubbers, UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

The main idea of this paper is to present the policy towards immigration exemplified by EU member-states. This paper empirically tests the theory of immigration. What does it mean common European Union immigration policy?

Immigration is a crucial political issue in turn-of-the-century Europe. Eighty-two percent of European Parliament Members agreed that immigration is one of the top problems facing Europe (Lahav 1997). Immigration policy and cooperation is necessary for the EU's single market, its internal border-free space, and its shared external borders. During last years, immigration also high on the EU's agenda as a shared security threat that can only be mitigated through common action. With this goal in mind, EU leaders met in 2002 for the Seville summit, which focused on reducing illegal immigration and harmonizing national migration policies.

I would like to explain immigration policy of certain states, its complexity and its realization as well as its legal and political basis and institutional solutions. Can we define common standards in the field of policy towards immigration exist and they put pressure upon member states? It is possible to observe how these processes function?

By the way, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the immigration policy of EU states is due to be progressively harmonized within the Community framework, incorporating the relevant Schengen acquis. At the 1999 Tampere summit, chiefs of state stated that the elaboration of a common European policy “in the distinct, yet closely related, fields of asylum and migration: was the EU's next major project after the single market and EMU. It thus seems a propitious moment to retrace the road to Amsterdam to understand the timing, character and content of transgovernmental cooperation in this emerging EU policy domain.

The main sources of my research were written publications found both in a library and in Internet. I also browsed some papers and information in media. Especially data from EurActiv web-page were very useful in showing this issue about European Union immigration policy.

History of the European Immigration and Asylum Policies

We should remember that people have migrated from time immemorial. In modern Europe, political refugees made their appearance long before the international community noticed this problem. For example the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (15th century) or the Huguenots from France (17th century).⁸

In the 19th century we can observe initiated a ‘new migration epoch’ in view of the major increase in migration movements, especially between Europe and North America. It also brought about the first state regulations pertaining to migration streams. The advent of the ‘new migration epoch’ was made probably by the advancement of technology, and in particular, the development of new means of transport and the transportation infrastructure. Around the turn of the 19th century, a considerable expansion of the railroad network took place. Consequently, a major outflow of population from Western Europe ensued. At the same time the industrial revolution boosted the demand for workforce, while the changing patterns of family life restricted its supply.⁹

Western European countries were thus forced to pursue a liberal immigration policy, so as to attract new labour, while taking a more restrictive stand – especially in the first half of the 19th century – on emigration. The end of the 19th century witnessed larger-scale movements within Europe, too: the Flemish and Italians would move to France, the Swedes to Denmark, the Finns to Sweden, the Italians to Switzerland, the Poles to Germany. The transformation of the Western European countries, the development of industry and the increased migration volumes within the continent resulted in the gradual dwindling of trans-Atlantic movements.¹⁰

⁸ A. Bolesta, *New Immigration Policy in Europe*, TIGER Working Paper Series, no. 70, Warsaw, December 2004, pp. 2 – 4 or <<www.tiger.edu.pl>>.

⁹ S. Lavenex, *The Europeanisation of refugee policies: between human rights and internal security*, Hampshire 2001, Ashgate Publishing Company, p. 138.

¹⁰ A. Bolesta, op. cit., 2 – 5.

The liberal immigration policy and dynamic economic development, which guaranteed a constant supply of new jobs, attracted foreign labour, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, which began to cause apprehensions and tensions among the native populations. In the result, Germany legally restricted immigrants from using their own language in official contexts.

Next step was in 1905 when Great Britain passed a law on immigrants, allowing the authorities to deny entry to certain groups of persons. From 1914, entrants were required to have passports and obligatory control by immigration officers was introduced. In the fact, the laws pertaining to migrants became consolidated in the Alien Act (1920).

The next, large migration waves led to further tightening of the regulations in several stages, so that 'by the 1920s most states had erected solid walls, with narrow gates to let in specific categories [of migrants]'. A very important role was played in this process by refugees from Russia, then engulfed in the Bolshevik Revolution, who acted in part as a catalyst of the emergence of the international refugee regime. The number of refugees further increased as a result of persecution in Nazi Germany. In order to keep the labour within the Nazi terror (Third Reich), a decree on foreigners was promulgated (1938) which prohibited, among others, citizens of 'enemy states' from leaving the country.¹¹

Post-war period was considered to be the time during which many essential changes took place in Western Europe. One of them was the fact the hitherto homogeneous society in terms of nationalities became multinational. It was due to the process of flow of immigrants. Certain countries, especially those seen as safe and rich ones and welcomed newcomers.¹²

European migration through history was caused by economics, war, persecution and the search of a better life. Overall economics was the main source of migration, which centres upon the issue of labour needs. This was the theme of European migration up to the 1970s, which gave rise to economic problems like the oil shortage of 1973.¹³

According to the history we can say that is possible to distinguish three groups of immigrants.¹⁴

1. The first group is considered as the legacy of a number of host countries' former colonial relationship. It includes aliens from the New Commonwealth in the United

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² R. Rosemarie, *Western European Responses to migration*, [in:] M. Weiner [ed.], *International Migration and Security*, Oxford 1993, p. 108.

¹³ << <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-117508-16&type=LinksDossier>>>.

¹⁴ R. Rosemarie, op. cit., pp. 108 – 109.

Kingdom; the West Indians, Moluccans and Surinamse in the Netherlands; West Indians and some Algerians in France. Now these processes of immigration have slowed down, but still their own and their children's and grandchildren's integration into society cause many problems.¹⁵

2. The migrants from the second group can be labelled as labour migrants. These movements began in the end of 50s when certain Western states encouraged foreigners to immigrate primarily to Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France. At this moment “guest workers” were staying on and bringing their families. Twenty years later host countries limited this possibility, which caused social tension. With respect to this group of immigrants, it is worth mentioning that such countries as Italy, Greece or Spain have undergone a migration transition. They used to be exporters of a large number of labour migrants. Now, according to economic, social and geographical reasons they have become countries of immigration.¹⁶
3. The third group includes asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. When it comes to the former group, the number of asylum applicants is increasing and recognition rates are falling. During 90s, most refugees arrived from the Former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iran, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Ghana, Zaire and Somalia. On the one hand, member states felt responsible for asylum seekers but on the other asylum systems in all states proved to be inefficient.¹⁷

The main reason for leaving by migrants their countries of origin and choosing new host places were: wars, totalitarian regimes, breaching human rights, exodus, internal conflicts, terror, poverty, starvation, discrimination, unemployment, natural disasters and very low wages and. On the other side, migrants who leave their home countries base their choice on the following factors like: social and economic terms, possibilities of further education, reunion of families, job-market structure, security, human rights protection and democracy.¹⁸

¹⁵ K. Nowaczek, *Europeanization of domestic policy towards immigration*, Students' Books „Consensus”, Lublin 2003, no. 4, p. 32.

¹⁶ Ibidem, s. 33.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ K. Hailbronner, *Immigration and asylum law and policy of the European Union*, The Hague 2000, Kluwer Law International, pp. 16 – 24.

Towards an European Union Immigration Policy

The Treaty of Rome (1957) was the basis for the establishment of a European immigration policy, but we have to remember that from 1957 until the 1990s a common immigration policy was not created. All the aforementioned treaties did gave workers a legal status and protect them from discrimination, which in turn encouraged them to migrate.

Other steps (the most important) towards common European immigration policy were taken in the 70s. In 1976, Council Resolution was issued. Member countries were encouraged to adopt common migration policies toward non-member countries in consultation with the Commission. On the base of existing legislation the Commission did not have the right to go further in the aspect of immigration at that time. Among member states certain common trends and concerns were possible to be distinguished.¹⁹

In spite of the restrictive immigration policies which have been in place since the 1970s in most Member States, large numbers of migrants have continued to come to the EU looking for work together with asylum-seekers and illegal migrants. Taking advantage of persons seeking a better life, smuggling and trafficking networks have taken hold across the EU. This situation meant that considerable resources have had to be mobilized to fight illegal migration especially to target traffickers and smugglers. On the other side, the EU Member States needs migrants in certain sectors and regions as one element of the policies being developed to deal with its economic and demographic needs.²⁰

In July 1985 the Commission had made a proposal for 'achieving progress towards a harmonization of national legislation on foreigners'. This resolution caused much controversy among members and opponents stressed the fact that probably that the Commission had no competence to issue that kind of proposals.

In February 1986 EU Member States signed the Single European Act which changed the perception of immigration policy in all member states. Although it does not mention common immigration policy, but Article 8A created an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.²¹

Single European Act, especially article 8A caused many disputes among those who referred this also to non-member-state nationals (the Commission) and those (especially Great Britain and Greece) who interpreted it exclusively to Community nationals.

¹⁹ K. Nowaczek, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁰ <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro>>.

²¹ K. Nowaczek, op. cit., p. 35.

The first meeting of the ministers responsible for immigration took place in London in October 1986. An Ad Hoc Immigration Group of Senior Officials (AHIG) was created and asked to look at the following areas of concern:

- ✓ the improvement of checks at the external frontiers of the Community;
- ✓ the value of internal checks;
- ✓ the role of co-operation and possible harmonization of member states' visa policies in improving controls;
- ✓ the role and effectiveness of controls at internal frontiers in the fight against illegal immigration;
- ✓ the exchange of information about the operation of spot-check systems;
- ✓ close co-operation to avoid abuse of passports;
- ✓ measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate asylum abuse, in the consultation with Council of Europe and UNHCR;
- ✓ examination of ways in which Community travel can be improved without adding to the illegal immigration.²²

Another body to AHIG considered about immigration issues was the TREVI Group, established in 1976 on the British initiative. The TREVI Group Meeting in Dublin in June 1990 concerned an agreement on a program that would lead to reinforcing and building cooperation on illegal immigration.

In 1985, the Benelux states, France and Germany formed an inter-governmental agreement to simplify travel between the states. By 1990, the Convention applying the Schengen is signed and agreements made over visa and asylum policy, closer police organization and the setting up the Schengen information System (SIS). It is not until 1995 that Schengen comes into force. By March 1995, Spain, Portugal and Greece had joined with Austria joining in April 1995, with all other member states pledging to join at a later date. (except UK and Ireland).²³

The Schengen Agreement has been a fundamental stage of the process of further integration of the EU. However, the agreement has a number of failings. Due to the system used to incorporate the Schengen agreement a two-tier system has been produced.

We have to remember that the Schengen acquis is fundamentally linked to the original agreements and acts as the area under which new protocols are grouped. This has been incorporated into the Amsterdam treaty, yet, it is a fluid and complex area. With problems

²² J. Niessen, *The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions*, Kluwer Law International 1996, p. 32.

²³ <<http://www.ex.ac.uk/politics/pol_data/undergrad/jsimpson/links.htm>>.

surrounding definition and the internal and external problems, it is a confusing situation.²⁴

During the Council Meeting in December 1988 in Rhodes, the Council asked each member state to appoint one person who would deal with matters relating to the free movement of persons (also with the participation of the Commission). This was the first step to establish The Coordinators' Group on the Free Movement of Persons.²⁵

Before signing the Maastricht document, several declarations and conventions were prepared. For example in June 1990, the Dublin Convention was signed, which was intended to regulate the matters of responsibility for examining applications for refugee status. Next declaration made the European Council during meeting in Edinburgh, where adopted a declaration on the principles for the external aspects of immigration policy, which advocated the following problems:

- ✓ the preservation and restoration of peace, and full respect for human rights and the rule of law, which would diminish migratory movements resulting from war and oppressive regimes;
- ✓ the protection and assistance of displaced people in the nearest safe area to their homes;
- ✓ the promotion of liberal trade and economic co-operation with countries of emigration, which would reduce economic motives for migration;
- ✓ targeting development aid and job creation, and the alleviation of poverty;
- ✓ efforts to combat illegal immigration;
- ✓ the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements with countries of origin or transit, to ensure that illegal immigrants were returned to their home countries;
- ✓ the assessment of home countries' practices in readmitting their nationals after they are expelled from the territories of the member states.²⁶

The most important issue is that the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) established three pillars of the European Union with the third pillar (Title VI) dedicated to Judicial and Home Affairs cooperation. The Article K.1 (now Article 29) included matters of common interest (9 areas) in achieving the objectives of the Union. The first three were: asylum policy, rules governing the crossing of the Community's external borders, immigration policy and policy regarding TCNs.²⁷

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ K. Nowaczek, op. cit., p. 35.

²⁶ J. Niessen, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁷ D. G. Papademetriou, *Coming together or pulling apart? The European Union's struggle with immigration*

In the Treaty on European Union it is also stated how certain areas of the policy can be transferred from the intergovernmental pillar to the Community pillar. There must be unanimous agreement (after 1 January 1996 qualified majority voting (QMV)) in the Council on the initiative of the Commission or a member state. It created expectations that common strategy can be achieved in the future.

In the Treaty, which entered into force in November 1993, issues of the harmonization of immigration policies were accorded priority treatment. Pursuant to Art. K9, immigration policy can be delegated to Community structures, while Art. K1 stipulates that, among others, the following areas should be the object of a common policy:

- ✓ asylum policy;
- ✓ rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon;
- ✓ immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries.²⁸

In November 1993, the Commission presented a Report to the Council on the possibility of applying Article K.9. to asylum policy. The report included dis- and advantages of transferring asylum policy to the Community's competence. Giving the Commission an exclusive (not shared) right of initiative would increase transparency and speed up the process, since it takes less time to implement the law than to ratify a convention. It was one of the first attempts to use the new-gained powers.²⁹

From 1990 until 1997, several resolutions, motions and joint declarations were adopted for the harmonization of immigration policies and formulated common guidelines for the member states of the Community on various policy aspects.

We have to remember that the most important supranational document towards the unification of immigration policies in the last years seems to be the Amsterdam Treaty. Signed on October 2, 1997, it entered into force on May 1, 1999.

Its provisions on migration and asylum have become European law in May 2004. Title IIIa of the Treaty concerns visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons. Pursuant to Art. 73k, the following shall be adopted within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty:

1. measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the

and asylum, Washington 1996, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 19 – 103; K. Nowaczek, op. cit., p. 36.

²⁸ A. Bolesta, op. cit., pp. 6 – 7.

²⁹ K. Nowaczek, op. cit., p. 36; J. Niessen, op. cit., p. 47.

Protocol of 1967 within the following areas:

- criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a national of a third country;
 - minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers;
 - minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees;
 - minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status;
2. measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas:
- minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries;
 - promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons;
3. measures on immigration policy within the following areas:
- conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence permits;
 - illegal immigration and illegal residence.³⁰

On the other hand, the Amsterdam Treaty retains the right of veto for Member States for at least five years in these sensitive areas. Since it will no longer be possible to 'tie' immigration permits to any single country in a Community that has removed internal border controls, and immigrants are likely to be far more mobile than EU citizens within the Community, as they are less inhibited by social, linguistic and cultural ties to particular Member States, the focus will be upon the overall EU limit. Arriving at such a Community quota may well prove difficult, as immigration limits acceptable to one Member State may be unacceptable to others.³¹

With the Amsterdam Treaty, asylum and immigration policies towards third nationals become a major priority of the EU policy-making.³² Now immigration policy became a full Community responsibility with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999. Article 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ex Article 73k) makes immigration a competence of the EU.³³

³⁰ All details regarding to the Treaty of Amsterdam, Title IIIa, Article 73k, EU Official Journal C 340 (10/11/1997); A. Bolesta, op. cit., pp. 7 – 8.

³¹ <<www.edpsg.org/cgi/go.pl?www.edpsg.org/Documents/Dp4.doc>>.

³² S. Lavenex, *Migration and the EU's new eastern border: between realism and liberalism*, "Journal of European Public Policy" 2001, No. 8(1), p. 25.

³³ <<<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm#ASILE>>>.

Until 1995, we have to consider that there had been massive criticism towards the third pillar by the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. But the Amsterdam Treaty was to be a comprehensive reform in this field. The most important were the institutional changes of asylum and immigration policy (changed and moved to the first pillar) and the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU framework.³⁴ All changes submitted in Title IV EC ('Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other policies related to the Free Movement of persons') had to be implemented till 1 May, 2004.

How is the EU immigration policy being built?

The leaders of the EU set out at the October 1999 European Council in Tampere (Finland) the elements for a common EU immigration policy and namely that:

- ✓ it be based on a comprehensive approach to the management of migratory flows so as to find a balance between humanitarian and economic admission;
- ✓ it include fair treatment for third-country nationals aiming as far as possible to give them comparable rights and obligations to those of nationals of the Member State in which they live;
- ✓ a key element in management strategies must be the development of partnerships with countries of origin including policies of co-development;
- ✓ there must be a common policy for asylum which fully respects the terms of the Geneva Convention and the Member States' obligations under international treaties.³⁵

The first step towards a common EU policy, the European Commission presented in November 2000, a communication to the Council and the European Parliament in order to make a debate with the other EU institutions, also with Member States and civil society. The communication recommends a common approach to migration management which takes into account the following:

- ✓ the economic and demographic development of the Union;
- ✓ the capacity of reception of each Member State along with their historical and cultural links with the countries of origin;
- ✓ the situation in the countries of origin and the impact of migration policy on them (brain drain);

³⁴ K. Nowaczek, op. cit., 38.

³⁵ <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro>>.

- ✓ the need to develop specific integration policies (based on fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the Union, the prevention of social exclusion, racism and xenophobia and the respect for diversity).³⁶

This was followed in July 2001 another communication which proposed the adoption of an open method of coordination for the Community immigration policy, to encourage the exchange of information between the Member States on the implementation of the common policy.³⁷

The continuation of this initiative (Tampere summit) was decided upon at the European Council of November 2004, and is known as the "Hague Programme". It was a 5 year plan to establish an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU. Both of these programmes include EU initiatives on legal and illegal immigration. This dossier will focus on illegal immigration, asylum and border control.

According to the legal and illegal immigration we have to know that the main ideas of these issues are (see below) and we can present these issues step by step:

Legal immigration

- Family reunification - The EU Council of ministers reached an agreement in February 2003 on a draft directive on the right of third country nationals legally established in a European Union member state to family reunification. Final adoption is pending on the opinion to be given by the European Parliament.
- EU long-term resident status - A directive on an EU long-term resident status for third country nationals who have legally resided for five years in the territory of a member state is on the verge of being adopted, pending the lifting of parliamentary reservations.
- Students - A draft directive on an EU framework for the admission of third-country nationals as students, vocational trainees and volunteers was put forward by the European Commission in October 2002 and is on the Council table.
- Workers - A draft directive put forward by the European Commission in July 2001, suggesting clear and transparent rules for non-EU nationals working in the EU is also on the Council table.
- Integration and employment - In June 2003, the European Commission adopted a policy paper on immigration, integration and employment in which it calls on the

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Ibidem.

EU member states to step up their efforts to integrate immigrants.³⁸

Illegal immigration

- Action plan - On 28 February 2002, the EU Council of ministers adopted a comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the European Union.
- Return - On 28 November 2002, the Council adopted a Return action programme which suggests developing a number of short, medium and long term measures, including common EU-wide minimum standards or guidelines, in the field of return of illegal residents.
- Assisting third countries - On 11 July 2003, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum. It contains a multiannual programme for 2004 to 2008, with an overall expenditure of 250 million euro.³⁹

At this moment all Member States of the European Union have agreed to develop a common immigration policy at EU level (not only at national level). We can add that the European Commission has made proposals for developing this policy, by adopting a two-track approach. The first one is to establish a common legal framework concerning the conditions of admission and stay of third-country nationals. The second one is to open the coordination procedure to encourage the gradual convergence of policies not covered by European legislation. The objective is to manage migration flows better by a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and demographic situation of the EU.⁴⁰

According to Andrew Shacknove we can use the term 'new immigration policy'. It denotes a common tendency to make national policies more restrictive and it has brought about three trends, comprising:

- greater sophistication of administrative measures;
- expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus promoting the standardization of procedures;
- a containment policy aiming to prevent refugees from arriving in the territory of the target country, while calling into question the institution of asylum itself.⁴¹

³⁸ << http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm>>.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ << http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro>>.

⁴¹ A. Shacknove, *From Asylum to Containment*, "International Journal of Refugee Law", 5(4) 1993, pp. 516-533.

Conclusion

By way of a conclusion, at this moment we can observe a public debate about immigration policy. It is clear that the debate about immigration is as much one about the social and political consequences as about the economic impact. According to the shape and direction of the current debate on European (not only EU policy) immigration and asylum policy, The European Network against Racism (ENAR) asks the following questions:

- Will it help citizens of the Member States to understand the positive role that immigration plays in European society and the benefits it brings not only in demographic terms?
- Will it promote understanding of the importance of the right to asylum to international relations and basic human rights?
- Will the procedures for the reception of immigrants promote integration and counter marginalisation?
- Will these procedures be free from discrimination on grounds of race or ethnic origin, both directly and indirectly?
- Will migrant workers and refugees acquire clear and definite rights, which approach as closely as possible those available to EU nationals?⁴²

We can agree with EU Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou that Europe seems to have shut its doors to economic migrants. But some 400,000-500,000 illegal migrants slip or are smuggled into the EU each year, according to the International Centre for Migration Policy Development in Vienna. Many across the EU perceive these new arrivals as welfare-scrourngers, job-snatchers and a general threat to stability. Opponents to a more generous policy toward immigrants claim the EU is "full". Do you believe that there is a need for a more liberal immigration policy in Europe?

The EU policy is to develop a common system for immigration and asylum and a single external border control strategy. The Luxembourg Presidency (January to June 2005) is committed to furthering the common asylum policy, working towards the long-term resident status of refugees and developing the return and readmissions policy.

We believe that this policy has the best of both world's, it enables the EU to have a secure immigration policy but not at the expense of human rights. All these advances like the past reforms will take co-operation, but in the long run the EU will stamp out the criminal aspects of migration.⁴³.

⁴² <<<http://www.enar-eu.org/>>>; <<<http://regenerationtv.net/pipermail/imc-la/2001-December/004138.html>>>.

⁴³ <<http://www.ex.ac.uk/politics/pol_data/undergrad/jsimpson/links.htm>>.

**The importance of reference system in international migration:
the duality “origin country – destination country” or system perspective?**

Introduction

This paper proposes a discussion about the mutual interactions between different international migrational flows having the origin in the country. The issue is directly related to our attempt to understand one of the contemporary international movements of people having as departure point Romania: the migration to Spain. The starting point is the observation that some aspects of the Romanian migration to Spain cannot be explained /understood solely through referring to the respective countries. The process of migration involves not only the migration policies of Spain and Romania, not only the migrants' networks from Romania to Spain, not only the cumulative effects of this migration. Factors related to other contemporary Romanian flows, to migrants' networks to other countries, to other countries migration policies intervene, interacting and shaping in different way this particular migration. The purpose of the paper is not to provide/propose a theoretical frame to explain these interactions. For the moment, we intend only to point out some facts and discuss their possible consequences. How could they be theoretically integrated is a question that requires further investigation.

To make the reader familiar with our subject of interest, the first part of the paper presents in general terms the Romanians' migration to Spain. The second one, dedicated effectively to the subject, is segmented in relatively independent parts presenting the empirical observations that we consider as “interaction facts” and attached discussion about their implications. Empirical observations (or how we choose to name them: “interaction facts”) are not related to a particular research conducted on this subject but partial results from diverse research projects regarding Romanians' international migration (particularly migration to Spain) (for a list of projects, see the annex).

Romanian migration to Spain

Romanian migration to Spain could be mainly identified with the movement of people to this destination after 1990. Before this date, the communist system of supervising its citizens' circulation abroad reduced Romanian international migration to the country in question to accidental cases. Consequently, when we discuss about the Romanian migration to Spain, we make references to the movements that occurred after 1990.

The beginnings of phenomenon are probably placed immediately after December 1989. The very first departures identified within different research projects⁴⁴ make reference to the period 1990 – 1991. They seem to be isolated individual projects for international migration, not necessarily oriented to Spain. From individuals, especially on the base of kinship and friendship relations– as main channels to transmit information and support from migrant to non-migrant – migration to Spain begins its development based on networks mechanisms.

In spite of a low initial visibility in the Romanian public space, the migration seems to have registered from the very beginning a relatively accentuated growth. In 1991, 2.612⁴⁵ work permits were granted to immigrants of Romanian nationality. It is clear the number of work permits is not a strong measure for the migration volume, but the relatively high number of Romanian immigrants who, in 1991-1992, achieved a legal status as workers seems to indicate a numerous Romanian population from the early stages of migration. Starting from 1990, migration to Spain registers a permanent growth. The existence of a migration “reservoir” in the origin country, the possibility to find work and to work without accentuated risks in the destination country and multiples entrance opportunities (even if expensive) make possible a constant growth of migration volume. In 2000, the Romanian residents in Spain were 10.983. The number increased to 24.856 in 2001 and 33.705 in 2002⁴⁶.

The network development had important consequences for migration as a whole. In 2002, in Spain could be identified emerging “daughter communities”⁴⁷, with a predictable evolution to transnational communities.

The year 2002 marked a change in the Romania international position in Europe. Starting from the beginning of this year to the Romanians has been granted the right to free entrance into the Schengen Space. How this change influenced the international migration to Spain is still a question to be answered. Signals from different studies seem to indicate an accentuate growth in the number of persons leaving the country in the first months of 2002, followed by a decrease. It is also probably that this change accentuated the circular character of the phenomenon.

The Romanian and Spanish states reactions to the flow can be generally qualified as delayed. Until 2002, the agreements between the two states were concentrated on the problem of Romanian citizens’ readmission.

In 2002, Romania and Spain signed the first bi-lateral agreement for work force. The number of Romanians having chosen to work legally in Spain raised spectacularly in 2003 compared with the first year (from 2623 in 2002 to 16439 in 2003⁴⁸), transforming the Spain in the second legal receiver (after Germany) of the Romanian work force.

⁴⁴ Bucharest University research projects, 2000; 2002, IOM, 2002;

⁴⁵ Data extracted from Claudia Clavijo, Mariano Aguirre(eds.). 2002

⁴⁶ Data from Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, <http://dgei.mir.es/>

⁴⁷ In this case is more appropriate to discuss about „region daughter communities”, the origin area not being a community but more a region (micro – region).

⁴⁸ Data extracted from the report D. Mihail, D. Diminescu, V. Lazea – Dezvoltarea rurală și reforma agriculturii românești, (Rural development and the reform of Romanian agriculture). Centrul Român pentru Politici Economice, 2004

Interaction facts

Before beginning the effective discussion about the “interaction facts” we have to make some specifications that frame our presentation. All the issues proposed within this section make reference to international migration on its phases of initiation and development. This not means that “interactions” appear only in these phases; it is only an option, oriented by available resources. We also have to make clear that the analysis oscillates between individual/family and community level. The text will include frequent references to networks (meso level). However, factors acting at national/supranational levels are also included in explanation.

The “facts” that we present are different by their nature and probably the reader will find the paper as missing the coherence. This is the tribute to the intention to mention some aspects that sustain the idea of a power interaction between migrations originated in the same place (country), keeping caution in making inferences at theoretical level. Two reasons stay at the base of this decision: first, we operate with hypothesis; second, we do not have any argument to favor the idea that these facts represent important (in quantitative terms) traits of international migration in Romania, all the more so as to generalize and discuss about migration in general. Under these conditions, we chose to present simply, as a collection, discussions referring to:

- communities in the origin country (Romania) that serve as pools for migration to different destinations – heading: *Multi-destination origin communities*
- interaction at the level of what is called migration industry (accent on migration black market) - heading: *Unspecific “black market” of migration*
- the specific aspect of international circulation between Romanian immigrant communities from different countries- heading: *International circulation between Romanians’ communities abroad*

Multi-destinations origin communities

One of realities that we encountered trying to understand why do people from Romania chose to migrate (particularly to Spain) and how does this process advance at community level, is what we called “multi – destination origin communities”. What are these communities? They are places from where *people concomitantly migrate to several (at least two) different countries of destination* and every of the *simultaneous migrations experience a development on a migrant network basis*. To better understand the reality to which we make reference, suppose a hypothetical case⁴⁹, a community that we will call A. Community A is characterized by a rich history and experience of international migration:

1. **Migration to Germany** is one the first movements that local history of migration registered. It developed on the basis of the policy that German state promoted, offering

⁴⁹ The hypothetical case has a correspondent in reality. From reasons related to the fact that introducing a concrete example means to add more information about the community, we choose to approach the subject in these terms.

to its nationals the possibility to “return” to their national state. Close relationships with German ethnics favored the movements of Romanians to this destination at the beginning of the ‘90s. This destination is not for the moment active (Sandu, 2002), meaning we discuss only about isolated departures, the big majority of them within the frame of legal agreements between Romanian and German states (legal departures).

2. ***Migration to Austria*** initiated in the same period as the German one, but much less developed. For the moment mostly inactive.
3. ***Migration to Italy*** the dominant movement, highly attractive (growing), mainly clandestine. A migration developed on network basis, including migrants in different stages of the migratory cycle.
4. ***Migration to the United Kingdom*** (particularly England), growing, mainly clandestine, less accessible than migration to Italy and Spain (still high costs and risk associated), developed on network basis.
5. ***Migration to Spain*** important movement, active (growing) but less developed than Italian one, mainly clandestine, developed on network basis, with an accentuate selectivity at confessional level (for the moment the majority of migrant being neo-protestant)
6. ***Migration to the United States of America*** less developed, highly selective on confessional basis (restrained to the members of a Pentecostal confession).
7. ***Migration to Hungary***, declining, accessible, mainly temporary

To this migration picture, we have to add that we are discussing about one community where the information about every destination is easily accessible and the effects of migration (we are particularly interested in effects on the households well-being that could stimulate further migration) are highly visible.

Let suppose that we begin a research work on international migration to Spain in community A, aiming to investigate in the first phase the migration decision in the light of assumption of the neoclassical economy (micro level) and network theory⁵⁰. Both theoretical approaches are well known in international migration, well documented in different spaces, but applied, as least as far as we know, in the indisputable assumption of one country of destination – one country of origin. We go further in our game, and suppose that we first pay attention to the individuals’ network connections abroad. We are informed by a large body of literature of the importance of personal relationship with migrants and about the role they play in the migration event (successful migration event) (Boyd, 1996). We are also convinced by Massey and Espinosa’s demonstration that these connections influence individual’s probability to migrate (Massey, Espinosa, 1999). Consequently, we are powerfully encouraged to determine if individuals that we are discussing with are connected (and by the mean of what type of relationship) to migrants. What are we discovering? In the particular

⁵⁰ We used for theoretical approaches „the labels” used by Massey et al in 1993 and 1998. We choose this two theories because the „multi-destinations communities” are, in our opinion, more provocative for them than for other theories in the series of approaches dedicated to international migration initiation and development.

case of A community there is a number (probably non-negligible, but we do not have the means to make valuations) of non-migrants (including former migrants) and migrants who are connected in a way that could induce migration to several migrant networks. To make clearer what do we intend to say, we will take few examples⁵¹:

- **Mr. A:** is a young single man with experience of international migration. He worked in Hungary for one year – departure mediated by one of his older brother (who also worked there at that time). He has a very close friend in England and two sisters (with their husbands and children) and two brothers (with their wives and children) working in Italy.
- **Mrs. B:** is a middle age married woman. She is a migrant to Italy. At the moment of her departure, her brother-in-law was a legal migrant in Austria and a close friend was a migrant to Italy.
- **Mr. C:** is a middle age married man, Pentecostal, migrant to Spain. In the moment of his departure to Spain he had a sister legal migrant to Germany, a brother illegal migrant to Austria, a very close friend in USA and a relative (“someone from the family”) in Spain. He had migration experience to Germany.
- **Mr. D:** is a young single man. He is a migrant to Spain. In the moment of his departure he had a brother legal migrant in Germany, a brother illegal migrant to Spain and a close friend illegal migrant to Italy. He has migration experience to Germany.

We have an entire list of persons involved in migration (or with increased chances to be in the future). Our problem is how these people decide to migrate. If we discuss this problem in terms of the neoclassical theory, we know they should consider the costs (in the broader sense of the word) of a possible future departure in connection with possible gains (related to their particular situation at the moment). But all the situations above presented suppose more than one alternative for migration. This means that our migrants/possible migrants didn’t make/are not making a calculus that includes “one possible gain”, but more calculus (or a more complicated one) that compare “more gains” (considering every country that could be a destination for their migration). It is clear that if we consider the individual a rational being (following the assumption of this theory), the future migrant will choose the destination that bring him “more” gain. Put in other terms, this means there is a “competition” at local level between destinations. Consequently that destination “offering more” attracts more migrants. What importance does this fact have for migration to Spain? In our opinion it will not be so easy to predict how migration to Spain will evolve at A community level, even if the result of the calculus Romania – Spain will be positive because any change in the calculus for other pairs of the type “Romania – other country” could affect this migration.

If we consider the statements of network theory, and we return to the list above presented, having a close connection to one destination/more destination can then predict only the probability to migrate but not the destination that will be chosen. If, for example, in the case of Mr. A, we can suppose using the gains of network theory that he will probably migrate we can not still predict which will be his future destination (Italy or England). Taking

⁵¹ Examples are real. Individuals named A, B, C, D exist and they were subject of our interviews.

another example, we can discuss the situation of Mr. C. He chose to migrate to Spain but he could also try to go to Austria, to Germany or USA. Why did he choose this destination? His explanation puts in light a decision taking into account lots of “details”: in Germany someone could earn “incomparable” much more money than in Spain, but he assumes himself incomparable higher risks and he could very hardly to reach the legal status of migrant. From the point of view of achieving the legal status compared with the investment (consequently associated risks), a migration to the USA was in the opinion of the same possible migrant (Mr. C) a less interesting project. Spain instead presents the advantage of a migration policy that is translated by migrants as tolerant, offering lower wages but much smaller risks and the possibility to achieve a legal status.

We can continue this discussion introducing other theories that try to explain migration decision (except maybe the dual labor market that explain migration taking into account mainly factors from the destination country) but it is not our purpose to do this. It is important to put in the light the fact that, at least in the case of this type of communities is very difficult to approach the problem of migration decision (to a destination) perceiving this migration as developing in absolute, independently of other concomitant international movements. If we are interested, as we supposed, in migration to Spain and we want to understand how people decide to go to Spain in this community, we can not leave aside other migrations. By other words, we can not study this migration without a good reference and understanding of the other migrations.

Let suppose that now we are interested to investigate the effects of migration in the same community, that we called A. We have an option for the cumulative causation theory (Massey et al, 1998), and we agree that migration has consequences that stimulate further migration. How does migration do this? Inducing changes in the life style of migrants’ households that are very difficult to be sustained with the gains from the local economy; changing the local households well being distribution and accentuating the relative deprivation of non-migrant households; introducing new elements in the local culture (migration as passage rituals) etc. From this point of view, what can be easily observed in the case of community A, it’s the fact that we can not speak about the effects of a single migration. In this community the effects of migration are double cumulative. For example, if we discuss about the effects of migration on households well being distribution, each of the movements has influence on it. This means we have changes induced by migrations to Germany, to Austria, to Italy, to Spain, to England, to Hungary, to USA and it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to separate or attribute changes to one or another. If we agree that migration induces a pressure or an incentive to migrate to non-migrant households by changing their local position, this means that we have a larger pressure than in the case of a single migration and consequently a stronger incentive to migrate. Referring again to our interest, migration to Spain, it will have no sense to discuss about the effects of migration to Spain because they could not be separated from other migrations effects. But it will have sense to discuss about persons involved in migration to Spain as effect of migration to other countries.

We can choose another example from the assumptions of the mentioned theory: the changes that migration induces in the life style of the households including migrants are difficult to be maintained with the gains from the local economy. If this is true, it means that a households that send abroad for work one of its members, will have high chances to do so a long period of time if condition from origin country do not change substantially. Let's analyze again Mr. C's example. Mr. C migrated for the first time to Germany and if we accept that this fact induced some changes in his family life style difficult to be sustain by the wages from Romania, than it is "normal" he migrated again. But in reality he did not choose subsequently Germany, as we expected, but Spain. Why to Spain? Because in his case, the German policy aiming to control/reduce illegal migration acted successfully, discouraging him to migrate again to this country, but encouraging him to choose another one with fewer risks associated – Spain. What does this mean? This means we are discussing now about one migration inducing another migration or migration in general inducing migration, but not particularly connected to one country.

Unspecific "black market" of migration

Under this title we propose a discussion about the development in Romania of what the literature dedicated to international migration calls "migration industry" (Castles, 1993). Our interest is concentrated on the role this phenomenon played in Romanians' migration to Spain. Before effectively put Romanian migration industry in relation with the particular migration that we are interested in, it is necessary to clarify what is the reality that this expression (migration industry) makes reference to. Institutional theory, the label under which some authors (Massey et al, 1993) incorporate the phenomenon is an approach centered on the study of institutions that appear and develop as result of international migration. The term "institution" is accepted in its broader sense, including mainly two types of realities: *agents*⁵² that speculating the economical opportunities offered by the difference between the great number of persons intending to emigrate and the restrictions regarding entry/staying/work/legal status in the destination countries, facilitate the migration in the scope of economic profit and *voluntary organizations* that help migrants, militating in favor of migrants rights or providing aids.

In this paper we are particularly interested in one segment of migration industry – black market of migration, particularly visas traffickers, persons who, in the scope of obtaining an economic profit facilitated obtaining visas in Romania.

Until 2002, Romanian citizens were under entry restrictions to most of the states that could be considered destination countries for international migration. The beginning of the year 2002 introduces an important change in this situation. From this date the visa requirements for Romanian citizens' entries in the Schengen Space have been relieved. Spain, the point of our interest is one of the states members of this international space of free

⁵² They could be individuals, firms, institutions of the state that facilitate international migration irrespective of their legal or illegal character of their activity.

circulation. The period on which we will concentrate our attention is that precursory to this date, period that played a very important role in phenomenon development (Sandu et al., 2004). There is an observation important for our discussion, documented by different studies dedicated to Romanians' international migration to Spain (Șerban, Grigoraș, 2002; Bleahu, 2004; Potot, 2001, 2003): in achieving their plan of migration, Romanians' could use (and in fact used) entry visas or transit visas for any country of Schengen Space. The particular way this space was designed, moved the accent on control of entry at the external borders of entire space, relieving in the same time the control at the borders between member states. This means that, for Romanian migrants to any country of the Space, the most difficult step was to obtain a visa for a country of the entire Space, but once this right achieved, the movement to a particular destination of the space was easier.

How the potential migrants obtained the visas? A significant part of them (we do not have data to make inference about what portion) bought visas from visa traffickers. In this moment become clear that visa traffickers played an important role in the development of the particular migration that we are interested in, providing migrants a way to surpass the entry restriction that Spain, as any country of destination, required. This fact is apparently unrelated with our attempt to demonstrate a strong connection/interaction between migrations originated in the same country (in this case Romania). But if we treat the visa traffickers as an independent subject, unrelated to a particular migration, it becomes obviously that: we have on one side a category of entrepreneurs that offer a product (entry visa for any Schengen Space) and on the other side a category of consumers (migrants to any country from the Schengen Space). By consequence, this segment of the migration industry experienced a development unrelated to any particular migration, but to a sum of migrations. From the perspective of Romanian visa trafficker, it has no importance if his/her client goes to one or another country of the Schengen Space or tries to use this visa to go to other countries. He or she could sell visas for country X (or countries X, Y...) and if the buyer has the money to pay is sufficient enough to gain and probably to develop further (as much as he have clients) the "business". The consequence is that the phenomenon of visa traffickers probably developed more quickly, was unspecified and answered to larger demand than if it could evolve as answer to particular demand for migration to a particular country. If we look bearing in mind these statements at history of Romanians' international migration after 1990 (Diminescu, 2003) and at the moment when migration to Spain developed, it become clearer that particular migration Romania – Spain did not need the time and the effort to create this segment of market because it probably was already functioning. Moreover, the development of each migration to a destination from a Schengen Space brings its own request on this market (thus exercising its specific pressure for the development of phenomenon of visa traffickers) but in the time, each migration used the services provided by the entire market.

International circulation between Romanians' communities abroad

The third fact that we bring into discussion is what we have called, maybe uninspired (see footnote) “international circulation of Romanians”⁵³ as referring to those migrants who, from one or another reason, choose to change their initial destination for another one. Our discussion is based on empirical observations accumulated especially during a fieldwork on few Romanian communities in Madrid area (Spain) in 2002. The observations are not the result of a research specially designed to investigate this subject, consequently they do not claim to offer a general view on this circulation (not even in visited communities), but could offer, we believe, a good starting point for a discussion⁵⁴.

From the information that we gathered, two categories of migrants circulating between destinations⁵⁵ could be distinguished:

- A category that migrates successively from one destination to another (let's call this *real circulation*)
- A category that interrupts its international migration with a return (variable as duration) to the country of origin, but at least, as far as we could investigate, with intention to go again for work abroad⁵⁶ (let's call this – *false return*)

We are interested in both categories, but the distinction is important as far as it put in discussion the way of classifying, sometimes superficially, a trip to origin country as a return, when in fact, for migrant himself or herself it does not have the sense of interrupting the migration. In this paper we will treat the both categories as migrants circulating internationally.

More important for our purposes are the motives that justify this type of movements. From the interviews with different persons in this situation (recently arrived in Madrid area from another country or after a period spent in Romania or declaring intention to leave in a near future Spain for another international destination) we extracted the motives, listed below in few larger categories:

1. Accentuated insecurity associated with the status of illegal migrant and the weak perspectives to obtain legal situation, as consequence of new restrictive migration policies. Persons who motivate their arrival to Spain in these terms are generally migrants from Germany and Austria. They generally argument they prefer lower

⁵³ The syntagm is similar to an expression (“l’installation en mobilité”) consecrated by one of the sociologists studying Romanian international migration (Diminescu, 1999), but is not used in the same sense. The main difference comes from the fact that we do not put the international circulation in relation with that intern one, and we do not make consideration about the permanent character of mobility or about its capacity to induce further mobility at individual level. For the purpose of this paper, we are particularly interested in the moment of changing destination and nothing more.

⁵⁴ The typology presented in the text has no claim to generality. We didn't specify the number of interviews because the information from interviews is used only as mean to illustrate a discussion in hypothetical terms.

⁵⁵ The most appropriate sense of „destination” within this section is „community of destination” (referring to concentrations of Romanian migrants).

⁵⁶ We are aware that it is very difficult to establish an intention when the act that it motivated had already become reality. Generally this declared intention is strengthen by the lack of involvement in any productive activity (irrespective of its character – as entrepreneur, employee etc) during the return to the country of origin.

earnings but more secure (including here the possibility to have a legal status), than higher earnings that could be very suddenly cut off (as entire migration) by authorities actions.

2. The stoppage/temporary suspension of some legal programs (of the type guest worker), case associated with Romania – Israel legal agreements.
3. The intention to accumulate social or material capital in order to achieve another migration plan to a country with better earnings but with difficult “entry” on the territory (case associated with migration to England or USA)
4. The failure to integrating in the previous destination country (victims of traffickers, thieves, persons abandoned by their network connection etc.), case more unspecific from the point of view of previous experience of migration – migrants coming from Portugal, Italy, England
5. Personal motivation (migration as life experience – to see another country, because of climate etc). Very unspecific from the point of view of previous destination.

Our list probably is not exhaustive but this has no importance. Important is that there are at least two, possible three motives (1, 2 maybe 3 from the above list) that have the capacity to justify/fundament significant movements of migrants (and revealing the potential of discussion in terms of “phenomenon”). We will analyze here more deeply the behavior/situation of the persons who motivates their coming from other country to Spain as a result of the approval of new restrictive policy measure regarding clandestine migration.

What information do we have about this?

- One of the effects documented for diverse spaces is a change in the life style of the households that include migrant/migrants. Changes are introduced and sustained for the period of migration through remittances. In the case of many households we can discuss probably about a dependency on financial support coming from abroad. Moreover, the experience of working and living in one society with a higher standard of life changes the aspirations, the life style for migrants themselves. All the aspects that migration changes are difficult to be sustained in the absence of significant increase at the level quality of life of origin country. This is one of the reasons for sustaining the continuous reinforcement of migration as effect of itself. This information could help us to understand that it will be very difficult for our illegal migrant to Germany or Austria to simply return to his country of origin. It is instead highly probable that he will try to find other means to sustain what he (his family) already achieved from migration to the moment.
- Another possible “suggestion” on migrant’s situation is given by a perspective that approaches international migration in terms of life strategy (Massey et al, 1997; Sandu, 2002). If international migration is a strategy, oriented to an end (even if we accept that this end is under continuous re-defining) and supposing an investment (of diverse sort of capital) to achieve this end, it is possible that migrant perceives any interruption of migration without his will as a loss (of resources). Consequently, he will probably try to avoid any loss or, in the case when this appears, will try to recuperate the deficit.

- New restrictions against illegal migration in one country probably throw the illegal migrant already on the territory of that country in a difficult period, marked by uncertainty. If the country of origin tries to reduce illegal migration introducing policy measures against the migrant clandestine worker, against the employer of clandestine migrant worker and if it has the capacity to implement and apply the measures, then:
 - Illegal migrant will probably find work more difficult (he had to find an employer willing to assume his own risk induced by sanctions against employers). This is probably converted for illegal migrant in longer periods of being in search for a job. If we take into consideration that in the case of clandestine migration migrant supports all the costs of being unemployed (Massey et al., 1993, 440-444), it becomes clear that costs of migration rise.
 - Even if using the capital of trust accumulated in the country of destination or using social relations or simply by chance, the migrant keeps the job or find a new one, he has to accept to live with the fear of “being discovered”. “Being discovered” could be followed by “being expelled” and supporting sanctions against the right to free circulation (the interdiction to go out of Romania for a limited period of time, for example). We have to also consider that in reality the facts could succeed in this order and the migrants is aware of this. If we make the connection with the previous two observations (their conclusion is that once involved in migration, the migrant is stimulated to continue), it becomes clear that having no right to travel abroad is not without importance for a migrant. We have to take also into account that, under conditions of exit restrictions, any former migrant who want to involve again in migration has to use the services provided by the black market of migration (for example to procure a false passport) meaning to risk more and to pay more.
 - Being illegally on the territory and having no job are already two elements that draw other consequences (for example migrant will find more difficultly to rent a house) that remove illegal migrant from hoping to achieve a legal status at destination and consequently to minimize the risks and costs associated with its illegal position.

Under the conditions that we tried to present above, what can an illegal migrant do? He has only few options:

- a. To try to find a way to adapt to the new conditions
- b. To return to origin country
- c. To migrate to another destination

If the first two observations are correct, then the migrant is not very stimulated to choose **b.** option. Still, probably a part of the total number of migrant will take the decision to return

home (probably a part of them will be in the position of a “false return” that we have discussed about). The observations related to the possible changes in the country of destination regarding migration are not of the type to encourage *a.* option; instead all observations are in position to justify the *c.* decision.

But still we have a problem. Do the illegal migrants from the country with restrictive policies (in our case Germany or Austria) have the means to choose another destination? Do they have information about other destinations (about work, wages, renting houses, status of migrant in society, chances to achieve a legal status etc)? Do they have the resources to involve in this movement (financial or other type of resources)? These are questions difficult to be answered. It is not our purposes to prove this happens but to answer if it is possible and to sustain that these questions are not without importance or sense.

Question regarding the access to information is of crucial importance. Information is the element that generates evaluations between “here” and “there”, and their results could be (in a case of an unfavorable result for “here”) migration (in this case re-migration) (Hugo, 1981). Then, we have to look of the sources of information that our migrants can access. It can be easily seen that a large amount of information about destinations of Romanians migration is provided by media. Newspapers, magazines, televisions, radios (from the country of origin or from abroad) present information about international migration (where are important communities, where migrants work, in what sector, what are the wages etc.) Of the special importance is the press that addresses the Romanian migrants. Newspapers distributed in Romanian communities abroad, designed to contain useful information for migrants located in different countries or newspapers addressing Romanians from one country have been circulating for years (in 2002 we identify three such newspapers).

An important amount of information about Romanians abroad is accessible on the Internet (web pages of Romanian associations, discussion groups etc.). Migrants’ social relationships can also act as a source of information, double anchored in two places: origin and destination. To understand the way how migrants use social relationships as source of information, we have to make reference at the role (roles) played by social networks in migration. This subject is probably one of the most prolific in literature, determining some authors like J. Arango, to say that: “Few things, if any, are as characteristic of the contemporary way of looking into migration as the central attention accorded to *migration networks...*” (Arango, 2000: 291). The importance of roles that migration/migrant networks play in international migration was also accentuated. One important function of the migrant’ networks is what Gurak and Caces name “channeling function of migration” (Gurak, Caces, 1992), meaning that inevitably a migration that enter a network development conduct to the creation of what Massey et al names “daughter communities” (Massey et al, 1987). In the case of Romanians, if we are discussing about international migration based on networks in similar way we can expect to have Romanians’ communities abroad. If Portes and Sensenbrenner have right when they discuss about specific forms of social capital in immigrants communities (Portes, Sensenbrenner, 1993), we can expect intense exchanges

between migrants (Romanian ones in this case) including exchanges of information. If all these happened, then we can expect that information about Romanians' communities abroad circulates. This information coming to migrants from media, from other Romanian migrants, we can expect to be enriched by a continuous flow coming from the origin country (origin community) (basically because of the same reasons – related to migration network - we are operating with flows that supposes keeping the contacts with origin area).

Having in mind this discussion about how a migrant could receive information about other Romanian communities abroad, we return to our migrant from the country with restrictive policies of migration. If he is discontented with his present situation (result of evaluation having information about other destinations) it becomes possible to accept that he could decide to “move his migration” to another destination, perceived for the moment as more profitable.

We still have an important question to answer. Is there realistic to believe that migrants have concrete means to change their destination? We believe the answer is yes, at least in the countries from the Western Europe. Why? Because Schengen Space offers a space of free circulation of the persons (so it is easier for example to go from one country of the Space to another one than to go from Romania to a specific one), because a migrant being him illegal have access to some financial resources that allow this (and he can accumulate for a new plan), because he already accumulated a “migration capital” (Massey, Espinosa, 1999) that can ease his new integration, because he probably already speaks or understands a foreign language...

Consequently, if the migrant has reasons to evaluate its position and have reasons to be discontented (by comparisons with other destination), if he has no incentive to renounce to his migration, if he has means, why to do not suppose that he will actually “internationally circulate”? We look again at our arguments. We did not make reference to the personal characteristics of migrants, we did not invoked particular connections between the country of the first migration (Germany or Austria) and the destination country of “international circulation” (Spain, in this case), we invoked only arguments related to the cumulative character of migration, to the investment in migration (from the perspective of life strategy); to consequences at individual level of the restrictive policies of migration (as including measures against illegal migrants employment, against employers of illegal migrant and restrictions on exit from the origin country) introduced in some countries already destinations for international migration that have the capacity (financial and institutional) to implement such measures. If our arguments do not make reference to any particular context, it means that we can attribute this kind of movements not only to the chance or certain particularities... and to believe that any time when the conditions will be met (illegal migrants confronted with applied restrictive policies) at least a part of migrants will chose to be involved in “international circulation between destination communities”.

Discussion

The paper discusses some aspects related to Romanians' migration to Spain suggesting that migrations having the same origin country (Romania in this case) interact. The aim is mainly to demonstrate that there are arguments to pay attention to such idea in the study of international migration.

Three elements (or “interactions facts”) are put in discussion:

- The existence of multi-destination communities – communities identified as origin for different migrations developed concomitantly
- The development of “black market of migration” – especially the phenomenon of visas traffickers who facilitate entries on the territory of destination country that enforce entry restrictions
- The international circulation of migrants between different destinations – especially the circulation caused by the enforcement of new restrictive measures of migration policies in some destination countries

Every of the three elements are approached in relationship with the particular case of Romanians' migration to Spain, without the intention to state that the reasoning presented could be applied anytime and anyplace.

Paper tries to argument for the idea that there are facts that impose us the exit from an analytical schema based on a dual reference of the type: “origin country – destination country”. Working with the hypothesis of interactions between migrations that encounter each other put in a new light the approach of certain subjects as the decision of migration, the migration development on the base of migration networks, the cumulative effects of migration or the effects of migration policies.

Annex: List of research project that provided information used within the study

- 2001 – Research project C8 – CNCSIS „ Regional development in Romania – the role of social and human capital”, cord. D. Sandu (fieldwork: Romania)
- 2002 – IOM Research project: “The migratory circulation of Romanians after 1989. Migratory behaviors, institutional practices and policies regarding Romanians mobility abroad”, cord. Dana Diminescu (fieldwork: Romania)
- 2002 – individual research project within the frame of C8 – CNCSIS „ Regional development in Romania – the role of social and human capital”, cord. D. Sandu (fieldwork: Spain)

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Economic efficiency or ideology?

Social support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

More than ten years ago the communist regimes have fallen down in Central and Eastern Europe. The general expectation was to replace the former communist regime with a democratic one all over Central and Eastern Europe. However, people from post-communist countries have different expectations from the new political regimes and are willing to support 'different versions' of democracy, depending on their economic situation, on their history or on their cultural background. Accordingly, the level of social support for democracy varies from one country to another depending on several factors.

This paper tries to find out which are the main determinants for the level of social support for democracy in post-communist countries. Starting from the theory of lifetime learning model, the paper aims to investigate what factor comes first in supporting democracy: the economic efficiency, the evaluation of government performances, the negative evaluation of the communist regime or the ideological orientation? In addition, the article searches to compare the determinants and the level of support for democracy in Western European countries and Central and Eastern countries. The analysis uses data from European Values Survey, carried out in 1999 – 2000 in 32 European countries, which allow cross-sectional comparisons among European countries.

The first part of the article is dedicated to a review of the theories about social support for democracy and attempts to draw some hypotheses. The second part describes the indicators used in the analysis and the methodology employed in the data analysis, while the third part presents the results. The last section is devoted to conclusions and to discussing the implications.

Diffuse support and specific support for democracy

Easton (1965) formulates a broad accepted definition of social support. According to this definition, "we can say that A supports B either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B. B may be a person or a group; it may be a goal, idea or institution" (p. 159).

Social support and legitimacy are different concepts. While social support points out if a political object is considered good or bad by a population, the legitimacy told us why it is evaluated in this way (Lillbacka, 1999). In fact, the social support indicates the peoples' orientation towards a political object, whereas the legitimacy justifies this orientation. The relation between legitimacy and social support is similar to that between value and attitude. The core of legitimacy consists of values, while support consists of attitudes, which can be more superficial and open to changes.

Easton (1965, 1968) formulates the distinction between *over support*, which consists in supportive actions, like individual's behavior, and *covert support*, composed by sentiments and attitudes towards political object. While the overt support can be easily observed, investigating the covert support needs deeper research about individual's attitudes.

Another distinction refers to *specific support* versus *diffuse support*. According to Easton (1965, 1968), the specific support is related to the actions of political actors and to the output of the political system. The specific support is dynamic, varying with the actions of political actors. If the requests of the political system's members are satisfied and people are contented with the output system then, one can expect an increase in specific support. If the output is not perceived as adequately, the specific support decreased.

The diffuse support is independent by the actions of political actors and by the specific material rewards (Easton, 1968). The diffuse support represents a reservoir of favorable attitudes which helps the members to tolerate outputs opposed to theirs wishes. The diffuse support provides a 'reservoir' on which the system can relay on in the context of lack of effectiveness and which sustain the legitimacy when the political system is perceived as inefficient by its members. Compared to the specific support, the diffused support is less dynamic and is more inertial. However, if the output is dissatisfactory on the long run, the reservoir of support is spent and the legitimacy of the regime decreased.

A series of studies have tried to explain the way in which the social support is acquired by the individual and the reasons for the variation in social support at the individual level. The theory of socialization supported by Inglehart (1990) states that the social support depends on the formative experiences passed by the individual especially during the primary socialization. This support built during the childhood and the teenage is quite resistant and is hardly changing under the impact of external factors. The theory of performances, sustained by Lipset (1960), points out that the social support depends on the recent individual experiences, especially depends on the performances of the political object. Therefore, the social support decreased when the effectiveness is decreasing and increased when the political object is effective.

Rose, Mishler (2000) and Rose, Mishler, Haepfer (1998) indicate that the two theories, of socialization and of efficiency are rather complementary then antagonist and both of them can be integrated in the *lifetime learning model*. According to this model, the support for the political regime is influenced by the early socialization, but it is steadily modified by the experiences of adult life. If the political regime is effective, the output strengthening the experiences accumulated during the primary socialization and the support for the regime increases. If the output is not satisfactory on the long run, then the support is eroding and is decreasing.

On the short run, the lack of efficiency of a political regime determines negative attitudes on the population side and the decreased in specific support. If the regime has a reservoir of diffuse support, built during the political socialization in the formative years, the legitimacy of regime would not be affected by this lack of efficiency. If the dissatisfaction towards the output is for a long time, not only the specific support will be affected, but also the diffuse support will suffer and the regime will be de-legitimated.

Many studies have pointed out that the efficiency plays an important role especially for social support in favor of new political regimes (Mishler & Rose, 1998, 2000, 2000b; Munro, 2001; Tóka, 1995; Lillbacka, 1999; Eckstein, 1979; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, 2004). New political regimes does not benefit of a reservoir of diffuse support, like the stable democracy does. The individuals have internalized another system of values from primary socialization, different from the core values of democracy. This fact has two implications for the legitimacy of the new political regime. On the one hand, the legitimation of the regime manly relay on the regime's output, namely on its efficiency. If the regime is not efficient the specific support decreased and the population reorients towards other alternatives. On the other hand, the individuals were socialized during the communist regime and have an experience with other type of political regime. Different form the citizens of stable democracies, those of new democratic states know an alternative to democracy and can made comparisons between democracy and the older political system. The dissatisfaction with actual political regime could easily engender the rejection of the present regime and the willingness to reinstall the older political system.

The studies carried out in ex-communist countries during '90 underline the role played by efficiency, especially by the economic efficiency, in producing social support for the new political regime (Tóka, 1995; Munro, 2001; Mishler, Rose, 2000). At the beginning of the transition, the population given a strong unconditioned support to democracy, but it was like *anticipatory reformism*, an unconditioned favorable attitude towards reforms (Sandu, 1996; Mărginean, 1999). This positive attitude was generated by the rejection of the older economic and political order in the context of lack of information about what the transition and the reform mean. After few years this attitude was replaced by what Sandu (1996) named *reaction reformism*, a rationale favorable attitude toward economic and political reforms, but this attitude is typical just for some social groups. The author underlines the association between this attitude and the level of individual's economic resources.

One can says that the new political regimes from Central and Eastern Europe do not have a reservoir of diffuse support, which can represent a solid core the legitimacy of the democratic rule. From this reason, the efficiency of government and, especially the economic efficiency, play a very important role in building the social support. On the other hand, ex-communist countries differ with the respect to the economic reforms and to the economic efficiency of the new government. Some countries prove to be more efficient in what it concerns the economic reform, then others. Therefore, in the context of social support theory one can expect that:

(H1) The level of support for democracy varies from country to country depending on the level of economic efficiency of the government during the transition. Countries with a higher level of economic efficiency show higher level of support for democracy, while countries in which the government proved to be less efficient in the economic area have an lower level of social support for the democratic regime.

As I have pointed out before, people from ex-communist countries have an experience with another type of political regime, with the communist one. Some studies have indicated the impact of the evaluation of the former regime on the support for democracy in ex-communist countries (Mishler, Rose, 1998, 2000, 2000a; Gunther, Montero, 2000; Mărginean, Precupețu I., Precupețu M., 2004). The former regime offers for the populations of ex-communist countries a reference point in evaluating democracy and an alternative for the democratic system. In this context, support for democracy is dependent to the evaluation of the communist regime.

(H2) The negative evaluation of the former communist regime increases the social support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

On the other side, the social support for democracy does not depend only on the rationale evaluation of the political regime, from the point of view of its efficiency. Weber (1965) indicates that the legitimacy of an order will be guaranteed in two main ways: by pure selfless reasons, which can be pure affective, can derive from the rational believe in the absolute validity of the order or it can originate in the religious attitudes or in self interest. On the other words, the legitimacy of an order can be originated in the ideological orientation or in the rational evaluation of the output, taking into account the individual interest. According to Munro (2001) the ideological orientation toward collectivism decreases the social support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. One can expect that:

(H3) The ideological orientation has an influence on the level of social support. The preference for left collectivist ideologies reduces the support for democracy, while the inclination for right ideologies is positively associated with the support for democracy.

Data and methods


In order to test the hypotheses data from European Values Survey (EVS), the third wave, have been used. The research was carried out in 1999 – 2000 in 32 European countries and allowed cross-cultural comparisons among European countries.

The indicator for the **social support for democracy** was build as a factorial score, using the loadings which have resulted from a confirmatory factor analysis. Figure 1 indicates the factorial structure with the loading resulted from running the factor analysis on the base including all the European countries from the data set. The factorial model was run for each European countries with the loadings resulted from the entire data set, in order to test the fitting for each countries. The indexes for fit by countries are included into the annex. The model fits the data from the most of the European countries, excepting The Netherlands and Iceland. These countries have been excluded from the analysis.

Figure 1 indicates a dual factorial structure for the attitudes towards democracy. The first dimension is **support for democracy** and is related with idea that democracy is the best way to govern a country, compared to a dictatorship or to an army rule. The second dimension refers to **the evaluation of democracy**, namely is indicating if the democracy is considered to

be effective in economic area, in political area and in maintaining order. While the present paper refers to the support for democracy and the two dimensions are highly correlates (Figure 1), the analysis is focused on factor social support for democracy as indicator for diffuse support for democracy.

Figure 1 Latent structure of attitudes towards democracy



$\Delta 2$ IFI=0,978 ; CFI=0,978 ; RMSEA=0,053

P test for close fit = 0,037

Other indicators used in the analysis are the dominant individual ideological orientation, the evaluation of the former communist regime, or the evaluation of the political regime ten years ago for the Western European countries, the evaluation of the present government and the GDP growth between 1990 and 2000. All the analysis have been carried out at the country level, therefore all the indicators measured at the individual level have been aggregated at country level.


The **ideological orientation** measures the individual preference for leftist versus rightist ideology on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means full support for leftist ideology and 10 mean full support for rightist ideology. The **support for political regime ten years ago** is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicate totally lack of support for the communist regime or for the political regime ten years ago and 10 means full support for that regime. The **evaluation of the present government** is measured on a 10 points scale, 1 indicating the

worst evaluation, while 10 indicating the best evaluation for the government. GDP growth between 1990 and 2000 is used as indicator for the economic efficiency of the government in the last decade⁵⁷.

Results

A first sight on EVS data indicates that the level of support for democracy decrease from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Western countries with stable democratic regime have higher level of social support for democracy then the ex-communist countries have. Moreover, the level of social support for democracy differs among ex-communist countries, decreasing from West to East, too (Map 1). Population of the Central European countries like Czech Republic, Slovakian and Hungary sustain in a great extent the democracy, compared to inhabitants of the other post-communist countries. The present analysis will try to see which factors determine the differences in social support for democracy between stable democracies and ex-communist countries on one hand, and among post-communist countries on the other hand.

Map 1 Level of social support for democracy in Europe



⁵⁷ The source of data is CIA - The World Factbook 2001

In order to check the effect of independent variables on the social support for democracy, a linear regression analysis was carried out at the aggregate / country level (each case representing a European country). The independent variables included in the analysis are: ideological orientation (left / right), satisfaction with the political regime 10 years ago, satisfaction with present government, GDP growth and country with stable democracy versus ex-communist country⁵⁸. In the first turn, the analysis has employed all the European countries for which the factor analysis model fits the data. The goal of this analysis was to identify the main factors which determine variation in the social support among the European countries. On the second step, I have tried to see which factor have an influence on the variation of social support for democracy among ex-communist countries, on one hand, and among Western stable democracy, on the other hand. The small number of cases did not allowed to run a regression analysis for the two clusters of countries, Western countries and ex-communist countries. Therefore, I have investigated the effect on each variable on the support of democracy at the country level, with the disadvantage of not controlling the cumulative effect of all the independent variables on the support for democracy.

Table 1 Regression coefficients – Dependent variable: Support for democracy in European countries

	Unstandardized coefficients B	Standardized coefficients β
(Constant)	2,185	
Ideological orientation (left / right)	0,024	0,023
Satisfaction with political regime 10 years ago	-0,088	-0,160
Satisfaction with present government	0,083	0,227
Stable democracy (dummy)	0,309	0,451
GDP growth 1990 - 2000	0,023	0,210
Durbin-Watson = 1,924 $R^2 = 0,535$ Adjusted $R^2 = 0,430$		

The data from the Table 1 indicates that economic efficiency of the government and the satisfaction with present government has a strong impact on the support for democracy at the country level. The dissatisfaction with political regime 10 years ago and being a citizen of a Western country also has a significant impact on the level of support for democracy. At the European level, the ideological orientation does not play a role in influencing the support for democracy, when controlling for real and perceived efficiency of government.


Comparing the effect of the predictors on the level of support for democracy in Europe, one can say that being a stable democracy has the stronger effect on the level of support. That is to say that the level of support for democracy is much higher in Western

⁵⁸ The label stable democracy refers to Western European countries which have a democratic political system for more than 20 years.

countries then in ex-communist countries when controlling for the other predictors. On the other hand, at the European level the economic efficiency of the government plays an important role with the respect to the support for democracy. In addition, the satisfaction with present government and the dissatisfaction with the former political system influence the level of support for democracy. The data invalidates the hypothesis of the impact of the ideological orientation on the support for democracy, and validates the hypothesis of the impact of efficiency of government on the support for democracy.

As I have mentioned before, the reduced number of cases does not allowed running different regression analyses for ex-communist countries and for Western stable democracy. However, some distinctions should be done between the two clusters of countries, as long as post-communist countries have experienced a political regime changing in the last decade⁵⁹. Thus, I have analyzed the effect of each independent variable on the level of social support for democracy for the Western and Central an Eastern countries.

Figure 2 Social support for democracy by GDP growth 1990 – 2000 in ex-communist countries




Data from Figure 1 indicates that the growth in GDP has a strong positive impact on the level of social support for democracy in Eastern Europe. The data sustain the hypothesis of the association between level of social support and economic efficiency of a democratic government. The level of social support is higher in ex-communist countries which have experienced an increasing of GDP per capita during the transition, compared to those that

⁵⁹ The data were collected in 1999 – 2000, 10 years after the falling of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

have has a lower level of economic development. The transition from the command economy to the market economy was difficult and painful for most of the post-communist societies, but countries which have managed to obtain an increase in GDP after ten years of social and economic transformations have strengthen not only the economic system, but also the politic one.


Not the same conclusion can be draw if we are looking to the Western countries (Figure A-1, from the annex). In the Western states the impact of economic growth on the level of social support for democracy is not the same like in post-communist countries. The graph indicates that there is no association between the support for democracy and economic growth. Ireland is an outlier, due to it atypical economic growth during the '90, but is not affecting the general pattern. If we exclude Ireland from the analysis the shape of the distribution is the same.

Figure 3 Support for democracy by GDP (2001) in Europe



However, the support for democracy varies among the Western countries by level of economic prosperity, not by level of economic growth. The Figure 3 shows that countries in Europe cluster in two groups depending on the level of support for democracy and on the level of GDP. The first cluster is composed by countries from Western Europe which have higher level of economic development and higher level of support for the democratic order. The second cluster comprises ex-communist countries with lower level of support for new democratic regime and lower level of economic prosperity. One should mention that Spain, , which have experienced totalitarian regimes until 20 years ago, is much closer to the ex-communist countries then the other Western countries, while Portugal cluster together with ex-communist countries.

Figure 4 Support for democracy by satisfaction with communist regime in ex-communist countries




On the other hand, data from Figure 4 indicates that in ex-communist countries support for democracy is highly associated with satisfaction with the communist régime. In other words, in those countries in which the positive evaluation of the former regime is prevalent, like in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine the support for democracy is lower. Thus, in countries with higher level of rejection for the communist regime, like in Croatia or Czech Republic, the support for democracy has a high level. Therefore the data sustain the hypothesis of the negative impact of satisfaction with communist regime on the level of support for democracy.

If one looks to the relation between support for democracy and evaluation of the political regime 10 years ago in Western consolidated democracies can observed the existence of a positive association between the two variables (see data from the Annex Figure A-2). Taking into account that in these countries the political regime was a democratic one ten years ago, one can say that the satisfaction with democratic system on the long run straighten the social support for democracy. However, the evaluation of the present government activity in Western Europe countries is not associated with the level of social support for democracy (see Figure A-3 in Annex). In consolidated democracies, the support for the democratic order depends on the satisfaction on the long run with the political order, not on the present evaluation of the political life. This fact sustains the idea that these countries have a reservoir of diffuse support, built in a long period of time, and the present evaluation of the government does not play an important role in legitimating of the political order. In these countries the government is allowed to be inefficient for a short period of time without any risk for the democratic order.

Different from the Western Europe, in post-communist countries the evaluation of the present government is highly associated with the support for democracy (Figure 5). These countries does not have a reservoir of diffuse support for democracy and the legitimation of the political order is done mainly on the evaluation of the present government and on the efficiency of the actual political actors. In this case the activity of the government is more important then in case of consolidated democracies and each error of the governmental actors could threaten the support for the new political order.

Figure 5 Support for democracy by satisfaction with present government in ex-communist countries



The post-communist countries differ from the Western consolidates democracy with the respect to the impact of ideological orientation on the support for democracy too. While in countries from Central and Eastern Europe the ideological factor does not play an important role in influencing the support for democracy, in Western countries the ideological orientation (left / right) has a stronger impact (see Figures A-4 and A-5 in Annex). In the first group of countries the social support for the democratic order mainly relays on the peoples' evaluation of the government efficiency, whilst in consolidate democracies the support is largely based on the value orientations. Therefore, people from post-communist countries are inclined to support or reject a democratic regime depending on the activity of the actual government; in this case, a decrease in GDP can strongly affect the popular support. In consolidated democracies, people judge the political order on the base of their value orientation not on the policies measures taken by a specific government. In this context, the democratic order has many chances to be sustained in Western countries in a specific moment of time then it has in ex-communist countries.

Conclusions

The level of social support for democracy is different across the European countries. It decreases from West to East. The Western countries, which have experienced democracy for a long time, have higher level of social support for democracy than post-communist countries have. Among the ex-countries the level of support for democracy varies from West to East too. Countries from Central Europe like Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary have higher level of support than those located on the Eastern Europe.

According to the EVS data the level of social support for democracy in Europe depends on the economic performances in the last ten years, on the evaluation of the political regime ten years ago, on the evaluation of the actual government. However, to be a Western stable democratic regime has the strongest impact on the level of support for democracy. On the other side, the countries from Western Europe and from Central and Eastern Europe differ with the respect to economic performances. As the data points out, the countries with a higher GDP per capita have an upper level of support for democracy too. A positive economic output in Western countries has generated on the long run a quite high and stable support for democracy. The economic efficiency has strengthened the support for the democratic order and permitted the formation and the consolidation of the diffuse support based on core values.

In post-communist countries the determinants of social support for democracy are different from those from Western countries. The economic performance has a stronger impact, like the negative evaluation of the communist regime and the positive evaluation of the actual government have too. Thus, countries with better economic performances after a decade of transition have a higher level of social support than those in which the economy is in decline. The dissatisfaction with the communist regime plays also an important role in influencing the country's level of social support for the democratic order. Different from the Western democracy in the new European democratic countries the left / right ideological orientation has no impact on the support for democracy. In this case the economic efficiency is more important for the evaluation of democracy than the value orientation, since the democratic order cannot rely on the diffuse support.

Even the social support for democracy relies on different factors in Western countries and in Central and Eastern ones, the data have pointed out that there is a common pattern of values with the respect to support for democracy in Europe. This pattern consists in a bi-dimensional space of value orientation and it rests in two value orientations: support for democracy and the evaluation of democracy. On the other hand, one can expect that the differences in level of support for the democratic order will reduce due to the increases in economic performances in the post-communist countries. On the long run, the positive evaluation of the economy and of the governmental activity can help in creating a reservoir of diffuse support in Central and Eastern Europe and in changing the pattern of support for democracy in this part of Europe.

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Appendix

Table A-1 Goodness- of – fit indexes

	$\Delta 2$ IFI	CFI	RMSEA
France	0.925	0.924	0.076
United Kingdom	0.839	0.838	0.126
Germany	0.858	0.857	0.095
Austria	0.897	0.897	0.084
Italy	0.914	0.914	0.081
Spain	0.794	0.792	0.103
Portugal	0.779	0.777	0.107
Netherlands	0.538	0.533	0.144
Belgium	0.959	0.959	0.052
Denmark	0.705	0.703	0.124
Sweden	0.833	0.832	0.103
Finland	0.895	0.895	0.087
Iceland	0.592	0.587	0.142
North Ireland	0.945	0.944	0.067
Ireland	0.847	0.846	0.095
Estonia	0.883	0.882	0.080
Latvia	0.838	0.836	0.090
Lithuania	0.909	0.908	0.075
Poland	0.942	0.942	0.067
Czech Republic	0.861	0.860	0.098
Slovakia	0.913	0.913	0.091
Hungary	0.912	0.911	0.079
Romania	0.902	0.902	0.075
Bulgaria	0.920	0.920	0.091
Croatia	0.855	0.854	0.108
Greece	0.777	0.775	0.109
Russia	0.930	0.930	0.082
Malta	0.835	0.834	0.111
Luxembourg	0.926	0.925	0.063
Slovenia	0.956	0.956	0.055
Ukraine	0.953	0.953	0.061
Belarus	0.961	0.960	0.053
Entire sample	0.949	0.949	0.078

Figure A-1 Support for democracy by GDP growth 1990 – 2000 in western countries




Figure A-2 Support for democracy by satisfaction with political regime 10 years ago in Western Europe




Figure A-3 Support for democracy by satisfaction with present government in western countries




Figure A-4 Support for democracy by ideological orientation in ex-communist countries





Figure A-5 Support for democracy by ideological orientation in Western countries



Fertility and social policies in Europe

Changing fertility

The European Countries have witnessed unprecedented family dynamics over the past 30 years. Fertility and marriage rates have declined constantly, divorce rates have grown up, far-reaching changes have appeared in patterns of family formation and dissolution, with the result that alternative family forms and non-family households have become widespread. These trends (especially extremely low fertility rates) raise major concerns for the future: the acceleration of demographic ageing and its socio-economic implications, the decrease in labour supply and its impact on future economic growth, and the prospect of population decline.

Moreover, the clichéd image of fertility in Europe is no longer true. For instance, large Mediterranean family from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal is rather a stereotype, these countries having now the lowest fertility in Europe. Such transformations in fertility regimes raise concern, considering the long-term effect on the economic, political and social security.

Aims

Far from being alarmist, the paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of the ins and outs of the problem. This study focuses on changing fertility in European countries and its implications for social policy. The beyond developments raise questions within the public policy debate on how to achieve changes in demographical behaviour, especially in fertility.

In the first part, the aim is to discover explanations of this decline in fertility and the persistently low fertility rates, what are the fertility differentials between European Member States and Candidates, for identifying country-specific models.

Demographic data certainly influence the modernization of social policies, having a clear impact on the demand for family services, as well as on countries' capacity of financing them. Thus, in the second part, the paper focuses towards public policy – fertility link: how do various social policies and especially family policies relate to fertility patterns. Any effort for improvement requires an appropriate understanding of the rationales for this low fertility in order for Governments to decide adequate adjustments.

Theoretical background

Most European and other societies experienced the so-called “demographic transition⁶⁰” between the second half of the 19th century and the ‘30s. Concerns related to

⁶⁰ Demographic transition is the process whereby populations shift from regimes of high mortality and high fertility in approximate long-run equilibrium (zero population growth) to a new equilibrium at low levels of

below-replacement fertility emerged in Europe between the two world wars. The post-war baby boom of the '50s and early '60s took away such fears for the moment. They have returned though, renewed, given the sharply fertility decline for the last decades.

Therefore, since the '30s, the alarmist questions on the topic of low fertility have dominated the political and scientific discourse within developed countries, particularly in Europe. For that reason, the theoretical approaches for the explanation of low fertility have been almost entirely based on conditions in the developed countries.

Thompson (1929) attributed the decline in fertility to the social and economic changes in modern society, idea further developed by Frank Notestein (1945, 1953) in demographic transition theory. Notestein considered that the fertility' transition was connected to several wide socio-economic changes as: slackening of the 'traditional' forces, enlargement of education and rational thought, changes in the economic benefits and costs of children, the new economic roles of women, incompatible with childbearing, and so on. Many future formulations of transition theory have followed, each ones emphasizing one factor or another.

Historical data indicate cyclical rates of population growth (periods of growth followed by periods of decline) leading to long-run paradigm of homeostasis, the view that whenever population and resources get 'out of balance', mechanisms come into play to restore balance (McDonald, 2001).

The seeking of a general demographic transition theory has generated several "middle-range theories" (in Merton terms) applicable in specific social, economic and institutional circumstances of fertility changing.

The rational choice approach

This theory states that, in deciding to have a child, people estimate if benefits overshadow the costs. Therefore, decline in fertility implies that child's cost has increased, couple incomes have fallen or couple's utility function (preferences) has changed in favour of other goods against children (Becker, 1981).

The specialists assume that the quality of children has become more important than the "quantity". Today's parents usually do not expect a material outcome of their investment in children, the most important driver being the fear of the social or financial cost of a child's 'failure'.

In the context of contemporary low fertility, Coleman states that, while the cost of children can be estimated in financial terms, the benefits or utility of children are rather psychological ('immanent values') and not easy quantifiable (Coleman, 1998).

Regarding policy making, rational choice theory implies that in order to have a positive impact on fertility, it has to reduce the economic costs of children, increase parental incomes and shift the utility function towards children in detriment of other goods. The last one is the most hardly to achieve because is not directly connected to policy.

The risk aversion approach

Risk and opportunity theory adds another dimension to rational choice theory, the last being based on the assumption that people analyze the costs and benefits of having a child in conditions of cognitive certainty. Risk theory states that the costs and benefits are mainly future costs and benefits, hence, people cannot certainly know what the costs and benefits will be.

In having a child, people make a choice that will affect their future life course, so it depends of their perception of the future (McDonald 2001). Beck (1999) has argued that today society is increasingly risk conscious. According to the risk theory, today people's behaviour implies investment in economic security (life long education, extra-work, savings) rather than in having children (that will involve lower income, higher consumption expenditure, an insecure return to the labour force for woman, and so on). Risk aversion might also be applied to the social, intimate or personal areas.

Post-materialist values approach

In relation to rational choice theory, changes in values shift the utility function away from children towards other goods. More sociologically oriented than the previous two approaches (rather economical ones), the post-materialist values theory is associated with Second Demographic Transition theory (Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996; van de Kaa 1997), stipulating that changes in demographic behaviour have been determined by the amplification of the individual self-realization values, liberalism and autonomy from traditional forms of authority, particularly religion.

The survey data generally show that within any society, higher educated, less religious, urban or more liberal value-oriented women with have lower fertility than the less educated, the more religious, the rural and the more conservative ones.

The researchers attempted to extend these findings in comparisons among societies, but data often contradicted the hypothesis that more liberal societies should have lower fertility than conservative ones. Therefore, the extrapolation of post-materialist values approach in analysis between countries has to be made with precautions.

Gender equity approach

This theory states that low fertility is related to different levels of gender equity applying in different social institutions. While gender equity in individual-oriented institutions (education and market employment) has progressed in all developed countries, the 'male breadwinner model' still stands out for the family-oriented social institutions (in industrial relations - the terms and conditions of employment, family services, the tax system, social security system and the family itself). This may explain why the lowest fertility rates are found in Southern European countries and other societies with traditional, male-dominated family systems.

From a policy perspective, public organization arrangements have to take into consideration the reform of institutional procedures that embedded the male breadwinner model of the family.

Quality of life approach

This approach is largely sustained at the European Union level through the most recent studies of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, partly integrating the previous discussed approaches. Low fertility can be viewed, from the quality of life perspective, as result of the freedom of choice and as an aspect of daily behaviour that is positively valued by citizens (Fahey and Spéder, 2004). For this reason, governments have been reluctant to describe in negative terms the practices leading to low fertility or to seek to change them in a strict way.

At the macro-level and in the long run, low fertility seems to be a damaging trend but at the micro level, the individuals' choice has to be respected. The two perspectives point in opposite policy directions, this tension creating an emerging dilemma for the decision makers.

The 'affordability thesis' (Fahey and Spéder, 2004), which argues that economic pressures are the root cause of the current fertility problems, has attracted interest in public and political discussion. According to this perspective, economic/material problems narrow people's family formation options and block ways of living, which they value highly. Therefore, low levels of fertility could be considered not only as a macro-structural threat but also as an expression of restricted personal options and as a negative aspect of current quality of life.

In its strong version, the affordability thesis is in fact unsustainable, implying that living in a rich society and in the developed part of the world somehow means not affording to have children. A weaker version of the thesis has some point though, arguing that economic development has raised the value of people's time, particularly those people who have high levels of human capital (Becker, 1981, Easterlin, 1978). For women in particular, this development has fundamental implications, giving them new options in life, beyond the traditional female roles of childbearing and rearing. The new opportunities are so many and so attractive that the loss required by sacrificing those options in favour of family and children is greater than all that previous generations have experienced. A similar explanation could be applied on men's situation, but with less impact compared to their historical experience.

However, people could end up making what might be called "inauthentic or unfulfilling choices" (Fahey and Spéder, 2004). They pursue a way of living conform to some of their impulses, or which responds to incentives and pressures from outside, but that somehow fail to satisfy deeper needs.

Therefore, low fertility is at least partly undesired and draws negative effects on subjective well-being among individuals. Relying on this, the policy dilemmas may be more tractable than they seem.

Finally, we can mention other theoretical perspectives. *Social institutions approach* stipulates that low fertility is related to the structure of social institutions and explanations of fertility change have unique characteristics in diverse social contexts because these institutions differ widely across societies. Other *approach related to relationships building*, assumes that low fertility is the result of increased difficulties in forming and sustaining relationships that might give rise to children, and the inventory could definitely continue.

This study emphasizes the diversity and the specificity within a wide European common pattern, trying to offer an explanation that combines these theoretical frameworks appropriate to different social, economic and institutional contexts.

Fertility in EU States (old members)

Fertility rates in the EU 15 have been below population replacement level for three decades and now are only at two thirds of that benchmark.

The average fertility rate in the EU reached a post-war high in the middle of the '60s (2.77 children per woman), falling sharply until the end of the '70s and then engaging into a more gradual decline until the mid '90s. The lowest level was reached in 1995, after that fertility increasing slightly.

Although the trends observed have generally been convergent, important variations can be noted (see the table from the Appendix). Countries that had the highest fertility rates at the mid '70s (southern countries and Ireland) recorded the biggest reduction (more than 40%, Spain - more than 50%), having now (except Ireland) the lowest fertility rates (Italy – 1.23, Spain, Greece – 1.25). The highest figure occurs in Ireland (2.0) and France (1.89) followed by Netherlands, Finland and Denmark (around 1.7).

Fertility in Central and Eastern Countries, EU and Non-EU members

In Central and East European countries, significant demographic changes are associated with the economic and political transition.

For this group of countries, demographic phenomena had been affected by the dismantlement of the social protection system. The majority of the population had to adapt to the weakening of the welfare system in general and to declining support for families in particular. The most striking demographic consequences have been a sharp decline in fertility, which has reached very low levels in all transition countries.

Most of the countries record values inferior to those of EU (old members). The Central and Eastern European area average value is considerably smaller, compared to EU older states mean.

Except Albania (over 2.0 children per woman) and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1.77), all countries have rates below 1.4. The smallest rate is encountered in Ukraine, Romania registering an average value in the area (1.26) (see the Appendix).

The dramatic fertility decrease in formal socialist countries was explained as a direct consequence of the fast and difficult to deal with socio-economic transformations or as a natural result of long-term trends, economic transformation only accelerating the coming of “second demographic transition”.

In the literature focus on this topic, the explanations can be grouped in two main categories (numerous studies considering both):

a. The economical approach. Worsening of the economic situation, expansion of education⁶¹, reduction in couple’s income, growing housing costs, rising economic uncertainty, relative deprivation⁶² and especially child cost increasing are considered important factors of fertility decline.

b. The cultural approach. Changes in norms, values, attitudes cause significant behavioural adjustments, fertility drop being one of these adaptations. The process of value change is discussed similar to Western countries (secularization, rising individualism and female emancipation), families developing in addition subversive methods to oppose to ‘pronatalist population policies’ of the socialist regime. The end of socialism accelerated the changes and the trends of fertility decline. This “second demographic transition” applied to CEE area is placed in the context of the overall society changes.

Aspects of fertility differentials

The survey data on fertility showed that although below replacement fertility was common, the composition of fertility varied across countries and showed a wide diversity in causal patterns. Recent studies on this focus (EU, 2004) demonstrate that three elements had a strong influence on fertility outcomes – *childlessness, average age at birth of the first child and propensity to remain single*.

However, the comparative data show that countries with the lowest fertility rates were not necessarily those with a high level of childlessness, nor those with a strong tendency of delaying the childbirth or those with a strong propensity for women to remain single. Fertility outcomes at the country level represent rather a wide range of combinations of these factors, so that no clear pattern could be identified. One factor seems to be consistently related to fertility outcomes at the country level: the degree to which women exceed the second birth and have a third or fourth child. The most prevalent element in fertility fall is the decline of large families (Fahey and Spéder, 2004).

⁶¹ In the background of the structural change on the labor market and the increased demand of highly qualified professionals, people spend more time in educational system and are more committed to their job, facts that negatively affect fertility (in particular, conflicting role mothers). Actually, economic approach interacts with the cultural perspective, in a broader social, economic and cultural change approach.

⁶² Relative deprivation would mean that people evaluate their income as low comparatively to others or to their own expectations, and hence perceive their economic situation as inconvenient for having (another) child (Philipov, 2001).

Many scholars consider that encouragement measures of earlier childbearing could contribute to equilibrate the fertility level. A frequent argument in that sense is the constantly higher fertility level of the USA compared to European countries, considered as a direct consequence of an earlier childbearing pattern (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000). However, relatively early childbearing in Central and Eastern European countries does not lead to a higher fertility level, on the contrary, as it shows in previous section, the average value for CEE area is significantly smaller compared to EU older states mean.

Fertility aspiration

Ideal family size has declined across the generations in all the countries, being a core element in the causal background of the fertility drop. Recent survey data show that in most countries, the ideal family size is still above two children, even among young people; nevertheless, this is considerably smaller than for previous generations.

Even in this context, the ideal family size is on average higher than the attained one. Economic factors such as financial problems, the cost of children and accessibility of accommodation, are the reasons most commonly mentioned in the surveys. Two non-economic factors play an important role for women: their own health and problems in relationships with their partners (Tony and Spéder, 2004).

However, the widening gap between ideal and actual fertility must be carefully interpreted. The gap could occur not because more women are failing to achieve their fertility ideal, but because fewer women are exceeding the family sizes they want. The data validate that hypothesis especially in the EU 15. The proportion of women whose actual number of children is smaller than their ideal has displayed no significant increase over time, while the proportion of women who exceed the fertility ideal has clearly decreased. "It is the more effective avoidance of excess fertility, rather than a declining capacity to achieve ideal fertility, that is behind the widening ideal-actual fertility gap" (Tony and Spéder, 2004, p. 48).

On the other hand, the below-ideal fertility is most common among the highly educated and better-off people who have the most control over their lives. Lack of resources tends not to restrict the number of children, but to wake the fertility control, increasing the probability of exceeding the fertility ideal.

An adequate explanation is probably a broader image that integrates the economical conditions with the level of aspirations, considering that people have fewer children because they fail to balance the various conflicting options, on a larger scale than ever before.

Fewer or not having children is a consequence of what André Béjin called "the modern obsession of gaining in every parts and not sacrifice any possibilities" (Béjin, 1998, p. 178).

Public policy

Public policies play an important role in motherhood choices because they change the cost of children.

Comparing family benefits

The EU has no competence in either population or family policy, not stating a formal policy position on existing fertility patterns.

All the EU member states have developed support measures for families with children, but only a few have an explicit family policy.

All countries provide for a series of cash benefits, tax-free allowances and benefits in kind. These prove a common desire to compensate family cost of bringing up one or more children. However, the comparative analysis of family benefits demonstrates that the common points are rather related to general principles than to policy objectives, revealing big discrepancies among states especially at the implementation level. The choices of a certain support measures or others relay on different social and familial values.

In spite of the process in progress of harmonizing social policies, EU states still differ very much on the topic of family support.

Dividing lines

A comparative analyze of national family and especially fertility policies (family planning and reproductive health policies, measures and services favouring childbearing and rearing) reveal interesting features. Cross-country differences in fertility levels seem to be associated with divergent policies.

The differences in the fertility levels and family-gender related policies between the Scandinavian and the Mediterranean countries suggest that gender equality measures in matters of labour and family life positively influence fertility, even though it is not the main aim of the policy (Hantrais, 2003).

There is rising consensus in Europe, but dividing lines remain (Krieger, 2004):

Narrow or wide concept of the family

Intervention on family structures and resources or exclusively on resources

Work-life-balance or male breadwinner model

Reconciliation activities exclusively for women or for both men and women

Support for different types of family policy

We have stated that data show different countries supporting quite different policy measures. The differences tend to correspond to the welfare state regimes. In countries where universal and employment-related programs are widespread, support for these kinds of measures is also more prevalent.

According to the data from the Eurobarometer, in the perception of the EU15 citizens, the *increased employment* and *flexible working hours* is the best social policy to improve the situation of families. Financial support measures like *child allowances* and *childcare provisions* are of high importance, but not on the top of the list.

In the newly admitted and candidate countries there are different attitudes towards family measures. The citizens have different preferences: *more child allowances, increased level of parental leave payment, limited costs for education*. (Eurobarometer, 2002)

The opposite patterns reveal diverse welfare systems and discrepant economic developments, but also different cultures. The modest economic performances, the increase of social inequality certainly contribute to the difference, along with the heritage of the welfare/redistributive state and general attitudes towards the state.

Therefore, there are no common supported measures, which could be taken to equilibrate low fertility trends, to combat child poverty, to facilitate reconciliation of work and family life and to increase the family welfare. People expect different things from their governments, divergence existing especially between EU 15 and newly admitted and candidate group of countries.

Implications for policy

The key policy challenge is to balance the conflict between the emerging need for intervention in favour of fertility rising and the general principle that being a private matter, people should be left to choose their own childbearing levels.

Can policy positively influence fertility?

I. Recent research results (comparative studies on the most European countries) demonstrate that, at least at the intention level, people could have more children in a more favourable socio-economic background. Relying on this, policymakers could contribute to fertility adjustment, improving the context of childbearing.

Research data indicate under-attainment of fertility ideal (the gap between the ideal and actual number of children is much higher in CEE countries than in EU15) but limited possibilities for direct policy intervention. DG Research (European Commission) clearly shows non-acceptance of public policies directly influencing family formation, concluding that public policy in general would appear to have a larger indirect influence on decisions regarding family life than do specific family policy measures (Hantrais, 2003). Especially for CEE countries, which experienced decades of aggressive 'pronatalist policy' such an option is likely to be unsupported by the population.

Romania is a good example for the negative consequences and the low long-term impact in redressing fertility of such policy actions (See Box 1).

Most women, particularly those with a high level of education, combine highly demanding occupational careers with family responsibilities. On average, around a fifth of

European workers declare they have problems to balance paid work and family responsibilities (with strong country variations from 5% in Netherlands to 27% in Latvia - Eurobarometer, EC) families with small children reporting a wider range of problems. This places demands not just on the childcare and family support system but also on the employer to encourage more 'family-friendly' ways of working.

Box 1. The demographic policy in Romania: 1945 to present

From the beginning, the socialist regime introduced a variety of new laws meant to change the structure and function of the family. In the first period (before 1966), no demographic goals were declared. Some measures seriously affect family: authorizing divorce, liberalized induced abortion. In several studies, these features have been interpreted as the Romanian government's intention to destroy family (Ghebrea, 2000). This first liberal period in family policy ended in 1966 when the State's attitude towards the family and fertility cardinally changed. In 1966, the Romanian state introduced a strong "pronatalist" policy. Induced abortion was prohibited and the official procedure for divorce became so difficult that it may be considered as divorce proscription. In addition, the State developed programs to improve mother and child health care and introduced substantial allowances for women giving birth to children.

These measures were reinforced during the '70s i.e. progressive birth premiums were introduced and monthly allowances for births of third and higher rank, extended maternity leave and instituted special awards for mothers of large families (honorary title "Mother-Heroine" for those having 4 and more children). As a supplementary dissuasive measure, it imposed a tax on childless men and women and on single persons (so called "childless tax" and "celibate tax").

On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to reduce the family policy of the Romanian State only to constrictive pronatalist measures. The main support for the Romanian families came from the social protection system with no specifically demographic aims. This policy guaranteed to all families free education, free medical care, full employment and accommodation, offering some additional benefits depending on family size.

The Romanian, as well as the other socialist family policies at that period had obvious demographic goals for stimulating population growth. The fertility decline and nationwide diffusion of one-or-two child family during the '70s and '80s clearly reveal **a long-term failure of this demographic policy**. *In 1989 the fertility rate had the same value as in 1966, when the pronatalist policy has been introduced.*

However, this policy had many consequences over the family formation and other family related aspects. These features of social policy from socialist period reflect the effort of the state, in Romania and in other European Socialist countries, to induce a paternalist dependency of the families with children (Zamfir, 1999). This context favoured early marriage, young age at childbearing and rather homogeneous reproductive behaviour in Romania, outlining a pattern encountered as well in the most of the European Socialist countries.

After the 1989, family policy was liberalized. Induced abortion was authorized again and divorce procedures were simplified. This changing of policy in the broader context of socio-economic renovations generated important transformations in family formation and structure, the fertility decline being by far the most dramatic one. The widespread model becomes one-child family. Besides the economic constraints, a very important factor for fertility drop remains **the inheritance of a "restricted fertility culture" as perverse effect of the pronatalist socialist policy** (Zamfir, 1999). Therefore, the general cultural shift, which has turned against the ideal of the large family throughout European countries, is reinforced by this additional reason in the former socialist countries.

Finally, one can accept the hypothesis that policy support measures can redress fertility, improving the context of childbearing and enhancing capacity to achieve overall preferences. The means to do this would be only acceptable measures in democratic society (Krieger, 2004): enlarge options, reducing constraints, not enforcing a certain pattern of family - fertility behaviour.

II. On the other hand, the fact that people's actual fertility is placed under their ideal, do not really offer a basis for policy intervention (or an expectation for policy success). This gap reflects the improved fertility control (situations in which actual exceeds the ideal number of children are uncommon, tending to be exceptions), which reflect rather a socio-economic development than a worsening situation (the widest gap is met among the better-off people).

It is very difficult to imagine policy responses efficient in raising fertility and socially acceptable. The socialist experience of Romania and the other CEE countries demonstrates the contradictory effects of intervention measures.

In spite of a low national value, the Romanian fertility is "extremely socially polarized" (Zamfir, 1999): it is very low for the well-off population, able to offer the adequate conditions for the future child development, and it is quite high (sometimes close to the natural fertility rate) for the poor population.

Therefore, financial and in-kind support measures may not be efficient, favouring a fertility increase for the disadvantaged categories of population and generating further social problems. On the other hand, on a long run, this support for the less well off could eventually have a positive impact on improving control over their lives that lead in the end to a fall in birth rates of these categories, too.

The categories with the lowest fertility already have a high level of resources, so that additional supports need to be other kind of benefits, but even so, the impact on fertility would be unclear.

CEE countries have a particular situation. Besides the cultural shift, dramatic economic changes clearly affected fertility, having now the lowest rates in Europe. The higher gap between ideal and actual number of children indicate not only an improved fertility control, but also a worsen context of childbearing⁶³. This could give a larger space of actions to the CEE states compared to the EU ones.

In a short term, some improvements in fertility of CEE countries could be achieved. Measures to improve the position of women on the labour market together with family-friendly services to facilitate childrearing and help women to come closer to the number of children they want could be some notable options. *Yet the influence of policies is limited in the long run* because of the already widely shared and growing influence of the cultural model of a small number of children.

In conclusion, cultural shift represent a major cause of the fertility decline and state's options to reverse this cultural change are very limited. Unequivocal evidence that family policy can contribute to an increase in birth rate is not available, but the lack of support and, more especially, of appropriate economic and employment policies seem to be contributing to the continuing fall in birth rates, particularly in the southern European and some ECE newly admitted and candidate countries.

⁶³ In Romania, demographers (Ghețău, 2000) point out a desire of recovering fertility of older parents, who postponed the birth of the second child, hoping for better times. As economic recovery did not occur but the parents got older, they decided to achieve their ideal number of children anyway. As a result, it can be observed a growth in births of the second and third range, between women age 30-34 in the last years.

Appendix


Table 1. Evolution of fertility rate⁶⁴ in Europe (children per woman)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Albania	6,57	5,28	5,12		3,62	3,21	3,00	2,62			
Bosnia Herzegovina	3,95	3,50	2,71	2,38	1,93	1,89	1,71		1,34	1,44	1,23
Bulgaria	2,32	2,09	2,17	2,22	2,05	1,98	1,82	1,23	1,30	1,24	1,21
Croatia	2,20	2,21	1,83	1,92	1,92	1,81	1,67	1,50	1,40	1,38	1,34
Russia	2,56	2,12	2,00	1,97	1,86	2,05	1,90	1,34	1,21	1,25	1,32
Serbia and Montenegro	2,57	2,53	2,30	2,33	2,29	2,22	2,10	1,89	1,66	1,71	
Moldova		2,68	2,56	2,52	2,41	2,75	2,39	1,74	1,30	1,25	1,21
Romania	2,34	1,91	2,90	2,60	2,43	2,31	1,84	1,34	1,31	1,27	1,26
Macedonia	4,11	3,71	2,98	2,71	2,47	2,31	2,06	2,13	1,88	1,73	1,77
Turkey	6,18	5,82	5,68	5,09	4,36	3,59	2,99	2,62	2,57	2,52	
Ukraine	2,23	1,99	2,09	2,02	1,95	2,02	1,89	1,38	1,09		1,10
Belarus	2,80	2,27	2,30	2,20	2,04	2,08	1,90	1,38	1,31	1,27	1,22
Czech Republic	2,11	2,18	1,90	2,40	2,10	1,96	1,90	1,28	1,14	1,14	1,17
Estonia	1,96	1,93	2,16	2,04	2,02	2,12	2,04	1,32	1,34	1,34	1,37
Hungary	2,02	1,82	1,98	2,35	1,91	1,85	1,87	1,57	1,32	1,31	1,30
Latvia	1,94	1,74	2,02	1,97	1,90	2,09	2,01	1,26	1,24	1,21	1,24
Lithuania	2,59	2,21	2,39	2,18	1,99	2,09	2,03	1,55	1,39	1,30	1,24
Slovakia	3,10	2,80	2,40	2,53	2,31	2,26	2,09	1,52	1,30	1,20	1,19
Poland	2,98	2,69	2,26	2,26	2,26	2,32	2,05	1,62	1,34	1,29	1,24
Austria	2,70	2,71	2,29	1,83	1,65	1,47	1,46	1,42	1,36	1,33	1,40
Belgium	2,56	2,62	2,25	1,74	1,68	1,51	1,62	1,56	1,66	1,64	1,62
France	2,73	2,84	2,47	1,93	1,95	1,81	1,78	1,71	1,88	1,89	1,89
Germany	2,37	2,50	2,03	1,48	1,56	1,37	1,45	1,25	1,38	1,35	1,31
- FRG (before unifying)	2,37	2,51	1,99	1,45	1,45	1,28	1,45	1,34	1,38		
- Former GDR	2,35	2,49	2,19	1,54	1,94	1,74	1,50	0,84	1,22		
Luxembourg	2,37	2,39	1,97	1,55	1,49	1,38	1,60	1,69	1,76	1,66	1,63
Netherlands	3,12	3,04	2,57	1,66	1,60	1,51	1,62	1,53	1,72	1,71	1,73
Finland	2,72	2,48	1,83	1,68	1,63	1,64	1,78	1,81	1,73	1,73	1,72
Denmark	2,57	2,61	1,99	1,92	1,55	1,45	1,67	1,80	1,77	1,74	1,72
Ireland	3,78	4,04	3,85	3,43	3,24	2,48	2,11	1,84	1,90	1,96	2,00
United Kingdom	2,71	2,86	2,43	1,81	1,89	1,79	1,83	1,71	1,64	1,63	1,64
Sweden	2,20	2,42	1,92	1,77	1,68	1,74	2,13	1,73	1,54	1,57	1,65
Greece	2,21	2,24	2,40	2,32	2,23	1,67	1,39	1,32	1,29	1,25	
Italy	2,41	2,66	2,43	2,21	1,64	1,42	1,33	1,20	1,24	1,23	
Slovenia	2,18	2,46	2,12	2,17	2,10	1,71	1,46	1,29	1,26	1,21	1,21
Malta				2,17	1,98	1,99	2,04	1,82	1,72	1,72	1,46
Portugal	3,16	3,15	3,01	2,75	2,25	1,72	1,57	1,41	1,55	1,45	1,47
Spain	2,77	2,94	2,88	2,80	2,20	1,64	1,36	1,18	1,24	1,26	1,25

Source: EC, Eurostat

⁶⁴ **Total fertility rate** = the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year. The rate refers to a synthetic female cohort. It is computed by the summation of the age-specific fertility rates. The total fertility rate is also used to indicate replacement level fertility; in the more developed countries, **a rate of 2.1 is considered to be replacement level.**

Figure 1. Europe, total fertility rate map, 2002 compared to 1990



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During the last decades, concepts like social capital, civic society, and collective action knew a huge popularity, especially due to the particular contribution that they may have as tools for or part of social development. An increasing number of academic articles and books flourish, doubled by a similar tendency in policy making circles, as well as in the media. The unprecedented popularity led to using those concepts in such a broad variety of contexts that they became almost meaningless. However, most of the papers devoted to social capital, using a careful selection of the indicators, provide important information and consistent models that allow better describing societies and explaining social processes and phenomena.

In this paper, I analyze the (bridging) social capital variations across European societies, aiming to see if Europe, as a mixture of countries, is or not homogenous from this perspective, how much Europe is different from other countries or (administrative/political) entities, and if the variability of social capital is one that might impede or facilitate European integration. I am avoiding defining social capital otherwise than through its main, operational elements. More, I am dealing only with those aspects of social capital which are useful for social development, according to the existing literature. I am interested in the frequency of (bridging) social connections, importance of friendship, membership in associations, interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as involvement in mass protest actions.

The quantitative country level analysis focuses on the variations across Europe, and tries to identify consistent patterns of social capital that allows clustering the European societies. I look for East-West differences, also sketching some cultural level explanations. In this context I address the question of how much the differences are important for European integration, and in which measure they contribute to the European diversity. However, my aim is not to build up an explanatory model, and I am not validating an explanatory one. I limit to describing the variability of social capital across Europe and to briefly discuss if the results have any importance for the European integration.

The findings are not necessary original: I identify several consistent patterns, derived from the cleavages between ex-totalitarian versus democratic recent history, and between the Nordic and Southern-Mediterranean heritage. I expect ex-communist countries to display lower levels of social capital, while Southern Europeans are more likely to often meet their friends. The Nordics, with a deep history of cooperation and collective action, developed higher levels of trust. Europe lacks homogeneity, but it belongs to a similar cultural pattern.

⁶⁵ This paper was partially supported through the CNCSIS research grant no. 715/2003 „Social Capital and Community Development”. Due to their large size, I have preferred posting some of the maps which illustrate the distribution of social capital across Europe on the Sibiu conference web site, being included in the PowerPoint presentation posted there (<http://www.iccv.ro/romana/conf/conf.sibiu.2004/program.htm>).

However, other state entities are sharing similar patterns. The innovative part of my approach is to put together this information, and to build up coherent clusters inside Europe, showing how the levels of social capital indicators shape the continent.

The paper starts with a brief definition of social capital, and its elements. Then I briefly state the hypotheses. Few methodological considerations precede the data presentation. In the analysis section, I employ EVS/WVS 1999-2001 data set to describe first the variability of each of the social capital indicators across European societies. Cluster analysis allows to identify the common patterns, and to compare the European societies with other entities. In the end, I discuss some possible implications for the European integration.

Conceptualizing social capital

Each of the three “founding fathers” of the social capital as a social science concept added a specific part to the definition of the term. Bourdieu (1986, 1999) focused on social connections. Coleman (1988, 1990), emphasizing the functions of social capital, showed that it is embedded within the social structure and facilitate collective action. Putnam (1993) added trust and civic participation. Thousands of papers and books contributed in the 80s, 90s and today to increasing knowledge and understanding of social capital. They have debated upon its positive or negative functions, upon its specificity as capital, upon its structure and measurement. I have no intention here to review the huge literature. Many scholars did it (see by example Portes, 1998; Robinson et al, 1999; Dagsupta and Serageldin, 2000; Mihaylova, 2004, to mention only a few sources). I specify only my operational definition of social capital by noting that I am interested mainly in the so-called positive social capital. Considering that ‘*collective action* is the central reference point in any definition of social capital’ (Weltzel et al, 2004), I understand through social capital the elements mentioned in Table 2.

Table 2. The elements of (bridging) social capital: an operational synthesis

Bridging connections	Socializing	<i>Meeting friends</i>
		<i>Importance of friends in everyday life</i>
Civic engagement	<i>Membership in voluntary associations</i>	
	Participation in mass protest actions	Latent support*
		<i>Actual involvement</i>
Trust	Social trust (<i>Trusting people</i>)	
	<i>Trust in institutions</i>	

* In this paper I use no measure for the latent support for participation in mass protest actions. The six entries marked with italics define the measuring model that I employ.

Networks, trust, and civic engagement define the space where social capital lies. Frequently meeting friends, considering them as important, participating in formal associations, involvement in protest actions, crediting people and institutions with trust are the operational expressions of social capital at societal level⁶⁶. In the following I briefly describe each of the components, also suggesting how they can contribute to individual/societal development.

First of all, a look to two taxonomies may be useful. The first one is between positive and negative social capital, used by many scholars, particularly when referring the ex-communist Europe (Rose, 1999; Paldam and Svendsen, 2002 etc.). The negative social capital is seen as that kind of social connections that may hinder general social development. They include clan and Mafia type relations, corruption etc. and are usually associated with generalized mistrust in institutions and people, as well as with lower levels of tolerance to differences. Positive social capital, described below, is the one who may support social development.

The second taxonomy in which I am interested, overlap in many aspects the first one. It separates the bridging and the bonding social capital (Woolcock 2000; Narayan 1999; Putnam, 2001 [2000]). Focusing mainly on social relations, the two categories describe qualities of social capital, related with the way in which individuals select their social network(s). If people use to interact mainly with similar individuals, belonging to their primary membership groups, they develop bonding social capital. Higher inter-group relations lead to increased bridging social capital. The later is useful in individual and social development, facilitating access to more various resources, societal negotiations, tolerance, trust, and collective action. Bonding social capital can lead, on opposite, to insular or conflictual societies. In many ways, bridging social capital is positive, when considering its consequences for development. Putnam (2001: 22-24) define the bridging social capital as being „inclusive”, while the bonding one is labeled as “exclusive”, since it may create, along with “strong in-group loyalties, [...] strong out-group antagonism”. As Putnam notes, in particular conditions, bonding social capital can be also positive, especially for “getting by”, while the bridging one facilitate individuals and communities to “get ahead” (p.23). The two forms are complementary, but the bridging one is more important for development. It represents the focus of this paper

Meeting friends acts as capital at individual level mainly through two basic ways: accessing resources controlled by the members of ones social network, including goods, but mainly information, knowledge; using informal safety nets as insurance for dealing with social risks. At societal level, the impact is less visible, but extremely important for development purposes: it allows people to share and discuss their ideas, acting as a trigger for developing participative culture.

⁶⁶ Following Coleman assertion that social capital is embedded in networks, there is a tendency to locate social capital only at the level of groups, communities, or societies (see Portes, 2000 for a discussion of this point). The concept works at the individual level too, since the individuals may use the social capital for their own sake. Paxton (2002) argues that social capital can be measured at multiple levels (individual, group, society etc.) and produces effect on each plane. I embrace the same position. However, since in this paper I am interested in the differences between nations, I am interested more in the “stocks” of social capital (Putnam, 1993) that societies may have. Therefore I am dealing only with measuring (bridging) social capital at aggregate level.

Meeting colleagues plays a similar role. However, for both individual and societal level, meeting friends has a higher instrumental value than meeting colleagues: interaction with the latter ones is somehow mandatory for everyone who has a colleague. More, colleagues use to have profiles very similar from the informational point of view, as they have access to similar knowledge. Friends may bring a supplementary value, even if they are not necessary very different either. Neighbors, then family, in this order, are less important, at least for ex-communist societies like Romania (B.Voicu, 2004), since their proximity reduces the instrumentality of accessing different knowledge and resources⁶⁷.

A further development of these hypotheses and past findings lead to the expectation that valuing friends at least in the same measure as family, is a good indicator for a latent orientation towards increasing the stock of social capital.

Some people might be skeptical on these matters: they claim that simply meeting friends for drinking, eating together, leisure activities, sports, etc. does not bring any value on increasing access or potential for access to knowledge, information etc.⁶⁸ However, reducing everything to only one dimension, one may argue that people have to talk about something even when they are drunk. Since simple communication facilitate information sharing, the more different the drunk schmoozers are, the more diverse and potential valuable information they may get. Removing the exaggeration of over-drinking, one may easily identify diverse ways of potential cooperation and increasing social cohesion and potential for collective action that meeting friends offers.

Membership in associations can be seen as a particular case of meeting friends. The formal framework and the pronounced civic engagement make the difference. The latter one is the phenomenon that impressed Tocqueville during its American journey. Following Putnam's works (1993, 2001), membership in association became the main indicator used for measuring social capital and civic society in contemporary sociology, despite the fact that its relation with development is quite weak (Weltzer et al, 2004; Mihaylova, 2004; etc.). Let also note that not all types of association provide bridging social capital: xenophobic, ethnic, nationalist, militia etc. are rather hindering social development, destroying social trust and bridging connections, they exacerbate existing cleavage and may generate new ones, they reduce access to information, to new ideas etc. (Paxton, 2002).

Participation in mass protest actions is infrequently used as indicator for social capital. At individual level, it might be an indicator of social capital (people are part of the protest because they have the social connections which allow them to cooperate with others in

⁶⁷ See Peri 6, 1997: 10, for a similar argument. Peri 6 claims that government 'should stop reinforcing the wrong types of networks' (p.11), particularly referring family, neighbors and friends similar to the referential person. However, one can easily de-construct the argument since in many cases, at individual level, family relationships prove to be more important, with direct consequences on the community and society level (Coleman, 1990; Pahl, 2000; Douglas, 1997). One the other hand, using the bridging-bonding distinction, Putnam (2001: 23) reads Granovetter's classic assertion about the weak ties showing that the more distant (and weak) a connection is, the more bridging potential it has, since it offers a tie with a friend that is outside the usual circles in which one is involved. Therefore, one may conclude that friends should be more important than colleagues.

⁶⁸ I have faced off this criticism in several meetings with colleagues from the Research Institute for Quality of Life, in Bucharest, when I have presenting findings related to social capital.

developing the protest action), but it can also be determined by latent orientations towards non-conformism, self-expressing, terribleness, need for company, and other different things (some people may simply be on the street when somebody ask them to sign a petition, or a demonstration occur). At societal level, the aggregate index is an excellent indicator for the incidence of organizing such mass protest within the respective society (organizing need organizers, which implies membership in associations, volunteering, trust, ties etc.), i.e. for social capital and collective action. As Weltzer et al (2004) noticed, ‘both forms of community involvement [<membership in associations> and <participation in instantaneously action>] reflect the contextual opportunities of involvement more than anything else’, and they are better measures for societal level predictions⁶⁹.

Following Putnam, trust became a standard component of the social capital mix (see Paxton, 1999; Sandu, 2003; Raiser et al, 2001; Anheier et al, 2004; etc.). Trusting people is a basis for any kind of cooperative action (Sztompka, 1999a; Misztal, 1996; Uslander, 2002). It implies an implicit insurance that the others will act according to ones expectation, decreasing the uncertainty of predicting their behavior.

Trust in institutions is also crucial for societal cooperation and cohesion. However, as Dumitru Sandu (1999: 75-78) noticed, trust in institutions is highly circumstantial, at least for societies like Romania. When including among the institutions the Government, the Parliament and other political bodies, several “trust cycles” may be noticed, depending mainly on the elections moment.

There are two other potential indicators of social capital at societal level, mentioned within existing literature.

Some scholars (Knack and Keefer, 1997; van Schaik, 2002; Raiser et al, 2001) argue that measuring social capital at societal level should also include what they call trustworthiness, civic mindedness, or attachments to the norms of order: rejecting cheating on taxes as legitimate action, as well as over speed driving, buying stolen goods, accepting bribes etc. However, this is more related with the support for the existing system of social order, than an intrinsic measure of social capital. It is a consequence of generalized trust in institutions, as one can argue using the data reported by the quoted authors. When considering the relation with social capital of the above mentioned indicators, one might argue that this is similar with the one of other attitudes towards the norms shaping the contemporary social systems of order: support for democracy, tolerance, ecological-friendly behavior etc.

Other authors (Sandu, 2003), discuss tolerance as a measure of social capital. As I have argued elsewhere (B.Voicu, 2004), tolerance is a consequence of the daily interactions with other groups, but it mainly stands as an indicator for post-modern social values, within a larger set including pluralism, open-mindedness etc.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Paxton (2002: 257) argues that ‘meetings can be planned, events can be organized [...] when individuals meet in associations’. Therefore, the incidence of protest events within a society can be considered as an indicator for the presence of certain stocks of bridging social capital, at the level of the respective society.

⁷⁰ Pluralism, open-mindedness, tolerance are discussed by Paxton (2002: 260) as effects of bridging social capital.

Main hypothesis

The bulk of the literature devoted to social capital is somehow embedded into the Western culture. Discussing levels of social capital indicators no matter where, scholars use the occidental cultural pattern and compare the investigated societies with this model. My approach is similar. I describe the differences between European societies using Western Europe as reference category, and emphasizing the specificities of the other regions. Cultural factors induced by recent history, the level of social development, religious and ethnic structure may contribute to inducing these differences. In this section I sketch the main hypothesis inferred from a superficial look at this factors.

Friendship is the first element to be considered. It changed a lot its meaning over time (Pahl, 2000): in developed societies friends became more and more important extending their role beyond the limit of young adulthood, and competing family and kinship in providing the social support of safety net. Urbanization, dissolution of extended family, changes in sexual and marital behavior, more time and possibilities for leisure are among the factors that went together with this change. Late modernity is particularly marked by an increasing role of friends and social networks (Giddens, 1992). For ex-communist societies, friendship is still at the beginning of its career as determinant for everyday life during mature adulthood and at higher ages. Some of the Eastern societies (Romania, Poland, Albania, Ukraine etc.) include large segments dominated by the rural/agrarian life-style and culture. Others (Poland, Romania) also present traditional models of family, as well as high levels of religious belief. More, suspicions and fears developed during communism, when the social representation described political police as omnipresent, hindered the development of large, bridging social networks. Somehow this was also the case of other societies which experimented years of totalitarian rule during the second half of the late century (Spain, Portugal). On the other hand, there is Southern heritage of a more friends-oriented life-style, especially during the hot summers.

Involvement in associations is also reported to be lower in those countries which experienced totalitarian rule relatively recently. Totalitarian ruler tried to fully control or forbid civil society (Ekiert, 1992; Rose, 1999). During communism, for instance, public space was a space of lying, where the official discourse was referring a different reality than the real world (Platonova, 2003). Even the private space was controlled in several ways, including diminishing the span of time in which one may speak with friends and even family (Verdery, 2003). In countries like Romania the communist regime imposed practicing so called “voluntary” or “patriotic” activities, on the behalf of the state, as representing the others, and undermined on longer run the meaning of and the propensity to volunteering (M.&B. Voicu, 2003).

Some deeper historical roots of different tendency for cooperation among the European societies can be found in the history of the structure of agricultural exploitation. In the Middle Age, Elba delimited two different patterns of land ownership and use (Rössener, 2003). The Western one involved peasant ownership over land or partial lease, with necessary

individual decision and cooperation when discussing, for instance, the crop rotation. The Eastern pattern (spread from Bohemia to Ukraine and Romania), supposed the existence of large plots owned by local boyards/nobles⁷¹, with the peasants depending on them and forced to work for the local aristocracy or gentry (the Western model involved different taxes paid by the peasants to the nobles). A mixture of the partial lease model and ownership over large plots characterized the Mediterranean countries. More, in the dawns of the industrial age, the Southern European aristocracy, particularly in Spain and Portugal, displayed a tendency to increase their relative power by ‘feudalising’ the agricultural relations, in the direction of to the above-described Eastern pattern.

The Western pattern involved more autonomy of the peasantry, and the need to cooperate for the common sake. The Norfolk type crop rotation⁷², present in countries like England and the Netherlands (Rössener, 2003), supposed some higher levels of cooperation amongst villagers. Common decisions and organized collective action, at least within neighborhoods, were more often present in the Western Europe than in the East, as well as in the North as compared with the Mediterranean societies. All these past realities may still reflect today in shaping a decreasing propensity towards cooperation from North to South and from West to East.

Trusting people is highly related with culture. Some scholars (Inglehart, 1997; Giddens, 1990) discuss it as part of the tendency towards the postmodern way of thinking. Higher levels are to be expected in the North and in the West. More frequent interaction with different people, and higher tolerance are present here. They are reinforced and reinforce social trust. The Netherlands, for instance, are expected to show higher trust in people. At the opposite, authoritarian regimes tend to destroy the social trust. When participating in public life is rather forced and ritualistic as in communism (Raiser et al., 2002), and every one can be an informer (B.Voicu, 2004: 202-203), trusting others is likely to be low, people preferring to be very careful, cautious when dealing with others. As Bădescu (2003) shows, inter-human trust is also related with the degree in which the economic system is closer to the free market model⁷³.

Trust in institutions is shaped by the familiarity with the institutional system (see Sztompka, 1999), by their past and present performance, by the support for the respective social system, by socialization etc. (see Mishler & Rose, 2001, 1997). From this respect, I expect to find a lower trust in institutions in the ex-communist Europe, and an even lower one in the Balkans. Western countries with high growth rates during the last decades, such as Ireland, should display higher levels of institutional trust.

⁷¹ In the beginning of the second millennium, in some of the Eastern societies the agricultural/ownership pattern was functionally similar to the Western model. The ‘communal village’ implied common ownership and exploitation of the land by the villagers, while taxes were paid to the state and/or to the local nobles. By the 15th-16th century, this “communal-trade political economy” (Chiot, 2002) was replaced by the omnipresent boyard, owning large plots of land on which the peasants were forced to work.

⁷² The Norfolk system represented by the 16th-17th century the prototype of the modern agriculture, having as a crucial feature the crop rotation.

⁷³ This relation partially proves the embedness of the social capital model within the Western pattern of democratic organization, briefly mentioned in the beginning of the current paper.

Involvement in mass protest action is part of a democratic culture of civic engagement, of collective action (Weltzel et al, 2004). This is specific rather to older than to newer democracies.

Summarizing, there are three influences that may change the Western pattern. The first one comes from the years of totalitarian rule experimented by some countries during their relatively recent past. The second comes from the Southern heritage, more opened to spending time with friends. The third is to be found in the Nordic societies, more post-material, in Inglehart's terms, and, therefore, displaying higher levels of trust (and collective action). Some atypical societies are to be found: Greece is Southern, and experienced de facto years of authoritarian rule (as Portugal and Spain also did). However, its belonging to the Western political bloc came with the influence of the Western cultural pattern, especially in developing the framework for an increased membership in associations. Albania's isolation during the second half of the 20th century was doubled by a severe totalitarian rule, which tempered the Southern influences. Ex-Yugoslavian more liberal communism, and Southern heritage were partially counter-balanced by the 90s war. Ireland with its high growth rates during the last decades should display higher levels of trust in institutions etc.

Measurement and data

Data. I am using the joint European Values Survey / World Value Survey 1999-2001 data base⁷⁴. The surveys are very similar. EVS was carried out within most of the European countries in 1999-2000. WVS completed with data for several other world countries, as well as in some European countries which did not applied the EVS (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova etc.). 81 societies were investigated, offering good indicators for the social capital. However, in some isolated cases, data collection seems to affect the quality of the information, limiting the analysis⁷⁵.

Meeting friends. The basic EVS/WVS item tapping for socializing is a four point scale, asking how often one Spend time with friends: 'every week', 'once or twice a month', 'a few times a year', 'not at all'. Several strategies may be employed for computing aggregate indexes at country level: counting the proportion of those answering 'every week', computing a dominant opinion index (a Hofstätter index), treating the variable as interval level measured and computing a mean (Anheier et al, 2004) etc. The resulting indexes present very strong correlations. I am using in the analysis the percent of people that declares that they spend time with friends weekly.

Importance of friends. Despite the fact that there is no direct measure of contrasting friends and family importance, EVS/WVS provides measures (four point scales) of how

⁷⁴ I have access to the data sets as a member of the EVS/WVS Romanian Team.

⁷⁵ This is the case of Albania (58% of the sample declared to be Catholic, in a country where the majority is Muslim), Georgia (a similar inconsistency), or Moldova (significantly more Romanians than expected and fewer Ukrainians – the weighting design did satisfactory solved the respective discrepancies).

important are considered to be friends, respectively family. Since the interested is related with those individuals for which the friends are at least as important as family, the strategy for computing the aggregate index is to count the number of individuals who declare higher or equal importance for friends when compared with the similar answer for the family.

Membership in associations. EVS/WVS asked people if they belong to select the type of associations to which they belong from a list of 14 types: religious, political parties, labor unions, women, peace, environmental, third world-development/human rights, professional, charity, youth, sports, cultural. The EVS questionnaire included a category of voluntary association labeled “other”, but this is not asked in the WVS. One may compute either the average number of type of association in which one participate, or the percent of people belonging to at least one type of voluntary association (M.Voicu & B.Voicu, 2003; Weltzer et al, 2004; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; B.Voicu, 1999 etc.). The indexes are highly correlated, and practically they produce the same results. I preferred the average number of types of membership. A second option to be made is to include all types of associations or to distinguish among them. Some papers prefer distinguishing⁷⁶, some others – following Putnam – treat all types as being similar (Raiser et al, 2001; van Schaik, 2001). I stick to the same option that I have made in previous work (M. & B. Voicu, 2003, 2004; B. & M. Voicu, 2003), distinctly treating membership and voluntary work for political parties and labor unions, as well as for religious associations. At least in some countries, all of these types include some mandatory membership, which decrease their potential as indicators for social capital.

Trusting people. The EVS/WVS questionnaire includes a dichotomous item for trusting people: ‘most people can be trusted’ versus ‘you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’. I use as aggregate index the percent of those who chose to trust most people.

Trust in institutions. EVS/WVS surveys include several items measuring trust in different institutions on a four points scale. Press, army, church, Parliament, labor unions, UN, civil services, and police are the institutions for which one can get measures for all the European countries included in the survey. As I previously mentioned, trust in Parliament is more exposed to trust cycles due to the distance to the elections. Trust in army and in church, as traditional institutions, may have different behavior than trust in other institutions. I have excluded these three institutions and I have run a factor analysis for the rest, computing the average for each country⁷⁷. I have computed different other similar indicators, for the European countries, through including different other institutions in the analysis, or excluding

⁷⁶ Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), using EVS-WVS 1990-1993 data, distinct two important groups: “old social movements” (trade unions, political parties, professional associations), and “new social movements” (women organizations, environmental associations, third world development associations, peace organizations etc.). Weltzel et al (2004), working on EVS-WVS 1999-2000 data, distinguish four categories: charity and environmental associations; educational and professional; labor unions and political parties; church and religious associations.

⁷⁷ The factor was extracted through Principal Axis Factoring method and explains 31,8% of the total variance. The analysis is fairly adequate to the data (KMO = 0,772, the smaller communality is 0,199). I have run similar analyses for each country in the sample, and the results also confirmed the adequacy of using factor analysis.

some from the ones for which the dataset provided information for every European country. The correlations among those indexes were very high, proving the stability of the index for trust in institutions.

Involvement in mass protest actions. Involvement in five types of mass protest actions is measured through the EVS/WVS questionnaire: signing petitions, joining boycott, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories. Three answers were possible for each of them: 'have done', 'might do', and 'would never do'. Different aggregating strategies may be employed, conducting to different but highly inter-correlated measures: to count the percent of those who joined at least one type of mass protest actions; to count the percent of the ones who joined or might join these actions; to treat the five variables as continuous and to aggregate them through factor analysis in a latent orientation towards mass protest action, then computing the country average as expression of capacity to mobilize etc. On the other hand, among these five type of collective protest behaviours, unofficial strikes and occupying buildings are differ from the others, since they are more radical and attract much less people in all investigated societies (see Weltzel et al, 2004). Considering all these, my option is to use – as social capital indicator at aggregate level – the percent of people who participated in at least one protest action (from signing petitions, joining boycotts, or attending demonstrations).

Some limits of the analysis are related to treating the countries as homogeneous units. As several authors have shown (see Putnam, 1993; Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2003; Sandu, 2003; etc.), focusing either on a specific nation, or doing comparative analysis at NUTS2 level, European societies are not very compact units. Southern Italy differs from the North, London region from the rest of the UK, Transylvania from Moldavia (in Romania) etc. However, the countries are homogenous enough when comparing with other countries to be considered as the cases in the analysis that I run.

Basic findings

The table included in the appendix describes the scores of each European country for the selected social capital indicators. This section aims only to underline the main observations that can be drawn when firstly looking to this data.

Meeting friends. The percent of people declaring that they weekly meet their friends is varying across Europe from about a third (31% in Albania, 35% in Moldova, 36% in Romania) up to over 70% in Bosnia (71%), Ireland (72%), Great Britain (74%) and Greece (73%). Two patterns are to be noticed: ex-communist citizens spend less time with their friends, as compared with the rest of Europe. On the other hand, Northern countries (more secular), and Southern (Mediterranean) ones tend to have a higher propensity towards socializing with friends.

Importance of friends as compared with family. In 19 European societies family is more important than friends. This is the case of about two thirds of the Romanians, Polish,

Maltese and Albanian. In other 26 societies, friends are at least as important as family is. Turkey and Sweden are the societies where friends are considered at least as important as family by three quarters of the population. There are no visible patterns: Europe seems to be a random mixture from this point of view. However, Catholic countries tend to put more importance on family than on friends. Western countries pay more importance on friends, as well as the Nordic people.

On average, 57% of Western Europeans consider family as important as the friends are, but the score for Turkey (76%) significantly exceeds all other regions⁷⁸. The average for the ex-communist countries is 45%, with a significantly higher score for the Balkans and the ex-soviet space as compared with the societies which are included or currently candidate for EU accession. Religious denomination seems to play an important role here. Significantly more Muslims than other religious or non-religious people put on friends at least as much as value as they put on family (71%). Protestants are somewhere in the middle (60%), but they put significantly more value than Catholics and Jews (50, respectively, 48%). Orthodox' score (47%) is even significantly lower than Catholics' one. Atheists and those that declare a free church (no denomination) are close to Protestants.

Membership in associations and volunteering provides the strongest East-West cleavage. Ex-totalitarian states (both ex-communists, but also Portugal and Spain) score lower than most of Western European countries. The average number of types of association, to which someone belongs mean of (0,78) is significantly higher in the Western societies than in any other region. The North-South tendency of decreasing membership in associations can also be noticed⁷⁹.

⁷⁸ All significant relations mentioned in the current section consider $p=0,05$ as threshold. The associations are studied either using contingency analysis or One-Way ANOVA, depending on the types of the involved variables.

⁷⁹ Greece is an important outlier on this axis, since it displays relatively high scores of membership in associations. I do not have a very consistent explanation for Greece behavior. One can imagine that the higher volunteering and membership in associations in Greece are somehow related to the influence of belonging to the Western bloc during the cold war. Social defining the involvement in associations as "the correct way of doing" may fasten the process of converting the frequent meetings with friends in a rich associative life. However, Spain and Portugal act different. External validation of the measure seems to prove that the membership indicator is a valid one: Generally speaking, the Balkan countries display relatively high levels of volunteering and membership. Second, Greece is not an outlier when comparing membership in associations or volunteering (the measures highly correlate) with economic development or with value orientations such as postmodernism (see Inglehart, 2003; B. & M.Voicu, 2003). However, in Greece volunteers are less likely to display democratic values as compared with non-volunteers, while in the rest of the European societies (except for the neighboring Bulgaria) they seem to be significantly more democratic or at least as democratic as the non-volunteers (Halman, 2003: 190). On the other hand, as Morales and Ulzurrun (2002) noticed, the measurement of membership in associations is subject to high errors, and depends a lot on the wording of the questions. For Greece, a brief inspection of Morales and Ulzurrun data shows that the EVS/WVS series and the Eurobarometers provide similar results. This is not the case of the 1999 wave of the European Community Household Panel which indicated the Greeks as the EU15 citizens with the lower propensity to membership in association (Christoforou, 2003). Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos (2002), also note that Greece displays lower membership in associations than many Western European countries, but they also notice that Spain and Portugal have even lower associationism. They also suggest that one should carefully interpret the Greek data, because of the need to separate between traditional passive membership and the active one.

At their turn, the new EU members formerly belonging to the communist block score significantly higher than the three candidate countries and Malta, as well as when compared with Turkey and the majority of the ex-soviet republics.

Volunteering follows similar patterns as membership in associations did (see Table 3). Netherlands and the Nordic countries display the highest levels of joining voluntary associations (more than 60% of the population), while Turkey (3%), Lithuania, Romania, Belarus and Russia (8% each) are placed at the bottom of such an hierarchy. Western Europeans are volunteering more than the ex-communist citizens, the new EU members higher than the Balkans and the EU candidates, which at their turn score higher on volunteering than the NIS.

Table 3. The incidence of performing voluntary work for different types of organizations in Europe

<i>Do you work unpaid for...</i>	Western Europe	ex-communist				Turkey & Malta
		now in EU	EU candidates	Balkan	NIS	
Volunteer in at least one type of organization	29%	23%	17%	20%	11%	16%
Volunteer in at least one type of organization except for political parties and trade unions	27%	20%	12%	17%	7%	13%
Volunteer in at least one type of organization except for political parties, trade unions and religious associations	24%	17%	10%	15%	5%	9%

Note: the figures are computed using the EVS/WVS 1999-2000 database, weighted according to the individual countries populations. EU candidates include Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. The figures for the Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) do not include Albania, due to the unexpected high volunteering incidence reported by the dataset for the respective country.

* The EVS questionnaire included a category of voluntary association labeled “other”. Since the WVS questionnaire (applied in countries like Moldova, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia etc.) did not include this category, we were forced to exclude it from the analysis.


Paxton (2002) notes the circular dependency between social capital and democracy, also reflected in membership in associations: ‘more associations would be expected to exist when governments allow them to exist’ (p.259). Using comparative empirical evidences, Paxton proves in the quoted paper the validity of the respective relation. This may explain the West-East differences, but also those between the Balkans and the rest of the ex-communist countries. The geographically western part of the communist bloc (E.Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary etc.), and the societies which were included in the former Yugoslavia, have experienced a more ‘liberal’ communist regime. This is reflected in the today higher propensity to membership in associations and volunteering.

Membership in associations describes the formal side of the relational social capital. Spending time with friends taps for informal bridging relational capital. Albania is the unexpected outlier with much higher levels of membership in association than expected. On the other side, Turkey also has an atypical behavior, with much more propensity to meet friends than expected when considering its level of associationism. However, this is probably part of Turkey’s Southern cultural pattern. Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and even the rest of

the Balkans also display quite high levels of informal relational capital. Great Britain, another atypical society, with – apparently – lower formal relational capital than expected, display the peculiarity that there are more people which volunteer within voluntary associations than people declaring that they do belong to such organizations⁸⁰.

One can easily note the fact that most of the Western countries are clustered in the top-right side of the figure. Spain and Portugal, with their totalitarian period during the second half of the 20th century, score lower on participation in formal voluntary associations. The most western former-communist societies (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Eastern Germany) are placed close to the imaginary border that might divide West and East.

Figure 6. Formal and informal stocks of relational social capital in Europe



Source: own computations based on EVS/WVS 1999-2000 data set.


Trusting people records the lowest scores in Portugal, Romania and Macedonia, where less than 15% generally trust the others. At the opposite, in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, the majority of the people trust the others. Generally, mistrust is significantly higher in the former communist block, and lower in the new EU countries as compared with the candidates, but otherwise there is no clear rule to divide the continent.

⁸⁰ Bartkowski and Jasińska-Kania (2004), using the same data set, also note this unique pattern in Europe.

Trust in institutions follows a similar pattern. Nordic countries and the Netherlands display higher levels of trust. Portugal and Ireland, with growing life standards during the last decades, score high too. At the opposite corner are the former communist societies, with the note that those accepted within EU have higher levels of trust in institutions than the others. Greece also shows a very low level of trust in institutions.


Considering both indicators of trust (social trust and trust in institutions), as in Figure 7, one may note that Western democracies tend to cluster together in the upper-right part of the graph. Portugal, place in the upper-left corner (lower social trust), is the one who is different. The ex-communist countries recently integrated in the EU, are close to the imaginary border that separate the West and the East. However, some other countries tend to interfere (Croatia and Georgia, for instance), making the group less compact. Greece is a complete outlier.

Figure 7. Patterns of trust across Europe



Participation in mass protest actions is also lower in the East and higher in the Nordic countries. Most Western societies, except for Spain and Portugal, with their past totalitarian experience, have a greater capacity to mobilize in mass protest actions than any ex-communist society excluding Eastern Germany, Slovakia and Czech Republic.

Figure 8. Participation in mass protest actions in different European regions




Note: the figures stand for the percent of people declaring that they have attended at least once one of the following protest actions: petition signing, boycott, lawful demonstrations. All differences are significant at $p < 0,05$, except for those regions marked with the same color. Data source: EVS/WVS 1999-2002 data set.

Clusters within Europe

In order to check for the existing patterns of social capital across European societies, I have employed cluster analysis. The first conclusion was that a solution with four clusters is the most appropriate to the data⁸¹, as I have expected. The main influences that add to the Western pattern are visible when plotting the results: the Nordic influence, the authoritarian experience in some southern societies, the communist regime (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Patterns of social capital across Europe: the four cluster solution



Note. The white spots indicate the lack of data for the respective country. Data source: EVS/WVS 1999-2001 data set.

⁸¹ I have used graphical recognition of the number of clusters (through plotting the agglomeration schedule coefficients), as well as the analysis of the adjusted Rand index. The last one takes the higher value (0,59) for the four cluster solution. The total variation explained through categorizing the countries into the four groups is $ETA_{2K} = 60\%$. In all cluster analyses reported in this paper, I use Standard Euclidian Distance for measuring the distance between cases, and the Ward method for measuring the distances between clusters. When computing the Rand Indexes, I employ BAVERAGE as alternate method for measuring the distances between clusters.

The main cluster includes all the western countries but Sweden and the Netherlands, which forms a separate group, labeled as ‘Nordic’. Finland, Denmark and Iceland are close to the Nordic pattern⁸², but no so different from the Western one (see the Appendix). The countries that experienced in the recent past some authoritarian regimes form two different groups. They share similar positions, with lower scores than the Western and Nordic societies with regard to membership in associations, trusting people, trust in institutions and involvement in mass protest actions. The Southern group of countries which experienced some authoritarian rule (Greece, Spain, Portugal, ex-Yugoslavia) differentiate through their higher propensity to meet friends⁸³.

Table 4 indicates the averages for the four groups of countries for the six dimensions of social capital considered.

Table 4. The four patterns of bridging social capital across Europe

	Eastern Ex-Totalitarian	Southern Ex-Totalitarian	Western	Nordic
<i>% spending time with friends weekly</i>	40%	64%	60%	67%
<i>friends - at least as important as family</i>	40%	55%	58%	71%
<i># memberships in assn.</i>	0,3	0,4	0,7	1,8
<i>social trust</i>	21%	20%	37%	62%
<i>trust in institutions</i>	-0,10	-0,21	0,24	0,37
<i>involvement in protest actions</i>	31%	32%	62%	77%

Note: Bold figures indicate the higher scores for the respective dimension (row). Grey background reflects the minimums.

Apparently, using only the statistical indicators, a better solution would be selecting 8 clusters⁸⁴. The groups are similar, but Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland separate from the Western group, forming a new cluster between the rest of the Western societies and the Sweden-Netherlands cluster. In the South, Greece on one hand, and the orthodox ex-communist southern societies (Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro) on the other, form separate clusters. In the East, the Czechs and the Slovaks join in a group which stays in between the western and the Eastern model. All these changes make logical sense and base on the particularities discussed when separately analyzing each dimension. However, there are several reasons that make me considering the four clusters solution as being more appropriate for the analysis. First, the eight cluster solution may be the outcome of certain ‘mechanical clustering’: there are few cases – only 40 societies with full data, and this may impede on the

⁸² For Norway I have lacked full data, but the existing indicators suggest that the country is close to the Nordic pattern.

⁸³ Bulgaria also belongs to this group: it shares a common past history within the Otoman Empire with most of the societies in the respective cluster, is Southern, communism was leader-centered, as in Yugoslavia, but softer than it was for instance in Romania, the Northern neighbor, etc.

⁸⁴ $ETA_{2K} = 76\%$ explained variation. Adjusted Rand Index = 0,80. See the map which plots the 8-cluster solution on the Sibiu conference website.

reliability of separating them into very small groups⁸⁵. At theoretical level, the four cluster solution gets almost the same support as the eight-cluster one. Finally, the four-cluster categorization is more parsimonious, offering a clearer tool for analyzing the European space from the point of view of social capital distribution.

Considering the above results, Europe is not very homogenous when considering all the six dimensions of bridging social capital. The four basic patterns are highly consistent and simplify the interpretation of the data. They also suggest that, from the point of view of social capital distributions, four different types of societies should be considered as existing in Europe. They reflect historical evolutions and social development levels, and suggest that the European puzzle may have some four different cores.

How different is Europe?

A further question is if using the same data, one can discuss not only the differences across the European area, but also, its relative individualization as compared with the rest of the world. I have used cluster analysis for the respective purpose, too. The EVS/WVS 1999-2002 covered 81 societies from all over the world. About half of them belong to the European space, but all the continents are represented in the survey. Most of the questions were the same, with few exceptions, notably the membership in associations for which the data is missing in several of the Asian and African societies included in the sample.

A first analysis considered all six dimensions and led to an 8-cluster solution⁸⁶. The results show that Europe is not very different, especially when compared with its former colonies, but on average, it imposes its four patterns to the rest of the world. The Western European pattern is quite unique, only Japan clustering in the respective group. The Nordic one includes now, along Sweden and the Netherlands, the Northern America (USA and Canada) and its center tend to be closer to the Western model (Finland becomes this time part of the Nordic group). Some countries in Latin America share one of the Ex-Totalitarian patterns, either the Eastern, either the Southern one. Generally, the countries in Asia and Africa follow different models than European societies.

In order to consider more cases, I have run the same procedure, but excluding the membership in association as dimension of social capital. Despite the higher diversity given by the increasing number of cases (75 societies, as compared with 61 in the previous analyses), the results are not very different. The optimal solution includes this time 10 clusters⁸⁷. Only six of them contain European countries. They are originated in the 4-cluster solution for the European space, with some differences that can also be found in the 8-cluster solution for Europe. Notably, the Western cluster includes ONLY European societies, while the Nordic one includes all Nordic countries but Iceland (which keep belonging to the

⁸⁵ The eight-cluster solution also gets less support when analyzing the agglomeration schedule.

⁸⁶ Adjusted Rand Index = 0,62; Explained variation: $ETA_{2k}=70\%$.

⁸⁷ Adjusted Rand Index = 0,87; Explained variation: $ETA_{2k}=76\%$.

Western European pattern). UK and Ireland form their own cluster, with US and Canada. The Southern and the eastern clusters include the same European countries, and some Latin American societies, Morocco and Algeria. Only Turkey and Bosnia tend to place outside Europe and cluster with some African societies.

Apparently, the findings support the heterogeneity assumption. However, I would say that Europe is heterogeneous, but somehow homogenous: *the diversity is there, but some large compact groups of countries are homogenous enough to ensure some general homogeneity*. The four parts core of the Europe mentioned in the end of the previous sections, looks more like a unique core – the (basic) Western European one – where three types of influences meet: the ex-authoritarian, the Nordic, and the Mediterranean ones.

One may argue that the measuring model employed in this paper is not valid and reliable for assessing other societies than the Western ones. For the CEE space, the validity of the model is externally proved through the consistency of the patterns depicted in the previous sections. The analysis refers other (i.e. non-European) societies only for contrasting them to the European models, to show that Europe tend to structure its own patterns. If the measurement is inadequate for these societies this would simply mean that those societies are indeed different, which confirms anyway my point of Europe as a different entity.

Conclusion. Implications for the European integration

Europe means obviously diversity. From the relatively “civic engaged” North, to the rather parochial, traditionalist East, one can identify a variety of situations. However the 42 European societies considered in this paper can be clustered in four consistent, reliable groups. More important, among the ‘original’ EU15 members, some Southern countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece) cluster together with two new EU members (Slovenia, Malta), some candidate countries (Croatia, Bulgaria, Turkey), and the rest of the ex-Yugoslavian space. This creates a premise for considering the current EU integration not very much different than the previous enlargements.

On the other hand, the rest of the former communist nations cluster together. Former USSR, most of the new EU25 members, Romania and Albania share a common pattern, which is opposed – especially in which regards civic engagement – to the Nordic and the Western models. The two different cultural backgrounds⁸⁸, reflected in the mixes of bridging social capital, may raise the question of the feasibility of integrating and making work a union of such diverse societies. A first answer may come from the tautology that Europe constitute a diversity per se, and it is not the same under almost any aspects, from the legislation to levels

⁸⁸ Sztompka (1999b) discusses about a certain ‘bloc culture’, common to the citizens of the former communist bloc. The syntagm refers not the identification with communism, or with the respective military and political alliance, but to the sharing of common cultural patterns, in terms of social values and norms, that may differentiate the Eastern citizens from the Western ones, and that were developed during the communist experience.

of social development or social values. Second, from the point of view of social capital patterns, I have shown that, when considering the whole World, European societies tend to cluster together. More specifically, neither China, India, most of the African or Arabic societies look different than Europe and its former American colonies. This largely confirms the differences between the Old Continent and other cultures, and suggests that, when comparing with the world heterogeneity, Europe is not that un-homogeneous.

Through this rather speculative argumentation I am trying to point out that:

(1) Even if from the point of view of the bridging social capital patterns, EU integration and EU construction are not very facile processes,

(2) The current evolutions do not differ very much from the previous enlargements,

(3) And, as a general conclusion, *bridging social capital is simultaneously bridging and bonding European societies.*

APPENDIX: Levels of the social capital indicators in Europe (EVS/WVS 1999-2002)

	Bridging connections		Participation			Trust	
	friendship	importance of friends	voluntary associations		mass protest actions	trusting people	trust in institutions
			At least one membership	# of memberships			
Albania	31%	34%	53%	1,11	27%	23%	0,03
Armenia	.	51%	.	.	36%	24%	-0,44
Austria	57%	49%	46%	0,79	58%	31%	0,01
Belarus	53%	40%	8%	0,09	22%	38%	-0,36
Belgium	50%	55%	56%	1,13	71%	29%	-0,13
Bosnia-Herzegovina	71%	71%	22%	0,29	24%	16%	-0,25
Bulgaria	58%	48%	11%	0,18	17%	25%	-0,51
Croatia	69%	54%	24%	0,34	35%	18%	-0,21
Czech Republic	47%	36%	44%	0,69	61%	23%	-0,34
Denmark	60%	63%	58%	0,98	65%	64%	0,30
Estonia	42%	44%	22%	0,30	25%	22%	-0,17
Finland	60%	63%	51%	0,86	50%	57%	0,21
France	59%	56%	31%	0,42	72%	21%	-0,12
Georgia	.	76%	.	.	25%	18%	-0,15
Germany	49%	61%	39%	0,56	53%	33%	0,02
W.Germany	50%	61%	41%	0,58	51%	31%	0,03
E.Germany	44%	57%	30%	0,39	67%	46%	0,01
Great Britain	74%	65%	25%	0,36	79%	29%	-0,15
Greece	75%	51%	49%	0,91	65%	20%	-0,84
Hungary	37%	40%	13%	0,18	15%	21%	-0,25
Iceland	62%	51%	63%	1,15	58%	39%	0,35
Ireland	72%	67%	44%	0,73	61%	35%	0,39
Italy	62%	41%	32%	0,52	61%	32%	-0,06
Latvia	39%	39%	13%	0,16	34%	17%	-0,21
Lithuania	37%	42%	8%	0,11	27%	23%	-0,20
Luxembourg	63%	54%	53%	1,08	56%	25%	0,34
Macedonia	55%	51%	34%	0,71	32%	13%	-0,65
Malta	43%	35%	20%	0,27	42%	20%	0,12
Moldova	35%	44%	26%	0,49	24%	14%	-0,07
Montenegro	56%	49%	30%	0,45	29%	33%	-0,52
Netherlands	67%	68%	87%	2,24	65%	59%	0,20
Northern Ireland	68%	71%	31%	0,50	60%	38%	-0,13
Norway*	.	66%	65%	1,21	69%	65%	0,36
Poland	36%	33%	13%	0,19	26%	18%	-0,01
Portugal	64%	42%	16%	0,20	27%	10%	0,27
Romania	36%	34%	8%	0,12	18%	10%	-0,30
Russia	37%	42%	8%	0,10	28%	23%	-0,56
Serbia	65%	62%	17%	0,21	35%	18%	-0,58
Slovakia	45%	42%	42%	0,57	59%	15%	-0,11
Slovenia	58%	54%	31%	0,52	34%	21%	-0,08
Spain	65%	52%	21%	0,32	35%	35%	-0,09
Sweden	66%	75%	70%	1,43	89%	64%	0,24
Switzerland	.	68%	.	.	64%	41%	-0,16
Turkey	65%	76%	3%	0,05	16%	16%	0,07
Ukraine	43%	49%	10%	0,14	24%	26%	-0,24

Notes: friendship = % of people spending time with their friends weekly or more often; importance of friends = % of people that give to the friends at least the same importance as to the family; at least one membership in associations = % of people involved in at least one voluntary associations; # of memberships = average number of types o voluntary associations in which one is member (see text for details); mass protest action = % of people declaring that they have participated in at least one petition signing, lawful demonstration or boycott action; trusting people = % of people declaring that ‘most people can be trusted’; trust in institutions = factor score (see text) – higher values denote higher levels of trust. Empty cells indicate lack of data for the respective dimension in the corresponding country. For Norway, the WVS 1990 data was employed.

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Generalized trust – an imagined trust?

Trust is or has become a kind of buzzword of the last decade. Although attention has been given to this subject prior to the 90's, a tremendous increase of interest came only after. We have found the subject of trust aggregated most commonly with topics such as cooperation, social capital, civil society, democracy, social development, etc. A search of the subject on the ISI Web of Knowledge in the Social Sciences Citation Index supports this idea. From 1955 to 2004 we found a number of 6.642 references cited by the authors of the articles covered by the SSCI of ISI⁹⁰. Approximately 85% of these (5621) are between 1990 and 2004. In more than two times shorter period, five more times number of citations

Morton Deutsch (1962), Niklas Luhmann (1979) and Bernard Barber (1983) are credited for placing the subject of trust in the top of the scientific debates before 1990. If the first came with a subjective perspective on trust (a social psychological approach resulted from his research on cooperation and conflict in small groups) the latter two putted forward the idea that trust exist also on the external level, emphasizing its functional importance and context. At macro social level, the current debates are focusing mainly over the problem of generalized and institutional trust, offering a wide range of explanations for their sources, impact and variation. We identified a wide range of structural, cultural, cognitive, functional, and psychological explanations.

Our paper is focused on a type of trust frequently discussed in literature: the 'generalized trust'. The paper aims to stand in front of an interesting challenge: first we explore the idea that the concept of generalized trust is inconsistent and then suggest that it could be understood as imagined trust. We argue – referring to some current understandings – that the concept is not accurately defined⁹¹ (if defined at all) and is difficult to be used and interpreted, because of its extreme fluidity⁹². Furthermore we suggest that beyond the "classical" "conceptualizations" of generalized trust, there is at least a way that needs to be explored and developed: the idea that generalized trust is not just a matter of faith, morality, perception, culture or psychological propensity but also a matter of imagination.

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⁹⁰ Search made on 5.12.2004

⁹¹ for instance the idea of intensities of trust (which we will shortly touch) seems to be vanished from the current debates

⁹² the range of explanations and associations is extremely wide as we will see

What is trust; the sources of trust.

Up to present the range of approaches of trust is pretty large and the most important are: the functional approach (N. Luhmann 1979; D. Lewis & A. Weigert, 1985) the cultural or structural approach (F. Fukuyama 1995; P. Sztompka 1996, 1998; E. Uslaner 2002, 2003, 2004) the rational choice approach (J. Coleman, 1990), the interactionist approach (R. Putnam, 1995, 2002), the self centred approach (R. Wuthnow, 1998), the power related approach (Rothstein, 2000). Each of these perspectives puts trust in multiple and various associations or connections. The multitude of relations can make one to believe that trust is sometimes seen either as a universal cause or a kind of universal panacea for both the micro and macro social problems. As we will see the focus of the papers dealing with trust, especially generalized trust is not so much the consistency of the concept but rather its sources, functions and effects.

Following the insights of G. Simme⁹³, for Niklas Luhmann (1979), trust is a functional precondition needed to reduce the complexity of the world and to facilitate adaptation through an increase of interaction. In the same manner David Lewis and Andrew Weigert see trust as “a functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity. [...] trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail, because to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur. Thus, trust reduces complexity far more quickly, economically, and thoroughly than does prediction. Trust allows social interactions to proceed on a simple and confident basis where, in the absence of trust, the monstrous complexity posed by contingent futures would again return to paralyze action.” (1985:969) They see a three dimensional composition of trust – cognitive, affective and behavioral – merged in a unitary social experience. The cognitive aspect refers to a calculated discrimination, based on sufficient evidences, of the trustworthiness of a person in conjunction with specific circumstances. Anyway, beyond these conditions there is a need of something, a “cognitive leap” based on a collective cognitive reality meaning that each trusts on the assumption that others trust. The affective dimension of trust is based on the ‘emotional bond’ tiding all who participate in a social relation. The behavioral dimension implies that an actor would act as if uncertain future actions of others are certain. (Lewis and Weigert, 1985) Apart from the classical critics of functionalism⁹⁴ that can be generally addressed to this conception, we can add, in respect to Lewis and Weigert’s approach, an observation regarding the “leap of cognition” that seems to be the cornerstone of trust. This ‘leap of cognition’ seems to be something transcendental, whose mechanisms are beyond ones comprehension, thus something that probably one shouldn’t rely on if wants to explain the social reality.

Francis Fukuyama sees the level of trust in a society as a cultural characteristic. Behind trust is the common culture, common norms adopted before trust becomes

⁹³ According to Georg Simmel, at individual level, trust functions as „a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct” (1950:318)

⁹⁴ i.e. the theory assumes equilibrium and harmony in the social systems and social life and this way neglects social change

generalized, the sharing of common values. “Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community. Those norms can be about deep “value” questions like the nature of Good or Justice, but they also encompass secular norms like professional standards and codes of behavior” (1995:26). A similar position has Piotr Sztompka (1996, 1998) when speaks about culture of trust or distrust at societal level. He considers that trust depends mainly on three elements: trustworthiness (the result of a rational judgment of the reputation, performance and appearance of others), trustfulness as a psychological trait (a “basic trust”⁹⁵, resulting from the early socialization) and trustfulness as a cultural fact (a typical orientation socially objectified and shared by a number of individuals). This third element is especially important when the objects of trust are of an abstract type such as firms, institutions, markets, and nations. The culture of trust/distrust is determined by the structural historical context: “Trust (or distrust), widely shared and manifested in all areas of social life, turns into a normative expectation, becomes embedded in a culture and not only in individual attitudes” (1996:42) Trust is a cultural or moral resource for dealing with the future. Anyway, Sztompka doesn’t offer a precise definition of generalized trust and the definition he offers for trust rather refers to the personal sphere and remains ambiguous: “trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others” (1998:20) Eric Uslaner (2002, 2003, and 2004) subscribes to the same general approach, considering trust as essentially cultural: the concept he proposes is: ‘moralistic trust’. “Moralistic trust is a moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy. The central idea behind moralistic trust is the belief that most people share your fundamental moral values. Moralistic trust is based upon ‘some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other’. Moralistic trust is a value that rests on an optimistic view of the world and one’s ability to control it.” Generalized trust says Uslaner lies in moralistic trust but it is not the same. Generalized trust remains something rather mystical⁹⁶, somehow suspended, and not clarified: a combination between faith – “faith in strangers is a matter of faith, and not an orientation grounded in experience” – and perception – generalized trust is a perception that most people are part of ones moral community (Uslaner, 2003). At least two main critics can be address to this approach. The first one is the idea of ‘cultural dopes’, which we will not develop here (see Giddens, 1984). The second one is related to data that obviously contradict this perspective. If we look at the question regarding general trust in WVS⁹⁷ (1981 – 1999/2000), the answers doesn’t seem to show a phenomenon which is stable or goes only in one direction, (up or down) but a phenomenon that may have a sinusoidal shape; indicating somehow that culture and moral principle vary in kind of circular way. That happens exactly in countries where – according to

⁹⁵ the “basic trust” as opposed to the rational trust is “a psychological propensity to trust others apriori”. (1998:30)

⁹⁶ is exaggerated to deprive the social actor from its will and from the possibility to construct and freely choose saying that trust is there because it is a moral percept learned in the early childhood and „moral dictates are absolutes” (Eric Uslaner 2003, 2004)

⁹⁷ “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”

the “cultural” theorizations of generalized trust – this should be less expected (see for instance the Northern European countries Sweden and Finland in 1995, the moment of acceding to European Union⁹⁸).

James Coleman approaches trust from the rational choice model standpoint, where the actor seeks his self-interest, wanting to maximize his profits. The decision to place trust in others⁹⁹ is seen as the considerations an rational social actor makes when placing a bet: “If the chance of winning, relative to the chance of losing is greater than the amount that would be lost (if he loses), relative to the amount that would be won (if he wins), then by placing the bet has an expected gain; and if he is rational, he should place it” (1990:99). Beside this simple relation, between two actors, Coleman speaks about three other systems of trust that facilitate the transition from the micro social level to the general/macro social level: the mutual trust, the intermediary trust, the third-party trust¹⁰⁰. Consequently, Coleman’s generalized trust is an extension of the micro-level trust.

For Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, and 2002) trust is one of the components of the social capital. Basically Putnam suggests that trust arises in social interaction, from two related sources: the reciprocity norms and the networks of civic engagement. Trust like social capital is produced if people join voluntarily associations like bowling leagues, choral societies and charities. Like Coleman, Putnam suggests too that generalized trust is an expanded version of the micro social level, interpersonal trust. Both Coleman and Putnam don’t really define what ‘generalized trust’ is but only suggest how it could come into being. In addition Putnam’s conception on the trust genesis is contested because it seems that fails to represent accurately who really influence whom¹⁰¹ (participation influences trust or trust influence participation?). Is the network of civic engagement that produces trust or trust is the reasons for people join different associations? Stolle Dietlind (1998) suggests that trusting people are more inclined to join associations than the vice/versa. Uslaner (2003) says that both informal and formal social networks aren’t producing or consuming trust. On the other hand R. Wuthnow (1998) shows that informal interactions are conducive to trust but formal structure not.

Robert Wuthnow (1998) suggests that the source of generalized trust, is neither culture nor rationality or interaction but the (intimate) psychological dimension. Wuthnow addresses this problem in terms of “trust from within”. He notices that “people’s willingness to trust others seems to be a reflection of whether or not they believe they can trust themselves”; in other words is a matter of self confidence and optimism¹⁰². People who see their own characteristics as a condition for trust emphasize three frames: self-knowledge, personal experience (a positive life history that makes one a trusting person) and trustfulness as a leap

⁹⁸ Percentages of population saying that most people can be trusted according to WVS data: Sweden 1981 – 1882: 57,1% ; 1990-1991: 66,1%; 1995-1997: 56,6%; 1999-2000: 63,6%; Finland: 1981 – 1882: 57,17%; 1990-1991: 62,72%; 1995-1997: 46,91%; 1999-2000: 56,16%;

⁹⁹ at individual/micro level between two actors

¹⁰⁰ Coleman, J. (1990, 175-96)

¹⁰¹ see Wuthnow (1998), Uslaner (2002, 2003, 2004), Stolle (1998)

¹⁰² In respect to optimism, Wuthnow’s and Uslaner’s ideas are convergent

of faith, (frame that suggests that trust may not be rational). In contrast, people who make an “external evaluation” of trust usually refer to two frames: the reliability of others (being in fact a rational assessment of someone’s performances and resources) and the problem of self-disclosure (one can trust other people if knows them well). Trust here seems to be captured in too much psychologism or individualism, over which poses that irrational and inexplicable “leap of faith”.

Bo Rothstein (2000) trying to explain the dynamic of the social system, the way and the reason why a type of society (like the Russian) moves into another one (like the Swedish), draws on the importance of trust, speaking about “trust from above”. This actually means that the source of the generalized trust are the politically and legally institutions perceived as fair and just on the basis of a historically established reputation, meaning in fact collective memory. Even though he doesn’t offer an explicit definition, trust appears to be a strategic resource, constructed by those in power, which makes societies move. We suggest that it is not trust constructed this way but just images and stories.

Taking into account all these approaches, it must be noticed that there are lots of definitions of trust but we weren’t able to really determine or identify an explicit and accurate definition of generalized trust. It seems that its comprehension is still staying at the level of implication. Considering this, it appears that the ‘generalized trust’ “concept” is still caught either in that famous “leap”¹⁰³ or in too much rationalism. Although many debates are going on, we still do not see great improvements or deviations from the original formula of trust suggested by G. Simmel¹⁰⁴: of dualistic, rational and transcendental or metaphysical nature. There are of course variations from the “standard” definitions in both directions but the latter leads towards something not quite easy to comprehend scientific but rather mystical, (i.e. see the moralistic trust), while the former promotes a rather inconsistent definition about a kind of rational bet on the future made in uncertain conditions¹⁰⁵ (see P. Sztompka 1996, 1998). In our quest, when speaking of generalized trust, we start having in mind what people think when asked about trust in most people, which is usually the indicator used in surveys for measuring the general trust level.

¹⁰³ leap of faith, leap of cognition; see R. Wuthnow 1998, D. Lewis & A. Weigert, 1985; even Uslaner’s “moral trust” is after all a product of a “leap”.

¹⁰⁴ that of a “hypothesis” (G. Simmel 1950:318) and something difficult to describe and that is “an element of socio-psychological quasi religious faith”, “a state of mind which has nothing to do with knowledge, which is both less and more than knowledge” (G. Simmel 1990:179)

¹⁰⁵ These definitions sounds very similar with the definition of the hypothesis

Capitolul 1. Types and intensities of trust

It clearly appears from what we shortly reviewed above that trust has a multi dimensional character. Depending on the way one wants to conceive the taxonomies a series of overlapping polarities between and within the previously enumerated approaches can be determined: trust ranging from particular to general, objective/external/interactional to subjective/internal, conjunctural /situational to structural or cultural, cognitive/rational to affective, and so on. All the distinctions are drawn upon the objects of trust or types of social or psychological processes involved in trust.

There are types of trust everyone speaks about. Luhmann (1979) differentiates between personal trust (involving an emotional bond) and system trust (involving a presentational ground). Coleman (1990) distinguishes between particular and large systems trust. Wuthnow (1998) differentiates between external and internal trust. Rothstein (2002) differentiates between interpersonal trust and trust in societal institutions, thus he speaks about horizontal and vertical trust. For Uslaner (2003) the particular - generalized distinction is similar to Putnam's dichotomy between bonding and bridging social capital. The cognitive - cultural distinction is conceived in terms of strategic versus moralistic trust. Strategic trust is knowledge base trust while moralistic trust is based on the idea that most people share the same fundamental moral values. Sztompka (1996) makes probably the most detailed distinction identifying no less than seven categories¹⁰⁶ of trust: the generalized trust (referring to the social order provides people with ontological security); the institutional trust (trust in institutional sequences of society such as education, justice); the technological trust (referring to systems of technical accomplishment like transportation, telecommunication, computer networks); the organizational trust (trust in specific organizations); the commercial trust (trust in all kinds of goods which satisfy humans needs); the positional trust (trust in social roles); the personal trust (trust placed in persons).

Although, there is one way of speaking about trust almost none speaks now. We have noticed that the majority of the 'recent' approaches have an important missing: the discussion about the intensities of trust. In this respect we think that the conception of trust has been drifted in a strange way. Obviously there are not only different types of trust (as a function of the objects or means) but also different intensities of trust. Varying with the context there are different intensities in the way one trusts his friends, his colleagues or his fellow citizens both within and between this categories¹⁰⁷ and this aspect indicates again how diffuse is the

¹⁰⁶ although he notices that all are contractible to one, trust in human action.

¹⁰⁷ be they real or imagined

generalized trust idea. If we place a second look at Lewis and Weigert's work we find a raffinate classification of trust. According to the intensity of emotional and cognitive content (high, low, absent) they identify the following types of trust: ideological trust (high rationality – high emotionality) emotional trust (low rationality – high emotionality), cognitive trust (low emotionality – high rationality), rational prediction, (absent emotionality – high rationality) probable anticipation, (absent emotionality – low rationality), mundane trust (low emotionality – low rationality) and on the level of virtually absent rationality: faith (high emotionality), fate (low emotionality) uncertainty or panic (virtually absent emotionality) (see: Lewis and Weigert, 1985:972)

Sources and effects of trust

We already pointed out that we couldn't find an accurate definition of generalized trust and moreover that there is an important aspect of trust which seems to be lost in the current debates (its intensity). We will focus now on the interpretations given to the changes of the generalized trust: both causes and results.

The efforts are mainly concentrated in explaining why the level of "generalized trust" indicated in surveys is low or decreases. Putnam (1995) suggests the following factors when focusing on the American society: the movement of women into the labor force; mobility: the "re-potting" hypothesis; other demographic transformations ("a range of additional changes have transformed the American family since the fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children, lower real wages"); the technological transformation of leisure (television). Wuthnow (1998) placing the source of change inside the social actors indicates other causes: lack of confidence in future in terms of economics; political scandals¹⁰⁸; heterogeneousness – religious, political, ethnic, lifestyle, values; rise in crimes hate, selfishness. Rothstein (2000) considers that mainly trust in societal and political institutions¹⁰⁹, or better saying the lack of trust, determines a low generalized trust. The lack of trust in institutions is determined in turn by the lack of their efficiency, negative memories about the history of institutions or negative "cognitive maps", a perceived high corruption and a non civic behavior (in terms of a very large prisoners dilemma) of ones fellow citizens. Sztompka (1996, 1998) enumerates an immense array of possible historical and structural factors¹¹⁰ and says that in specific conditions they are conducive to a "culture of distrust".

¹⁰⁸ Wuthnow shows that abrupt declines in trust are observed during the Vietnam war and Watergate

¹⁰⁹ actually he emphasizes that what matters most is trust in the institutions that keep law and order.

¹¹⁰ i.e.: unemployment, inflation, financial instability, unstable taxation policy, escalation of crime and delinquency, corruption and the spread of organized crime, anomie, inefficiency of control agencies, the perception of political elites, the dissonance between the high level of expectation after the 90's changes and the reality (for Eastern Europe), normative uncertainty, opaqueness and secrecy of social organizations, rapid social change, the lack of safeguarding of the dignity, integrity and autonomy of societal members.... and the list may continue...

A high level of trust and the increasing of generalized trust have in their turn a multitude of explanations. Before referring to any of them we must say that all the opposites, of the above enumerated conditions conducive to low or decrease of generalized trust, can be and are considered factors favoring a high level or the increasing of generalized trust. Putnam (1995, 2000) suggests that a high level of education, membership in voluntary associations, and actually external threats¹¹¹ can be conducive to an increase in generalized trust. On the other hand Wuthnow says that the level of education (the way that education shapes the cognitive life and experience of people and ultimately their attitudes), is not actually a source for the level of trust but the relative standing in society – which means that ones higher social position or a social position that offers a potential ascendant mobility or more opportunities makes him to be more optimistic relatively to others¹¹². Self-confidence and positive self esteem are other factors: “many people's willingness to trust others seems to be a reflection of whether or not they believe they can trust themselves.” (Wuthnow, 1998) Optimism and confidence in future are only two of the factors conducive to trust, indicated by Uslaner (2003). Sztopka (1998) emphasizes on various structural conditions, considering the democratic design and institutionalization as an overall factor leading to trust.

After such an impressive enumeration we could say that we are a little bewildered. All the authors claim they are right and support strong evidences for the factors they enumerate. Even if we consider the hypothesis of co-linearity between some factors, still there are a lot of them remaining. Indeed, the social reality is extremely complex, but if we are enumerating almost all its characteristics and say that all of them influence “something” than it might be an idea that that something either is not efficiently measured or very robust theoretically – as we already showed.

Generalized trust - an imagined trust?

The approaches touched above seem to neglect a direction we think is important especially now in the ‘global village’ era. It is about images. We believe that the question¹¹³ “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted....” puts the respondents in a strange situation. “Most people” are a vague reference system. A de-contextualized answer¹¹⁴ is not about trust in others or the perception of others, but is either about the psychological propensity to trust or – we suggest – about an imagined trust. These answers are more than perceptions because they imply, at least in some cases, an imagination process

¹¹¹ in “Bowling alone” Putnam speaks about national crisis, natural disaster, war as factors facilitating a restoration of civic engagement in the USA, and in “Bowling together” the September 11th event is assimilated to these; Putnam (2000) identifies rather a conjunctural situation

¹¹² on the contrary, lower education means fewer opportunities thus lower levels of optimism, that is conducive to a lack of trust or distrust

¹¹³ our inferences are made considering the classical survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”

¹¹⁴ which is supposed to refer to a reference system that passes the borders of the micro-social level)

regarding an “imagined community”. When saying at least in some cases we think at the Mai 2004 Romanian Public Opinion Barometer¹¹⁵ which contains an interesting item referring to the “generalized trust question”. The respondents were asked to say what they have in mind when answering to the question about “most people can be trusted”. We found and analyzed¹¹⁶ 449 answers to this item. In spite of a high variation we were able to identify four main categories of answers: rather particular references (i.e. myself, friends, family, colleagues, acquaintances, past experiences) normative expectations (i.e. have to, it is normal) references to general values (i.e. honesty, respect, kindness), references to divinity. At least the first category of people mentioned refers explicitly to an imagined community¹¹⁷. Thus we would say that people are challenged with an imagination process. First they create an imagined community, the community of reference¹¹⁸, which in our opinion is contextual and variable, and then they assign an image to it. We also are in an exploratory phase, examining few cases where in-depth discussions about the generalized trust question were done. The idea that is prefigured by the discussions with these people is so far the following: either they imagine a community of acquaintances and past situations (more or less vague depending on case) and then answer, or they extend this community of imagined acquaintances not with strangers but categories of strangers. This means that the strangers added are actually assimilated with social roles not with persons¹¹⁹. To conclude we would say that the answer to the “generalized trust question”, which is usually assimilated or interpreted as generalized trust, is the product of an imagination exercise depending on the immediate and the past experiences, thus having important chances to be different each time. The micro-macro transition of trust implies an imagination process. Therefore we suggest that generalized trust can be understood as an imagined trust.

¹¹⁵ The Public Opinion Barometers are bi-annual (omnibus) surveys, developed in Romania on representative samples at national level, sponsored by the Open Society Foundation.

¹¹⁶ without having any claims of representativity

¹¹⁷ The second category also refers to an imagined community of norms,

¹¹⁸ We’ve also checked (in the EVS 99-2000 database) for the reference community people identify with first and noticed that 48,5% of people are identifying with their localities. Out of these only 16,6% (that live in localities below 2000 people) can be “suspected” (making big concessions related to the ageing process, horizontal mobility, and so on) of thinking to “a real universe of references”. Thus it is hard to believe that at least for the rest of the people the reference community is not imagined....

¹¹⁹ This could offer an explanation of the link between the institutional or vertical trust and the imagined generalized trust.

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Civic Participation of Young People in EU: New Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction

At the time of European integration the space of civil society has transformed from national to post-national level. EU is the best example of cosmopolitan public sphere. New images, considerations and perceptions are shaped towards this political, economical and cultural concept.

New and old EU citizens have not only new opportunities and space of action. At the same time they have to find out and adjust the channels and structures of social and political participation. Action cannot be isolated from its social contexts. For the individual actor social conditions can be seen as a set of possibilities or constraints. Social conditions are represented both as a set of rules and as resources which simplify different forms of action. Social conditions, as historically developed possibilities and constraints, are frequently contradictory and the individual both accepts and changes social conditions.

Besides, the concept of citizenship itself has changed. Formerly, there were only few kinds of situations that could be defined as the area for citizen action. In established liberal democratic states, such activities like voting in elections, participating in the work of political parties, serving in social organizations, performing military service and paying taxes or under dictatorship conditions, secret or open activities of resistance and refusal were involved.

In the contemporary situation there are more variable settings for citizen action, which are indicated by such phrases as “the displacement of politics”, “the end of the nation state”, “the loss of center” or “interactive participation with show elements”.

Situations and motivation to act on the level of European Union are the pretension to deterritorialization and hybridization which both not on the same level and not with the same intensity affect the participants – individuals and their groups and the spheres of action – cultural, economical, political and social. These phenomena create a mediate circle of action and participation, where people are involved as much as they consciously understand how much they get from it and how much they lose. But in reality, these phenomena face very local and similar circumstances. It is the consequence of the relationship between national identity and European identity which influence each other as the two sides of the same coin.

The aim of this article is to (re)view how these changed local and global circumstances affect such a social group as youth. It is quite reasonable to find out their position towards the EU and the opportunities or challenges which are caused on the level of this transnational institution all across the states of Europe. How do they understand and interpret these changes, what common Europe means to them, are they ready to act on its level and to coordinate their national and global interests in the near future? Youth could be

imputed to be passive and taking the role of sceptical watcher. However, the educational system, mass media or voluntary organisations are unready and incompetent to accept a challenge to develop active, conscious and global citizens.

Theoretical approaches and the disposition of young generation to new and challenging content and context of European Union are revealed in this article.

The European Commission in 2003 launched a new series of surveys “Youth in Europe 2003” modeled on the Standard Eurobarometer in the countries applying for European Union membership. This new mean’s function was to gather information in a way that was fully comparable with the Standard Eurobarometer from the societies that are preparing to become members of the European Union. Using this tool, it is possible to provide decision makers and the European public with opinion data that help them to understand similarities and differences between the EU and the Candidate Countries.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CC-EB) continuously tracks support for EU membership and the change of attitudes related to European issues in the Candidate Countries.

A broad range of issues of young people (age from 15 to 24) in the 13 Candidate Countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey (9754 respondents) is represented. An identical set of questions was asked of representative samples of the population aged fifteen years and older ones in each Candidate Country. The comparison with EU countries reveals many differences in the investigated issues and attitudes towards their everyday life, their studies and social/political participation.

Europe: Perception and Acting on its Level

Europe and European identity, its content and context are not crystallized as the pure objects. On the theoretical level it is described in several forms. It could be understood as an artifact of historian continuity which counts 200 years of development from the Enlightenment through the common experience of colonialism and imperial periods with the holy mission of civilization and imagination of cultural, economical and political superiority in the world.¹²⁰ But at the same time Europe has artificial and derivative elements in self-conception as during the last 50 years active integration was enforced. At best, the European ethos emerges around highly mobile elites and consumers of cultural heritage. It is not possible to point to the existence of an European identity as a collective identity of European peoples¹²¹. Another problem of definition is the lack of evidence what are European and what are universal achievements – paradigm of civil rights and universal values, norms, pluralistic democracy, and liberalism – is it a universal contribution to Europe or a unique part of European identity¹²²?

¹²⁰ Divided Europe – Society and Territory (1999) Hudson, R., Williams A.M. (eds.), London, p. 210

¹²¹ The Origins of National Interests (1999) Chafetz G, Spirtas M, Frankel B. (eds.), London, p. 115

¹²² Kühnhard, L. (2003). Constituting Europe. Identity, Institution-Building and the Search for a Global Role. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, p.54

Despite these theoretical debates, researches of public opinion during the last 30 years show the emerging trust of people in European community and their identification with Europe as political, cultural and economical unity.*

The mainstream of issue is the question when and why ordinary people and their groups, representatives of political, economical or cultural elite choose the acting on the level of Europe, what they mean declaring their European identity. Is it the final decision or just one of the most choices which depend on the type of situation, problem and the context of action? Not a less important question is about the motives, aspirations and reasons which make to be faithful or to ignore national interests.

Contemporary theoretical viewpoints state the processual nature of identity which takes the form of flexible, negotiated, multifaceted or even utilitarian phenomenon. The difficulty or the peculiarity is that identity is not a once for all granted reality, but:

- It is composed of various constituents or aspects of identity called “partial identities”.
- It is an ongoing process throughout one's whole life.¹²³

Besides, the national identity fails to disappear. National identity, described as a set of habits, attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, emotions, as well as archetypes and stereotypes, creates the sense of belonging and performs such important functions as standardization of practices, the construction of homogeneity, it helps to make choices and participatory dimension, creates the source of security, political sovereignty, democratic legitimation and solidarity¹²⁴.

National identity has not emerged spontaneously; it is learned and acquired during massive institutional support as it aims at influencing the overall population of a national territory. Citizens are united by common culture which leads to expression of identity; in this way they learn what to do and how to perform in order to make possible the functioning and reproduction of the national collectivity. But new speeds and new forms of social life as well as challenges of modern derivations make us search the other levels of action and to participate in the transnational sphere which is not precisely defined. So, the European identity and perception of Europe as joint community have to do the same job.

As the data of research “*Youth in Europe 2003*” reveals, young generation of Europe associates their life with the European Union.


*1997 data of Eurobarometer shows, that up to 15% of all those questioned saw themselves exclusively or mainly as Europeans and around 40% considered themselves first as members of their own nation and secondly as Europeans. (Munch, R. (1999). The Transformation of Citizenship in the Global Age. From National to European and Global Ties. In: Kriesi, H., Armingeon, K., Siegrist, H., Wimmer, A. (eds.), Nation and National Identity. The European Experience in Perspective. Zurich, p. 110). 1998 data of *The Survey of European Identifiers (SEI)* states, that 27,1% identify themselves with the Europe first of all and 46,9% refer to European identity as the second choice after the national level. In comparison to the survey of 1971 – 1993 when just 4,1 – 8,1 % of respondents identified themselves with idea of Europe it is a great progress. (Green, D.M. (2000). On Being European. In: Green, M., Smith, C and M. (eds.), The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival. Vol.5. Oxford, p. 297).

¹²³ Hettlage, R. (1999). European Identity – Between Inclusion and Exclusion. In: Kriesi, H., Armingeon, K., Siegrist, H., Wimmer, A. (eds.), Nation and National Identity. The European Experience in Perspective. Zurich, p.244.

¹²⁴ The Origins of National Interests (1999) Chafetz G, Spirtas M, Frankel B. (eds.), London, p 111

For young generation in candidate countries to EU, between the ages of 15 and 24, European Union mainly means a way to create a better future for young people. As it is shown in the *Graph 1*, almost two-thirds in the candidate countries (CC-13) (61 per cent) agreed with this statement. And it could be explained as the reflection of social situation in these countries. It means, that young generation of candidate countries, most of which are located in Eastern part of Europe, transfers the responsibility for social safety from national government to transnational body. But the attitudes of EU members towards this statement are not so optimistic. Their experience and future unease related to the issue of enlargement of Union reveal that transnational organisations are not the main decision makers. About two-fifths of the CC-13 youth see EU as a single decision-making body (European government, 40 per cent), a guarantee of lasting peace in the EU (38 per cent) and the protection of the citizen rights (37 per cent).

Graph 1. Meaning of the European Union



Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.1_youth_analytical_report_en.pdf, accessed: February 15, 2005

David Held and Richard Falk also agree that cosmopolitan democratic law as a legal framework that could serve both to regulate conflict between states and to give recourse to individual citizens whose rights have been violated by their own states. State sovereignty should be constrained by international law enforced by international courts in which the European Court of Justice is often taken to be the prototype¹²⁵. It sounds as the great support

¹²⁵Held, D (1995). *Democracy and the Global Order*. Cambridge, p. 273
122

of values that are common to the ideal model of Europe and as the opportunity to use it in practice. It means that states should settle their disputes not by the time-honored methods of force and economic pressure but by appeal to a commonly agreed set of principles which are recognized as having the status of law and which would be applied by an international body. The idea that individual people should be able to invoke international law against their own states bring closer to a recognizable ideal of citizenship which consists not only of obligations and formal rights but also of motivated participation. These courts may serve as an effective check on government in certain cases.

David Miller argues that this idea has serious difficulties and gives two contra arguments:

- Why the international enforcement of citizens' rights should be preferred to domestic enforcement. Instead of setting up international courts of human rights, why not ensure that each state has in place an effective constitutional mechanism for protecting the rights of its own citizens. He is arguing that where domestic protection of citizens' rights is feasible, as it is in all liberal democracies, citizenship is better served by constitutional reforms within those states, than by the creation of transnational bodies whose likely effect is to dilute the quality of citizenship by applying uniform criteria in fields where uniformity is neither necessary nor appropriate.
- What incentive there would be for these states to subject themselves to such external regulation, or what incentive the liberal democracies have to make cosmopolitan law apply effectively to non-democratic states.¹²⁶

Another important criterion to measure the meaning of EU and new opportunities is the question about the new possibilities and channels of action for citizen of EU.

As it is shown in the *Graph 2*, for the young generation of all Europe, first of all it means being able to work anywhere in the European Union.

It is relatively less important in Slovenia (64%, 11 percentage points below the CC-13 average of 75%) and in Turkey (67%), but takes a significantly bigger proportion of the vote in Lithuania (84%), Poland, Slovakia (both 83%), the Czech Republic (82%) and in Hungary (79%). Fifty-seven percent in the member states agree and put it first on the list of advantages.


The second advantage – being able to move permanently to any country in the European Union carried little weight with the Slovenians and the Slovaks (52% and 55%, as opposed to the CC-13 average of 70%, the 2004 member countries' average of 67%, and the EU-15 average of 51%), while the Cypriots gave it 13 points more than the CC-13 average.

The third right of European citizenship – being able to study in any member state – was chosen by 69% of CC-13 young people, 78% in the 2004 member states, and 42% in the present EU member countries.

¹²⁶Miller, D. (2000). *Citizenship and National Identity*. Oxford, p. 92 - 93

The right to vote in local, national or European Parliament elections was not very popular among the young generation of Europe. Representatives of candidate countries shared the opinion of EU members.

Graph 2. What being an EU citizen means



Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.1_youth_analytical_report_en.pdf
accessed: February 15, 2005

The idea prevails that democratic citizenship needs to be exercised at many different territorial levels depending on the issues that are at stake. There should be concentric circles of citizenship in which either direct or representative democracy should be practiced. Held proposes the model of cosmopolitan democracy or expanded version of democracy, where instead of being a single arena of citizenship – the nation state – people would act as citizens in many arenas, such as sub-national as well as transnational with constituencies defined according to the nature and scope of disputed problems.¹²⁷


David Miller argues that any member of that constituency, which is created as artificial body, must not to behave as a responsible citizen who participates in voting and making it according the sectional interests. The constituency is created to decide this particular issue – for example environmental, education and training, crime prevention or guarantee of equal opportunities for everyone and employment issues. These issues were mentioned in the research “*Youth in Europe 2003*” date as the most important, which should

¹²⁷ Held, D (1995). *Democracy and the Global Order*. Cambridge, p. 275

be solved on the level of Europe. See *Graph 3*.

But this common fragmented action fails to guarantee and its members have no reason to expect that they will be invited to decide things together in future. They are not involved in relations of reciprocity, nor communal ties or relationships of mutual trust hold them together. What creates the constituency is merely the physical fact that its members are placed that their actions impact on each other. The fact that few regions have the problem of pollution fails to make the members of the constituency into responsible citizens. Of course the fact of responsible voting can occur but it could be because ideal citizenship (which includes not only rights and obligations, but also responsible and motivated participation) has become thoroughly ingrained in them, and they carry it over from their local or national community to the new level of decision.¹²⁸

Graph 3. Areas in which European Union should give priority



Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.1_youth_analytical_report_en.pdf
 accessed: February 15, 2005

Richard Falk states that people should also act as citizens within a global civil society as members of transnational grouping with a particular concern or interest. (For instance environmental groups or groups of lowers concerned about the international protection of human rights, global reformers, the business elite). Members of such groups could be named

¹²⁸Miller, D. (2000). *Citizenship and National Identity*. Oxford, p. 95
 125

as “citizen pilgrims”, who are committed more or less consciously to the construction of a compassionate global polity in the decades ahead, having already transferred their loyalties to the invisible political community of their hopes and dreams, one of which could exist in future¹²⁹. But though transnational activism represents an emerging global civil society, more often global civil society is dominated by the people of a few states and by just a handful of citizens within those states.

The main problem of transnational activism is the filter of participation – Jurgen Habermas states “citizens have no effective means of debating European decisions and influencing the decision-making processes.”¹³⁰ And John Tomlinson describing the privileged participators of transnational activity, distinguish persons who use the modern technology of transport and communication, take active part in the process of globalization and push to the periphery such social groups as retired people, work emigrants, which are not able not only to use new technologies and to represent their interests, but at the same time their experience is isolated and located.¹³¹

Is Young Generation Ready to be Active and Responsible on the Level of EU?

On the background of these theoretical approaches and the disposition of young generation to new and challenging content and context of European Union, it is necessary to raise the main question – are they capable to accept this challenge, do they have enough theoretical knowledge and understanding how to adjust this knowledge in the real world? The people of this generation are the potential consumers of European identity, citizenship and participants of transnational activity. Of course, the national state shapes the models of common ideals and nets of interests in the space of Europe through the educational system, different institutions of society through mass media and youth organizations or youth clubs. And the “*World Survey of Civic Education in 2000*” shows that all across the Europe both in old members of EU or in candidate countries, the goals of civil education are the same.

The Main Goals of Civil Education in Europe are:

- Perception of human rights and social justice;
- Active civil participation in democratic society;
- Responsibility for the human and society;
- Tolerance and equal opportunities despite gender, race and ethnic differences;
- Democratic and civil principles;
- Balance between Europe integration and cultural identity.¹³²

Because young people lack the competence of full, adult citizens, education offers

¹²⁹Falk, R (1995). On Humane Governance. Cambridge, p. 211 – 212

¹³⁰Habermas, J. (1995) Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the future of Europe. In: Beiner, R. (eds.), *Theorizing Citizenship*. New York, p. 267

¹³¹Tomlinson, J. (2002). *Globalizacija ir kultura*. Vilnius, p. 139

¹³²World Survey of Civic Education. (2000).

them a protected area where they can learn, experiment, fail and try themselves out in relative safety. In the context of education system, variety of NGOs and positive effect of mass media, young generation is able to create/recreate, accept and to use the social capital as the background of effective citizenship implementation.

But the index of participation quality remains problematic. It is important to stress that the perception of citizenship and active social/political participation, which was shaped on the theoretical background and used in the classic form of democracy, contradict to the interactive environment of contemporary society. Now the citizenship and participation take the overlapping and fragmented configurations of consumer and entertainment details. New “rules of the game” in politics and civil society should be adjusted if the players still want to be on the “stage”. Therefore interactive communication, perspective of material prosperity and the elements of pop culture in the new discourse of citizenship can be seen. But the main problem of the youth of Europe, both in old EU members countries and in candidate countries, is the lack of information about the mechanisms of behavior on the stage of Europe, about the ways to achieve these inspired imaginations. Most of the young people receive knowledge about EU rights and responsibilities at schools. 2004 members are the likeliest (62%) to receive information at schools and universities. CC-13 countries are the second likeliest (58%). TV evidently tops the list as the medium through which most young people learn about their rights and responsibilities as European citizens. Seventy-seven percent in the candidate countries and 75% in 2004 member states get EU-related information from television.¹³³

But this flood of information (lessons according the educational programmes, television programmes) leaves youth on a passive stage. They get the example but they do not get the way of using it.

Theoretical Suggestions How to Become Active on the Stage of EU

What is necessary to enhance the meaning of European Union and its influence on the ordinary people of Europe? David D. Latin suggests, “Europeans, who wish to participate fully in a wide range of mobility opportunities, need to be conversant with an all-European culture.”¹³⁴ Jürgen Habermas expresses about the idea of civic cosmopolitanism and European citizenship and not only the possibilities for collective political action across national borders but also the consciousness of an obligation toward the European common-wealth and identification with democratic or constitutional norms and not with the state, territory, nation or cultural traditions. The prospective citizen must be capable and willing to be a member of

¹³³http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.1_youth_analytical_report_en.pdf
accessed: February 15, 2005

¹³⁴.Latin, D D. (2000). Culture and National identity: The East and European Integration. In: EUI Working Papers RSC No.3, p. 2

this particular historical community, its past and future, its forms of life and institutions within which its members think and act.¹³⁵ Tomlinson shapes the citizen, who recognizes the global dependence, involvement and responsibility and is able to interweave these matters in every day action. Cosmopolitans should understand, that they live in the world as the whole, where there are no *others*.¹³⁶

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¹³⁵Habermas, J. (1995) *Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the future of Europe*. In: Beiner, R. (eds.), *Theorizing Citizenship*. New York, p. 277

¹³⁶Tomlinson, J. (2002). *Globalizacija ir kultura*. Vilnius, p. 199

Bulgarian Turks and The European Union

The aim of the article is to show the changes, which have occurred in the status of the Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria after the fall of the communist regime in November 1989. Before that, however, I would like to take a brief retrospective look at the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) for this minority during the 1944 – 1989 period.

The policy of the BCP to the Bulgarian Turks after it came to power in 1944 has been changed many times and is in compliance with the lack of a well-defined course from the preceding period after the restoration of the Bulgarian State in 1878. It is not possible to talk about a hard-line policy to the Bulgarian Turks, as well as to the other minority groups, such as the gypsies, Bulgarian Muslims, Jews, Armenians, etc.¹³⁷ In general, the ethnic policy of the BCP swung like a pendulum from the provision of rights to periodical waves of emigration to the attempts for accession and enforced assimilation¹³⁸.

The real turn in the status of the Bulgarian Turks came in the spring of 1984, when the concept for the change of their native names was approved. This was followed for an enforced action for the changing of their names in December and January¹³⁹. Numerous prohibitions were implemented, which restricted the rights of the minorities: talking in Turkish in public places, wearing the traditional Muslim clothes, practicing the Islamic traditions and rituals (e.g. Bayrams, Muslim marriage rituals and circumcision), even listening to Turkish music and dancing Turkish dances (KyocheK)¹⁴⁰. Publications in Turkish language were discontinued. The ideological basis for this process was made public only after the end of the campaign for the changing of the names in 1988. The action was referred to as “Revival Process”, since it was considered as a part of the “Renaissance, which never happened” of the Turkish population. The Turks in Bulgaria were announced comprise “assimilated by enforcement during the Turkish yoke Bulgarians”, who must find their “real” identity. The final aim was to create a “unified socialist Bulgarian nation”¹⁴¹. As a result of this Process,

¹³⁷ Бюксеншютц, У. (2000). *Малцинствената политика в България. Политиката на БКП към евреи, роми, помаци и турци (1944-1989)*. София: МЦПМКВ; Василева, Д. (1992). Изселническият въпрос в българо-турските отношения. В: *Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация в България* (с. 58-67). София: АКЕС

¹³⁸ Стоянов, В. (1998). *Турското население между полюсите на етническата политика*. София: Лик; Трифонов, С. (1991). Строго поверително! *Поглед*, 16-19; Eminov, A. (1990). Nationality Policy in the USSR and in Bulgaria: Some Observations. *The Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 19 (2) from http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer9_2.html; Petkova, L. (2002). The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish Relations (1947-2000). *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1(4), 42-59; Poulton, H. (1993). *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict* (pp. 119-171). London: Minority Rights Publications.

¹³⁹ ЦДА, ф. 16, оп. 63, а. е. 72.

¹⁴⁰ Eroğlu, H. (1986). The Question of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria from Perspective of International Law. In: *The Turkish Presence in Bulgaria* (pp. 59-90). Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi; Memişoğlu, Ş. (1989). *Bulgarian Oppression in Historical Perspective*. Ankara: Devran Matbaası Necatibey Cad; Şimşir, B. (1966). *Contribution a l'histoire des populations turques en Bulgarie (1876-1880)*. Ankara.

¹⁴¹ Живков, Т. (1988). Етнокултурно развитие на Възродителния процес. В: *Проблеми на развитието на българската народност и нация* (с. 127-143). София: БАН; Живков, Т. (1997). *Мемоари*. София: Сив” АД; Загорев, О. (1993). *Възродителният процес. Теза. Антитеза. (Отрицание на отрицанието)*. София;

between 310 and 370 thousand of Turks left Bulgaria in the summer of 1989 during the cynically referred to by the authorities “Big Vacation Trip”¹⁴².

After the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in November 1989, changes occurred in the status of the Turkish population in the country. Since the first opposition meetings after November 1989 requests were voiced for the reinstatement of the “Turkish-Arabic names”¹⁴³. After long debates and inspired by the BCP nationalist protests, the Reinstatement of the Names Act was voted on the 5th of March 1990. By the 1st of March 1991, more than 600 000 applications were processed and approved¹⁴⁴.

As compared to the reinstatement of the names, a lot more problems occurred with reference to the rights to use and study the native language. Nonetheless, the new Constitution, voted in 1991, provides for the rights of the “citizens, for whom the Bulgarian language is not native, are entitled simultaneously with the compulsory studying of the Bulgarian language to study and use their native language” (Art. 36, clause 3)¹⁴⁵. According to the Constitution, “everyone is entitled to use the national and generally human cultural values, as well as to develop one’s culture according to one’s ethnic origins, which is accepted and guaranteed by the laws” (Art. 54, clause 1)¹⁴⁶. In compliance with the above provisions of the Constitution, in November 1991 the Government issues a decree for the implementation from 3rd till 8th grades of 4 hours per week study of the native language as a voluntarily selected subject. Later on, this subject was implemented for study as of the 1st grade (as of 1994). Initially, the students used Turkish school books, but in 1996 the Ministry of Education and Science began publishing Bulgarian editions of the required school books.

In order to provide for the religious education and the training of Islamic spiritual leaders, the Islamic College at the Office of the Chief Mufti was established in 1990. Later on, 4 secondary Islamic schools were established in the country, as well¹⁴⁷.

As regards the printed publications of the Turkish minority, some developments can be observed during the post-communist period. Since 1990, the published till then only in Bulgarian newspaper “Nova Svetlina” (“New Light”) became bilingual. Other publications for the Turkish minority began to appear, such as “Prava i svobodi” (“Rights and Freedom”), “Hak ve isgurluk”, “Guven”, etc.¹⁴⁸ Much later, as late as 2001, the broadcasting of news in

Михайлов, Ст. (1992). *Възрожденският процес в България*. София: М&М; Тахиров, Ш. (1981). *Единението*. София: ОФ.

¹⁴² Георгиева, Ив. (1993). “Възродителният процес” и “Голямата екскурзия” (Опит за орална история). В: *Етническата картина в България (проучвания 1992 г.)* (с. 105-109). София: Клуб’90; *Етническият конфликт в България през 1989 г. (1990)*. София: Профиздат; Желязкова, А. (ред.). (1997). *Между адаптацията и носталгията. Българските турци в Турция*. София: МЦПМКВ.

¹⁴³ Стоянов, В. (2000) (1). По трудният път към възраждането – българските турци и мюсюлмани в отвоюване на малцинствените си права. В: Русанов, В. (съст.) *Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация. Осем години по-късно* (с. 190-205). София: Аксес; Стоянов, В. (2000) (2). Българските мюсюлмани в годините на преход (1990-1997). Етнокултурни аспекти. *Исторически преглед*, 1-2, 112-173.

¹⁴⁴ Кънев, Кр. 1998. Законодателство и политика към етническите и религиозните малцинства в България. В: Кръстева, А. (съст.) *Общности и идентичности в България* (с. 67-117). София.

¹⁴⁵ Bulgarian Parliament. Retrieved: December 1994 from <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=bg>.

¹⁴⁶ Bulgarian Parliament. Retrieved: December 1994 from <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=bg>.

¹⁴⁷ Стоянов, В. (2000) (1). Ibid. (с. 195-202).

¹⁴⁸ Ялъмов, И. (1998). Турският периодичен печат в България (1878-1996). В: *Периодичният печат на*

Turkish began by the Bulgarian National TV, as well as individual broadcasts being made in Turkish on the “Hristo Botev” Program of the Bulgarian National Radio.

All of the above changes in the status of the Bulgarian Turks would have been much more difficult without the participation of its representatives in the management of the country. Immediately after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the members of the illegal until then “Turkish National Freedom Movement of Bulgaria” gathered and decided on the 4th of January 1990 to cast the foundations of the “Movement for Rights and Freedom” (MRF) as an independent, individual political organization. On the 26th and the 27th of March 1990, the National Founding Conference of the MRF was convened in Sofia. Two alternatives for the program were presented. The first was the “Program Declaration of the MRF for the Turks and the Muslims of Bulgaria”, and the second was the “Program Declaration of the MRF”. One of them expresses the idea for the unification of the Turks and the Muslims. According to the words of the movement members, “this is a consequence of the attempt for the separate assimilation of the totalitarian regime on the basis of ethnic and religious principles – division of the minorities and weakening of their resistance capabilities.” The accent in the other program declaration was on the common national characteristics of the MRF.

The elections for the Great Parliament were held on the 10th and the 17th of June 1990.¹⁴⁹ The MRF succeeded in having 23 Members of Parliament elected to the same. Since then, the Movement has become the third political force at the Bulgarian Parliament. At present, the MRF has 20 MP’s at the Parliament¹⁵⁰.

The movement also plays an active role in the local municipal management throughout the country. After the local elections in October 2003, the Municipal Mayors, elected by the ballot of the MRF amounted to 29, while local Mayors numbered 549¹⁵¹.

All of the above leads to the conclusions that for the last 15 years Bulgaria has achieved a lot in improving the status of the Bulgarian Turks. Our country makes significant efforts to adjust our legislation in compliance with the European legal standards, to establish sustainable democratic institutions, and to develop its civil society. This is aided by the accession to the Council of Europe and the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights on the 7th of May 1992.¹⁵² The Framework Convention for the Protection of the National Minorities was also ratified (in 1999). In synchronization with the requirements of the EU on the rights of the minorities, our Parliament voted to implement the Protection from Discrimination Act (2003). The National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues also tries to resolve the problems of the Turkish minority in the country (since 1997).

малцинствата в България (1878-1997) (с. 6-67). София.

¹⁴⁹ Движение да права и свободи. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.dps.bg/bg/history/history2.php#1>.

¹⁵⁰ Bulgarian parliament. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=ns&lng=bg&nsid=5>.

¹⁵¹ Bulgarian parliament. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=ns&lng=bg&nsid=5>.

¹⁵² Bulgarian local elections (October 2003). Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.izbori2003.is-bg.net/rez/partii.html>.

However, there are a lot of not yet resolved problems. It has to be noted with reference to the legislation, that the Protection from Discrimination Act is not enforced. The reason for the above is the failure to incorporate the required authority body to perform the control in accordance with the requirements of the EU, namely, the State Agency for the Minorities. There are also a lot of problems remaining with reference to the education of the Turkish minorities – shortage of qualified teachers, speaking good Turkish, and of updated school books and aid in the native Turkish language; unsatisfactory learning of the taught at school due to insufficient knowledge of the Bulgarian language; insufficient range of education of the children in Turkish language and unsatisfactory level of teaching quality; ethnic centrism in the contents of the educational agenda and teaching methods, which forms a negative attitude to the Turkish minority; difficult adaptation of the children of Turkish origin at the kindergartens and primary schools¹⁵³.

The main issue, however, remains the elaboration and approval of a strategy for the development of the underdeveloped from economic point of view regions with a compact minority, Turkish in this case, population. Notwithstanding the fact that the elaboration and approval of such a strategy comprised a part of the program of the current Government, no efforts to resolve this issue are to be observed¹⁵⁴. As of date, the unemployment rates in the regions with a mixed population reach 80%. This year, the project for the Urbanization and Social Development of the Regions with Prevailing Minority Population has been started (2003). However, this project is very small and will affect not more than 2000 persons¹⁵⁵.

The general impression is that even though the Turkish population has been given certain rights throughout the country, its economic status has dropped sharply after the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria. The reasons for this lie in the fact that the transition to the market economy has led to high inflation and unemployment rates, restrictive credit and taxing policies, as well as low production levels. The regions with a mixed population are characterized by less investments and lower income levels, as well as higher dependence on state subsidies, as compared to the average values for the country as a whole. The less developed infrastructure, the privatization of the land, and the differences in the educational and professional profiles of the Turkish minority communities affect adversely the constantly worsening economic status of these communities¹⁵⁶. After 1989, the state withdrew its support for the small textile and sewing companies, established in the regions with a mixed population, while the constant problems in the field of tobacco production and grain production additionally weigh down the economic status of the Turkish minority¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵³ Bulgarian President's speech. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.president.bg/slovo-43.php>.

¹⁵⁴ National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Questions. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.ncedi.government.bg/>.

¹⁵⁵ Bulgarian Government's Program. Retrieved: December 2004 from <http://www.government.bg/Government/Program/397.html>.

¹⁵⁶ UNDP. (1995). *National Human Development Report. Bulgaria* (pp.27-31).

¹⁵⁷ Statistic for unemployment National Statistic Institute (1992).

The critical economic situation and the limited employment market in Bulgaria have forced the Turkish population to seek other ways to provide for its food. New migration practices appeared after 1989 among the ethnic Turks. These are directed along two lines – the EU and Turkey. I would like to discuss in more detail the seasonal migration to Western Europe. It includes both Bulgarian Turks and Turks, who for one reason or another, reside permanently in Turkey. It has to be noted that the seasonal migration is not something new for the Bulgarian Turks, who have had long-term traditions in practicing the same within the framework of the Bulgarian State.

The main countries of destination for the seasonal search for jobs of the Turks in Western Europe are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Holland, and Sweden. This migration grew even more after the discontinuation of the requirements to hold a visa for Bulgarian citizens since April 2001.

The seasonal employment migration of the Turkish minority has certain specific characteristics. First, its aim is not a permanent residence in the EU. It is illegal and is generally within the terms of the three-month permitted stay without a visa in the countries of the EU. The employment migration is illegal, because the Bulgarian Turks work without holding official work permits. It also has to be noted that the seasonal search for employment in the EU is characteristic of the men. Family couples migrate in certain cases, more rarely – lone women, and even more rarely – unmarried girls. The reason for the above may be found in the fact that the unemployment among the Turkish population in Bulgaria is higher among the men, than among the women. The larger part of the women is employed in small textile plants in Bulgaria, which provide them with a minimum, but regular income for their families. Last, but not the least reason for the male migration comes from the traditionally strict family control and the aims to maintain the typical for the Turkish ethnos moral lifestyle.

Most Turkish villages have already established their own “colonies” in the larger Western European cities. They use well-established routes. Something else is characteristic of the Turks, who reside permanently in Turkey. Most of them prefer to come back to their native places and go to Western Europe from there. The reason for this lies in the belief that the joint employment migration with the common villagers provides a certain feeling of support and security in the foreign country.

One cannot miss the impression that the compact Turkish villages are very well organized for the export of workers. They have established means of transport and accommodation in the selected western city. This saves a lot of problems during the trips to the large cities for the purchase of tickets and useless expenditures. The money can be repaid only after a job has been found.

Most of the immigrants prefer illegal jobs since, according to their opinion, they are better paid. They do not complain of the heavy work loads and the often long working hours. The basic jobs occupied by the Turks in Western Europe are in the field of qualified laborers in construction and related to construction activities. According to the opinion of the immigrants, they are welcomed by the local residents as workers to perform the dirty work, since the local residents rarely engage in unqualified work.

In general, the employment immigrants live several persons in a common home, with the selection of the roommates being generally based on blood relations or the common village origins. They generally avoid gathering in large groups in order to avoid the attention of the neighbors and the police.

It is an interesting fact that some of the Turks prefer to travel, using their Bulgarian names, due to the negative attitudes in the West with reference to Muslims. This is especially valid for the Bulgarian Turks, who are now permanent residents in Turkey. The change from the Turkish names to the Bulgarian ones also is made in cases of having a black stamp in the passport and a prohibition to work in the EU. In some cases, such immigrants have even succeeded in changing their Unified ID numbers.

Most of the immigrants are employed by Turkish or other Muslim entrepreneurs, who are permanent residents of the respective West European country. In this way, language problems are avoided, but the people do not learn the local language, notwithstanding their long-term work there.

At this stage, the migration to the EU is fully oriented towards the home and the relatives in their country of origin. In the destination country, the immigrants live very frugally and send most of their income home¹⁵⁸. Initial terrain studies among such immigrants, who have returned to Bulgaria, indicate that these incomes are used mostly for domestic needs. The bravest “investments” till date comprise the acquisition of real-estate properties in the nearest towns, but no cases of development of one’s own business with the saved money from the months of immigration have been registered as yet. Without knowing the language, being very restricted in their social contacts, the immigrants do not inter-relate with the new environment, they do not learn anything about the same and, respectively, they do not bring home any new economic or social experiences¹⁵⁹.

Finally, I would like to discuss the way the Bulgarian Turks look on the EU and how they see its image. First of all, they relate the EU to the better economic conditions and the higher standards of life. Second, they point out the respect for the rights of the minorities – the possibilities for ethnic and religious self-determination.

The Bulgarian Turks indicate as an important factor the quick accession of Bulgaria into the EU, as well. The main reason for this comes from the economic advantages and the achievement of higher standards of life. The Bulgarian Turks also are interested in the accession of Turkey to the European structures. This, for them, is a strategic move, which will expand the markets and change its image as an underdeveloped economically and culturally country. The reason for the slow progress of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU is pointed out in its numerous population, which causes the economic problems of the country¹⁶⁰. Another reason for the difficulties on the road of Turkey’s accession to the EU lies in the fact

¹⁵⁸ Kabakchieva, P. R. Guentcheva, P. Kolarski, (2004). Migration Trends in Bulgaria. *IOM* (forthcoming publication).

¹⁵⁹ Маева, М., М. Манчева. (2004). Миграция на български турци (1878-2004). В: Султанова, Р. (съст.). *Български миграции и миграционни движения от 80-те години на XX в. до днес. София*.

¹⁶⁰ АЕИМ, № 574-III: 25.

that it is a Muslim country. This, however, is viewed as the main requirements for its accession into the European structures. The accession of Turkey into the EU is viewed by the communities of the Bulgarian Turks as a prerequisite for the successful defense against the Muslim organizations.

Another reason for the importance of the accession into the EU lies in the self-determination of the Bulgarian Turks as “Europeans” and their views that they are an integral of the European civilization¹⁶¹.

Finally, I would like to point out that even though Bulgaria has achieved a lot with reference to the rights of the Turkish minorities in the country and to the synchronization of the Bulgarian to the European legislation, there is still a lot to be done with reference to their economic status. Due to this unresolved problem, the migration of the ethnic Turks creates problems for the EU member-countries, while for this minority this is the only road to survival, to the maintenance of certain standards of life and social status in their country of origin.

¹⁶¹ АЕИМ, № 574-III: 18.

The European Parliament Elections: Participation of the Political Parties of Ethnic Minorities in Lithuania

Introduction

This article deals with the impact of European Union (EU) accession on the ethnic minorities' political behaviour at the Lithuanian political arena. There is a focus on the European Parliament elections, as the first "second-order" elections held after the Lithuania's accession to the EU. The European Parliament (EP) elections in the Western Europe are considered as the second-order elections because they have the second order importance, comparing to the national elections, as they have no impact on the politics of the state. Some Western politicians think that the electorate has voted for those parties that are more oriented to the European issues¹⁶². The article analyzes how ethnic minority parties reflect the European issues and how the electorate of ethnic minorities behaves during the EP elections in Lithuania.

EU accession and ethnic minorities' political behaviour

Most political scientists¹⁶³ note that the different Western organizations' pressure applied to the Eastern and Central European (ECE) accession countries during the European integration process empower these countries to adopt more robust forms of minority rights? W. Kymlicka (2001, p. 382) supposed, that there was a waiting game going on before the ECE countries gained the entry into the EU.

"The majority are waiting to get into the EU because it thinks that once accepted, it will not longer be subject to the humiliating hypocritical monitoring of its minority policies, and will have the same freedom as France or Greece to declare itself a homogenous centralized unitary state. Minorities, by contrast, are waiting to get into the EU because they expect that once included, they will start to get the same rights as the Catalans, Scots, Flemish, South Tyroleans, and other Western national minorities." (Kymlicka, Opalski, 2001, p. 382)

M. Brussis (2003) while talking about three accession countries Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia added two other reasons (without W. Kymlicka's above mentioned factor about the ongoing game in the ECE countries) suggesting that the EU accession process has made an important contribution to these candidate countries' political actors.

"First, since the great majority of the citizens in the three countries support European integration

¹⁶² BRC INFO (10.01.05), *Работает ли модель выборов второго порядка? Анализ выборов в Европейский Парламент 2004 года на примере стран Новой Европы*. Retrieved: January 1, 2005, from <http://www.brcinfo.ru/publics.php?id=1905>

¹⁶³ See more *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe* (2001) Kymlicka, W., Opalski, M. (eds.), New York, Oxford: University Press.

and the EU membership of their country, citizens expect political parties to reflect European values and to meet the normative expectations of the EU. Parties representing ethnic minorities and majorities thus both have an incentive to demonstrate their European value orientation to their constituencies by taking moderate political positions and building compromises around European norms of interethnic reconciliation and co-existence.” (Brussis, 2003)

Second, “<...> EU policy tends to favour a security-based approach aiming at consensual settlements over the enforcement of universal norms. This policy approach has been particularly conducive to interethnic coalitions since it has caused political leaders of ethnic groups to abandon principle positions unlikely to be appreciated by the EU. Political representatives of ethnic majorities know that concessions to ethnic minorities are appreciated by EU institutions, and minority representatives know that moderate positions will find more support in Brussels.” (Brussis, 2003)

To see if the EU accession process and the European issues have had the impact for the ethnic minorities’ political behaviour in Lithuania, it is necessary to view what attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the countries’ integration to the EU prevailed.

The ethnic minorities’ attitudes towards the country’s integration into the EU


The public opinion polls, held before the referendum regarding the country’s membership in the EU, shows the Russians’ and Poles’ opinion in Lithuania and reflects different attitudes towards the EU accession. The opinion during the time (from 1997 to 2003) between the Russians and the Poles ethnic groups changed, but it is important to state that opinions between the Poles and the Russians were different before 1999¹⁶⁴. The Poles had an obscure opinion and objected to the membership in the EU, the Russians supported the Euro-integration and gave preference to it. But after the 1999 the opinion among the Russians changed – from the most euroenthusiastic they have become the most euroskeptic. (See Graph 1) Lithuanian sociologist T. Leončikas (2004, p.52) considers that such an opinion among the Polish ethnic group in Lithuania can be explained by the fact that most of them depend on agriculture. The question of the land restitution could be one of the factors influencing their attitudes towards countries’ integration to the EU. The actuality of the land ownership restitution was supported not only by some persons’ concern, but also the smoothness and the lack of transparency dealing about the ownership of the land in Vilnius region revealed in mass media. High support to the Euro-integration by the Russians can be explained by the sociodemographic peculiarities of the Russian population of Lithuania: a high level of education and living standards, which especially occur in the urban areas¹⁶⁵. The Lithuanian press in Russian language also reflects actual to the Russians questions dealing the process of Lithuanian integration into EU. The prevailing questions, reflected in the Russian press before the referendum, were: the future of Ignalina nuclear power station, located nearby

¹⁶⁴ See more Leončikas, T. (2004). Lietuvos etninių grupių nuostatos dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Etniškumo studijos 2004: Europos integracijos suvokimai*, 50-59.

¹⁶⁵ Leončikas, T. (2004). Lietuvos etninių grupių nuostatos dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Etniškumo studijos 2004: Europos integracijos suvokimai*, 50-59, p.52

Visaginas¹⁶⁶, and perspectives of its employees when the plant is decommissioned, and low quality of secondary education in Russian schools in Lithuania. These factors can be also related to the support of euro-integration, according to high migration attitudes among Russians¹⁶⁷. The changeable opinions among Russians towards the countries integration into the EU induce Lithuanian sociologists consider these attitudes of the minorities depending on the adaptation and integration process into the society. For example, Russians in Lithuania were noticed to experience an identity crisis, lower identification with Lithuanian citizenship and feeling to have gone down in terms of their social status. Consequently, the orientation towards the European framework is a means to decrease the significance of the national context and to overstep the minority-majority tension¹⁶⁸.

Graph 1. At Referendum would vote “for” the Lithuanian accession to the European Union (per cent). The aggregated data from five periods;



Source: Leončikas, T. (2004). Lietuvos etninių grupių nuostatos dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Etniškumo studijos 2004: Europos integracijos suvokimai*, 50-59, p. 54

We can see that the Polish and Russian ethnic minorities had the different attitudes and different expectancies regarding the integration of Lithuania into the EU. The opinion of Poles was similar to Lithuanians. The opinion of Russians was absolutely diverse – from the most eurooptimists they became the most eurosceptics. The Poles were concerned about the Vilnius region’s (where most of them live) issues. Russians were concerned about more general issues relevant to heterogeneous community such as a level of education and employment.

¹⁶⁶ Visaginas, the town next to the nuclear power plant, there lives 85 percent of non-Lithuanians (Russians make up 52 per cent of its population). Most of them work in the nuclear power plant.

¹⁶⁷ Leončikas, T. (2004). Lietuvos etninių grupių nuostatos dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Etniškumo studijos 2004: Europos integracijos suvokimai*, 50-59, p.56

¹⁶⁸ Leončikas, T. (2004). Lietuvos etninių grupių nuostatos dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Etniškumo studijos 2004: Europos integracijos suvokimai*, 50-59, p.57

The ensuing section analyses how all these issues concerning the ethnic minorities were reflected in the political arena and how the political parties, representing the ethnic minorities, reflected these attitudes.

The differences of ethnic minorities' political participation in the EP elections

The participation of ethnic minorities' parties in the EP election differs in comparison to previous national elections. It was the first time when ethnic minorities chose such political tactics (the interethnic coalition between the major Poles and Russian political parties) for participation at the elections. Usually the representatives of the Russian political party for passed the threshold for ethnic minority parties (which comprise 5%) and got the seats in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (Parliament), formed the coalition with the parliamentary party (social democrats). Contrary, the major Polish political party always manages to get the seats in the Parliament alone in the multi-mandate constituencies where Polish minorities population is mostly concentrated. The results of the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" were also unusual because they were surprisingly high¹⁶⁹, comparing to the previous Parliamentary elections¹⁷⁰, when the major Polish and Russian ethnic minority parties participated separately.

The coalition between the major minorities' political parties in Lithuania *The Polish Election Action (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija)* and *The Union of Lithuanian Russians (Lietuvos rusų sąjunga)* called "*Together We are Strong*" gained 5.74 % per cents of all votes and passed the 5 % threshold for the coalitions but failed to get any seats in the EP because of the lack of the 80 000 quota of the votes given to the party.


There was a regional dimension of the results: The Southeast part of Lithuania mostly voted for the coalition "*Together We are Strong*". For the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" voted in the regions, where Polish ethnic minority lives (Šalčininkai region (65, 75% of votes), Vilnius region (55, 54% of votes), etc. The coalition "*Together We are Strong*" was less but still successful in the towns, where Russians mostly live - Visaginas town (29, 72% of votes), Klaipėda town (7, 37 % of votes)¹⁷¹. (See Map 1)

¹⁶⁹ The fact that the EP election was held simultaneously with the first round of the President Election of the Republic of Lithuania should be mentioned because it could influence the turnout of the EP elections.

¹⁷⁰ See more Фреюте М. (2003). Политические партии этнических меньшинств в контексте современной политики Литвы. In: *Национальные меньшинства в период становления гражданского общества. (Материалы международной конференции)* (pp. 92-111). Vilnius: Tautinių bendrijų namai.

¹⁷¹ Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, available at: <http://www.vrk.lt>

Map 1 The votes for the Coalition between the Polish Election Action and The Union of Lithuanian Russians “Together We are Strong” in the constituencies in the European Parliament elections



Source: Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, available at: <http://www.vrk.lt>

These two factors – the political tactics and the conditionally high results of this *Coalition* - show the ethnic minority groups interest in the European issues and the will to participate in politics both of the national and international level.

The reasons of ethnic minorities’ parties for participating at the European Parliament elections

What was the main reason for Lithuanian ethnic minorities’ parties to participate in the EP elections? Was it an opportunity for ethnic minorities’ representatives implement their political programs? Was it a possibility to influence the policies related with the ethnic minority issues of the EU, which they could not implement on the national level? Or was it only testing the new political strategy before the Lithuanian Parliamentary elections in 2004?

The Lithuanian political scientists (Mazylyis, Unikaite, 2004) thought, “After the EU Referendum, the EP election was the next occasion when it was possible to use campaigning to increase knowledge of the EU and enhance voters’ interest in European matters.” But when

they talked about the EP elections in Lithuania, they noticed, “The opportunity was lost. Parties once again simplified the issue and adjusted to the political culture of society.” (Mazyliis, Unikaite, 2004)

Despite the fact that there is a tendency, not only in Lithuania but also in the most Eastern European countries that the domestic issues were most important both for the voters and the parties that participated in the European Parliament elections. The data of European Elections 2004 Barometer¹⁷² shows that the issues concerning the employment, agriculture and specific countries’ domestic issues were the main factor for decision how to vote.

Nevertheless, Latvia is a good example when the domestic, and specific Latvian issues have become “Europeanized”. For instance, the questions of education reform and minority rights

“<...> With respect to the role of Latvian Russians and citizenship, is clearly an example where a Latvian problem has become more “Europeanized” through the efforts of For Human Rights in a United Latvia [essentially a party of ethnic Russians, author’s comment] to make this a special issue at the EU level, all the more likely now that For Human Rights in United Latvia has a representative in the European Parliament.” (Pridham, 2004)

In Lithuania the program of the coalition between the major ethnic parties reflected the domestic issues being important to Lithuanian major ethnic minorities. It is interesting to mention that the programs of major Russian and Polish ethnic minority’s parties have always had a different ideological orientation¹⁷³. Also, the Polish minority political party *the Polish Election Action*, differently from Russian’s minority political party the *Union of Lithuanian Russians* had a regional identification¹⁷⁴. So, the question arises what main issues connected two major parties into the coalition and if these issues were “Europeanised” as in Latvia. Moreover the program of the coalition “*Together We are Strong*” reflected the issues closer related to the Polish minority actual question concerned the Lithuanian integration into the EU. The program was more concerned about Vilnius region issues (the polish language usage in the public sphere, the restitution of the land property in Vilnius region). The only actual question to the Russian minority listed in the program concerned the exploitation terms of Ignalinos nuclear power plant.

The reasons for making coalition among the ethnic parties

It is also important to mention the “Russian factor” in the EP elections. Scientists note, that in the Baltic states “<...> Russia continues to speak in the name of ethnic Russians in the

¹⁷² See European Elections 2004 Barometer, available at: <http://www.eosgallupeurope.com>

¹⁷³ e. g. *The Polish Election Action* belonged to the fraction of liberal democrats, *The Union of Lithuanian Russians* belonged to the governing social democrats coalition in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania in 2000-2004

¹⁷⁴ Фреюте М. (2003). Политические партии этнических меньшинств в контексте современной политики Литвы. In: *Национальные меньшинства в период становления гражданского общества. (Материалы международной конференции)* (pp. 92-111). Vilnius: Tautinių bendrijų namai, p. 101.

Baltic countries, and to adopt a confrontational attitude towards these countries, even though the local Russians themselves do not share Moscow's agenda"¹⁷⁵. As mentioned by D.L.Horowitz (2000) the ethnic parties could "<...> derive from two sources: the internal imperatives of the ethnic group as a community and the external imperatives of the ethnic group, in relation to others, as the incipient whole community." (Horowitz 2000, 294)

The actuality of the Russians minority question in the Baltic States as the Russia's efforts to pay attention of the EU responsible institutions that the rights of Russian ethnic minority are violated in the Baltic Republics (especially in Latvia and Estonia) gives a chance for Russian minority to mobilize and make their demands more "Europeanised" at the international level. The "Russian factor" played the successful role trying to create the Russian party of the Baltic states. The Russian minorities' political organizations' leaders supposed that such a body could become a political tool influencing politics of the EU, inner affairs of the state as well as local municipal politics realizing interests (equal social and economic rights and common European citizenship in future) of the Russian population.

Comparing to Latvia's case the „Russian factor“ in Lithuania lacks any impact while conceptualizing the domestic issues of ethnic minorities and making it more "Europeanised" which is more actual to the European institutions. In Latvia

"<...> The Russian factor was present in many ways: over the lifting of the ban of former Communist as candidates (a matter of sharp division and acerbic debate in Saeima); through the heightened tension between Latvia and Moscow during this period with regular coverage in the media, including such stories like that about increased activity by the Russian intelligence services in the Baltic states since they joined NATO and the EU;" (Pridham, 2004)

Even more, the stereotypes predominating the public opinion about the different Polish and Russian minorities integration into the Lithuanian society¹⁷⁶ challenge inadequate comments about the Polish and Russians ethnic minorities' political participation and about the main reasons for making the coalition among the major ethnic parties. Lithuanian political scientists noted that the coalition at the domestic level among the major ethnic minorities' parties in Lithuania that was made before the elections for the EP could be partly influenced by the Russian Federation provocations. According to Lithuanian political scientist A. Kulakauskas, by creating such a coalition the ethnic minority parties try to play with the "Russian minority card", because Russian minority issues are very actual in the Baltic states. According him, Polish minority is eliminated from this context but if they maintain an old attitude, then such a coalition is naturally and explicable too¹⁷⁷. Lithuanian political scientist

¹⁷⁵ Kymlicka, W. (2001) Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. In: Kymlicka, W., Opalski, M. (eds.), *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe* (pp. 13-107). New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 65.

¹⁷⁶ In contrast to a prevalent view, the sociological research findings maintain that Lithuania's Poles are a loyal and integrated minority. While Lithuania's Russians are described as publicly indifferent group with some manifested aspects of marginality. (See more Kasatkina, N., Leoncikas, T., (2003). *Lietuvos etninių grupių adaptacija: kontekstas ir eiga*. Vilnius: Eugrimas.)

¹⁷⁷ Makaraitytė, I. (2004). Kodėl buriasi Lietuvos rusai ir lenkai? *Atgimimas*, 24.05.2004. Retrieved: May 25, 2004, from <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/print.php?id=4391928>.

V. Radzvilas, thinks that probably they try to create a tool for influencing the domestic and foreign politics, but if they were successful, the situation would be regrettable because *The Union of Lithuanian Russians* and their leader have revealed his intentions representing the Russian's Federation interests in the international institutions. Explaining the fact why the interests of Polish and Russian minorities coincide, the political scientist notes that Lithuanian Poles has become similar to Lithuanian Russians during the Soviet period and the way of thinking has also become similar¹⁷⁸.

The coalition formed before the elections to EP was not directly oriented to win the seats in the EP. It was seemed like the considering if this political strategy would work and if they could get seats in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections. According to the "second – order" theory¹⁷⁹, the electorate in the most Western and Eastern Europe considered the national elections as being more important.

Lithuanian political scientists' (Mazyliis, Unikaite, 2004) note that not only the electorate, but also the political elite regarded the EP elections unimportant in comparison with national elections:

"<...> The Lithuanian political elite did not really consider the elections to the European parliament sufficiently, or simply regarded them as a test before the national parliamentary elections to be held in October. It was very difficult to notice any fresh ideas, or construction of serious party programme, concentrating on European issues. The European ideas included in the electoral programmes rather bureaucratic, conformist and opportunistic, without any trace of political vision." (Mazyliis, Unikaite, 2004)

The mentioned, "<...> style of campaigning was like studying the situation before forthcoming parliamentary elections"¹⁸⁰.

Afore mentioned attitudes and the programs of ethnic minority parties could be the example for this. Firstly the coalition's "*Together We are Strong*" program reflected the domestic issues of ethnic minorities, which failed to be oriented to the European values, but were similar to the issues which predominated in the programs of the previous national elections. Secondly the electoral campaign in mass media was neither designed to political presentation of the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" nor for the demonstration of the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" program's orientation to the European politics.

Coalition "*Together We are Strong*" was incompetent to reflect the social requirements of ethnic minorities and this political strategy failed in the Parliamentary elections in 2004¹⁸¹.

¹⁷⁸ Makaraitytė, I. (2004). Kodėl buriasi Lietuvos rusai ir lenkai? *Atgimimas*, 24.05.2004. Retrieved: May 25, 2004, from <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/print.php?id=4391928>.

¹⁷⁹ BRC INFO (10.01.05), *Работает ли модель выборов второго порядка? Анализ выборов в Европейский Парламент 2004 года на примере стран Новой Европы*. Retrieved: January 1, 2005, from <http://www.brcinfo.ru/publics.php?id=1905>

¹⁸⁰ Mazyliis, L., Unikaite, I. (2004). 2004 European Parliament election briefing No12 the European Parliament Elections in Lithuania June 13 2004. *EPERN European Parties elections and Referendums Networks*. Retrieved: January 28, 2005, from http://www.ecmi.de/download/monograph_1.pdf.

¹⁸¹ In the elections to Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania in 2004 the members of the major Russian party were included into the list of the major Polish party *The Polish Election Action*. Regarding the formal elective

The results of the Parliamentary elections in 2004 show both the reasons why they failed at the elections and the different efficiency of ethnic parties' participation in Lithuanian politics at national level.

Still the participation of the ethnic minority parties in the Parliamentary elections in 2004 was unsuccessful, due to the lack of organization among the parties and the leaders of both parties' were interested only in personal success but not in the ideology of the party.

The Polish Election Action in Parliament of Republic of Lithuania in 2004 gained only two seats in the single-mandate constituencies; however, they gained almost 4 per cent of votes in multi-mandate constituency (the highest percentage of the votes comparing with the former Parliamentary elections). Both mandates in the Parliament of Republic of Lithuania belong to the members of *The Polish Election Action* (to the leader of party Mrs. V. Tomaševski gained in Vilnius – Šalčininkai (63,02% of votes) and to the deputy of the party leader Ms. L. Počikovska gained in Širvintai – Vilnius (50,13% of votes) in single-mandate constituencies¹⁸².

The failure of the members of *The Union of Lithuanian Russians* shows the crisis in the structure and resources of the party and its incapability to create the ideology of the party.

Another factor, which could explain the results of ethnic parties' participation in the Parliamentary elections in 2004, is to consider if national minorities voted for the ethnic minorities' parties and the representatives of ethnic minorities.

To test if the parties represented the group members, W. Kymlicka (2001, p.349) suggests to look into this considering democratic accountability. "If <...> parties cannot win in a free and fair election, we know they do not speak for the majority of group members." (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 349)

The elections of the EP and previous parliamentary and municipal elections showed that the Polish ethnic minority voted for the party and the representatives of their ethnic minorities¹⁸³ and for the leader. Despite the fact that in EP elections the towns where the most Russians in Lithuania live voted for the coalition "*Together We are Strong*", in the Parliamentary elections in 2004 most of Lithuanian Russians voted for the new political party *Labour party* which leader was born in Russia and came to Lithuania only in 1987 and whose origin was being emphasized all the time in the electoral campaign. In the Presidential elections in 2004 Russians voted for Ms. K. Prunskienė, the leader of *Union of Farmers' Party and New Democracy Party*, who was the absolute favorite in Visaginas. In Visaginas town she received 91, 49 per cent of votes in the second round of the Presidential elections in

constitution, this strategy is not considered as coalition formation and the parties have to overcome only 5 percents of electoral threshold (for the party), which was passed in the elections to the European Parliament. Why members of major Russian party were included into the list of the major Polish Party and not vice versa, it could be explained by stability factor of *The Polish Election Action* electorate particular by constituencies where Polish minority population is mostly concentrated.

¹⁸² Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, available at: <http://www.vrk.lt>

¹⁸³ See more Фреюте М. (2003). Политические партии этнических меньшинств в контексте современной политики Литвы. In: *Национальные меньшинства в период становления гражданского общества. (Материалы международной конференции)* (pp. 92-111). Vilnius: Tautinių bendrijų namai, p. 96, 98.

2004 mainly because of his campaign against the closure of nuclear power station. The conditionally high voting results of the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" in the constituencies populated mostly by Russians, could be explained by the emotional factor – the solidarity of the ethnic electorate to their representing politicians. Also the "Visaginas" factor could influence the choice. Differently from Russians, high voting results of the coalition "*Together We are Strong*" in the territories mostly populated by Poles could be explained by the stable electorate of major Polish minority party at the constituencies in these regions.

Conclusions

It could be stated, that the coalition made before the EP elections and its program was incapable to reflect the social requirements of ethnic minorities. It reflected the expectances of Poles ethnic minority more than the Russians ethnic minority. However, the participation of these parties in the EP elections was not considered by the parties as important as the participation in the national elections. The coalition formed before elections to EP was not directly oriented to win the seats to the EP but it seemed to be testing if the strategy would work and they could get the seats in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections. Thus, the theory of second-order elections proves out. Lithuanian political scientists note that not only the electorate, but also the political elite regarded the EP elections not so important as national elections and both the attitudes and the programs of ethnic minority parties could be the example for that. The program of coalition "*Together We are Strong*" between major ethnic minority parties reflected the ethnic minority domestic issues, which were similar to these, which predominated in the programs for the previous national elections. These issues were not "Europeanized", failed to challenge both the public and the European Union's attention, as it was in Latvia. The EU accession process and the European values had insignificant impact for the ethnic minorities' political behaviour.

The coalition's "*Together We are Strong*" conditional success at the EP elections partly show the actuality of the ethnic minorities' issues and the will of the ethnic minorities to participate in the politics both at national and international level. But participation in the EP elections revealed the problems of differences between the major ethnic minority parties political competence that are evident at national level. The Russian party's program failed to reflect the heterogeneous Russian community interests, comparing with Poles, which shift the parties' ideology as the regional party and to seek representation of the regional politics in the EU. Also, the failure of the members of *The Union of Lithuanian Russians* in the Parliamentary elections in 2004 shows the crisis in structure and resource of the party and the incapability to create the ideology of the party. Results of the former elections reflect a low activity of the Russian population in the social-political life of the country.

The comparatively high Polish minorities' participation in the former parliament and municipality elections shows the features of "traditional" political participation pattern when both the leaders of the parties and the ethnic minority identify themselves with the territory they live in.

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
Possibilities for developing social integration of ethnic minorities in Lithuania

The Situation of National Minorities in Lithuania

Population composition by nationality. National minorities constitute an important part of any society by enriching its culture with their distinctly original traditions and mode of life. That is why in search of our own traditions we turn to the multicultural heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. One of the specific features of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the peaceful and creative co-existence of a great number of nationalities – Jews, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, etc. In present-day Lithuania national minorities also account for a considerable part of its population – 17 per cent or 576.7 thousand (under the census taken in 1989 the figures were 20.4 per cent and 745.9 thousand respectively) (Vaitiekus, 1992).

The structure of population distribution by nationality in various regions of the country is different. Some municipalities may be characterised by ethnic diversity. The territory of some municipalities is quite populous with Poles. The greatest number of non-Lithuanians live in Eastern and south-eastern parts of Lithuania and also in the cities of Vilnius, Klaipėda and Visaginas.

Figure 1. Population by nationality (% , 2001)



At present, the largest ethnic groups are the following:

- Russians (in 2001, their total number stood at 219.8 thousand, which accounted for 6.3 per cent of the total population; in 1989, the numbers were, respectively, 344.5 thousand or 9.4 per cent),
- Poles (235.0 thousand, 6.7 per cent; in 1989, 257.9 thousand, 7 per cent),
- Byelorussians (42.9 thousand, 1.2 per cent, in 1989, 63.2 thousand, 1.7 per cent),
- Ukrainians (22.5 thousand, 0.7 per cent; in 1989, 44.8 thousand, 1.2 per cent),

▪ Jews (4.0 thousand, 0.1 per cent; in 1989, 12.3 thousand, 0.3 per cent), Other nationalities reach 0.6 per cent (19.6 thousand) of the population (Figure 1) (Department of Statistics, 2003).

Legal Situation of National Minorities in the Republic of Lithuania. The rights of Lithuania's national minorities are enshrined in the Preamble and Chapters II, III, IV, XIII of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on National Minorities, the Law on the Official Language of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Education, the Law on Citizenship, the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations, the Law on Public Information, the Law on Religious Communities, the Law on Political Parties and Political Organisations. The Republic of Lithuania has signed or ratified various international covenants and conventions: the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The latter Convention was ratified by Seimas in 1995. On February 1 of the same year the Republic of Lithuania signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. It was scheduled for ratification in 1999. On 23 December 1997, Seimas adopted the Law on Petitions under Articles 25 and 46 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. By this law the Republic of Lithuania recognised the competence of the European Commission on Human Rights to accept petitions from individuals, non-governmental organisations and groups of persons claiming that their rights under the Convention have been violated. Lithuania also recognised the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights in all cases related to the interpretation and application of the Convention (Vaitiekus, 1996).

Lithuania has signed and ratified bilateral political agreements on friendly and good neighbourly relations with Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Poland. New and effective forms of co-operation have been established by the following joint institutions of two states: the Parliamentary Assembly of Lithuania and Poland, the Council of Co-operation of the Governments of Lithuania and Poland, the Committee of National Minorities of the Council, and the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland.

In 1997, the National Committee on Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine and the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad under the subordination of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania signed an agreement on co-operation in the affairs of national relations. In 1999, a similar agreement was signed with the National Committee on Religions and Nationalities of the Republic of Byelorussia.


Participation in non-governmental organisations. The total number of **non-governmental organisations** of national communities exceeds 200. At the beginning of 2004 there were 285 NGOs of ethnic minorities, among them 68 Russian organisations, 55 – Polish, 31 – German, 26 – Jewish, 23 – Byelorussian, and others. Also non-governmental

organisations have been established by the following nationalities residing in Lithuania: Ukrainians, Tartars, Latvians, Gypsies, Armenians, Azerbadjanians, Georgians, Estonians, Karaites, Greeks, Romanians, Hungarians, French, Bulgarians. Representatives of 22 different nationalities have decided to establish their NGOs at all.

The majority of established NGOs aimed to cherish national traditions, language and religion. The most active NGOs organise various events both on national and international levels, seek to attract more people in their activity. Nevertheless there are few such organisations in the country. Most of NGOs have narrow field of activity, use bare operating tools. They lack information about possibilities to attract more finance and manage it while planning long-term organisation strategy (LR Government, 2004b; Department of national minorities, 2004).

Education. The ethnic minorities differ by their educational attainments in Lithuania. As the Population census data shows the Jews have the highest education. Also the education of some other nationalities (Armenians, Ukrainians, Russians, Germans) is higher than Lithuanians (**Figure 2**). The biggest part of representatives of such nationalities lives in the cities. Poles and Gypsies have the lowest education.

Figure 2. Population by education and nationality (2001)



Access to education is one of the most important factors that determine the situation of ethnic minorities in society. As the data of Ministry of Education and Science shows in the academic year 2003-2004 there were 1816 schools of general education in Lithuania (at comparison, in 1998/1999 there were 226 schools). Among them 142 schools with Russian, Polish and Byelorussian language of instruction and 59 mixed schools which have classes with different languages of instruction (LR Government, 2004b).

During the last 14 years the proportion of Russian and Polish schools has changed. It

is evident that the number of pupils in Polish schools almost doubled when in Russian schools it has dropped down sharply. In 1990-1991 there were 85 Russian schools, in 2003-2004 have remained 58 while the number of Polish schools have arisen from 44 to 83. This trend could be explained by fact that a big part of Russian people who had lived in Lithuania decided to move to Russia; other decided to let their children to schools with the Polish language of instruction.

Table 1. Schools according to the language of instruction

	1989–1990 academic year	2003-2004 academic year
Total	2032	1816
Lithuanian	1795	1616
Other	236	200
From them:		
Russian, Polish and Byelorussian	142	142
Mixed	74	59

In recent years more and more children from ethnic minorities' (Russian speaking) families attend pre-schools and schools with Lithuanian language of instruction. These trends are very clear in Vilnius, Utena counties and in Vilnius, Klaipėda and Visaginas cities (LR Government, 2000).


Good conditions to learn official language through educational system are ensured in Lithuania for young people. However, talking about elder people the set of training services is insufficient to gain a good knowledge of Lithuanian language. Further training for even better language skills is needed for representatives from ethnic minorities with higher (especially liberal) education, as everyday vocabulary they already have is inadequate in their professional life.

The problem of social integration of Gypsies is still a puzzle in Lithuania. There are about 3000 people of the mentioned nationality in Lithuania. Most of them have no ID, home, and permanent work. Unemployment factor determines poverty of commonly big Gypsies families. Furthermore, the children start school later or do not go to school at all. About fifth part of Gypsy's children drop out of school and do not gain basic education. In recent years there were only few high-school graduates of this nationality in the country, so the most of Gypsies could not seek for further education and get qualification. As Population census data (2001) shows about 38% of Gypsies told that they do not know Lithuanian language and contrary to other nationalities older people know state language better than the youth does. Because of these facts most of Gypsies have no education what makes their integration process through employment very difficult. There were registered 53 unemployed Gypsies in Vilnius labour exchange in 2003. Active labour market policy measures were implemented to 42 of them however only one person was employed (LR Government, 2004a).

Situation in labour market. According to the labour force survey Lithuanians constitute to 83.4% of labour force, Russians and Poles respectively 6.9 and 7.8 %, and others – 2.5% in the country (Petrauskas, 2004).


The situation of different groups of population is examined according to the Labour force survey (LFS) data. While analysing employment and unemployment situation of ethnic minorities it is should be noticed that mentioned indicators vary slightly between national minorities and Lithuanians. According to the data of Department of Statistics of Lithuania in 2003 the employment rate of people aged 15-64 was 60.9%. Figure 3 shows that the employment rate of Lithuanians is a little higher than Poles and Russians. The employment rate of Lithuanians was 59.6%, Russians – 54.3%, Poles – 55.5%, other nationalities – 57.6% in 2002 (Department of Statistics, 2003a).

Figure 3. Employment rate by nationality (%)



Unemployment rate of different nationalities differs from national average level more than employment indicator does. In 2003 the unemployment rate of Russians was 18.7%, Poles – 13.9%, other nationalities – 15.3%. The unemployment rate of Lithuanians was 11.7% and it was lower than average national level by less than one per cent (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Unemployment rate by nationality (%)



The main reason for the disparities in employment and employment rates could be language barrier, territorial distribution, educational attainment, qualification of ethnic minorities or other factors. Deeper analysis is given further.

Situation analysis

While analysing the situation of ethnic minorities in Lithuania by different aspects we can say that position of the mentioned group in such spheres like right security, education, participation in civic society life and labour market is quite favourable. However, with the purpose of studying the situation of analysing group we should mark some factors, which evoke certain concern.

Structure of ethnic minorities. Quite big changes in the structure of ethnic minorities have been noticed in the country since the Rebirth. The share of Lithuanians since Census 1989 has been risen, while the share of other nationalities as it was shown before has decreased. Such trends could be explained by emigration of the part of Russian speaking people. Assimilation process has influenced the structural changes of population as well. As many research show, normally fertility of ethnic minorities is lower in the Baltic countries.

Decrease of the number of schools with other than Lithuanian language of instruction could be explained by the decrease of the share of ethnic minorities in whole population. Also at the time of education system reform some schools have been joined. Such trend is valid for Lithuanian schools as well.

As it was shown previously many children from ethnic minorities' families attend schools with Lithuanian language of instruction. So the *language of instruction in the school* of general education in ethnically mixed territories often *doesn't match with the nationality of schoolchildren*. As in the schools of Lithuanian language of instruction the number of children with other than Lithuanian nationality has sharply arisen, many schools have not prepared to operate in multicultural environment. Due to the facts it is possible to predict that some part of this group of children will face marginalisation because of lost of their national identity and lack of recognition in other (majority) group (LR Government, 2004b).

Employment of ethnic minorities. When talking about employment of ethnic minorities there were noticed some differences both in employment and unemployment levels.

As was shown above, the greatest number of non-Lithuanians live in Eastern and south-eastern parts of Lithuania. Big economical and social differences between regions could determine presence of social tension. Appearance of different forms of economic and social inequality is recognised as one of the main four reasons of social conflict (as well as value mismatch, ideological reasons and factors concern interaction of social system elements) (Rubin at al., 1994; Zdravomyslov, 1996). The fact that a part of territories belongs to ethnic minorities could compound the possible conflict situation and disturb process of its resolution.

With regard to territorial distribution of ethnic minorities we can't say that unemployment level is higher in the regions where the share of ethnic minorities is big. There

are some exceptions there – the districts of Švenčionys, Ignalina, Utena and Šalčininkai. But in this case the higher unemployment may be caused by insularity of economy. As it has been noticed the worst situation is in borderline territories which are farthest from the big cities. In the borderline regions the links between subjects of national and cross-national market are less developed. Statistical data show that the situation of ethnic minorities in the labour market practically doesn't match with regional unemployment issues in the country.

The important question when tackling the problems of ethnic minorities in labour market, is how social differences of ethnic minorities influence the situation in labour market. Normally in urban regions where the number of job places is bigger, unemployment is lower and contrarily with poor developed economy, the lack of vacancies is apparent. In this way, ethnic aspect of unemployment is closely linked with territorial unemployment differentiation, which is mostly determined by economic development inequality in the regions.

As the territorial factor gives only partial explanation of differences of national minorities and Lithuanians in labour market we should examine the education of analysed groups.

One judgement not based on any statistical data often appears in different sources. It points that representatives of national minorities are not so successful in labour market as Lithuanians because of their lower education. However the data of population Census show that only a few big groups of national minorities (Poles and Gypsies) have lower education than the people of major nationality have. According to this fact and the analysis of the last decade economical situation we can presume that such inequality was mainly determined by structural changes of state economy. In Soviet times when big plants and enterprises were developed in Lithuania a lot of qualified workers and high level specialists came here to work from Russia and other Soviet republics. After the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Lithuania in the beginning and the middle of ninetieth the most of such enterprises crashed and workers (Russian-speaking people mostly) lost their jobs. Without sufficient or any knowledge of Lithuanian language and under growing competition a big part of these people didn't manage to integrate to the labour market. Lack of appropriate knowledge of state language could block acquisition of other qualification, which is demanded in territorial labour market.

Possibilities for developing social integration

Such negative factors as bigger unemployment and lower employment rate, children from non-Lithuanian families losing their ethnical identity attending schools with Lithuanian language of instruction, rather passive role of NGO's of ethnical minorities dealing with social issues of their members appears while analysing the situation of ethnic minorities in Lithuania.

Talking about *NGO's of ethnic minorities* we should say that such organisations should not only confine themselves to developing ethnical traditions, language, and religion

but also encourage and co-ordinate the social integration processes of their members through developing opportunities for participation in the labour market, providing assistance for seeking welfare and solving problems of social adaptation.

As it was noticed non-Lithuanian children attending the schools with Lithuanian language of instruction could face problems of social integration in the future because of their placement in unfamiliar cultural environment at schools. Special measures should be implemented on the purpose of saving ethnic identity and ensuring smooth adaptation to Lithuanian cultural traditions for children from ethnic minorities' families who go to school with Lithuanian language of instruction. Special programmes are prepared by the Ministry of Education and Science for bilingual pupils in the schools with Lithuanian language of instruction with the aim to eliminate negative consequences of rough shift to Lithuanian language and school environment to the children from the families recognised as ethnic minorities.

As we mentioned above one of the obstacles to successive participation of ethnic minorities in labour market especially when talking about older people is weak knowledge or *absence of knowledge of Lithuanian language*. Now in the Integration Program for 2005-2010 of Ethnic minorities in Lithuanian society the measures ensuring possibilities to learn official language have already scheduled. Such measures include for example organisation of unpaid courses for representatives of ethnic minorities. Given the facts mentioned above it would be purposeful to organise advanced language courses for unemployed non-Lithuanians with higher education. It could help them to acquire profound knowledge of state language that is necessary when working in a particular speciality.

There are also such objective reasons, which do not depend on personal features and abilities (knowledge of language for example), as situation in national labour market, economic situation in regions and its attractiveness for investments, infrastructure development, etc. Thus seeking for higher employment level of ethnic minorities, the measures enforcing economic development of entire region should be applied as well as active employment strategies.

Thereby, in our opinion, more attention when seeking for better social integration of ethnic minorities should be paid on the participation of ethnic minorities NGOs when solving social problems of particular ethnic minorities groups. Creation of special programmes ensuring adequate knowledge of state language for skilled non-Lithuanians unemployed people, smooth integration of children from families of other than Lithuanian nationality who attend school with Lithuanian language of instruction, elimination of regional disparities could be also proposed with the aim of better integration of ethnic minorities to social life.

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Presentation of the Roma ethnic minority in the Czech media¹⁸⁴

The article presents and compares the basic findings of two surveys focused on the presentation of the Roma ethnic minority in the Czech media: 1) the research on Czech nation-wide daily newspapers: *Mladá fronta Dnes*, *Právo*, *Lidové noviny*, *Zemské noviny*, *Moravské slovo* published between 10/1/2000 and 3/31/2003, and 2) the research on main news programmes on Czech TV – *Události*, and on a commercial channel Nova – *Televizní noviny*, broadcast in the calendar year 2000. The article is looking for common features of the studied minority presentation in these media. It finds them mainly in the news values (on whose basis the events to be presented are selected) and in the content embedding of the presented events. It directs attention to the risks connected with such presentation of the Roma minority that accentuates stereotypes the Czech population has of this ethnic group and that can lead to its social exclusion.

The question of integrating ethnic minorities into the majority society has gained in urgency over the last two decades, not only in countries that were formerly politically isolated and thus closed to inflow of immigrants. As research shows, the attitude of Czech society towards various ethnic minorities shows xenophobic features¹⁸⁵. The majority population approach is undoubtedly influenced also by the media whose role is growing in the contemporary information society. Television today belongs among the most important agents participating in socialisation. In addition, for many participants media is often the only source of information about certain events, phenomena or persons. The Roma minority undoubtedly belongs among such “unknown quantities” because the majority of Czech population lacks any personal experience covering the knowledge of their life style, standards or values, and culture. This is why it is necessary to know which reports the media present to their readers, but also the context in which they inform about this minority, the genre or programme, and also the broadcasting time or the page. It is also important to realise the risks and pitfalls connected with these ways of presentation, because through presented images the media can accentuate the prejudices and stereotypes concealed in the subconscious of the Czech population. Eventually, they can in this way contribute to discrimination against members of minorities – or in the least fail to explicitly deprecate it –, thus taking part in their social exclusion from the majority society.

¹⁸⁴ This paper is a short version of the article *Media as a tool of social exclusion – an example of presentation of the Roma ethnic minority in the Czech media* printed In: Sirovátka, T (ed) (2004): „The challenge of social inclusion: minorities and marginalized groups in Czech society“. Brno: MU. – in print. This article presents the findings of the research projects supported by the MŠMT 143200001 grant.

¹⁸⁵ According to the Bogardus scale of social distance tested in a representative research by the Focus agency, (only) 7 percent of citizens declared affection towards members of the Roma ethnic minority and admitted the possibility to accept them into the narrow circle of friends and family. Most respondents accept the Roma (only) as fellow citizens. Almost one third of the population, however, refuses any closer contact and one tenth believes that it is necessary to exile this group [Skotnica, Volek 2001]. Similarly, see Navrátil 2003, Rabušic, Katrňák 2002.

We cannot span the whole above-outlined problem in this article. On the contrary, we shall focus only on the main features of presenting the Roma minority living in the territory of the Czech Republic in countrywide daily newspapers and television. We shall point out the common features of their representation which we encounter across the Czech media scene.

Possible risks of presentation of ethnic minorities in the media

In his book *Communicating Racism* the Dutch author Theun A. van Dijk outlines five basic features characterising the presentation of the *race* in the printed media: 1/ ethnic minorities are minorities also in the press. They are presented marginally and their life receives less coverage than is the case with the majority population. 2/ A wide range of dominant themes are being directly or more delicately associated with problems and difficulties or with jeopardising the dominant culture, its values, interests or aims. 3/ Ethnic minorities are consistently described from the viewpoint of the white majority population, whose authorities receive more space and are presented in a more credible manner than minority speakers. 4/ The themes which are relevant for everyday life of ethnic groups, e. g. work, housing, health, education, political life and culture, as well as discrimination in these areas, are discussed only seldom in the press unless they lead to the “problems” of the society as a whole or cause a stir. 5/ Racism towards these groups is systematically underrepresented, reduced to instances of discrimination by individuals or attributed to small right-wing groups, and situated in poor areas. Racism by the elite or institutions is discussed rarely [1987: 45]. Van Dijk sees one of the sources of this state in routine conditions of producing news and in news values, because negative and sensational events usually draw more attention, and every poorly organised group with limited power and influence always has a worse access to the media.

Christopher P. Campbell in his book *Race, Myth and the News* [1995] shows how under-representation of minorities in news and their “invisibility” contribute to marginalisation of non-white Americans. Their existence is not ignored any more, as it used to be 25 years ago, but the lack of perspective and depth of media coverage can encourage dangerous perception of the life of minorities. In such cases J. Hartly speaks about the “myth of marginality”, referring to such coverage that overlooks the complexity of the existence of minority communities and hungers for the culture of the majority. It reflects general beliefs about lives of minorities and positions them to the margins, outside the social mainstream. It is the kind of thinking that creates the impression of the society margin as something irrelevant and peripheral, possibly disruptive and threatening. Because people of colour are found on the margins of the social mainstream, they do not deserve the same attention as is devoted to the whites. Such a journalists’ approach indicates that what is happening on the boundaries does not count – as if it did not exist at all. Because it is exactly the margins of the majority society where minorities in America, and in other parts of the world as well, are usually found, the media are only minimally interested in their coverage [Hartley In Campbell

1995]. Thus not only that the themes related to minority groups living in the given society are neglected, but above all the social exclusion of members of these groups is reinforced and intensified.

S. Hall and M. Pickering works with the concept of *the Other*. According to Pickering, stereotypes function as a method of locating persons within the universe. This always happens from a certain privileged perspective and it always involves an aspect of evaluation. The process of defining *othering* is no different. Labelling a person as *other* is an act of evaluation and a symbolic exclusion used to control ambivalence and create boundaries [2001:48]. In fact, it is a process of social exclusion – that is a process of forcing out to the margins of the unimportant and, from the perspective of the cultural norm, secondary and at the same time potentially dangerous and therefore outlawed. Labelling a person as *other* is done through his/her objectivisation, separation and exclusion. This is facilitated by constructing dissimilarity/otherness as a deviation from what is considered to be important, safe, normal and conventional [2001: 49]. Through presenting images working with dissimilarity/otherness the media can take an active part in the processes of stigmatisation of minorities and thus become an instrument of social exclusion of their members. The mass media participate in defining the socially acceptable and unacceptable, normal and pathological, our and different/other. They become not only an instrument of labelling and exclusion, but also an important promoter of such exclusion.

The presentation of the Roma in Czech daily newspapers and television news

We shall now focus on our own research findings. The presented data are based on two surveys carried out by the Department of Media Studies and Journalism, School of Social Studies, Masaryk University.¹⁸⁶

The first project was devoted to monitoring printed media, specifically the countrywide daily newspapers *Mladá fronta Dnes*, *Právo*, *Lidové noviny*, *Zemské noviny* and *Moravské Slovo*¹⁸⁷ published between October 1st 2000 and March 31st 2001.¹⁸⁸ During the research period we noticed 289 such articles¹⁸⁹ in the five selected newspapers. In total, the dailies published in average 11 articles with the Roma themes in a week. However, the articles were not published on a regular basis. On the contrary, while some days there was a cumulating of news, at other time we did not find anything at all about the Roma ethnic group. It was the fans of the daily newspaper with the greatest readership, *Mladá Fronta Dnes*

¹⁸⁶ Details see Sedláková 2002, Sedláková 2003

¹⁸⁷ *Zemské noviny* and *Moravské slovo*, that were to merge later, had a joint editorship at the time of the survey and most of the materials they published were identical. Their readership differed, however, and therefore we included articles published in both periodicals in the survey.

¹⁸⁸ We are aware that the collected data can be subject to seasonal variations and that during summer months other topics may be presented. However, we believe that they do not differ fundamentally.

¹⁸⁹ The basic research unit was an article. The inclusion of an article into the analysis was governed by the occurrence of the key word Roma in it.

– which was bringing information about the studied minority approximately every other day –, who had access to the greatest number (77) of articles. The readership of the other newspapers were informed less often. Considering the volume of individual dailies the share of published articles about the Roma ethnic group is very small and can be regarded rather as an exception than a systematic coverage of the problem.

The second realised project was devoted to countrywide television channels. In Czech audio-visual media space there exists a duality of two operators of commercial channels – *Nova* and *Prima* – and the public service media represented by two Czech television channels (1 and 2). From the wide spectrum of available contents, the main news on Czech TV 1 (*Události*) and on Nova (*Televizní noviny*) were selected for monitoring the presentation of the Roma. All news broadcast in 2000 were processed.¹⁹⁰

In the calendar year 2000, 105 reports about the Roma ethnic group were broadcast in the *Události* and *Televizní noviny* news. Most of them – 61 (58 %) – were broadcast by the Czech television and formed over one percent (1.3 %) of the *Události* news broadcasting time. Over the given period, the Nova television station broadcast 5333 reports, of which less than a percent (44 reports) were devoted to the Roma ethnic group. The public service television broadcast about 91 minutes devoted to Roma themes in the main news over the concerned period of time. In the case of the Nova station it was 28 minutes less. It means that both the stations in question devoted less broadcasting time to the Roma ethnic group than would be appropriate according to the estimated proportion of the Roma in the Czech population.¹⁹¹

Table 1. The number of articles in individual daily newspapers and television broadcast

Printed media	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency
Mladá fronta Dnes	77	27
Zemské noviny	59	20
Moravské Slovo	57	20
Lidové noviny	57	20
Právo	39	13
Total	289	100

¹⁹⁰ The basic research unit was an item of news, usually a visual report introduced by the newscaster in a studio. All reports framed as “Roma problems” and reports concerning members of the Roma minority were included among the analysed material. These were reports in which the Roma or the Roma ethnic group were mentioned, and those where the Roma were presented as protagonists of the given events (although they were not termed the Roma). It proved to be the biggest stumbling block to decide which reports are relevant for our survey. In the case of audio-visual media working with images it was in some cases very difficult to recognise whether the displayed persons were Roma. This decision was then guided by the physical characteristics of the persons and their diction. The chosen criterion can undoubtedly be regarded as a stereotype. We used it because it is perhaps closest to the view of an ordinary viewer, who identifies members of the Roma ethnic exactly on the basis of these characteristics. But in addition, it is exactly the skin colour of the depicted people that also foreign researchers present in their studies as the criterion for the selection of relevant reports.

¹⁹¹ Only 11,716 citizens of the Czech Republic declared the Roma nationality in the Census of people, houses and flats in 2001 [Srb 2001]. However, it is estimated that there are between 180,000 and 300,000 Roma minority members in the Czech Republic (which means that they make 2-3 % of the Czech population) [Navrátil 2003].

Audio-visual media		
Události	61	58
Televizní noviny	44	42
Total	105	100

The periods during which we monitored the newspaper and the audio-visual reports are not identical, and therefore we cannot simply compare the obtained results. However, our objective is to point out the common features that are characteristic for the Roma minority presentation, because our principal aim is to give a picture of more general, long-term trends in depicting this ethnic group in the media. The analysed reports shall therefore be regarded from three perspectives: 1) what news values they reflect, 2) what topics are chosen for presentation, and 3) what information sources they quote. In the end, we shall briefly discuss the specifics of visual presentation of the Roma minority in audio-visual media.

Events versus news

“News are not as much discovered or even collected as they are manufactured.” [Fowler, 1994: 13]. Theorists of media studies conceptualise today’s media as agents that consciously construct the image of outer reality. This holds true also for the news genres, which are generally considered to be objective sources and disseminators of information. Even a reported news is a representation of social reality (not reality itself) and always shows only a part of it. As W. L. Bennett states in his book *News: Politics of Illusion*, a news is a product that is continuously being modified by people and institutions that produce and consume it. Behind the “illusion” of objective news and independent media there are hidden factors influencing the production of news, such as for example the taste of the public, the method of collecting news, communication strategies of participants, and communication technologies. The reports presented in the media are not simply accounts of what happened. In order for an event to get to readers, it has to undergo a relatively long selection process that begins at getting over the so-called “*threshold of attention*”, which means that the persons authorised to make decisions about what is going to be presented must consider it to be *newsworthy*. Different approaches speak about possible factors that influence the production of news. The theory of news values by Johann Galtung and Mari Ruge [1973] elaborates in detail twelve criteria according to which the authors of reports assess the relevance of events for further processing. The criteria are: 1/ frequency or incidence in time, 2/ the threshold of attention, 3/ explicitness, 4/ meaningfulness, 5/ consonance, 6/ unpredictability, 7/ continuity, 8/ diversity, 9 – 10/ relation to elite nations and persons, 11/ personalisation, and negativity.

We tried to identify what news values are presented in the analysed news. In most cases there were several possible explanations of why the given event was selected for publication. This reflects the fact that the more criteria an event meets, the bigger its chances to become an item of news. Some news values were impossible to reconstruct retrospectively

on the basis of the given article. The most problematic turned out to be: the *threshold of attention* and *composition*, which were possible to determine only hypothetically. The category of *frequency*, reflecting news' incidence in time, presented us with the same problem. In order to be able to determine it more precisely we would, in these cases, need to be present to the process of the news' production or have information about other events that took place at the same time. The technique of contents analysis does not make this possible. That is why the resulting table (no. 2), that shows what news values the analysed reports reflect, does not comprise the three mentioned categories.

Table 2. News values of news about the Roma

	NEWSPAPER ARTICLES		TV REPORTS	
News value	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency(%)	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency(%)
Total of reports ¹⁹²	264	100	105	100
Explicitness	229	87	73	70
Personalisation	208	79	66	63
Continuity	138	52	46	44
Negativity	137	52	61	58
Meaningfulness	25	9	31	30
Unpredictability	21	8	37	35
Relation to elite nations	12	5	24	23
Consonance	7	3	6	6
Relation to elite persons	4	2	12	11

Table 2 reflects certain differences in the presentation of the Roma minority in the printed and audio-visual media. It is above all the greater emphasis on negativity in the studied television stations. Also the criteria assessing the links between an event and elite nations and persons were applied more consistently during the selection of events to be presented in the main news broadcasting. This was probably due to a substantial volume of information about the migration of the Roma to Western European countries in 2000.

Further, the table shows that regardless the media type the events concerning the Roma ethnic group on which journalists decide to report are selected mainly on the basis of four criteria: **explicitness**, **personalisation**, **negativity** and **continuity**. This indicates a preference for attractive events whose interpretation is not ambivalent, events related to a known person and thus having their "heroes" and/or "losers". They are events that are not positive and one-shot, which means that it is possible to report on them repeatedly. These are categories suitable for news of the narrative type that are typical of infotainment. The four identified criteria that are applied most frequently correspond also to Bennet's statement, according to which the contemporary reporting is characterised by four main features: personalisation, dramatisation, fragmentarisation, and normalisation [1996: 42]. Moreover,

¹⁹² The total number of published articles in this table does not correspond with the total number of the analysed articles, because in this case we only worked with articles of the reporting genre.

the high frequency of the category of explicitness shows that for the presentation of the Roma minority, non-problematic and clear events are deliberately chosen. This can suggest that journalists are aware of the fact that this is an area on which they have to inform very cautiously. On the other hand, it undoubtedly leads to simplifying and flattening the problems of the Roma ethnic group.

The other criteria were applied less often in the selection of articles about the Roma minority and some of them can be considered entirely marginal. This concerns particularly references to elite nations or persons and consonance, that is news awaited by the readers. This indicates that neither the public nor “celebrities” are much interested in Roma topics.

Thematic foundation of articles about the Roma minority

We showed that the reports which are presented to readers by journalists are usually selected on the basis of four news values. But what is the content, topic or context of these reports? We carried out a categorisation of reports on the Roma minority on the basis of their main topic and context into which they were framed. We identified seven basic thematic fields within which the journalists reported on the Roma ethnic group: 1/ criminality (reports on committed criminal offences, their investigation, offenders or defendants; it is possible to distinguish two sectional subcategories: cases where Roma act as victims of perpetrated offences and those where they stay on the defendants' part; 2/ discussion about racism (reports on the attitude of the majority population towards the Roma ethnic group, for example, outcomes of public opinion polls relating to racial discrimination, suggestions as to how to fight it, and possibilities of prevention); 3/ politics (reports putting the Czech Roma situation into the international context, dealing with the approach of Czech political representation to the Roma ethnic group, including the evaluation of the Roma situation by foreign experts, but also activities of the Roma political groups. Also reports on the Roma migration fall in this category, but since we consider this to be a very specific topic, we kept them separately in the table); 4/ culture (information about the Roma life style, art activities, cultural events and interests); 5/ history (above all reports referring to the Roma Holocaust during the World War II and any current events related to this period, for example, a dispute over the wording on the memorial plaque at a camp in Lety); 6/ education (reports on the education of Roma children, requalification training courses for the unemployed, but also articles and reports about working with children in their free time), and 7/ social issues (a category summarising reports on housing, unemployment and health of the Roma population). Some of the reports did not fall in any of these groups; therefore a category *Other* was created. Especially reports of a columnist genre, comments and, in the case of audio-visual media, for example, reports about football competitions amongst Roma teams³², were put into

³² This leads to the question as to why these media reports were not included in the sports broadcasting. By their inclusion in the main news, a notion of exclusiveness of the presented event is created. We can consider this to be a certain form of discrimination since an activity involving a minority receives different/special attention than would be the case with the majority population.

this category. On the other hand, some reports covered more topics and it was possible to put them into two groups at the same time. In such cases we considered the topic being dealt with in a greater part of the article or report, and we categorised the reports accordingly. Table 3 shows the number of articles that were put into the individual categories.

Table 3: Thematic categorisation of reports on the Roma minority

Topic	NEWSPAPER ARTICLES		TV REPORTS	
	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency(%)	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency(%)
Roma - victims	52	18	20	19
Social Problems	40	14	6	5
Criminality of Roma	34	12	15	14
Culture	32	11	6	6
Discussion about Racism	29	10	7	7
History	27	9	-	-
Politics	24	8	3	3
Education	23	8	6	6
Migration of Roma	7	2	31	30
Other	21	7	11	11
Total	289	100	105	100

Also in this case, the table illustrates the differences between the printed media agenda and the audio-visual media agenda. Especially within the television discourse, no information is to be found relating to the history of the Roma ethnic group, neither is there any reflection on it on the part of the Czech and foreign representations, including reports related to the activities of the Roma organisations. Moreover, there are significantly fewer social issues such as, for example, accommodation, health and/or unemployment, to be encountered on the television screens. On the contrary, however, substantial attention is dedicated to the “Roma migration case”. It is precisely these reports that have a tendency to create a phenomenon of moral panic, as we have mentioned at the beginning, and to give rise to ungrounded feelings of fear or danger posed by “waves of migration” of the Roma not only out of the Czech Republic, but also, in the case of Slovakian Roma, into the country.

The table, however, also shows similar characteristics of informing about the Roma minority, for example, a high proportion of information about criminality. At the same time, the Roma are more often portrayed as the victims rather than the defendants of the criminal offences. The majority of violent criminal offences on which the media report have a racist nature (news about attacked Roma families, information about the course of trials), but neither the investigators nor the journalists usually state so. These reports illustrate that the Roma in the Czech Republic are indeed exposed to some extent of danger. This is not, however, represented by the state or the ethnic majority – as the Roma themselves maintain in their asylum claims -, but mainly by members of right-wing extremist groups. These characteristics

correspond with findings of research into the Roma presentation in international media.¹⁹³ Further, reports on crime suggest a distinct character of crime perpetrated by members of the Roma minority (criminal activity by Roma activists, usury) as compared to criminal acts by the majority. Some cases can literally be called “a rarity” (for example, a dispute between a married couple which ended up by burning the wife to death; illegal mains gas supply, dismantling abandoned houses and selling them off). The strategy to inform about the Roma when the behaviour of some Roma individuals surpasses what is generally considered “normal” contributes to their exclusion and positions them outside the majority society. Such reports are also very often stereotypical (they accentuate, for example, the stereotype of the Roma as a layabout or abuser of the social benefit system) and, by the sound of it, they encourage the reinforcement of prejudices against the Roma that are rooted in the Czech population.

Overall, it is obvious that the scope of topics that the researched newspapers cover is bigger than in the case of television news programmes. This can be caused by the different size of the area which the given media allow the journalist to cover. While television news contain on average 14 flashes, the number of reports printed in the newspaper is several times higher. Therefore, even events (for example, cultural or historical) which are not so attractive, with regards to their news value, have a chance to appear on their pages. In the case of the “absence” of social issues in television news, the explanation can possibly be the complexity of such issues and thus their problematic translatability into the - on average - 80 seconds of a newsflash. A low level of expert knowledge of the given issues among journalists undoubtedly plays its own part. Out of fear of being accused of political incorrectness or of having presented the situation in too simplified a fashion, they prefer to avoid these issues altogether.

Quoted Information Resources

The proportion of the Roma among the quoted information resources is another topic we would like to discuss in comparing the presentation of the Roma ethnic group in the printed media as against the audio-visual ones. We counted 345 people being interviewed (the average of three in each report) in the studied television reports. Members of the Roma ethnic group were a minority (40%) among them. There was no “Roma voice” in one quarter of the media reports. The situation was similar in the printed media. There are hardly any Roma statements to be found on the newspaper pages. The only exception are reports of the story genre, where individual members of the Roma minority appear as key speakers. Whereas in the case of the majority population journalists seek opinion from an official representative or an expert, they refer to opinions of “random witnesses” in the case of the minority – i.e. probably of people who are the easiest to access (although, undoubtedly, an official standpoint of the Roma minority representatives often exists as well).

We can conclude that a large part of the studied reports on the Roma took a non-Roma

¹⁹³ Compare: Erjavec, Hervatin, Kelbl 2000.

society's point of view. When the Roma were quoted, it was usually in connection with questions related to their ethnic group and not in connection with issues referring to the whole society. A similar situation was uncovered by a survey conducted in Slovenia. Its authors state: "The media treats them (the Roma) as if they were, from the reporting point of view, underage, or in other words, as if they were informants who are unable to express their own opinion and therefore need certain mediators" [Erjavec, Hervatin, Kelbl, 2000].

Conclusion

We presented findings arising from two surveys which monitor the presentation of the Roma minority in Czech nation-wide daily newspapers and in the main news programmes of the two Czech most widely watched television channels. We tried to identify more general trends in portraying the Roma in different types of media. In doing so, we concentrated on the kind of news values that the analysed reports reflect, the kind of thematic context into which the journalists frame the reports, and the kind of information resources they quote.

In the introduction, we quoted five features which, according to Theun A. van Dijk, characterise portraying of ethnic minorities in the printed media. On the basis of our findings we can confirm that the stated features describe the portraying of the Roma in the Czech media as well. It is generally true that the amount of information about the Roma minority, which has the chance to address the reader of the Czech press and the viewer of the Czech television news programme, is very small and does not correspond to the proportion of the Roma in the population of the Czech Republic. The very lack of information about this minority leads to its marginalisation in the subconscious of the Czech population and it promotes social exclusion of their members, who are thus forced out to the margins of society which does not consider them to be significant enough to pay due attention to them.

We found out that the events the media report on are selected particularly on the basis of four criteria designated as news values. They are: explicitness, personalisation, negativity and continuity. The presented stories are therefore unproblematic and easily communicable events, which undoubtedly lead to oversimplification of the "Roma issues" in the media. This corresponds to the opinion of J. Veis who claims that "mainly because of the television influence the news is becoming more and more 'of a clip'. The media are not willing to perceive a topic as part of a wider context." [Veis 2003:11] Also the type of themes which are selected for presentation by journalists contribute to stereotyping the information about the Roma ethnic group, because it is mainly crime-related events and, in the case of audio-visual media, information related to the Roma migration that dominate. Moreover, the Roma are usually not given enough space to comment on the presented reports. And, if their opinion is quoted, then it is almost exclusively in connection with their ethnic group, and hardly ever with questions related to the ethnic majority. We consider an informed, individual approach to the members of the Roma minority as well as to any events which might be reported on, to be the possible key strategy which could contribute to improving the quality of reports on the Roma that are being presented to the readers.

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Used material:

- Video footage of news programmes *Televizní noviny* and *Deník* broadcast in 2000.
- Copies of daily newspapers *Mladá fronta Dnes*, *Právo*, *Lidové noviny*, *Zemské noviny* and *Moravské Slovo*, from 1 Oct 2000 to 31 Mar 2001.

The Multidimensional Process of Mobilization of the Polish Roma Around Holocaust Memory.

This article examines the process of Roma mobilization around Holocaust memory. A fuller picture of the motives and background of the activities of Roma organizations in Poland concerning Holocaust commemoration will be given here. It is hypothesized that this mobilization can be seen from many perspectives, in terms of ethnic and political mobilization, but also as a process of developing a Roma organizational and leadership structure. In elaboration of the main subject, theoretical approaches of constructivism and instrumentalism can be particularly useful, as well as elite and social movements theory. This text suggests that the analysis of Roma activation should go beyond the static dimension of ethnicity and ethnic identity, search for new approaches and take into account the broader political context.

Introduction.

In times of the political mobilization of ethnic groups, the proliferation of a variety of their demands from the free maintaining of the traditions to political self-determination, we are witnesses of the revival of terms such as nationalism, ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic mobilization. Nowadays a widespread debate around them takes place not only among politicians but also in academia. Nationalism has recently become a “hot” area in social and political theory. Scholars have started to re-elaborate the classical theories of nationalism and create new ones, basing their ideas on the evidence around them, with the Roma being one of the examples.¹⁹⁴

This article is a brief introduction rather than a thorough survey, but it attempts nevertheless to provide an analytical descriptive perspective and contributes to the literature examining the problems of ethnicity, group mobilization and the role of the elite. The hypothesis here is that the recent activities of Roma organizations around Holocaust memory is a part of wider process which can be described in terms of both ethnic and political mobilization, and in which we can observe a few parallel processes: 1) common ethnic identity creation, 2) Roma leaders' efforts to help the Roma become recognized as a nation at the international level, and 3) current leadership's competition for prestige and power among local Roma activists. In this study, I will present the activation of Roma organizations in Poland around Holocaust memory that is taking place currently, which is an essential part of these processes mentioned above.

¹⁹⁴ It should be noted here that the term ‘Roma’ is used in the text as an umbrella term, including all various Roma groups and subgroups, however, the diversification of the Roma community must be kept in mind here.

Ethnicity is a powerful form of political activity. This article examines the way in which Roma leaders use Holocaust memories and symbols to gain support for the political goals. Holocaust commemoration is a new Roma tradition constructed by Roma leaders with great support from international organizations and foundations. The aim is first to build Roma self-identification with their own history, and to maintain, at the same time, a Roma identity, but also to legitimize a variety of requests of Roma leaders. Specifically, my hypothesis is that leaders use Holocaust symbolism as an effective tool in the power struggle both for the influence among the Roma and for the position in the eyes of outside bodies.

The structure of the article is the following. First I will briefly describe the examples of the Roma activities concerning Holocaust commemoration, and suggest explaining the motives lying in the background on two levels, “ideological” and “political”. In the first case, I use the traditional framework of nationalism and ethnicity. However, this article is also a kind of challenge to the traditional ethno-cultural approach, which prevails in literature on the Roma. I agree with Wim Willems who calls for breaking up the ‘splendid isolation’ of Gypsy studies and stresses the necessity for analyzing Roma issues from many different perspectives, also from the point of view of elite and social movement theories (Willems 1997). To answer this call, I will examine Roma activation around the Holocaust also at the ‘political’ level, from the perspective of resource mobilization and competition theory. A few issues are particularly important in better understanding of Roma mobilization around Holocaust memory. The questions worth asking here are why the “forgotten story” of Roma Holocaust has become a political issue now, what kind of factors and motives lay in the background and what is the role the motives of the Roma leaders who are the “engine” of activation around Holocaust commemoration.

The Romani Holocaust – A Forgotten Story.

The Roma and Sinti, in German “*Zigeuner*”, were a population besides the Jews who were assigned by the Nazis for mass extermination in the Final Solution. Their foreign appearance, strange customs and language, nomadic way of life and lack of regular employment distinguished them easily from the majority of the population. Accused of being thieves, beggars, and tramps, the Roma very quickly became a target of police harassment and persecution in the Nazi state. The policy against *Zigeuner* was progressively radicalised in the early thirties, and they started to be registered and classified as “*inferior people*”. They were included in the group of “*racially distinctive*” minorities with “*alien blood*” and stigmatised in formal papers as “*second class nationals*”. Together with other national groups they became a target in Nazi extermination policy (Kenrick & Puxon 1995, p.25).

The limited framework of this article prevents me from presenting the details of the history of Roma persecution during the period of World War II. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to say that the unreliability of pre-Holocaust population figures for Roma and the lack of research, especially on their fate outside Germany during the Holocaust, make it difficult to estimate the number and percentage of those who perished. Although, the

estimates of the Roma murdered by the Nazis and their collaborators all over the Europe vary significantly, most scholars assert that as a result of the Nazi plan of extermination the Roma lost thirty to fifty percent of the population.

For more than half a century the history of the Roma Holocaust was forgotten. Holocaust awareness began increasing much later in the Romani case than awareness about the Shoah among Jews. Many different answers could be provided as an explanation. To my knowledge, the main reasons are connected with two overlapping processes: not only is the general public unaware of the Roma Holocaust, but the Roma themselves are often ignorant of this aspect of their history. Agnes Daroczi, a Hungarian Roma activist noticed two different sides of this process: "*Ours is an oral culture and there is a low contact level among the various Gypsy communities. The historians have not really dealt with this part of the Holocaust and it is not part of the education curriculum*" (Bandy, 1997).

On the one hand, there is a specific perception of the past among the Roma. The time of the Holocaust has been seen as a subsequent episode in the ongoing persecution of Roma communities conducted over time by different state authorities. Additionally, personal experiences and individual memories about the Holocaust remained exclusively as family stories, which are long lasting but limited territorially, not shared with the others. On the other hand, there has been no publicity around the Roma Holocaust. The Roma themselves do not speak about it in public, and they do not possess any political representation which could do it on behalf of them. After the war, the Roma received little, if any, reparations from any government for their losses and suffering. Not a single Rom was called to testify at the Nuremberg Trials, or in the front of any of the subsequent war crime tribunals.

In July 2000 the main body representing Europe's Gypsies – the International Romani Union (IRU) – made a demand for the international recognition of the Roma people as a "*Nation without a State*". According to the IRU Declaration of a Nation, the Roma Nation is based on "*the same tradition, the same culture, the same origin, the same language*", but most of all the authors appeal to the fact that the Roma are the nation "*of which over half a million persons were exterminated in a forgotten Holocaust*". The IRU leaders recognize the Holocaust as an important and effective instrument in the battle for recognition as a nation, moreover it is perceived as politically and morally justified by the Roma leaders. They postulate that the Holocaust as a shared Roma experience is a crucial component of Roma common identity which should bind Roma all over the world. This Declaration was a very important step in the Romani process toward achieving the accepted status of a non-territorial national group, together with designing and recognizing national symbols - the Romani flag and anthem and efforts to standardize the Roma language. The IRU also started a widespread campaign to popularize the term "Roma" instead of "Gypsies", as politically preferable term which includes all Roma subgroups, tribes and clans.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ As a result of the objection of the Sinti groups, the expression "Sinti and Roma" is also often used. This division has been accepted internationally, and the OSCE agenda on Roma issues established in 1994 was called: Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues.

In the perspective of the IRU, activities around the Holocaust, as a historical and political component of the Roma integration process as well as the issue in international demands for national recognition, commemoration events organized by Roma associations all over the Europe become politically significant.

Roma Activities Around the Holocaust in Poland.

Nowadays the Roma in Poland are engaged in many events commemorating the Romani Holocaust. It has become the main focus of the activities of many Roma organizations. I present below the most important of these activities, which are crucial for understanding the character of the Roma commemoration of Nazi persecution.

Most of the activities around Holocaust memory are concentrated around the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp. This is a central place for Roma Holocaust memory. There was a special separate section of the camp for the Roma (called *Zigeunerlager*) created in January 1943, in which Nazis gathered Roma from all over Europe. According to camp documents, the number of Roma kept there is estimated around 20,000. They were killed systematically, and they died in extremely poor conditions as a result of the miserable nutrition, sadistic 'medical' experiments, infections, and epidemics. The last 3,000 died in the gas chambers the night of 2 August 1944, a few days before the final liquidation of the camp by the Nazis. This day is recognised as a Roma Extermination Memorial Day, and every year a commemorating ceremony is organized in Auschwitz. This event unites Roma coming every year to the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp from all over the world. Especially the 50th anniversary of the final extermination of the Roma camp organized in 1994 became a great international meeting of Roma representatives, state officials and invited guests.

There are many places of massacres of Roma all over the country, some of them are still unknown, some of them remain forgotten, most of them are not marked and protected. There is one important exception from this common situation – Szczurowa. This small village near Tarnow has a special meaning for Roma in Poland, and in addition to the Auchwitz camp it is a symbol of the Roma Holocaust in Poland. On 3 of July 1943, a group of 93 Roma who had lived in the village for generations were shot at the local cemetery. This tragedy has been alive in the minds of Szczurowa inhabitants, and they have maintained the place of the mass grave and they played an active role in turning it into a historical monument in 1966, around which the commemoration activities take place every year. To remember the tragedy in Szczurowa and to commemorate the Roma Holocaust is the main objective of the Caravan of Memory organized every summer by the director of the Tarnow Regional Museum together with the Roma Association in Tarnow. The first Caravan was organized in 1996, and since then every year a large group of Roma and non-Roma from many countries start on a brief journey in old Roma wagons to visit the places of Roma and non-Roma martyrdom in the region (Kapralski 2003).

Many Roma associations in Poland are engaged in activities concerning the collection of data about persecutions of Roma during the war, such as the places of massacres and the

names of the victims and recording the testimonies of the victims. Its main task is to fill the gap in the records of Roma history during Nazi times, mostly by collecting the individual memories of survivors and their families. Gathering any kind of materials, documents and interviews with the victims and witnesses of Nazi crimes on Roma are one of the basic objectives and an important part of all the activities of Roma associations in Poland. The importance of collecting the documents, preparing the publications, and propagating knowledge about this time is hard to overestimate in the situation when the facts concerning Roma persecutions were overlooked for decades.

The point here is that all these activities mentioned above have many different but overlapping functions. They create a link to the past, which played a key role in building the common consciousness of shared history and collective Roma identity. At the same time, Holocaust commemoration is an instrument of Roma visibility in the public sphere, which helps them make claims for recognition as an ethnic-national entity, and is a tool used by Roma local leaders in their internal power struggles. The aim of this text is to elaborate on these functions.

Roma Identity under Construction.

The primary difficulty involved in every discussion concerning the Roma is their diversity and problematic classification. All over Europe Roma groups have travelled from one region to another. It can be assumed that the encounters of different groups of Roma with other peoples were quite regular and, as a result, a cultural and linguistic exchange took place and led to the greater diversification of the Roma groups. Their language, customs and style of life have been in the constant process of adopting elements from other societies; consequently, groups differ among themselves, because of the different influences which come from distinct groups of non-Roma.

Therefore, in case of the Roma population it is extremely hard to avoid some generalizations connected to the fact of the disputable perception and description of the Roma population as one entity. The term Roma, or Gypsies, has been used to label such different and diverse groups, and it is difficult to uphold the idea that they are a population with a distinct culture. The internal diversification of the Roma is, on the one hand, the key to understanding every Roma-related issue, and on the other, the key problem in its analysis. Roma *“is a specific ethnic community – an intergroup ethnic community- which ... is divided into a widespread archipelago of separate groupings, split in various ways into metagroups, groups and subgroups, each with their own ethnic and cultural features. Sometimes these groupings are even opposed to each other and their problems are frequently completely different in nature and therefore cannot be generalized”* (Marushiakova & Popov 2001, p.33). To conclude, any general statements concerning all Roma could always be arguable, because exceptions can always be found among this much diversified population. This danger and the complexity of the Roma issue must be kept in mind in the following discussion.

An attempt to describe Roma ethnicity leads to many difficult questions. The Roma ethnicity can be described as a process under construction, in the sense that most of its elements are not consistent and are in the process of permanent creation. One of the basic doubts concerns the fact that ethnic markers are not shared by all members of the Roma population. Most ordinary Roma identify themselves not with whole population, but rather with the clan, tribe or subgroup they belong to. The other problem is that ethnicity is a past-oriented term, and among ordinary Roma the sense of the origins and their own history is disputable. These problems will be the substance of further examination.

The Roma are in the process of defining and re-evaluating their ethnic characteristics. The recent efforts to reconstruct a standard Romani language are one side of the desire of the Roma (or more precisely, the Roma elite) to find the way around the diversification within their own population. The other side is to reconstruct and disseminate the consciousness of shared origins and a common history. Language is always an important distinguishing feature of every nation or ethnic group. Whatever description of Romani we use here, whether it is a group of closely related languages or rather a single language with numerous dialects, the most important idea is that there has never been one single Roma language and there are perhaps more than sixty so-called Romani dialects (Fraser 1992, p. 301). The differences between dialects are very often significant, mostly because there have been constant borrowings from the different host cultures. However, nowadays there have been long-term efforts to establish and popularize a standardized version of the literary Romani. The basic challenge remains how this new standardized language will be spread not only among the elite reading Romani newspapers and periodicals, but also among ordinary uneducated and in a large part illiterate Roma who in a great part do not know Romani and use the national languages of the states where they live. In Hungary, for example, only 20 percent of the Roma can speak Romani (Barany 1991, p.312).

The other attempts aim to reconstruct and disseminate the consciousness of shared origins and a common history. This is a real challenge for Roma elite, for without this consciousness it is hard to talk about the Roma as an ethnic group, but it is evident that the obsession with origins and history concerns only this small group of self-proclaimed Roma leaders. There is a lack of awareness of shared origins and history among the Roma masses. Ordinary Roma simply ignore their roots and history and live in the present (Okely 1983; Stewart 1997). In Roma culture there is no past commemoration tradition, in a way known in the other communities. Stewart's observations among the Hungarian Roma allow him to formulate the opinion that except for the educated Roma elite, the ordinary Roma do not possess an ethnic identity, in the sense that *"for them, identity is constructed and constantly remade in the present in relations with significant others, not something inherited from the past"* (Stewart 1997, p.28). In his works about the Hungarian Roma, Stewart suggests that looking for ties with the mythical homeland is the idea important only for a small group of Roma intellectuals, while ordinary Roma create an alternative autonomous imagined space connected with horse dealing activities, *brotherhood*, demarcated residence, songs, etc.

(ibidem). Besides the cultural factors, a simple lack of knowledge about their own history is visible among the Roma masses. This is the result of the still low level of education among Roma children, but also the absence of the history of minority groups in the national curriculum in many countries.

In the Roma case, it is hard to talk about a common shared historical awareness or the recollections of ancestors. The main observation of scholars is that history is simply irrelevant for ordinary Roma (Mroz & Mirga 1994; Stewart 1997). The reasons can be shortly characterized as nomadism and related lack of rootedness in the case of many Roma groups in any particular territory. Moreover, the presence of oral culture and the absence of a written language play an essential role here. In the Roma population the stories about the past, as it was mentioned before, were mostly the family story, shared only by the closest members of family and were limited to a few previous generations. In the case where is no common shared traditions and historical memories on which the group identity can be based, they must be invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).

In this context, the Holocaust has played an essential role in the case of Roma population for several important reasons. First of all, stigmatization of the Roma by that Nazis as a target of extermination because of their ethno-cultural characteristics led to the perception of a variety of Roma groups as a unified group. Second, this tragic experience became a symbol of common shared long-lasting persecution of the Roma by the outside groups, providing a basis for internal solidarity. In other words, following the Nazi politics against the Roma the German authorities put together different communities into one category and to a large degree stimulated the feeling among the victims that they had more in common than they thought. As it was already noticed, group identity is not only a matter of self-identification, but also a matter of the perception from the outside, by the members of the out-groups. In the Roma case, the fact that the state authorities throughout time and Nazi decision-makers during the Holocaust perceived the Roma in racial terms as one group, and the aim for physical elimination had a powerful unifying role. As Leo Lucassen described this process, *“it works like a boomerang: we are one, because they say we are one; so we unite by using that frame. In the end, what is decisive is not present or former cultural similarities, but the common experience of persecution and genocidal racism - taking as fact that this indeed historically happened to all these so-called Gypsy groups”* (Willems & Lucassen 2000, p.266).

I argue that although identification among ordinary Roma with the whole Roma population is rather weak, it does not mean that the term ethnic identity cannot be applicable to the Roma case. It rather does not fit the prevailing Western framework which is based on *objective* criteria such as shared language, religion, origins, symbols or historical memories. Roma self-identification with their own clan is very strong, which is based on other, more *subjective* criteria, such as specific way of life and traditions connected to Romanipen (the Romani codex of values and behaviours). In the non-historical dimension, the Roma identity is very strong and visible. However, I agree with the point made by Slawomir Kapralski that *„it is not the kind of identity which could be easily transformed into a national one: the latter needs historical tradition, something which the former cannot provide. Therefore, efforts*

toward establishing a sense of national identity among Romanies would involve necessary the invention of tradition....it is actual persecution experienced by the Roma that will create the foundation of such tradition” (Kapralski 1997, p.237). The activities of Roma organizations in Poland presented at the beginning could be interpreted from this perspective, as a part of Roma ethno-political mobilization.

Roma Ethno-political Mobilization – Elite ‘in actu’.

Following the definition proposed by Liesbet Hooghe, political mobilization can be described as a process whereby the group brings the resources of its members under its control and puts them into action, „*it is, in other words, a process of accumulation of power*” (Hooghe 1992, p.34). Whatever we choose to call the process we are currently witnessing in the Roma case, either ethnogenesis (Nicolae Gheorghe), an ethno-mobilization (Zoltan Barany), or political nationalism (Slawomir Kapralski), its main objective is searching for a common identity and on this basis to call for the political recognition of Roma as an ethnic-national entity. The problem is that the understanding of the ethnic group prevailing in the Western tradition is based on the classical nationalist approach supported the vision of a nation as homogenous cultural entity with a common shared ancestry and history.

The core of the ethnicity is the group consciousness of a common bond that distinguishes its members from the others, and these bonds are mostly the history and culture. It is visible that most ethnic groups are obsessed with their own history, and they have made history the ideological nucleus of their existence. Shared historical experiences and group memory about them have a powerful impact on the consciousness of individuals as members of one group. Ethnic or national groups need their own history, and the rising elite play a key role in the process of recreating it. The historical consciousness of the rising elite is a chief element of the emerging national consciousness of the group, and it is also the basic ideology which initially integrates the elite and then, under their leadership, the whole population. As Miroslav Hroch said, the national elite are like a vanguard of the ethnic group’s march to nationhood. The elite are responsible for development the history from a focus of interest of a narrow group, to the subject of consciousness of all members of ethnic community. In this sense historical consciousness is produced by the elite. The role of this stratum cannot be overestimated, and their position and activity determine the success or failure of the mobilization process (Hroch 1985, Smith 1986).

The approach which stresses the power of ethnic markers in group categorisation and political recognition is, as it was already presented, very problematic to apply to the Roma case. In order for Roma nationalism to be efficient it must join this common narrative constructed along ethnic lines. This is how Roma ethnicity becomes a point for politicization. Roma activities around the Holocaust as a shared tragic historical experience are the Roma’s response to this framework in order to win the battle for recognition as an ethnic group. The role of the Roma elite is crucial in this process.

There are two main institutional forms of mobilization: the elitist and mass movement. In the Roma case exclusively the first model appears, and without almost no grass-roots support and participation, the Roma masses have been traditionally politically passive. In this situation, one basic question remains: who is the elite in the case of the Roma? Romani scholars have described this group in different ways. Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorghe (1997, p.6), well known Romani activists, characterize this group as „*a thin strata of Romani intellectuals, party activists, and a middle class, a by-product of the state's coercive educational measures*”. Will Guy (2001, p.20-21) adds that they are also the product of state socialism education and political culture, and do not possess the legitimacy; they are self-proclaimed representations of Roma people. Moreover, the Roma leaders are very deeply divided and not very willing to cooperate with each other. Additionally, there is a strong conflict, as mentioned before, between new (modern) and old (traditional) strata in Roma elites.

The sources which legitimate particular persons to be perceived as leaders in the Roma community are different, and they could be experience, capability, financial success, education, age, coming from a respected clan or prior activities done for the community. The process of Roma self-organization cannot be perceived in terms of democratic representation. The most important factor of Romani leadership is the “usefulness” for the community. It is based on ability to fulfil of group's interests, especially regarding contacts with the outside. In this situation the key to success for a prospective leader is to build the links of political and economic dependence between him and the particular population. It helps him to obtain internal recognition as a leader, and at the same time, to create an image of a representative of the group in the outside. This is a key factor of success in the case of the “new” Roma leaders and their organizations.

The Case of Roma Elite in Poland. A New Perspective.

Generally in Central Europe, and also in Poland, the Roma have started to be self-organized in response to external requirements to institutionalise the relations between minority groups and outside state institutions. Establishing formal organizations seemed to be inevitable to challenge the legal and administrative procedures in a democratic state. Roma organizations are quite numerous, but most of them are rather small, and with a weak organizational structure (Klimova 2002, p.115). Moreover, they operate only on a small territory, locally or regionally, and are concentrated on cultural and social services. In most cases, Roma organizations can be described as a “family business”, which is not surprising taking into account the traditional Roma clan structure. It is natural that in such an internally divided community as the Roma there are many organizations and it is hard to expect one strong and united representational body at the national level. According to data collected by Ilona Klimowa (Klimova 2002), there are 120 registered Romani organizations in the Czech Republic, 150 in Romania, and 280 in Hungary.

Zoltan Barany (1991, p.312) claims that in this situation competition and tension between the leaders are likely to arise. He mentions that fragmentation is related to leadership competition, generation disputes, ideological cleavages, class differences and interfamilial and class tensions. The situation in Poland is more difficult than in countries where the Roma are a more numerous population.¹⁹⁶ Whereas in Romania or Bulgaria there are numerous Roma political parties and a developed network of Roma organizations and associations, in Poland there are about twenty Roma organizations, and only a few are very active in the public sphere. There is neither a Roma political party nor a Romani representative in the Parliament. The main reason is the demographic situation in Poland (the territorial dispersion of the Roma) and the favouring of the large parties electoral system.

Moreover, the Roma elite is not a unified group. There are two main lines of divisions; the first one is connected with internal traditional diversification, which results in a variety of particular sub-groups, clans and families, but there is also a very visible and important distinction between the old and new elite. The Roma elite structure has been mostly a traditional one, the old elite are traditional leaders, and consists of heads of extended families, which have a great respect among Roma due to their age, knowledge, knowing the Romanipen (Romani codex of behaviour), etc. The council of elders and community court have been one of the main sources of power and group loyalty. A different style of life of a particular group causes the different social organization and social interactions within the Roma population. Whereas the Bergitka Roma have been settled for many years and was never an internally integrated group, the Polska Roma, Kalderash and Lovari are nomads with strong internal organization including their leaders. Especially the Polska Roma have had a traditional integral internal social network of the leadership and representation within the community with the institution of Shero Rom on the top.

However, the situation is changing. Nowadays, these traditional dependence relations have been weakening. The “new” leaders’ stratum has appeared consisting of so-called “professional” Roma – composed of political and organisational leaders, relatively well-educated, with prestigious jobs, who want to create an image of themselves as modern politicians. Mroz (2001, p. 266) describes the relations between them as a „*clash of tradition and modernity*”, which is constantly apparent in the activities of formal Roma associations. On the one hand, “new” leaders try to obtain support from traditional clans’ leaders, by convincing them that their activities are in full compliance with Romani tradition and rules. On the other hand, at the same time they create their own image as independent modern

¹⁹⁶ Although it is extremely difficult to determine precisely the present population of the Roma in Poland, it is estimated by Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2001 approximately at 30,000-35,000 people. In the national census done in 2002, more than 12,000 people recognized themselves as Roma. Ethnographers distinguish at least four main groups of Roma living in Poland: the Polish Roma (Polska Roma, the largest one, settled all over the country, mainly in cities), the Carpathian Roma (the poorest group living in southern Poland, generally in the Malopolska region, in rural communities), and small groups of Kalderash and Lowari. Additionally, there is a small group of Sinti Roma (in the western part of Poland) and a group of recent immigrant Romanian Roma. Moreover, most of the Roma groups living in Poland are subdivided into smaller groups. The division of Roma groups are mainly according to the regions where they have been living, for example the Polska Roma is divided into: Kaliszaki, Galicjaki, Jaglany, Warmijaki, etc. (See: Ficowski 1991; Mroz & Mirga 1994).

politicians. As Mroz (2001, p.269) notices, *“this is an ever-present cause of conflict – balancing on the boundary of two words, two systems while attempting to satisfy the modern leaders” own ambitions without antagonising traditional leaders*”.

The process of the self-organization of the Roma is strongly influenced by outside forces. The international organizations, Roma and non-Roma NGOs and foundations have a particular crucial influence on both ethnic and political mobilization processes. One of the essential conditions of successful mobilization is financial resources, and without regular financial support no organization can effectively develop. State governments together with different organizations provide opportunities to create a structure such as financial and training support, co-operating on research projects, organizing meetings and festivals, etc.

The recent activation of the Roma at both the national and international level has largely depended on outside factors, domestic governments, international bodies, different NGOs and private international foundations engaged in Roma issues. In most cases Roma organisations are weak in every sense: structure, organization, and financial resources. In this situation state agencies and private international foundations appear to be key beneficiaries, and without their assistance the development or even existence of Roma organizations seems to be extremely difficult. It inevitably makes the situation of dependence and patron-client relations, where, as Nidhi Trehan (2001, p.134-136) in the text examining Roma NGO-s says, Roma organizations *„find themselves adapting their agendas to the priorities of the high-profile partners, even though they may have decidedly different priorities”*. Later on she notes also: *„Just as Romani leaders and politicians have been dependent on state structures for financial support ..., so too many Romani actors within the NGO-s sector have become dependent on major philanthropic donors for continuing their work”*.

This donor dependency seems to have a powerful influence on Roma initiatives. The curtailment of the Roma organizations’ autonomy takes place because of their dependence on public and donor funding (Klimova 2002). A similar situation occurred also in the case of Holocaust activation. When the case of the so-called “Holocaust reparations” become not only the matter of long-lasting debate but the states like Germany or corporations like Swiss banks decided to pay a large amount of money to the Holocaust victims, it starts a new period in Roma organization activities. The Roma have been a numerous group on the lists of beneficiaries. The foundations such as Shoah, German and Polish Reconciliation (Polsko-Niemieckie Pojednanie), or recently the International Organization for Migration (IOM) were responsible for distributing these funds, which was strictly connected to the search for potential receivers of reparations. These foundations looked for Roma organizations as partners in this searching process, organizations which were legitimated enough to represent, or rather to be perceived as a representation of the Roma people.

One can perceive the recent Roma activation around Holocaust memory simply in terms of achieving *“emancipatory political goals”* (Willems & Lucassen, 2000, p.268). Undoubtedly, one of these goals was to become visible and active in the public sphere, to be invited to co-operate in the dissemination of “the Holocaust funds”. Activities around

Holocaust memory can be seen as an attempt to demonstrate a leader's influence and prestige among the Roma population. Individual Romani leaders have been engaged in the Holocaust campaign in hopes of deriving political, financial, organizational, and personal benefits. In this sense, co-operation with the foundations and became a desired resource, demanding, however, political competition among Roma leaders. This competition has led to strong internal antagonisms among the Roma elite group.

From the picture presented above, one can draw the conclusion that the Roma activities around Holocaust memory are imposed from the outside rather than coming from natural grassroots ethnic needs. In the wider context, the spontaneity of the mobilization processes of Roma leaders appears to be limited, and rather constructed and contributed by the outer forces. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a variety of motives and the complicated background lying behind these activities, and to search for different perspectives through which they could be perceived. One of them is the resource mobilization theory. According to this theory, movements and organizations are innovative forms of political participation, which create and use the new available political resources to change their condition (Garner 1996, Pakulski 1991). This includes both material and non-material resources - money, services and goods, as well as authority, popular support, and mass publicity. Organisations involve all possible conventional and unconventional means of generating influence and exerting pressure, and their activities are seen as calculative and rational. The resource mobilization school rejects the "collective behaviour" approach as an interpretation of sources and origins of movement. It put, instead, a strong emphasis on the role of leaders and activists in devising strategies and accomplishing the goals.

Following the resource theory in the case of Roma organizations, the conclusion is clear. The primary aim of every organization is to obtain the necessary sources for its own development, and of every leader to obtain profits for maintaining his leadership in the organization and in the whole community. From this point of view, confrontation among different organizations for the resources offered by the state and international foundations seems to be a natural process. Roma leaders are just using the existing limited opportunities. They also adopt patterns and strategies from the outside which appeared to be successful and effective (namely the Jews' strategy in the struggle for political and financial reparations) and apply them to the Roma case.

According of competition theory, ethnicity is considered as just one of the tools by which individuals are engaged in competition for scarce resources (Hooghe 1992, p.25). The leaders opt for mobilization along ethnic lines because it seems to promise better results. This is due to the Polish reality where the Roma is a small and dispersed population strongly divided into clans and subgroups, without almost no real political influence in the public sphere. If the political opportunity structure changes and previous activities cease to be effective, following the "competition theory", the rational choice should be to try to reorganize themselves. In this situation, the leaders will look for new opportunities, stimulated by the outside environment follow its suggestions, and start to be active along for

example the framework of education, health or woman rights. As Nidhi Trehan (2001, p.139) notices in regard to Roma NGOs, *“the values traditionally associated with voluntary sector and public interest work such as altruism, community service, alliance-building and co-operation, etc. face the danger of being diluted or marginalized by new emphases on technocratic ability (of mainly non-Roma) and tokenism (of Roma). Work in the development and human rights sector may become ‘just another job’ and technocratic work may well take priority over service to the community”*.

The activities of Roma organizations in Poland are determined by the aspirations of individuals, therefore there is little visible cohesion and co-operation at the organizational and grassroots level. Although the cleavages among leaders and their organizations are expressed only at the formal level the structural fragmentation and controversies existing among various Roma groups throughout centuries, Holocaust commemoration is a great potential source of group cohesiveness. The activities around this historical trauma should be a great occasion to bind the members of the distinct Roma group together. Unfortunately, because of the lack of the necessary solidarity and mostly because of lack of the will, even in the front of the Holocaust tragedy, there is little likelihood of taking advantage of this unique opportunity.

Conclusions.

Nowadays the Roma are in a crucial period of their development as an entity. Whatever we choose to call it - building a common identity, ethnic revival, nation-building process, or the ethnogenesis - this process is dynamic and multidimensional. One of its aspects is Roma activation around its history, especially around Holocaust memory.

In the case of the Roma it is difficult to talk about collectively shared myths of ancestry and historical memories of the heroic moments and brave heroes, which create a historical foundation for ethnic identity in the case of other groups. In recent decades Roma elites have emphasized the role of the myth of origins and India as a homeland, and Holocaust as a group bonding experience. The history of suffering partly fulfils this role, thus playing a key part in building a group consciousness and solidarity. The “victim narrative” as an historically oppressed community is an important factor of group mobilization, it provides the powerful argument for standing united in front of the outside (governments, international organizations, foundations) and makes the variety of demands from financial repatriation for Roma Holocaust victims to official recognition as a nation. However, perceiving their own history as never-ending persecution and making claims of victim status can also have negative consequences where they may be internalized by the group.

The problem which becomes significant here in the front of the challenge of the creation ethnic entity, is that this “obsession” with a common history does not concern ordinary Roma; they simply ignore it. This phenomenon is influenced by many factors: lack of education, specific traditional “day-by-day” way of living, when cherishing the present moment is more important than thinking about the past and future. It creates a great division

between the elites and the ordinary masses in Roma communities in the sense of the perception of shared history and its influence on group identity. In this sense I used the term “identity under construction” in the Roma case to stress not only the fact that the elements of Roma ethnicity like language or historical memories are not consistent and their definitions are problematic, but I also wanted to point out the fact that it is difficult to discuss Roma ethnicity without a shared sense of groupness among them in meaning of sense of belonging to a distinct, cohesive group. Most Roma do not recognize themselves as a part of a unified population but identify themselves with the sub-groups of which they are members.

The ongoing processes taking place in the Roma case is a very complex phenomenon, which undoubtedly deserves careful further examination by social and political scholars. The multidimensional character of these processes call for new approaches. Therefore, constructivism and instrumentalism, besides the traditional “ethnicity centred” pattern of explanation, have been suggested here as useful analysis perspectives. I have attempted to show above that to a large extent the activation of Roma organizations around the Holocaust should be perceived not only as a part of creating an ethnic identity and rediscovering the forgotten Roma history, but also from the perspective of elite and social movement theories.

Holocaust memory is crucial in building Roma unity and relevant to present-day events taking place among the Roma elite. Roma nationalism and the process of Roma leaders’ mobilization are overlapping and are strictly connected processes. Moreover, both of them are stimulated and determined not only by the Roma themselves, but international organizations and national authorities also play a crucial role here. The findings presented in the article lead to the conclusion that Roma leaders use the Holocaust memory to achieve political goals. It is used by them as an important instrument for demands of international recognition as well as an instrument for internal power struggle. Moreover, Holocaust activities lead to direct competition for scarce resources among Roma leaders, connected directly with the process of Holocaust reparations. The activities of Roma organizations and co-operation with international organizations turn into effective tool in the influence and power competition rather than a sign of spontaneous ethnic Roma revival.

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Jewish Minority in Ukraine: social networks and identity.

Ukraine undergoes the process of transformation from a Soviet republic to a new independent state. One of the problems that the country faces in this process is formation of new Ukrainian identity, nation-building.

Any society is different from a simple collection of communities, corporations and groups in that it is drawn together by the ties of common identity (or, according to Durkheim, “common consciousness”). Vitality and stability of the society in many respects depend on the citizens’ position, meaning of their identity, and also on the way the potentially consider competing forms of national, regional, local, ethnical and religious identity [1, p.67]. The identity policy is tightly coupled to the national idea. However, it still remains unclear what exactly is meant by the nation and nation-building process as applied to Ukraine. No clear policy in this issue has been established by the government in all the 13 years of Ukrainian independence. In Ukrainian practice, the term “nation-building” is applied in a dichotomic dimension: either as “ethno-nation building” or as “civil nation building”. The inconsistency of the situation is reflected on both the legislative and institutional levels. Thus, in the Constitution of Ukraine the category of “Ukrainian nation” is represented in different semantic meanings. Such notions as “people of Ukraine”, “native peoples”, “national minorities” are not clearly defined.

In 2002 O.A. Filippova conducted a research of identity practices among different ethnic groups in the city of Kharkov [2, p.267]. Respondents were asked to rate their relationship to particular types of identity from positive (+1) to negative (-1). Responses were averaged over all respondents. The results are depicted in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of self-identification in the Kharkov region

Types of identity	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Germans	Total
Civil («Citizen of Ukraine»)	0.76	0.23	0.22	0.48	0.42
«Soviet» («a Soviet person»)	-0.72	-0.31	-0.29	0.36	-0.42
Ethnic («member of an ethnic group»)	0.64	0.48	0.34	0.76	0.55
Local territory («member of a local community»)	0.71	0.83	0.48	0.74	0.69
Regional territory («European»)	-0.16	-0.07	-0.31	-0.64	-0.29
Transnational («Citizen of the world»)	-0.01	-0.04	-0.38	-0.87	-0.32

These data show that in the Eastern region, in particular in Kharkov, local territory and ethnical identities prevail. Civil identity is in the formation stage and mostly manifests for ethnic Ukrainians (+0.76). In this identity structure, between the identities with extreme positive (local territory and ethnical identities) and extreme negative (“Soviet”) indices, one finds regional territory and transnational identities. Younger generations identify themselves in these ways to a larger extent, yet in the whole they receive a negative rating, which

signifies that they are not yet formed and understood (these data coincide with the results of national researches conducted to National Academy of Science of Ukraine [3. p.587]).

In the absence of well-defined policy a number of grass-roots non-governmental organizations have been created to promote national and cultural values of Ukrainian ethnos and of various ethnic minorities. Now around 400 different ethnic-culture communities exist in Ukraine, which through their activities are included into the identity-building process. If we accept their activities as a self-organizing element of the “identity policy”, we have to state that it has a regional characters and mostly reflects the self-organization strategy directed “inward” (consolidation of an ethnical group) and “outward” (connection to the historical homeland), rather than to the integrity of the national and state-wide formation. The “outward” orientation promotes the formation of the loyalty towards the states that reflect the image of the historical homeland to a larger extent than towards the nation-wide Ukrainian state.

We will consider the Jewish minority as an example. This minority has a number of specific features, one of which is that it enjoys extensive support, financial and otherwise, from the worldwide Jewish community and the State of Israel. It must be noted that the Jewish community of Ukraine has developed a wide network of national-cultural organizations, spreading all over Ukraine. Such organizations not only focus on promotion of Jewish cultural heritage among the community members, youth in particular, but also serve as community centers where people can get help in professional development (e.g. study computers, English language), and simply get together to communicate. Religious organizations often set up schools and kindergartens where children study the Hebrew language, Jewish tradition and religion. The students of religious schools regularly talk to native Hebrew speakers, celebrate Jewish holidays, even eat Israel food. Such religious school in essence replicates an environment of a typical religious school in Israel.

We will specifically consider the situation with youth organizations and the role of the Jewish youth centers.

According to sociological research and statistical data, youth non-governmental organizations, despite the stable tendency to grow in number and diversity (for example, from year 1992 to 2000 the number of nation-wide youth and children non-governmental organizations grew from 7 to 97 [4, p. 109]), are often limited in the number of members; their majority represent a local level only; most importantly, they are often unknown even in the youth environment. The percentage of the youth that participate in such non-governmental organizations in the last 10 years remains practically constant at about 2-3% [4, p.110] (see table 2).

This article makes use of the data obtained in the sociological research of the nominal and real status of youth non-governmental organizations in the political field of Ukraine (in Kharkov), which was conducted in November 2000 – January 2001 by the Kharkov municipal youth non-governmental organization “Kharkov regional association of young sociologists and political scientist” [5, p.560]. The research was conducted within the framework of the

qualitative research paradigm. Its object was youth non-governmental organizations of the city that aim at providing social services, as well as the youth that does not participate in youth non-governmental organizations.

It was found that the youth explains the lack of interest in non-governmental organizations activities by lack of realization of the interests that the youth is supposed to defend and lack of trust in the ability to actually influence the current social process and established social relationships. At the same time the leaders of the organizations interpret the lack of interest in their activities as the socially passive position of the youth and conclude that all measures aimed at enrolling the youth in their organizations are useless and futile.

As the research has shown, the organization leaders apply the “natural selection” strategy to their target group, the strategy that can be expressed by the following quote from an interview with the leaders: “active young people will always find us, and others we don’t need”. This strategy explains the lack of informational policy towards the target groups.

Table 2. Registered public associations as of Jan 1st, 2004.

	Registered public associations	Have status of	
		International	Ukraine-wide
Total	1978	399	1579
Political parties	96	–	96
Public organizations	1882	399	1483
Public movements	8	3	5
Associations for national relations	123	43	80
Youth associations	113	8	105
Of them students’	15	–	15
Children organizations	9	1	8
Women organizations	42	4	38
Associations of veterans and people with disabilities	58	10	48
Of the veterans of war	12	–	12
Professional associations	335	45	290
Environment protection organizations	51	16	35
Organizations for protection of historical and cultural monuments	2	–	2
Sports and physical training organizations	241	15	226
Associations for protection from aftermaths of Chernobyl catastrophe	31	22	9
Scientific and creative associations	143	36	107
Educational, cultural associations	162	38	124
Other public organizations	564	158	406
In addition, unions of public associations	76	4	72

In additional, specifically and systematically informing the youth through formal communications channels assumes significant financial cost. Such expenses are usually not provided for in the organization budgets. Thus if the organizations spread the word about

themselves at all, they make use of informal (cliental) communication channels. As the result, as the research has revealed, the youth is not really informed about the youth non-governmental organizations' activities.

Currently the youth distrusts the activities of the non-governmental organizations. This is caused by the wide-spread notion of formalization, politicization, bureaucracy, primitive administration and manipulation of the youth in the non-distant political past, as well as by the personal experience.

At the same time the leaders of the organizations often exhibit passive stereotypic perception of their target group. As the result they often strive for realization of interests of themselves and their closest surrounding. The latter reflects the unilateral direction of the leaders' activities, mostly aimed at providing their organization with various resources (in particular, maternal, technical, informational).

In my opinion Jewish cultural organizations are in a better position than most other types of non-governmental organizations. No other group in Ukraine has such a wide and well-organized network of community centers, which is especially important for young people. This network of organizations manages to inform their target group about their activities and successfully enroll participants.

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Romanian Integration in European Union. Some Aspects regarding Rural Development

„we must also look ahead and build policies robust enough to meet tomorrow’s demands and needs and not just focus on dealing with yesterday’s problems” The Future of Rural policies, OECD, 2003, p.9

Introduction

We live in a world of complex interrelations and dependences. Decisions taken in one part of the world affect spread or punctual locations in a completely different geographical area.

The power of any kind is shared or negotiated between various organizations or agencies acting at several levels: national, regional or global.

From the global approach, one has to consider the so-called international actors that promote global social movements such as: environmental issues, feminist movements or the emergence of the transnational civil society. Therefore, there is a new public space, a new formula of the public life focusing on regional debates or on global issues (Archibugi, Held & Kohler, 1998).

The following approach aims to present some actors involved in the development of the policies for rural development at the global and regional level and to present the main policies they are promoting.

The premises and importance of such an approach is the certitude that the development of the Romanian rural areas and of the Romanian agriculture will have to be in agreement with the global values and precepts on the environment, agriculture and on the role of traditions. The policies of rural development in Romania will have to be the result of a creative internalisation of the millennium targets developed by the United Nations, of the World Bank desiderates or of the precise stipulations of the European Union’s Agenda 2000.

Following is an analysis of the typologies of rural development policies promoted by these actors at various levels of approach – global (the United Nations), regional (the European Union).

We will also try to review some international documents (The Millennium Declaration¹⁹⁷, Agenda 21¹⁹⁸) and some regional ones (Agenda 2000, Rural Development Regulation¹⁹⁹), specifying for each of them what type of policy of rural development they promote.

¹⁹⁷ Adopted at the 2000 United Nations Summit

¹⁹⁸ Adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the environmental and development

¹⁹⁹ EU’s Rural Development Regulation 1257/1999

The main directions of rural development promoted by the United Nations

Although the main stated aim of the United Nations is to preserve the peace and security of the world, the largest share of the funds available to the organization are invested in the development at the global level. The multiple social and economic transformations during its five decades of activity led to the rephrasing of the main objectives concerning the development. The United Nations promote three directions of development through its departments of economic development, social development and sustainable development. The recent, June 28 – July 23, session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council highlighted the importance of an integrated approach of the world rural development: “All the United Nations bodies are called to support the development of programs for the development of the rural areas.”²⁰⁰

The United Nations have several agencies or programs concerned with rural development such as: FAO, World Bank, UNDP, IFAD.

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization, established in 1945, is a forum in which the nations negotiate international treaties from equal standings or in which they participate in policy making debates. The main objective of FAO is to eradicate famine, focusing particularly of the development of the rural areas (where 70% of the hungry people live). FAO concentrates a multitude of information and knowledge on agriculture, forestry and fishing. Its main activities are to disseminate expertise and policies, to develop research, to establish structures facilitating the debates among nations, to fit the knowledge to the actual state of things.

The World Bank is the main force mobilising resource at the global level in support of the developing countries.²⁰¹ Absolute poverty was considered to be more stressed in the rural areas as early as in 1973. Most of the poor people live in the rural areas: “About 800 million people go to bed hungry every night. 70% of them live in rural areas”.²⁰² In 1997, the strategy of rural development “From Vision to Action” was elaborated²⁰³, which had a decisive influence on the global approach of rural development issues, but with insignificant results at the level of implementation.

²⁰⁰ Motions and decisions adopted by ECOSOC during the June 28 – July 23 2004 session), United Nations, E/2004/INF/2/Add.2 Coordinated and integrated United Nations system approach to promote rural development in developing countries, with due consideration to least developed countries, for poverty eradication and sustainable development

²⁰¹ Since 1946 until now it supported worldwide by loans under favourable conditions projects in excess of 333 billion USD

²⁰² Eighty percent of our global population have 20 percent of the world's income . . . Some 800 Million people . . . go to bed hungry every night, the majority of them in rural areas. Indeed, 70 percent of the poor of our globe are in rural areas . . . why is it that this year in the demand for World Bank loans, we're almost at an all-time low in terms of the proportion of our lending for rural and agricultural purposes” JAMES D. WOLFENSOHN President, The World Bank Group, Rural Development Strategy Regional Consultations, 2001

²⁰³ “From Vision to Action”, The World Bank, 1997

The World Bank Department for Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) formulated a strategy for rural development centred thematically and sectorially. Every 5 years the strategy is reviewed by counselling with a large number of local decision-making people.²⁰⁴

In 2003, the World Bank reviewed its strategy on agriculture and rural development, strategy included in the document “Reaching the Rural Poor”. The improvement of rural life focused on three dimensions: competitive agriculture, development of non-agricultural activities and a better management of the natural resources. In view of implementing this strategy the World Bank undertook important actions such as:²⁰⁵ increasing the awareness on rural poverty at the level of the national policies, increasing the allocated funds from 5 to 7 billion during the last fiscal year and development of projects in areas such as the restoration of irrigation systems, land management, agricultural insurance, fishing management, international implementation of the phyto-sanitary standards.

With this view, in 2003, the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development was established²⁰⁶ whose purpose is to mobilise the investments and support for rural development and for agricultural development. Following the concentrated actions of the World Bank, in the fiscal year 2004, the investments in projects of rural development exceeded 7 billion (over 40%) as compared to only 5 billion for the fiscal year 2002.²⁰⁷

Factors such as the progress of reforms, the size and role of the rural economy, the causes of rural poverty, the access of communities to the market and credits are considered when elaborating and implementing the policies of rural development. .²⁰⁸

UNDP (United Nation Development Program) is a network promoting development at the global scale. It is acting in 166 countries of the world. The main areas of interest are: democrat governing, poverty alleviation, prevent the crisis situations, environmental and energy issues, AIDS, human rights, gender issues. It releases annual Human Development Reports. UNDP develops and implements programs of development in various sectors (agriculture, industry, the environment)²⁰⁹, being the largest source of assistance grants for development.

²⁰⁴ The counseling for the current strategy started in 2000 and the final strategy (Reaching the Rural Poor) was adopted in 2003.

²⁰⁵ Implementing The Rural Development Strategy: A Progress Report

²⁰⁶ Global Donor Platform for Rural Development

²⁰⁷ Jellinek, Sergio, Ebro, Kristyn *Developing Countries Increase Rural Investments. World Bank Strategy focuses on improving lives of rural poor*, September 23, 2004, Washington.

²⁰⁸ The rural development projects run by the World Bank in Romania are as follows: Agricultural Pollution Control Project, (5.15 mil USD, 2001) Agricultural Support Services Project (11 mil USD, 2000) Afforestation of Degraded Agricultural Land Project (3.67 mil USD, 2003) Forest Development Project (25 mil USD, 2002), Irrigation Rehabilitation And Reform Project (80 mil USD, 2003), Modernizing Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (50.23 mil USD, 2004), Romania Biodiversity Conservation Management Project (5.5 mil USD, rural finance project, , , 80 mil USD, 2001), Romania Shelterbelts and Sustainable Agriculture Biocarbon Fund Project (2.5 mil USD) , Carbon Offset N/A, Social Development Fund II (Phase II apl), (20 mil USD, 2001)

²⁰⁹ With a budget of 1.3 billion, it promoted over 5000 development projects all over the world

IFAD (International Food and Agriculture Development) is a specialized United Nations agency established in 1977 as a financial institution empowered to monitor the achievement of the main desiderates established by the 1974 World food Conference. Its task was to mobilize resources for rural poverty alleviation and for rural development by: promoting the social development, gender equality, increased incomes, environmental protection, and a better local government. IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) strategy materialized in loans and grants, in supporting intensified dialogues and in developing partnerships. The target groups are the small agricultural workers as well as the landless poor. Since its establishment IFAD has financed 653 projects²¹⁰ in 115 countries amounting to 8.1 billion USD. These projects improved the situation of over 50 million rural families, which is of over 250 million people. Over the years, although the rural problems diversified and worsened, IFAD funds shrank continuously (Table 1).

Table 1. IFAD funds: 1977-2006

	Initial resources 1977	IFAD I 1981-83	IFAD II 1985-87	IFAD III 1989-91	IFAD IV 1997-99	IFAD V 2001-03	IFAD VI 2004-2006
Contributions (USD Million)	899	998	473	551	460	473	495

In 1997 was established by the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (today UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination), The UN System Network on Rural Development and Food Security is a global partnership approach towards tackling rural development challenges at the country level. It brings together key actors for the achievement of the shared goals of "food for all" and rural poverty reduction. Comprising 20 UN organizations²¹¹, the UN System Network is an inter-agency mechanism for follow-up to the World Food Summit (1996) and World Food Summit: five years later (2002) and supports the International Land Coalition.

Based on the serious research and a global perspective of realities, all this international organisations try to elaborate and implement a new approach regarding rural development.

²¹⁰ In 1998, IFAD financed in Romania the "Munții Apuseni" Development Project amounting to 31.5 million USD. The project involved 40 mountain communes with about 24,000 families with a yearly household income of 55 USD (much below the national average per capita income, which is 1,480 USD)

²¹¹ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Office (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Main rural development concepts on the international agenda

Development is a dynamic, extremely complex and hard to define phenomenon. Over the years the stress shifted from economic development toward social or human development, each of them proving to be incomplete in relation to the multitude of phenomena implied by development. In 1987, the United Nations report “Our Common Future”²¹², launched the concept of **sustainable development**.

The key concept of '**sustainable development**', in the 1970's during the first modern upsurge of interest in environmental issues. There are over sixty definitions of the same principle. Though it received some attention, it did not really enter the mainstream until the World Commission on Environment and Development of 1987 provided a working definition that has largely been accepted ever since.

The commonly accepted wording is: "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

Sustainable development can be roughly defined as improving everybody's life “now, and for the generations to come”. Practically, it links thus economic development with social justice, with democratic values and with environmental protection. The element of novelty is the human, integrated and in tight bond with the environment. The concept of sustainable development promoted by the United Nations concerns mainly: equitable and balanced economic development, high employment rate, high social cohesion and high level of inclusion, assume responsibility for natural resources utilization and for environmental protection, coherent, open and transparent policies, international cooperation for sustainable development promotion at the global level

The main concepts developed from the perspective of rural development are:

Sustainable rural development, which requires an equitable and balanced economic development, with a high level of social cohesion and inclusion, assume responsibility for natural resources utilization and for environmental protection.

Extensive or integrated rural development which refers to rural development by expanding the communication and information means and by expanding the rural activities towards the non-agricultural sector and the promotion of extensive agriculture whose essential coordinate is the transfer of information (the concept of extensive agriculture is different here than the traditional one, which defined the opposite of the intensive agriculture).

Multisector rural development, which refers to the establishment of networks and partnerships between international organizations and national agencies or organizations of the civil society in view of a multisector approach.

²¹² “Our Common Future”, World Bank.

European Union policies for rural development

In Europe, the rural was studied for a long time from the ethnographic or geographic point of view. Several research paradigms took shape over the years²¹³:

- the traditionalist pattern that considers the rural areas, that is the village, as the true holder of spirituality, specificity and originality of a culture or society, the aim of this type of surveys being to reveal the traditional rural values, behaviours and symbols
- the meliorist pattern that considers the rural areas as the genetic form of a society, insufficiently developed, however, that has to be brought to the level of the urban structures. The surveys in this area generally measure the lag between the rural and the urban from the perspective of incomes, education, comfort and productivity
- the ecological pattern that reveals the specificity, peculiarities and advantages of the contemporary rural way of life
- the chrono-regressive pattern generally used by the monographs of rural settlements (see Durand Drouhin, LM Szwergub, Mihăilescu)

Definition of the rural in Europe

The new European Union policy stresses particularly the rural development. In the European Union (25), over half of the population lives in rural settlements that cover over 90% of the territory.

In June 2001, at Göteborg, the Council of Europe concluded that the policy of rural development will stress less the aspects related to the market support for agriculture and will be mainly directed towards securing the welfare of people, animals and plants, towards the preservation of the environment, towards the care for nature and towards food safety.²¹⁴

For a very long period, the rural policies overlapped the agricultural policies and the agricultural sector of the European Union. The European rural was considered as a sector disregarding its spatial dimension²¹⁵.

The new approach of the rural implicitly presumes its spatial definition. The European Union practice adopted the OECD criterion based on population density. Thus, international comparisons can be made at the level of the conditions and dynamics of the European rural areas. The available socio-economic data are at the level of NUT3 areas²¹⁶. At regional level (mainly NUTS 3), the OECD distinguishes larger functional or administrative units by their

²¹³ See the Dictionary of Sociology, 1994, coord. Vlăsceanu, Zamfir

²¹⁵ The European Charter for Rural Areas, a report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, defines a rural area as "a stretch of inland or coastal countryside, including small towns and villages, where the main part of the area is used for: 1) agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and fisheries, 2) economic and cultural activities of country-dwellers (crafts, industry, services, etc), 3) non-urban recreation and leisure areas [or natural reserves], 4) other purposes, such as for housing."

²¹⁶ They represent territorial-administrative units.

degree of rurality, depending on what share of the region's population lives in rural communities. To facilitate analysis, regions are then grouped into three types: predominantly rural regions: over 50% of the population living in rural communities, significantly rural regions: 15 to 50% of the population living in rural communities, and predominantly urban regions: less than 15% of the population living in rural communities.

These also include the urban agglomerations so that the data cannot be aggregated on rural – urban coordinates, which is a disadvantage for the rural development decision makers.

Historic evolution of rural development in Europe

Rural development in Europe was implicitly included in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The major steps of CAP development are summarized in Table 2.

At the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s, the common agricultural policies were meant to encourage the agricultural production by the direct support of production and by modernizing agriculture. The agricultural structure of Europe was characterised by a large number of small farms and by a large share of the population working in agriculture.

Table 2. The major steps of CAP development

<i>Period</i>	<i>Features</i>
1958	The Stresa Conference
1962-1972	CAP implementation, with agriculture as the single pillar
1973-1982	The period of “prudent price policy”
1983-1991	The years of CAP crisis
1992- 1999	CAP reform (Mac Sharry) – the new approach
1999- 2001	Long term CAP for a sustainable agriculture, Agenda 2000
	Priority of CAP second pillar – rural development
2003 Sept.	The new CAP

There also were many social problems such as rural poverty and urban unemployment. The design of CAP architecture provided thus conditions to reorganize farms and to make agriculture more efficient by using the technical progress in agriculture. In 1962 a special fund was established, which to guarantee the market prices of the agricultural products (The European Agricultural Guidance and Guaranteed Fund – EAGGF) ²¹⁷, which actually is the largest consumer of EU budget.

Therefore, in mid '60s, the main objectives of rural development were to improve the agricultural production structures and to improve the agricultural products processing and marketing conditions. Stress was laid on investments in production means both at the level of the individual farms and at the level of the processing and marketing units. The main desiderates were to increase productivity in agriculture, to stabilize the market, to ensure equitable incomes for the agricultural workers, food safety, reasonable prices for the

²¹⁷ Adopted by UE Regulation 25/1962 and amended by UE Regulation 728/70
199

consumers. The main mechanisms used to enforce these desiderates were: they system of guaranteed internal price in support of the market, protection against imports, subsidies for the export.

This was the period of the economic boom. Agricultural production increased by over 30% in 10 years and it was characterized by self-supply of the major agricultural products and by increased incomes for the farmers.

Thus, during the period 1962 – 1972, the period of CAP implementation with the development of agriculture as the central and single pillar, the CEE (which has been a net importer of agricultural products) turned into a large exporter of agricultural products.

The period 1973 - 1982 is called the “period of prudent price policy”²¹⁸. The main objectives of this period were to transform the small farms into competitive, properly equipped farms and to connect them to market necessities. The elder farmers with lower possibilities of adapting to market requirements were offered the possibility to retire and give up agriculture, while the farms located in disadvantaged areas were supported with compensatory pensions. During this period the importance of CEE 9 on the international market of agricultural products increased reaching one third of the international trade. At the same time the self-supply extended to a wider range of agricultural products. The production taxes were replaced by the system of production shares (1979). The subsistence farms were modernized and reorganized on productivity criteria, while their number declined dramatically.²¹⁹

During the ‘70s, according to the Marshall plan, the stress shifted on the management of the human capital as represented by early retirement or by novel professional training. The disfavoured areas of the Union that require specific measures were defined in 1975. The purpose was to stop the exodus from agriculture and from the rural that could even affect the very existence of some communities and the preservation of the natural environment and of the nature.

For the first time, due to economic, social and environmental reasons, the territorial approach was used in elaborating the agricultural policies. The expenditure for agriculture doubled throughout this period.

Therefore, throughout these years, the rural development policies focused exclusively on the agricultural sector

The period 1983-1991 were the years of CAP crisis. CAP was intensely criticised and its reform was demanded both from the inside and at the multilateral negotiations within the Uruguay Round. The exceeding production peaked (particularly for the cereal crops and dairy products).

The budgetary costs increased rapidly. CAP expenditure increased by 30% between 1989-1991, reaching 36 billion ECU (over 60% of the CEE budget) in contrast with the decline of the real income for the farmers and with the significant shrinking of their numbers.

²¹⁸ The first two CEE enlargements took place

²¹⁹ In 1979 there were 4.8 million farms (10.4 million in 1960) The number of farms declined 3% annually.

Besides the introduction of new production quotas a program was implemented to narrow the crop fields (20% throughout 5 years) in exchange of substantial bonuses. Limit prices were guaranteed and the highest admitted levels of production were enforced. The domestic consumption was stimulated by subsidies to consumers.

Despite the diversification of the mechanisms monitoring the markets and the production, the fundamental problems of the CAP were not solved.

Starting with the '80s the territorial dimension of the rural policies gained momentum. Thus, the European Commission elaborated in 1988 a new concept of rural development referring to the **integrated rural development** bearing influence beyond the simple agricultural production. The agricultural Structural Fund was reformed in the same years. The first principles of the integrated rural development were enforced in areas considered to be disadvantaged, such as Scotland (Western Isles), France (Lozère), or Belgium, by encouraging the adaptation of the agricultural production to the environmental requirements and by diversifying it.

The LEADER initiative experimented this new concept of rural development based on strategies of integrated development at the local level, on the establishment of the local partnership.

In early '90s, the market support component of the CAP, which reached its limits in stimulating the production, entered a process of major reform. This was accompanied by three structural measures financed from the Guaranteeing Funds: early retirement, development of the ecological agriculture, afforestation of the marginal agricultural land. The Community adopted several instruments and methods that reflect the orientation toward 3 major objectives: reorganization of agriculture, local territorial development and integration of the environmental issues.

1992-1999 is the period of the Mac Sharry reform. During this period, the mechanisms monitoring the availabilities (reduction of the guaranteed prices and provision of direct compensation payments) could not prevent the rising overproduction that required increasing storing costs. The trend of declining real income for the farmers could not be stopped either, while the methods of intensive production deeply affected the environment. The immediate effect of this crisis was a lower CEE competitiveness on the international agricultural market. The reform of the common policy was a must. The actual reform was to direct increasingly the agricultural policy towards the free market by introducing the direct compensatory payments according to the type of crop, to the average regional (not individual) output from a past period and to the actual agricultural land area. The pressure on the EU budget was alleviated. The effects of the reform were visible and noteworthy. The income of farmers was stabilised and the demand and offer on the agricultural common market were balanced. In late '90s, the requirement for a new policy of rural development was felt, which to include the reorganisation of agriculture and which to address the environmental issues and the extended requirements of the rural.

During 1999-2001 the second CAP pillar – rural development become a priority²²⁰. In Agenda 2000, the policies of rural development are the second main objective besides the reform of the trade policies.²²¹ The European agricultural pattern is developed **in which the integrated rural development received priority**.

New topics are discussed such as food safety and quality, the integration of the environmental issues in the agricultural policy, the development of rural economy and vitality, encouragement of the environmentally friendly agricultural practices, increasing the awareness on land arrangement, encouragement of the less intensive methods of production which to alleviate the environmental impact, multi functionality of the agriculture. The policy of integrated and sustainable development of the rural areas focused on individuals and groups other than farmers. The elaboration and management of programs became more transparent. Several services for the farmers are identified and encouraged. The production of food is diversified and the guaranteed prices are reduced, compensated by direct prices at the farmers. The demand/offer balance is improved on the common market of the agricultural products while the income from agriculture increased. The aid for rural development became more flexible and it relied on subsidiarity, decentralisation and simplification. The legislation became more accessible. A solid basis for EU enlargement and for the negotiations within the World trade Organisation was also established.

In 2003, the new Common Agricultural Policy continued the change of its profile that started in 2001. The funds from Pillar 1 of CAP are transferred to Pillar 2 of CAP.

The fundamental reform of CAP was passed in June 2003. The reform grants the farmers the liberty to produce according to the market requirements. The main subsidies are to be paid independently of the production under clearly defined conditions. The focus shifts from quantity to quality and the subsidies to agriculture are changed entirely being increasingly directed towards the market by non-linked subsidies²²², by introducing the module system²²³, the regressive (gradual reduction) of the payments granted to farmers (2006-2012) and by observing the cross-compliance²²⁴. The necessities of supporting and strengthening the rural areas and of redirecting the support toward extensive agricultural practices²²⁵ are reasserted. The “package for rural development adapted to the requirements of the new member states” is adopted. It is important to remember that in 2003 (according to Agenda 2000) the support for production was cut off.²²⁶ The new problems confronting CAP are: food safety, environmental issues, multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO, and the agreement on EU enlargement (2002). The law of rural development 1257/99 (RDR)

²²⁰ The Goteborg Council (2001)

²²¹ See objective no.1 of Agenda 2000

²²² Most subsidies will be paid independently of the volume of production

²²³ Mechanism that reduces the direct (“modular”) payments for the larger farms, the sums being transferred for financing the measures included in the new policy for rural development

²²⁴ Mechanism based on which the single agricultural payment is conditioned by environmental protection, food safety, animal and plant health, by the standards of animal welfare and by the requirement to keep the land in proper agricultural and environmental conditions

²²⁵ Extensive agriculture

²²⁶ Single Farm Payment (SFP).

stipulates 22 measures (that can be extended to 26) if we also consider CAP reform according to which the programs for rural development should be developed, according to the specific requirements of each region, with the following targets: reorganization of agriculture, environmental protection and diversification of the non-agricultural activities. Completing these major targets of the rural development programs, the LEADER initiative, now at its third generation (LEADER+), tests and innovates the idea of integrated local rural development. Two new chapters have thereafter been added to the law of rural development, which explain the new food quality and safety standards and the new animal welfare standards. CAP reform, that is to be implemented starting in 2005, will provide for a minimal income of support for the producers who are free to produce in agreement with market demand. In order to qualify for this support the producers will have to observe a compulsory standard of quality, namely 18 measures relating to the environment, public goods, animal welfare and plant health and will have to keep the land in good condition whether they use it or not. Beyond these basic requirements the second major CAP objective refers directly to the support policies for agriculture and the rural area.

The main principles of rural development in European Union are: the multifunctionality of agriculture, its varied role over and above the production of foodstuffs. This implies the recognition and encouragement of the range of services provided by farmers;

A multisector and integrated approach to the rural economy in order to diversify activities, create new sources of income and employment and protect the rural heritage; flexible aids for rural development, based on subsidiarity and promoting decentralization, consultation at regional, local and partnership level and transparency in drawing up and managing programmes, based on simplified and more accessible legislation. **Concluding,** rural development has a recent history in Europe. The European Union has rather recently defined its intent to enforce development programs in the rural areas.

The European rural was approached for decades just from the perspective of the agricultural policies. Rural design was shaped for decades by policies aimed to food security or to promote the European Union as a worldwide powerful exporter of agricultural products, not to develop.

Starting 1998 (The Lisbon Agenda), the rural was defined as one of the fundamental and defining values for Europe, which has to be preserved, cared for and promoted.

The strong core of European Union rural development policies are the desiderates promoted by the United Nations, namely fitting the precepts of sustainable, integrated and multisector development to the European state of facts.

Discussion and conclusions

The rural became increasingly present on the agenda of the international bodies. It became a priority on international public agenda. Several international organizations undertook to alleviate rural poverty and to promote rural development. There is a constant and correlated effort of the international institutions to redistribute wealth at the level of the poor

countries. The pace with which they are left behind is faster than the speed with which these international organizations succeed to implement programs. The concept of rural development is considered lately as a possible solution to world poverty but these international mechanisms are sometimes slow and the different actors are more or less cooperative, more or less interested. The stress started to shift from the policies originating in the center towards the policies emerging locally. The rural areas are considered more and more as public goods.

Everywhere in the world the agricultural sector is supported mainly due to political and social reasons and less due to economic reasons. The agricultural policies are the result of negotiations among various actors that act based on electoral reasons. The market does not govern agriculture. The large worldwide lag of power reflects directly in the agricultural sector. There are huge differences in the manner of doing agriculture: from agriculture as way of life to agriculture as business. The protectionist policies create an excess of agricultural products in the center and starvation in the peripheral countries. The relation between value, prices and starvation („in fact one block consumes too little food because the other consumes too much”)²²⁷ resulted in sharpened inequities in consumption.

According to the new approach, rural development requires information above all. A particular stress is laid on the dissemination of knowledge, information and know-how, on the transfer and management of information and knowledge. Concepts such as „rural extension development” or „agricultural extension” involve the development of communication, information and innovation infrastructure.

European Union has a particular model of agriculture that responds to the requirements of civil society – in terms of their expectations on food production, food safety, environmental standards and conservation of the rural environment, relations with the developing world (agricultural trade) and value for money for their taxes. Agricultural and rural policy have an important role to play in the cohesion of European Union territorial, economic and social policy. Agriculture involves much more than the production of crops and animals for food consumption. The complexity of their profession requires farmers to play many roles. For most farmers it’s a way of life too.

For these reasons the scope of rural development policy is much wider than traditional ‘agricultural’ activities, including measures to protect and improve the environment, schemes to support rural communities and to develop the rural economy as a whole.

Rural development in Europe is based on the following principles: recognizing the multifunctional role of agriculture, improving competitiveness, ensuring that environmental issues are taken into account, diversifying economic activity, conserving rural heritage.

The global economic growth increases the lag between the development of agriculture and of the other sectors. The constant decrease of the price of agricultural products generated a redistribution of the relations of power from agriculture towards other sectors. A transfer of power takes place and there is an increasing difference between the income from agriculture

²²⁷ Charchedi Guglielmo 2001 For another Europe (A Class analysis of European Economic Integration) Verso, London, New York, p. 218

and the income from other sectors. We might conclude that actually there are two major directions that determine and influence the worldwide process of rural development: the agricultural to non-agricultural sector ratio and the care for the environment. The subsidies are replaced by the development of new, competitive sources. From this perspective, the concern for diversifying the activities in rural areas is increasing continuously. Although the proportion of the agricultural sector within the national gross product of many countries decreased, agriculture is still essential for the rural economies.

For Romania rural development by long term implies well being of rural society, improving the quality of Europe' food, guaranteeing food safety, ensuring that the environment is protected for future generations, providing better animal health and welfare.

The rural must be thought from the perspective of future, not as a solution of the past problems: "the rural area must not be regarded merely as a problem, but also as an opportunity". The rural development policy must include agriculture within a wider socio-economic and ecologic context.

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Defining post-socialist societies: relations between the individual, society and state, search for social integration

In the following paper, an attempt is made to offer an alternative viewpoint to the analysis of the relations between the society, state and individual in post-socialist societies, diverging from the dominating discourse of transformation theory and placing in the more general framework of theories of modernity.²²⁸

In this framework the principal question to be posed is the following: while discussing the developments in the post-socialist societies, if and how should we take into account the theories that concentrate on the profound changes taking place in the Western (modern) societies, as well as on the global scale. At the same time – if, taking into account their universalising attempt, how fit or adequate are these theories to give insights into the developments in the post-communist societies with the history and experience of a different type of modernity.

In a nutshell, theories developed by e.g. Touraine, Giddens, Delanty, Stehr etc, characterised by the accent not on the institutional development of the modern society (captured in the differentiation/integration-discourse), but on the cultural process of self-transformation of the modern society, argue that the growth and spread of knowledge in the society has not resulted in the (threatening) growth of rationality and controllability, due to growing amount and wider spread of knowledge (the defining feature of society), the capacity of individuals for social action has grown enormously, while the state and social institutions have considerably lost in their ability to regulate or impose their will in the face of growing contestation.

At a more abstract level, this reasoning is based on a specific definition of knowledge as always containing emancipating elements as well as the moment of doubt (or integral criticism towards yourself, i.e. reflexivity). The reflexivity that originates in the cognitive sphere of the society has spilled over into the sphere of power – any kind of power needs legitimating as power, which automatically means that it can be challenged. The negative consequences of the growing freedom of individuals from the constraints of the state are e.g. illegal economy, criminal action, concentration of wealth, illegal immigration, terrorism (Stehr, 1992: 222). This means that the normative structure of the society is weakening – the “compromise” between the individual and the state of the former accepting general (political) norms or the general will that from its part guarantees personal security and wealth.

The weakening of the state structures has, however, also weakened its ability to protect and give security to its citizens. The growth of knowledge, as well as the growth of world economy, more and more independent from any political or state regulation, has in

²²⁸ This also provides an opportunity to “test” the openness of these theories to the different variants of modernity, e.g. if the growth and spread of knowledge is sufficient as the defining feature of modern social change.

parallel resulted in creating more insecurity and contingency into the social relations both on societal level (e.g. labour market). Thus paradoxically, though given power in the political field, many individuals are kept back by the problematisation of their identity. Many theorists fear that attempts to manage this 'identity crisis' caused by lack of secure references can lead to the dissolution of the society, either to neocommunalism (e.g. Alain Touraine) or yuppification (e.g. Hans Joas), i.e. formation of several communities with no ties with each other or, which is most probable scenario – both, the formation of societies torn between a (global) community of cosmopolites, well-adapted to the "new world" and small, radical cultural communities in (often violent) search of recognition (Zygmunt Bauman).

Thus the most "burning" question in these theories is the search for new basis for social integration, to create a new common ground with which everybody has a chance and a wish to identify with, and which could also re-establish the weakened legitimacy of the state structures. What has been proposed by the authors as the best strategy can in short be defined as communication – abandoning the normative and strengthening the discursive mechanisms in the regulation of social relations, especially in power relations. Thus even if the state in its modern form is weakening (which is happening mostly due to the remarkable success of the spread and intensification of its functions, which has granted citizens access to resources that have increased their ability to claim and oppose), it had through its development created a discursive space in which the society can self-organise (due to the overspill of reflexivity from the cognitive sphere to the power sphere). In other terms, this could be described by what Sztompka has defined as the existence of mechanisms of doubt in all power structures (or "institutionalised distrust"). In terms of democracy theory, such institutionalisation of discursivity can have different forms: the control mechanisms can be more or less integrated into the state structures or taken over by effective and widely respected third sector. According to Touraine, similar cognitive shift could be realised also on the individual level, if everybody would come to the recognition that in fact, each of us is struggling the same struggle: maintaining a meaningful unity of individuality while being torn between faceless and levelling world of mass consumption and growingly one-dimensional cultural communities.

From such theoretical background the main question of the paper can be finally be raised. How should we interpret the state of things in the post-socialist societies, taking into account their different socio-historical background? Which specificities of the socialist version of modernity should be taken into account and how can we evaluate the ability (or resources) of these societies and their members to cope with the anticipated growth of contingency in the functioning of the societies and the weakening of the regulation by the state. From the other side, it gives a splendid chance to evaluate the real openness and universality of those theories towards the societies which in their historical development diverge from the Western path of modernity, e.g. in the question, if the growth and spread of knowledge is the adequate variable for defining social change in modern societies.

Here, however, we face a theoretical challenge. While the cultural theories of modernity see the new source for social integration in the growing discursivity and reflexivity of the societies, in the conceptualisations of the socialist type of modernity, reflexivity is one of the key concepts that differentiates this type from its capitalist rival. Though institutionally, several of the characteristics of modernity existed, as coined in the term ‘industrial society’ (Eisenstadt, 1996), the other essential side of the modernist project - growing reflexivity of culture and knowledge and increasing capacity for individual action – is considered highly deficient.²²⁹ This, as discussed earlier, has been achieved by the growing control of citizens over the state, the creation of institutional mechanisms for the constant criticism of state politics. At the same time this institutionalisation of criticism creates social integration which is necessary for political legitimisation. Andrew Arato (1982) defines this as negative and positive domination by the state – while the modern societies have moved from the first increasingly to the other, it was different in the socialist societies. Where the modern social organisation, based on rationality and science was immunised against counter currents,²³⁰ the unity of individuals and the state was aimed at without mediating institutions (civil society). As a result of that e.g. Arnason sees the social actors in the post-socialist societies badly prepared to grasp the chances for social action after liberation from repressive state formations.²³¹

The last claim - the seemingly efficient suppression of growing reflexivity by the communist societies - can and should however be challenged. Also these societies were in their economic development based on scientific-technological progress. This could be achieved only through increased use of scientific knowledge, which due to its amorphous and uneducable nature, provided into the emancipation of the members of the society. Also, the exhaustion of the ideological legitimacy of the system and the existence of the parallel symbolic interpretation of the political reality are signs of reflexive capacities of the society (the legitimisation crisis was especially accentuated in the „peripheries” of the communist system where the regime was mostly imposed from outside.²³² Thus an argument can be made that if the capacity for social action are related to people’s reflexive capabilities (as can be deduced from these theories), people in the post-communist societies cannot not much less be equipped to “manage” the changed reality, individual “success” is as much variable and related to both individual characteristics and relative access to knowledge and information as in the Western societies.

What, however, can be described as insufficient or inadequate in the post-communist societies, are not the reflexive (interpretative) capacities of the society, but their institutionalisation into state structures, i.e. extensive availability of checks and controls in

²²⁹ Citing Johann P. Arnason: „The institutionalisation of constant criticism and control, also the relativisation of all meaning-producing frameworks, that has resulted in the growing capacity of the individuals towards the state/society” (Arnason 1993: 123)

²³⁰ Arnason 1993, 124.

²³¹ Arnason 1999, 23-24. Similar arguments can be found in Delanty 1999.

²³² Arnason 1993, 138.

each phase of political decision making, creating the context of discursivity in the relations between the state and the citizens. The threat for social disintegration can be higher in the post-socialist societies, but not because of the bad preparation of the citizens, but because of the greater difficulties for the states (many which, in terms of their functions, were practically inexistent 15 years ago) to gain new social integration through deepening institutionalised discursivity between itself and its citizens. The threat of return to neo-communal loyalties can be considered especially acute among groups whose ties to the state are weaker than average (cultural minorities, immigrants). Even if such threat is overstated by the social theories, nevertheless, it includes an important political message – any kind of attempt for one-dimensional identity or sharpened imposition of unity is dangerous.

However, if the socialist model of modernity is not defined through the total lack of reflexivity but through the lack of reflexivity in the state structures (or as proposed by Arato – we should distinguish between positive and negative domination), (ab)using the logics of the modernity theories we could also speculate with an opposite scenario. In the search for new forms of social integration in post-socialist societies the particular weakness of the state will not be a weakness, but a strength – and that the new forms of integration will occur even more independently of the existing state-structures, setting a developmental example. Indeed, at least once these societies have found inner resources to transform into a democratic movement, even if whose high modernist nation-state discourse exhausted itself quickly in the new social conditions.

Even if most of the above presentation falls in the range of rather audacious and empirically ungrounded speculation, this proposed theoretical frame achieves at least one aim: it raises several methodological and theoretical questions for the analysis of postsocialist societies. Namely, should we consider, as suggested by the theorists advocating such cultural approach to modernity, growing reflection as the defining feature of modernity? If, according to the same theories, this is the main feature lacking in Socialist societies, can these be called modern altogether? Or, if still defined called modern, is the growth of reflexivity inevitable – taking into account the amorphous and never fully controllable nature of knowledge, the base of scientific and technical development on all modern societies?

This calls for situating the question of reflection to the fore in the interpretation of socialist societies – did it exist and in which forms? And, to relate it with the earlier interpretations: which is more defining (as the key feature of Socialist societies) – the suppression of oppositional thought (critical reflection) by the communist regime or the growth of reflection (as an unavoidable feature of modernity) in the society despite its oppression? What is more defining on personal level – the growth of emancipation or its partial suppression (of political action, etc)? How has it affected the ability of the “descendants” of the socialist societies to manage their lives in the drastically opened-up world?

And on yet more general, more political or ideological level: would it be fruitful to move forward in the analysis of post-socialist states from the classical vision of the society’s structures and the role of the state? Or are these developments possible only if certain steps in

the state's development are first passed through – should the social scientists keep this state-centred approach to society and promote the old forms of democracy, etc, or should we also start looking for new forms of integration in our societies, keeping in mind the relative weakness of the proposed discursive mechanisms between the state and the society? Especially as most of our countries have accepted a rather neoliberal ideology of the unavoidable and positive development towards liberalisation and globalisation without too much reflection on the possible negative side-effects.

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VICTOR CEBOTARI

Gateway To A New Modernity: Ruling Elites Between Past, Present and Future. The Moldavian Case

Power used to be in the hands of princes, oligarchies, and ruling elites; it was defined as the capacity to impose one's will on others, modifying their behaviour. This image of power does not fit with our reality any longer. Now, power is everywhere and nowhere...

Alaine Touraine, *Lettre a Lionel*, pp. 36-8, 42 ; Translation by Manuel Castells in *The Power of Identity*, vol.II, p. 309.

And democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in . . . offices.

Socrates in Plato, *the Republic*, Book 7.

I should start my essay, by underlining the fact that the reality of the social state in Eastern Europe, especially in the former Soviet republics, looks more and more the same as in the famous Russian fable about the pike, the swan and the crawfish.²³³ In this context, the case of the Republic of Moldova is the most typical of all other former soviet countries. After 13 years of independent status, Moldova has come full circle. Declaring its independence in August 1991, Moldova set down the path of establishing a democratic system of government rooted in fundamental rights and freedoms. But, unfortunately, the country that earlier was one with the highest level of the socio-economic development from the Soviet Union, has now become one of the poorest countries of Europe. The reasons of this situation are so many that is impossible to describe in this paper.

However, I will try to analyze a part of the transformation of Moldavian society, from the past history within Soviet Union till the present, based on a circulation of elites into national political reality. According to these facts, I can specify that the aim of this essay is trying to redefine but not to justify the main obstacles which Moldavian politics faces nowadays. But, at least, by underlining and trying to understand the reflection mentioned below, we can obtain a clearer view about another face of transition, within a society, who has its roots in the past, problems in present and uncertainties in the future.

Moldova should be seen less as a struggling democracy, where leaders strive to build more pluralistic institutions, and much more as a case of failed authoritarianism or what I tend to call pluralism by default, a form of political competition specific to weak states.

Pluralism by default describes countries in which institutionalized political competition survives not because leaders are especially democratic or societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to

²³³ The main idea of this fable is that in one day, the pike, the swan and the crawfish wanted to move a cart, and started to pull each other in the direction they were able to pull. As a result the pike pulled up, the swan down and the crawfish back but finally the cart remained in the same place.

impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context. In such cases, leaders lack the authority and coordination to prevent today's allies from becoming tomorrow's challengers, control the legislature, impose censorship, manipulate elections successfully, or use force against political opponents. Perhaps, this situation can be explained by looking in the history of this small state. Apart from the fact that Moldova did not experience, in the past, a stable democracy, we must understand the unfair history of this country.

Moldova became part of the Russian empire in 1812. It experienced a short period of freedom, between the 1st and 2nd World Wars, when, joined to Romania, it became a legal part of the Romanian nation. After the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1940, the Soviet Union took back this area between Prut and Dniestr rivers (also called Bessarabia) and forced the Moldavians to become the 15th socialist republic within Soviet Union. As a result of Stalin's annexation of eastern Romania, the newly formed Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic became perilously divided between a Romanian-speaking western zone and the highly industrialized, Slavic-speaking region of Transdnestria in the east. This split created the basis for significant ethnic tensions that surfaced during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika. In the late 1980s, the Popular Front of Moldova, founded by Moldovan academics and writers, focused on strengthening the linguistic and ethnic rights of Romanian-speakers whom nationalists felt had suffered disproportionately under communism. In 1990, the Popular Front won roughly a third of the seats in the Supreme Soviet and chose the premier. Bolstered by its early victories, the Front began to press for immediate unification with Romania, restrictions on Russian in-migration, and increased employment opportunities for Romanian-speaking citizens. Such policies helped to generate a highly polarized atmosphere.²³⁴ Opposition quickly appeared among local Russians and Ukrainians (who together accounted for about a quarter of the population in the late 1980s) in Transdnestria, and also sprang up among the Gagauz (a group of Turkic-speaking Slavs in the south who account for about 4 percent of Moldova's people). In the summer of 1990, deputies from Transdnestria and Gagauzia started boycotting the national legislature and declared their respective regions autonomous. Gun battles soon broke out between Moldovan government troops and separatist armed forces in and around Transdnestria. Mircea Snegur, Moldova's first president, declared a nationwide state of emergency in the spring of 1992 in an attempt to disarm separatist militias. General Alexander Lebed's Russian Fourteenth Army, stationed in the area, responded by supporting Transdnestrian separatist forces and a full-scale civil war broke out. Having cost about three hundred lives and a thousand wounded, fighting receded by the end of the summer. Since then, Transdnestria has remained a de facto separate state outside of Moldovan control.

²³⁴ See William Crowther "Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova," in D. Dyer, ed., *Studies in Moldova: The History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova*. (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1996), p. 36.

Underlining this historical aspect, I can now proceed to analyze the procedure of the *sovietisation*²³⁵ of Moldavian society, taking into account the importance of this reality nowadays in the ruling characteristics of our elites. Thus "...the Soviet Union was constructed around a double identity: on the one hand, ethnic/national identities (including Russian); on the other hand, Soviet identity as the foundation of the new society: *sovetskii narod* (the Soviet people) who would be the new cultural identity to be achieved in the historical horizon of Communist construction".²³⁶ Nevertheless, there is one more comment to make in this context. There was in the Soviet Union two categories of states. In one of them (including countries such Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Leetonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), the particular national identity had been more and less permitted. These were the states, within the Soviet Union, who bordered the western and south-western part of the URSS and where the national base of society differed totally from the so called ethnic/national Russian identities.

In this sense the socialist mission of USSR was constructed: to create the state as a social "mind," capable of directing the irrationalities of the social identity market and administering the multitude of competing wills present in the Soviet Union's civil societies. This concept of the civilising mission of the supra-national culture - its role as the educational support for the rationally administered society and its function as the cultural foundation for national unity (*sovetskii narod*) - has foundered upon the radical doubt introduced by reflexive modernity. But, instead of a supra-national culture, reflexive modernity stimulates global and local cultures; instead of a civilising mission designed to produce supra-national uniformity, post-modern culture exposes everything - including the unity of modernism and the validity of civilisation - to radical scepticism and cultural fragmentation.

Continuing, we can see that here is a critical point concerning the evolution and formation of the Moldavian national elites – they never became "ruler" in their own country. The high level leadership (nomenclatura) always was "imported" from the "brotherly" countries²³⁷ and begs the question in the political determination: "...about who are the represented, who are the representatives, and what is their relation?"²³⁸ It is evident that progress in society is established by the good circulation of elites. Even in a socialist society, away from manipulation of the mono-party regime, people expected to have rules that know and respect their culture and language.

Moreover, we can find a way looking at the more-radical and theoretically well-developed form of elite theories developed by C. Wright Mills, Mosca and V. Pareto. While Mills concentrates upon the way elite groups organize and take power in democratic societies,

²³⁵ *Sovietisation* should not to be confused with *russification*. This process (russification) has been put into practice, over the Bessarabian territory, from its annexation at the Tsarist Empire in 1812 and also during the process of *sovietisation* (1945-1989). *Sovietisation* was focused at the supranational aspect of society which embraced all countries from the Soviet Union (URSS).

²³⁶ Castells Manuel. *The Power of Identity*, 2nd Volume, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 1997, p. 35.

²³⁷ For example, the ex-president of Republic of Moldova Petru Lucinsckii (1997-2001) was delegated in the '80s to lead the communist party in Tajikistan, never in SSR Moldova.

²³⁸ Wagner, P. (1994). *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*. Rutledge, London, p. 92.

he argued this process - far from being right, proper and inevitable (as argued by Mosca and Pareto) - was neither inevitable nor necessarily beneficial to society as a whole. In this respect, Mills argues that even in a dictatorial society, group of dominant elites succeed in controlling various institutions in society. Since some institutions were more-powerful than others (an economic elite, for example, was likely to be more powerful than an educational or religious elite), it followed that the elite groups who controlled such institutions would hold the balance of power in society as a whole - they would dominate politically on the structural level of power.

In a democratic regime there are three major institutions or "power blocs": *Major Corporations, the Military and National Government*.²³⁹ In the Soviet Union, also, there were three important institutions that took power over society: the *Central Communist Party, the Military and the Secret Services (KGB and GRU)*.

Each of these institutions formed a power bloc in its own right (since each has a set of specific interests) and each was dominated by an internal elite, the leaders of the most-powerful Secret Agency, the upper echelons of the armed forces, and the leaders of the political party in government "nomenclatura". Although such elites were powerful in their own right, with exception that in the last decades of soviet government, one institution, the USSR Secret Service (KGB) succeed in controlling the last two. As a result, in a democratic regime, the collaboration between all these institutions formed a "powerful elite" within society, while in an authoritarian regime, as was the case of the Soviet Union, each of these institutions was on the look-out for political dominance over all of the others.

Underlining these aspects, I can move onto the following set of ideas focused directly on the Moldavian case. While the process of elite domination in the Soviet Union has been understood we must point out the fact that this process was applied at the central union level and not at the republic's national level. In this particular country there were two categories of elites. The first one, was ethnic Russian (most of them), coming directly through the *sovietisation* process, and the second one was ethnic Moldavian (sub-elites or under-elites). As Pareto said "the ideal governing class contains a judicious mixture of lions and foxes, of men capable of decisive and forceful action and of others who are imaginative, innovative, and unscrupulous."²⁴⁰ Unfortunately, no one can pretend to be either "lions" or "foxes" because of their direct subordinated status to central power. But the differences between them were made in the special ruling characteristics of their "power". While the first rank elites (Russian ones) became dominant because of acquiring support from the central ruling institutions, the second ones were contented with regional and local collaboration. Thus, the "power capital" (in this context – *the political capital*) necessary in the ruling process was accumulated only by the Moldavian ethnic Russian elites instead of national Moldavian second rank elites – *under-elites*. This process affected the whole Moldavian society not only

²³⁹ Mills, C. Wright. (1970). *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²⁴⁰ Vilfredo Pareto, (1935). *The Mind and Society*. Ed. Arthur Livingston trans. Andrew Bongiorno. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Vols. III, Section 2027.

at the political level. Intellectual as well as economic elites passed through the same process, of sub-elites-(ation), under the soviet domination. The end result is that, the dominant elites, who took the power capital (political, intellectual and economical one), have the necessary instruments to make rule into society. In this way Moldavian society became a *stone institution* (which means with unchanged institutions), and had intact power elites that were never replaced by new ones. Thus, the circulation of elites who must renew the ruling class was set in stone.

What changes happened in national society when Moldova became independent? After a short period of national anarchy, Moldavian society refused to subordinate towards old elites. Moldavian nationalism²⁴¹ became very popular. In such conditions the Russian ruling powerful elites were divided into three parts. The first one was obliged to return to the Russian Federation, the second one become sub elites defending the Russian minority's rights and the third one, the most powerful, decided to protect their *power capital* and not to accept Moldavian independent status. As a result, they constituted a separatist secessionist republic located in the eastern part of Republic of Moldova named the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic (PMR).²⁴²

As a result, at the beginning of '90s, the political constellation of Moldavian society was changed; the former under-elites from the soviet era became "powerful elites" and the former ruling elites became under-elites. But, the transfer of power *capital*, from former elites to new elites did not happen. In this context the new ruling classes took the power but not the necessary instruments and mechanisms to make the successful transition from socialist governance to a democratic one. The missing instruments of rule, created chaos in the multinational Moldavian society where the main powerful elites (political, economical and intellectual), found themselves in the fable position mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

Moreover, after declaring its independence, the Moldavian people even nowadays do not consider themselves as a nation. After seven decades of "sovietisation" the Moldavians are still looking for their national history. A part of them feel they belong to Romanian nation, others tend to make their own Moldavian history and to define the Moldavian nation in the past, and the third group identify with their recent communist history.

It is hard for political reality to respect the political bonds concerns of who is allowed to participate in political decision-making, that is, who should be awarded with political citizenship: "it was, by and large, established that the boundaries of the polity should coincide with those of a nation"²⁴³ which has not happened yet, even on the level of Moldavians who believe in their national affiliation.

²⁴¹ In this context Castells draw attention to the fact that the explosion of nationalism is in direct relation to the weakening of existing nation-states. See Hustinx L. and Lammertyn F. (2004). *Societies in Transition: From Simple to Reflexive Modernity* (Course text), p. 46.

²⁴² For more details concerning the Transdniestrian Conflict see: Cebotari Victor, (2003). *The Transdniestrian Conflict: Strategies, Interests and Ways of Settlement*. Bucharest. Black Sea University Press.

²⁴³ Wagner P. (1994). p 132.

As a conclusion, it is clear that in post Soviet Moldova without, a democratic history, or a dynamic civil society, the degree to which democracy and stability endures have depended on how severely split elites are, and how long they stay that way. One of the most important sources of sustained elite fragmentation and state weakness in Moldova has been ethno-national conflict rooted in the nature of Moldova's incorporation into USSR. Yet such polarization creates serious problems for governance and long-term democratic consolidation.

Moldova nowadays is living in a strange mixture of *pre-modern* and *industrial* society or in other words in a "modern feudal society"²⁴⁴. Even now, in Moldova, around 40% of the labour force is working in agriculture and only 14% in industry.²⁴⁵ We can see this situation as a side effect of the industrialization in the Soviet era, where all countries were specialized in the special industrial field within the entire Soviet industrialization project. So, as a result, even though Moldova became more industrialized than before it entered the Soviet Union, it was made to depend on neighbouring ex-soviet countries and was "in-dependent" of its own agricultural sphere.

Anyway, three recent developments are increasingly changing Moldavian social development: "globalization, internationalization, and regionalization"²⁴⁶. In this context, a lot of side-effects occur in a Moldavian society with deep consequences in the future development towards the next step of social development - second (reflexive) modernity: the emigration of the Moldavian labour force,²⁴⁷ the instability of the ruling class, the freezing of the conflict situation in Transnistrian region etc. To make a clear vision of the present Moldavian reality, we can read a part of 2004's report concerning Moldova: "democratic practice in Moldova continued to decline in the period covered by *Nations in Transit 2004*, with the country receiving worsening ratings in the areas of electoral process, civil society, independent media, and governance. The ruling Communist Party achieved victory in flawed local and regional elections in 2003. Overall public support for the party actually slipped during the year, but the opposition remained fragmented and lacking in resources. Efforts to settle the Transnistrian conflict continued, but Russia failed to comply with commitments to withdraw its armaments and munitions from the breakaway region. The persistence of weak governance, widespread corruption, and a fragile system of checks and balances also marked the year".²⁴⁸

It is hard for Moldavian society to get through the present situation with all these connected problems and to move into, to a new, strange for Moldavians, reflexive modernity. However, we know that a new paradigm in society is changing over the generations. A new ruling class, young and powerful, is on its way to stepping forward and to bringing Moldavian society into deserved European modernity.

²⁴⁴ Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*. London: Stage, p. 106.

²⁴⁵ CIA. The world fact book: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html>.

²⁴⁶ Hustinx L., Lammertyn F. (2004), *Societies in Transition: From Simple to Reflexive Modernity*. (Course text), p.45

²⁴⁷ Around 25% of Moldavian labor force (800.000 persons) is working in the Western Europe's countries.

²⁴⁸ Freedom House, *Nation in Transit 2004*,
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2004/summary2004.pdf>

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Appendix: facts about Moldova

Basic information

<i>Capital:</i>	Chisinau
<i>Polity:</i>	Parliamentary democracy
<i>Economy:</i>	Capitalist-statist
<i>Population:</i>	4,300,000
<i>GDP per cap at PPP:</i>	\$2,109
<i>Private sector as % of GDP:</i>	50
<i>Ethnic Groups:</i>	Moldovan/Romanian (65 percent), Ukrainian (14 percent), Russian (13 percent), other (8 percent)

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

NIT Ratings	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.75	4.00
Civil Society	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	4.00
Independent Media	4.00	4.25	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00
Governance	4.25	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	5.25	5.50
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.50	4.50
Corruption	.na	.na	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25

NOTE: *Nations in Transit* ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. The 2004 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2003. The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author of NIT Report, which can be found at the link shown below.

Source: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm>

Romanian welfare state between survival, reform and European Union Enlargement

The recent enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states on 1st of May 2004 and the forthcoming accession of the candidate states (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) in 2007 have increased the interest in studying the statement of political, economical and social achievements inside the former communist countries. Under the framework of social policy reform in East European countries particularly the case of Romania; the paper explores the impact of transition period on the development of post-communist welfare system in Romania. In this respect, the paper is structured in three main parts as following: firstly, the paper examines the Romanian welfare system offering a general description of the welfare policy configuration during the communist regime; secondly it explores the main trends of the social policy reform within the transition period in Romania and thirdly it analyses the statement of social achievements due to the forthcoming accession to the EU.

The configuration of social policy during the communist regime in Romania

First, the paper analyses the Romanian welfare system by offering a general overview of the social policy configuration during the communist regime. The standpoint of the analysis is the communist heritage in terms of wide-coverage social design, as it will be explained below.

During the communist period one could identify at least two widely respected taboos in the field of social policy: the unofficial recognised of the unemployment (Zamfir & Zamfir, 1999) and excessive social expenditures (V. Rys, 1998). Unemployment was not officially recognised despite the fact that in the '80s more and more persons started to confront it. Officially, unemployment was interpreting as a complete use of the available labour force to achieve politically established economic goals. The communist regimes were very proud to successfully implement the communist ideology in terms of collecting individual work contributions to build collective welfare. (Zamfir & Zamfir, 1999, p 25) The excessive social expenditure subject represented an even more sensitive issue connoted mainly with the fear to confirm the true about the real costs of maintaining the socialist societies with their additional social design. An honest realist cost-benefit analysis could have exposed the political elites to the potential risk to assume the responsibilities for financial necessary changes, which implies loosing the public support from workers not willing to accept social benefits decrease. (V. Rys, 1998, p. 142)

The fundamental aim of the communist welfare project was concentrated on *'creating a prosperous socialist society characterised by a highly homogeneous among citizens, not necessarily totally equal but at least low social inequalities in between'*. (C. Zamfir & E. Zamfir, 1999, p. 21) The welfare communist regime was rather focus on assuring an optimal and relatively homogenous level of welfare to all through subsidized social services, free access to education, health, and housing for all workers. Social policies emphasised the equality among citizens, reducing the vertical inequalities and didn't recognise officially the social problems. (B. Voicu, 2004, p. 27)

As ideological key concept, the 'work' represented simultaneously an individual duty to the society and a right assured by the state to anyone. As the state was the main provider of collective welfare, the state employment policies were very much aware about assuring a work place to each person able to work. As characteristic, this system was between American 'workfare' and Scandinavian 'productive' one in the meaning that the socialist presented two consecutive compulsory issues: the person obliged to work for her /his welfare and the state obliged to assure the jobs. (M. Voicu, 2004, p. 30)

Work participation represented a compulsory key condition to distribute social benefits to workers eligible both by accessing the labour market (ex. child allowance, housing, scholarships, holiday and treatment tickets, health care, sick and maternal leave) and contributing to the earning-related system (ex. pensions). In this context, persons outside the labour market were completely excluded from the social benefits system. *Four types of welfare benefits* for social support were used in the communist regime: *universal transfers* of benefits and services, *income-related benefits* related to work contributions (ex. the social insurance system), *social transfers* dictated by needs but conditioned by participation to work (ex. free health care, housing, child allowance, and free or subsidised health treatment tickets or holiday tickets) and *unconditioned transfers targeted for ones in need* based on means tests. (Zamfir & Zamfir, 1999, p. 21 -22)

In the view of the above, the welfare policy could have been characterized as a mix between universal social benefits and special benefits related either to employment either to the 'advantages' of being hired within a particular economic area (C. Zamfir & E. Zamfir, 1999, p. 21). Sometimes comparable jobs implying similar skills and similar work environment were paid differently depending on the industrial area they belong to. As an illustrative example, miners were better paid then other workers. (M. Voicu, 2004, p. 29) So, more advantages social or family benefits were distributed for employees working in economic areas considered more favourable in terms of higher interest paid by the communist regime.

The communication network (newspapers, television, radio) but particularly education system were highly politicised. Everything could potentially represent a threat for promoting communist ideology by affiliation to international scientific exchange ideas outside the communist countries was eradicated. This had a direct impact in terms of closing several university departments in the social sciences, for instance anthropology, sociology,

psychology and social work. Some of the direct consequences of these radical measures are: the current low number of Romanian experts in areas of social policy and social work and also discontinuities after the Second World War and in the communist period in terms of developing the sociological achievements of the Romanian Sociological School in Bucharest.

The configuration of the social policy in Romania during the communist regime could be described as being focus on the followings: workfare policy in terms of the total use of the existing labour force; assuring a relatively homogenous collective welfare in terms of complete eradication of the poverty, promote a relatively homogenous collective welfare, promotion of an active policy to compensate differences between needs and resources through social benefits (especially applicable in families with many children), active policy for social housing support; wide coverage of social assurance scheme covering a broad set of risks related with the income lose situation; lack of unemployment benefits and means-tested benefits system, work based universal social benefits (in money or in kinds), large extent of generous social benefits focus on children, preferences for providing social services rather than direct transfers in money and a non-discriminatory ethnical policy. (Zamfir & Zamfir, 1999, p. 25-30) The enterprises and trade unions were formally involved in managing distribution of social services or family allowances depending on political decisions but access to welfare was conditioned by access to labour market as the state was assuring jobs for all. (M. Voicu, 2004, p. 31) On the other hand, social policies ideologically promoted during communist period were not sustainable in long terms perspective, due to high costs involved. (B. Voicu, 2004, p. 27)

As a general conclusion, social security system in communist Romania was mainly based on socialist ideology and missed two important elements: unemployment and the means-tested benefits.

Social policy in Romania during transition period

One could say that 1989 was a common synchronisation in recognising the collapse of communist system in Europe. This part overviews the main tendencies of the social reform within the transition period in Romania. The main assumption of this chapter is that within the larger framework including East European post-communism countries and despite the convenient tendency to study them as a whole, the Romanian welfare regime corresponds to the main trends developed in other post-communist countries (B. Voicu, 2004, p.8) but particular aspects could be identified.

As already mentioned, Romania is one of the post-communist countries confronting the transition from planned to market economy.²⁴⁹ Bob Deacon characterised the welfare

²⁴⁹ Bogdan Voicu refers to this period either as 'transitions' due to complexity of the phenomena either as post-communism in the meaning of including 'the period after the communism, including a stage called transition, on the other hand it is a post-transition, successive to transitions'. (B. Voicu, 2004, p. 9) On a temporal dimension,

regime in Romania during the transition period as “*post-communist conservative corporatist*” in terms of low economic development, high working class mobilisation, little influence of catholic teaching on policy, high absolutist authoritarian legacy, mass character of revolutionary process and low transnational impact (larger if indebt to West). (B. Deacon, 1993, p. 196)

The development of a specific common applicable pattern concerning social reforms in East European countries is a high difficult task. Anyhow, the analyses of post-communist societies emphasised one common goal: (re) building of capitalist societies on West inspiration and two visible components: ‘political democratisation’ and ‘marketing of economic act’. (B. Voicu, 2004, p.36) Despite initial economic, political and social similarities registered in the beginning of ‘90s mainly due to apartness to communist regime, the former satellites states of Soviet Union approached the social, economic and political changes and consequently progressed each in their own way. (V. Rys, 1998, p. 139)

The Romanian crisis is essentially an economic one. The unstable economic environment can be characterised as a mix of different factors as massive deindustrialisation after 1989, weak legislation framework, large privatisation of previous state-owner enterprises and consequently the explosion of unemployment.

During the transition period, both contributively and non-contributively assistance systems in Romania kept the same pattern as in the communist regime and have been slowly progressed further. (S. Ilie & S. Vonica, 2004, p. 4) Developments noticed in the 1990s in these two areas were not part of a coherent national social policy approach. (C. Zamfir, 2001)

As presented in the first part of this paper, the contributory scheme during communist period was a comprehensive one but focus exclusively on employees. During the transition period, the social policy continued to remain concentrated mainly on wage class protection. (S. Ilie & S. Vonica, 2004, p. 4) The emergence and rapid increase of unemployment in Romania after 1989 has forced the authorities to officially recognise it and develop social strategies to cope with it. Moreover, the social problems have increase in amplitude and included a higher number of citizens. Despite this, the slow developments of unemployment benefits and also means – tested system in the ‘90s didn’t offer the expected protection to ones concerned. Immediately after 1989, the lack of social measures targeted for ones in need, exposed different vulnerable groups to poverty risk.

The non-contributively assistance system slowly reacted to dangerous problems like children (especially adopted) and persons with disabilities. The activities of NGOs working in the field of child and youth protection are remarkable and more visible than any other area. (S. Ilie & S. Vonica, 2004, p. 4) Steps in this direction were done especially in 2004 when legislation for accreditation of social services providers.

The Romanian population experienced a very powerful euphoria after the so-called 1989 Revolution and put all hopes in changes. Unfortunately, quite soon after revolution the

the three would be as follows: communism, transition, post-communism. (idem, p. 14)

population was disappointed by the incapacities of newly established democratic governments to adopt suitable measures to social problems, to comply the electoral promises, to fulfil the public expectations and at not but least to successfully implement social and economic reforms. Failures in adopting efficient social reforms, partially caused by minimalist interventions of the state in early '90s showed the national authorities' incapacity to critically analyse the status of affairs, to preview negative effects as social exclusion of large group of population exposed to poverty and to offer suitable solutions to social problems emerged due to brutal and sometimes not sufficient prospect economic challenges. As an example the design of unemployment benefits was officially adopted long time after the issue started to be officially recognised.

The social policy after the collapse of communist period was adopted under the direct and assumed responsibility and inspiration of national and international actors. The former communist countries have experienced global organisations, which have imposed austerity policies in the form of structural adjustment programs, and other changes as a condition for the granting or rescheduling of loans (B. Deacon, 1997). Regarding the national political class, it is interesting to prospect the composition. Where they could come from? Who composed the new political elites? This article doesn't intend to offer a complete set of answers but it arise the questions of political decision factors involved. The birth of post-communist political class in an ex mono-political party context was primarily focus on developing credibility and power in order to "seduce" population perceived as a future possible elector. Witness of some 1989 revolutions happened in the East part of Europe, Ralf Dahrendorf emphasised the three potential possibilities: new political elites could have been composed: by members of political parties into force before communist regime instauration, by of the ex-communist nomenclature either by a completely new established political parties (R. Dahrendorf, 1993).

In a nutshell, the social policy in Romania could be classified according with three phases: reparatory stage (of injustice measures or lack of specific other social measures), the stage on building a legal and institutional social policy framework crucial element but done in an emergency pulse and effective transition with a social policy rather reactive with strong minimalist tendencies. (C. Zamfir, 1999, p. 41)

Social policies implemented during transition period could have been characterised as a 'governmental culture of poverty'. (M. Preda, 2000, p. 17) Malfunctions such as diagnosing social problems, developing and implementing more appropriate social policies, evaluating the impacts of social policy have proof the low political interest, attention and understanding of social ground in Romania.

Social costs of transition were: the increase unemployment; decrease number of paid jobs; decrease level of medium incomes, especially small incomes; explosion of informal economy as an alternative; decreased value of social benefits; increase social polarization and social desegregation. (C. Zamfir, 2004, p. 141 -142) Major social problems during transition from planned to market economy were: explosive rates of poverty, social exclusion,

increasing informal economy, unemployment, lack of access to social service, low education. High exposed vulnerable groups were: children, young people, elderly, long-term unemployed, homeless, Roma population.

Negotiations in the social area between Romania and European Union

Thirdly the paper takes a closer look on the institutional building approach in the field of social assistance and explores the implications of negotiating process with European Union for the Romanian reform. From the legislative point of view, negotiations between Romania and European Union are regulated by the Association Agreement, which was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1995 when Romania applied for Accession. The paper is focus on analyses of the last developments in the field particularly due with the last country report submitted by the European Commission on the 6th of October 2004.

The impact of Romania's accession within the interstates cooperation structure of European Union is related with legislative harmonization in the social field, the implementation of communitarian *acquis* and search for sustainable social policy solutions in terms of appropriate answers to specific social problems Romania is confronting to during the transition period.

This part of the paper is focus social aspects as they are reflected under the negotiation framework on chapter 13, *Employment and social affaires*' between Romania and EU. Generally it was considered as a success in the Romanian negotiation by the Romanian authorities in charge and not only due to relatively short period of time required to close it. It was open during Belgian presidency during second semester 2001 and provisory closed during Spanish presidency during the first semester 2002.

According with Governmental Decision 273/ 2003, the Romanian specific delegation in charge with negotiating chapter 13 '*Employment and social affaires*' is composed by main institution responsible in the field: the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family (chapter integrator); the National Agency for Employment; the Ministry for Health and Family; the Ministry of Development and Prognoses; the Ministry for Small and Medium Enterprises; the Economic and Social Council; and the Council for Occupational Standards, Evaluation and Accreditation.

Several Ministries such as Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family; Ministry of Education and Research; Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affaires distribute the social and family allowances in Romania. According with the Law 705 / 2001 regarding the National System of Social Assistance, the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family is '*the authority which elaborate the social assistance policy, establish the national strategy of development in the field and promotes the rights of family, children, single persons, elderly, disabled persons and any other person in need*' on the base of consultation with main representatives of civil society. (Law 705/ 2001, p. 4)

According with Governmental Decision 737/ 2003, The Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family is organised as a body of the central public administration with responsibilities in implementing the governmental policies in the field of labour, social solidarity, social protection and family. One of the main tasks in the area of social assistance and family policies are concentrated: to develop the national social assistance strategy, to coordinate its implementation at national level, to offer financial support for social assistance programs, according with the to subside law the foundations working in the social field, to evaluate the implementation of the social assistance programs, to provide methodological guidelines and develop social indicators in the field.

The institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family are: the National House of Pensions and Other Social Insurance Rights (established by law 19/ 2000 with precise tasks in the field of the management the public system of pensions and other social insurances rights mainly due to transferring them nationally to insured persons) and the National Agency for Employment (focus on national strategies in the employment field and social protection for unemployed).

In its activity, the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family collaborates with its subordinated public institutions with legal personality financed either by the state budget (National Authority for Disabled People, National Authority for Children's Rights, National Agency for Family Protection, County and Bucharest Directorates for Labour, Social Solidarity and Family, decentralised public services and Office for Labour Migration), either financed by its own profits and subsidies from the state budget (Labour Inspectorates).

The management of main part of social and family benefits and also social services if under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family and its 42 decentralized units named Directions of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family: 41 in each Romanian county and 1 for the 6 districts of Bucharest. Theses decentralised units function within the Law 737/ 2003 framework carrying out tasks related with social dialogue, legislation, employment, labour conflicts and collective labour contracts; public internal audit; social welfare; human resources; financial, accounting; and IT.²⁵⁰

On-going work related with the reform on social assistance field implies the modification of the legislative framework. Future directions taken into account for modifying the law 705 / 2001 are focus on setting up new institutions, which can provide the necessary missing links for a better picture such as the Social Observatory, the National Agency for Payment and the Social Inspection. Last but not least an Integrated Management Information System is to be implemented at the national level.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ *** ,Framework Regulation for the Organisation and Functioning of the Directorates for Dialogue, Family and Social Solidarity, September 2003, p. 3

²⁵¹ The speech of Marta Nora Tarnea- the state secretary for family and social policy (2003-2004) during the conference "*Romanian social model in the perspective of the next two centuries* " organised by the Research Institute for the Quality of Life, Romanian Academy of Sciences, 10 of June 2004 published in Simona Vonica,,*Modelul social românesc în perspectiva următoarelor două decenii (10 iunie 2004, București)*’, Quality of Life review Research Institute for the Quality of Life, Romanian Academy, XV, no. 3-4/ 2004, (forthcoming).

According with the regular report on Romania's progress towards accession 6.10.2004, the progresses since the last regular report in the social field during 2004 covered areas as: labour law (better dissemination of new Labour Code and more efficient administrative capacity); equal treatment of women and men (sett up the National Agency for Family Protection and developed legislation in the field of domestic violence, maternity protection); health and safety at work; social dialog (the strengthen role of Economic and Social Council), public health; employment policy; social inclusion; social protection (a social programme 2003-2004 was adopted, increased social public expenditure, decentralization of social assistance system continued and adoption of occupational pensions law) and anti-discrimination policy. (***) Regular report, p. 91-93)

According with the Strategy Paper of the European Commission on progress in the enlargement process 6.10.2004, Romania is continuing to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. We should also keep in our minds that The Accession Treaty could recommend to postpone the accession with one year if Romania will be unprepared to meet the requirements of membership by 1st of January 2007. (***) *Strategy Paper*, 2004, p. 3, 7-8)

As a successful continuation of the positive conclusion of the European Council meeting in Brussels on 17 December 2004 and the finalisation of the Treaty of Accession in February 2005, the

European Commission adopted on the 22nd of February 2005a favourable opinion on the accession to the European Union of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania. (***) Press release, February 2005).

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JULIUS MASTILAK

East-West Integration

From Regional, Socio-Economic, Institutional Perspective:

Understanding Development of Bratislava-Vienna Metropolitan Region

Introduction

The geographical position of the metropolitan region of Vienna-Bratislava makes it a role model for Europe's post-Cold War reunification process. First, the area stretches over the border formerly known as the "Iron Curtain". The gradual dismantlement of the Iron Curtain (since 1989) has and will influence the area's economic development. The enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the ensuing integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets into Western Europe directly affect the regional level. Second, in the area, as elsewhere, functionally integrated regions have emerged. The major differences in various economic indicators add to the scope for integration, designating the Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region as a social laboratory for processes of regional integration. The Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region offers an example of how institutional arrangements affect integration and helps identify the fields that are important to the advancement of integration.

Despite their history of close relations, before 1945, Vienna and Bratislava merely co-existed without any form of institutionalized co-operation. The region's peripheral position has changed after the fall of Curtain Wall in 1989 to that of a gateway between the East and West. With 4.5 million inhabitants and an economy the size of Ireland's, the region has the potential to develop into a major hub in Central Europe.

In my paper I analyze which forces/factors contributed to the development of a particular cross-border region, Vienna-Bratislava region. I am particularly concerned with how the institutional arrangements and policies (particularly regional, and some national) contributed to that development in comparison to what can be attributed to natural development or context for development (intensification of economic relations due to low labour costs in Slovakia, increased mutual trade due to import of raw materials from Slovakia and export of fixed capital from Austria, fall of iron curtain) and how those two factors correlated.


Methodology

In the paper I combine the use of statistical data analysis (hard data obtained from national statistical institutes - ESA95 methodology, central banks, and chambers of commerce) with common analytical critical study of soft data such as from background OECD reports, EU reports & studies, press. The hard data of the latest time series available to date (1995 – 2001/2002) were processed with the aid of computer software tools such as SPSS, MS Excel, and MS Access.

Definition of the Regions

The term Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region may be viewed in different ways and analyzed on different territorial levels. In this paper we will distinguish between a wider and narrower scope: Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region (VBMR), and Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region Core (VBMR-C), respectively.

Map 2 VBMR



Source: ÖIR.

The Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region has a surface area of around 30 000 km² and is home to around 4.5 million inhabitants. It encompasses Vienna Metropolitan Region (VMR) and Bratislava Metropolitan Region (BMR). The Slovak part makes up for roughly one-quarter of both area and inhabitants.

Table 5. Key figures for the Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region, as of 2000

Region	Total population	Area (km ²)	GDP (mEUR)	GDP/capita (EUR)
VIENNA-BRATISLAVA METROPOLITAN REGION	4,597,200	29,755	101,700	22,122
Vienna Metropolitan Region	3,429,200	23,554	94,298	27,498
Vienna	1,608,700	415	56,410	35,066
Lower Austria	1,542,500	19,173	33,340	21,614
Burgenland	278,000	3,966	4,548	16,360
Bratislava Metropolitan Region	1,168,000	6,201	7,402	6,338
Bratislava	617,000	2,053	5,201	8,430
Trnava	551,000	4,148	2,201	3,995
AUSTRIA	8,110,259	83,859	207,915	25,636
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	5,400,880	49,035	21,518	3,984

Source: OECD Territorial Database.

The term Vienna Region (Wien Region) is defined and used in different ways. For the purposes of this paper and in concurrence with OECD definitions, federal states (NUTS 2) Burgenland, Lower Austria and Vienna are referred to as the **Vienna/Wien Metropolitan Region (VMR)**. The more detailed description of the **Vienna Region Core (VMR-C)** is given in the context of NUTS 3 regions of Nord-Burgenland, Wiener Umland Nord, Wiener Umland Süd and Vienna. In a similar fashion, Slovak regions of Bratislava and Trnava are referred to as **Bratislava Metropolitan Region (BMR)** while **Bratislava Region (Core) (BMR-C)** encompasses Bratislava region defined in terms of NUTS 2.

For analytical purposes European classification of territorial units for statistics NUTS is used in the paper. On the NUTS 2 level Vienna region appears then under code AT13, Burgenland under AT11 and Lower Austria under AT12. The NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistique) statistical system is a territorial concept used by the EU in defining the eligible areas *for structural funds and determining assistance* in form of programmes and resources from EU funds (see [Error! Not a valid link.](#) for what is valid for Slovakia and Austria).

Table 6. NUTS territories – Austria, Slovakia

NUTS Level	Territory	
NUTS I	<i>Austrian regions (3): Eastern Austria Southern Austria Western Austria</i>	<i>Slovak Republic (1)</i>
NUTS II	<i>Federal States territories (Länder)(9): Burgenland, Lower Austria, Vienna, Carinthia, Styria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg</i>	<i>Aggregation of administrative regions (4): Bratislava region, West Slovakia, Central Slovakia, Eastern Slovakia</i>
NUTS III	<i>Combined administrative districts (three to four) (Bezirke) (35): Nord-Burgenland, Wiener Umland Nord, Wiener Umland Süd, Vienna. ...</i>	<i>Administrative regions (8) Bratislava, Trnava, Trenčín, Nitra, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Prešov, Košice</i>

Source: Eurostat, national statistical institutes


The bi-national region represents, in fact, the core of an emerging bigger functional region, “Golden Triangle” Bratislava-Győr-Wien” or the European Region Vienna or Europaregion Wien. The Europaregion Wien is supposed to develop into a policy-platform that encompasses the Vienna- Bratislava Metropolitan Region as well as parts of northwestern Hungary around Győr and the south-eastern part of the Czech Republic around Brno. It will, however, not be treated in this paper.

Comparison of socio-economic situation

The area of VBMR is said to be divided by an edge of prosperity (“Wohlstandskante”). This term has been coined to characterise the striking differences in certain economic indicators between bordering EU- and EU-accession countries. Not only do these borders separate two countries, they also make a distinction between two levels of prosperity: nominal Austrian GDP per capita amounts to roughly six times that of the Slovak Republic in 2002.

The [Error! Not a valid link.](#) shows prominent position of VMR within Austria with regard to economic performance (value added) in comparison to other regions. We may see that VMR region accounts for almost half of national GDP.


Table 7. Comparison of Austrian Regional GDP Mean Values Over Period 1995-2002



Data source: national statistical institutes

The [Error! Not a valid link.](#) shows prominent position of Bratislava region in Slovakia with regard to economic performance (value added). The BMR region accounts for about 37 % of national GDP. Noteworthy, both city of Bratislava and city of Vienna account for a very similar share of their total national GDPs: 26% and 28% respectively.

Table 8 Comparison of Slovak Regional GDP Mean Values Over Period 1995-2001



Data source: national statistical institutes

Both, **Error! Not a valid link.** and **Error! Not a valid link.** show that in both countries regional differences in GDP are statistically significant with a very high F-value²⁵² - the results aren't from sampling error alone if we assume that variability of GDP levels over years for particular regions (between groups variability in the tables) should not differ from variability across individual regions (within groups variability in the tables).

Both, **Error! Not a valid link.** and **Error! Not a valid link.** show similar results for both countries that the variability of GDP *growth* is significant across the years and not across the regions, or in other words that regional differences in GDP growth are not statistically significant in Austria at NUTS3 level and in Slovakia at NUTS2 level.

Table 9. One-way ANOVA test, Austrian NUTS3 GDP 1995-2001, by NUTS3, non-weighted

	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Between Groups</i>	6656215673.469	34	195771049.220	67.859	.000

Data source: national statistical institutes

Table 10 One-way ANOVA test, Austrian NUTS3 delta perC GDP 1995-2001, by year, non-weighted

	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Between Groups</i>	.013	5	.003	9.628	.000

Data source: national statistical institutes

²⁵² Please note that Austrian and Slovak samples are on NUTS 3 level.

Table 11 One-way ANOVA test, Slovak NUTS2 GDP 1995-2001, by NUTS2, non-weighted

	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Between Groups</i>	47354135.268	7	6764876.467	41.037	.000

Data source: national statistical institutes

Table 12 One-way ANOVA test, Slovak NUTS2 delta perC GDP 1995-2001, by year, non-weighted

	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Between Groups</i>	.194	5	.039	136.844	.000

Data source: national statistical institutes

Summing up, there are regional differences in levels of GDP among the Austrian regions and among the Slovak regions but that is not true for the GDP growth. This suggests the regional differences inside both countries were not diminishing over the 1995-2001 period.

Institutional (Support) Framework

The political split between Eastern and Western Europe has long repressed regional attempts for integration in the Vienna-Bratislava Metropolitan Region; thus, depriving both sides of the region from parts of their natural hinterlands and marginalising them in their respective political systems.

Regional development has been a focus of growing interest in Slovakia. It has been emphasised in the latest Government's organisation and policy programmes, and has been encouraged by the prospect of access to European Union (EU) Structural Funding.

Internal policies

The Austrian constitution expressly stipulates Austria to be a decentralised nation. However, fiscally there is hardly any connection between the level of economic activities and budgets at the Lander level. Regarding the contents of the overall development policy pursued, the municipalities have a relatively firm position (Vienna City administration, 103-111).

Since several decades no major changes have taken place in the distribution of policy competencies and powers, that is I will be devoting in the next lines more to Slovak case where the changes have been profound.

Slovak government regional strategy. The fact that regional disparities, particularly between Bratislava and the remainder of the country, are very large means that state regional policies rather disadvantage than support Bratislava. In 1991 it adopted the 'Government Decision No.390/91 - Principles of Regional Policy', which emphasised the importance of understanding the impacts of macro-economic trends at the regional level. With the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the regions, it adopted a set of measures directed to renew economic activity in the districts with the highest levels of unemployment.

Since the late-1990s, interest and activity in regional policy has been intensified and the new coalition government, elected in September 1998, made the design and implementation of effective regional policy one of its election pledges. It was undoubtedly influenced by the results of the *screening exercise* which had been conducted at the time by the EU. Subsequently, much debate about the approach to regional policy and the identification of an appropriate institutional structure at national and regional level has been taking place.

Decentralization. Progress has been made with respect to developing an effective public administration system in Slovakia. In 1997 the Government approved Decision No.802/97 (Concept of National Regional Policy), which specified the objectives of regional policy, its basic development documents, as well as the institutional infrastructure.

As of beginning 2005 the revenues from personal income tax will become municipalities' own resource. Slovak Finance Ministry estimates the income to amount to above 33 billion SKK (0.85 billion euro). Municipalities will have full power to decide on how to use the money for its primary purposes. However ministry will decide on the tax rate and tax base of assessment. The real estate tax will be fully transferred to municipalities (Trend n. 39/2004, p. 6).

Investment support. In the past Slovakia lacked any appropriate legislation dealing with industrial parks, which was in sharp contrast with the strong legislative frame in neighbouring countries. In May 2001 the new Act on support for industrial parks (No. 193/2001) was passed. The act defines the conditions upon which the state may provide a support to set up industrial parks (financial subsidy for technical infrastructure goes wholly to municipality, covering up to 70% of total costs; the rest must be financed by municipality). Only private entities could set up industrial parks until the law was adopted, with no state subsidy, therefore just a few foreign developers were able to start such projects. Once there is a possibility to get financial state support, private developers began to join municipalities which are the *only bodies entitled to receive such a state aid*. The other important legislation encouraging investments in Slovakia is the Act No. 175/1999 on measures relating to the strategic investments.

The Ministry of Economy (MH) approves the granting of subsidy with consultancy assistance of the state FDI agency SARIO. The final decision on a state support is made by the government. SARIO provides MH with its assessment and recommendation whether to provide the support upon several criteria, such as costs-benefit analysis, unemployment in the region, number of newly created jobs, regional development benefits, focus on the supported production's value added, export and development of local supplier base and ecology. Counterpart organisation with similar functioning to Slovak SARIO in Austria is The Austrian Business Agency (ABA), a government-operated consulting firm that serves as a one-stop for foreign investors.

Industrial parks in my view are a very good practical example of necessary cooperation between state, municipalities and private companies (investors). As long as business environment is not standard (globalised), agencies such as SARIO or industrial parks

are needed so the companies do not have to deal with formalities and can concentrate on their core business. The companies in these cases invest and start production very soon. It is not the value of a subsidy that counts, but the share of state/municipality in the project, the expression of interest and involvement in the project that it represents. A good example are ownership rights which in current state really needs in Slovakia really needs involvement of public institutions' (ownership rights are in Slovakia very fragmented and unconsolidated).

EU

According to various studies carried out in the EU MSs, regional development is increasingly influenced by the regional policies of the EU, particularly by the allocations of financial resources through Structural funds (Building Partnerships, 2002).

When we assess the impact of the policies and support of the EU we must realize that the actual impact is higher than what we may read from the figures of allocations from EU budget. First, there are multiplication effects. The projects realised will spur development of some other projects or processes. Second, principle of co-financing says that if the final recipient is in the private sector, then substantial share of funds comes from private sector (for Phare support the requirement was the minimum 75% funds should come from a bank loan or equity). On the other hand, for the majority of structural support, the beneficiary is public sector. However, in future, private sector is expected to take greater role as a recipient of the funds, especially through partnership programmes. Third, the achievements of EU regional policy, cannot be merely summed up in financial and statistical terms. The establishment of partnerships, communication among the various parties involved, networking, exchanges of experiences and experimentation with new approaches to development, international experience are the assets that are more difficult to measure and record but still very important.

EU Pre-Accession Aid. European Communities' Phare programme, created in 1989 became in the 90's world's largest assistance programme in central Europe (Delegation of the EC in the SR). In 1990 it was extended to Czechoslovakia. Since January 2000 there are three pre- accession instruments financed by the European Community to assist the applicant countries of central Europe in their pre- accession preparations: the PHARE programme complemented by SAPARD and ISPA.

PHARE. Slovakia was allocated for the 2000-2006 period 49 million euro yearly. The PHARE allocation for the Slovak Republic has totalled MEUR 330 for the period 1995- 2000.

In Agenda 2000, the EC proposed to focus the Phare Programme on preparing the candidate countries in central Europe for EU membership by concentrating its support on two curical priorities:

- I. *Institution building* which means adapting and strengthening democratic institutions, public administration and organisations that have a responsibility in implementing and enforcing Community legislation. Approximately 30 percent of Phare funds is being used to meet these Institution Building needs, in accordance with the conclusions of the Luxembourg European council, in particular through the *Twinning* mechanism.

II. *Investment* - the types of investment support includes structural and social actions, SME development, large scale infrastructure, adoption and enforcement of EC norms in areas such as environment, nuclear safety, transport safety, working conditions, marketing of food products, consumer information and control of production processes. This second priority accounts for around 70 percent of the Phare budget.

A limit of 10% of the national Phare allocation for the SR can be used to co-finance participation in Community programmes such as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, Youth for Europe, TEMPUS.

In 1994, a new budget, for the *cross-border co-operation (CBC) programme*, has been available to support co-operation between Slovakia and the adjoining border regions of the EU and Candidates to Enlargement (*Austria*, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). The basis of the CBC programme Slovakia-Austria was formed by the Letter of Intent signed in November 1996 between the Governments of the SR and AT, where the priorities of cooperation were identified as follows:

- To actively support the process of integration of SK into the EU
- To support changes in the political and economic system of Slovakia within transformation process
- To support border areas and regions in overcoming specific development problems, including the periphery position through improved transport links, reduction of environmental pollution and provision of necessary infrastructure.

Beneficiaries of assistance under Phare are state administration, municipalities, private sector and SMEs, NGOs, education and science sector, etc.

Submitters in Phare programming process are interest associations, vocational organisations, trade unions, self-governments and regional state administration and non-governmental organisations. The national development plan provides strategic framework for economic and social cohesion component of the Phare national programme which is drawn up annually.

ISPA. Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession (ISPA) follows the lead of the Cohesion Fund in financing the construction of large projects in environmental protection and transport (from 2000). Slovakia was allocated for the 2000-2006 period between 36.4 and 57.2 million euro yearly.

According to Delegation of the EC in SR „most municipalities do *not yet have* all the necessary capacity to carry out large-scale infrastructure projects“ and the Ministry of Environment (in particular a specially set-up Implementation Agency withing the Ministry), will take overall responsibility ofr impleamentation of most of the projects, including tendering and contracting functions.

SAPARD. Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development supports the efforts made by the applicant countries to join the Union's Common Agricultural Policy (from 2000). It includes a wide range of measures concerning the adjustment of agricultural structures, the quality of foodstuffs and consumer protection, rural development, the protection of the environment and technical assistance. Slovakia was allocated for the 2000-2006 period between 18.3 million euro yearly.

Characteristics and Eligibility for EU Funds. Solidarity support comprises the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. After the Common Agricultural Policy it is the second largest item of the EU-budget: between 2000 and 2006, more than 200 billion euro²⁵³ will be allocated to regions and Member States that lag behind in development, have industries in decline, or face high unemployment. This amounts to more than 40% of the EU budget. The Commission's proposal for the solidarity support for the 2007-2013 period is 336 billion euro.

Table 13. EU Solidarity Support (2000-2006)

<i>Priority</i>	<i>Objective Description</i>	<i>Eligibility</i>	<i>Funding (%)*</i>
Objective 1:	Help with basic infrastructure, encouragement of business economic activity	NUTS II regions (an EU classification – see chapter 3) with per capita GDP less than 75% of the EU average	60%
Objective 2:	Regions having to restructure their economies due to the decline of a traditional industrial or agricultural base	Eligibility for objective 2 funding is complex ²⁵⁴ . In order to qualify industrial regions must have an unemployment rate above the Community average, a higher percentage of jobs in the industrial sector than the Community average, and a decline in industrial employment. For rural or other types of regions similar sets of requirements apply. Moreover, regions must not be eligible for objective 1 support.	9.3%
Objective 3:	Adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems relating to education, training and employment	This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may qualify, provided that it does not receive objective 1 funding.	11.3%
Community initiative**(CI) – Interreg	Cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation (partnerships across borders)	This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may qualify.	2,3%
CI Urban	Innovative strategies to regenerate cities and declining urban areas	This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may qualify.	0.3%
CI Leader	For rural societies and economies to look at new local strategies for sustainable development	This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may qualify.	0.9%
CI Equal	Eliminate factors leading to inequalities and discrimination in the labour market	This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may qualify.	1.3%
Cohesion Fund	Finances projects designed to improve the environment and develop transport infrastructure.	Member states whose per capita GNP is below 90 percent of the Community average.	8.5%

Source: (European Commission, Working for the Regions), own calculations

* Planned figures

** Community initiatives are limited to Interreg and Equal for countries that joined EU in 2004 including Slovakia.

Structural Funds are directed to meet different objectives; each programme has its own criteria for determining eligibility. The Structural Funds concentrate on three defined priority objectives and account for 94% of total resources of destined for structural funds (**Error! Not a**

²⁵³ 195 billion euro for Structural funds and 18 billion euro for cohesion fund.

²⁵⁴ For a detailed description of Objective 2 eligibility see Council Regulation No. 1265/1999.

valid link.).

Distribution of EU Funds. An intricate interaction between the EC, the Member States, and the regional authorities characterizes the actual distribution of the funds. The general approach is top-down: first the budgets for the separate Member States are negotiated, then the money goes to the regions, and only then are the details of the individual projects determined. The process is constrained by EC guidelines. These pre-empt arbitrariness in distribution, and help to achieve uniformity in monitoring and evaluation of individual projects. The downside is that they *create bureaucracy*.

This is particularly important for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) having or about to accede to the EU. Indeed, most of these countries still lack the administrative capacity to draw down the funds to which they are entitled. This then leads to lower effectiveness of national or EU regional policies in their redistributive objectives while giving advantage to more developed regions such as Bratislava or Vienna. On the other hand this is limited by the *eligibility* to the resources of course.

Most of the VBMR region is relatively affluent and *cannot* realistically *expect* substantial future assistance from EU structural and cohesion fund. Trnava region and Burgenland (partly – phasing out) are eligible for funds under Objective 1, all the other regions forming VBMR are not. Bratislava (partly) and Trnava region are eligible also for Objective 2 for the period 2004-2006. Summing up, in the stated period it is only Objective 3 of the structural funds and community programmes that the whole VBMR region is most suitable for. However, structural fund assistance which accounts for the most profound financial resources is destined mainly for Objective 1 (National Development Plan for 2003 in Slovakia earmarked for Objective 1 around 88% of the structural funds). In addition, community initiatives are limited to Interreg and Equal for Slovakia.

However, EU support should not be viewed only in numbers, the establishment of partnerships, communication among the various parties involved, networking, exchanges of experiences and experimentation with new approaches to development, international experience – these are the assets that are more difficult to measure or record but still very important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze these soft benefits here but I considered it necessary to mention it here.

In a nutshell, EU financial support is not a crucial factor and will continue to be less influential in development of VBMR region but on the other hand it is not negligible.

Natural Forces of Cooperation: Factors and Results

Geographical vicinity

Only 55 km located from each other, the two cities are the closest located capitals in the world, resulting in potentially easy commuting, trade and personal business, political and

other forms of contacts between them.

Common history

Before Second World War Bratislava region used to be an important regional centre and a 'melting pot' of Slovaks, Magyars, Germans and Jews who could move freely across largely symbolic borders (Bratislava–Vienna, Bratislava–Brno, Bratislava–Budapest).


After the Second World War, Bratislava became a regional republican capital of Slovakia (though of secondary importance as the key administrative organs of the Czechoslovak state were concentrated in Prague), located directly on the new republic's periphery with a sealed border to Austria. Slovak speakers have been dominating since then (currently the overwhelming majority of the population are Slovaks), the share of Magyars has dropped below 3% according to the last official population census, and other nationalities (especially German speakers) have nearly disappeared.

Although it might shed a more negative light on the possible cooperation it was rather renewed interest in establishing historical tights and making use of the differences that have evolved over the time of forced separation.

Economy

Convergence. Economic growth theories predict that there is 'natural' convergence: economies tend to grow closer together in terms of GDP per capita. The evidence favours convergence: according to Ederveen et al. (2002: 8) the GDP per capita of poorer regions in the EU tends to grow faster than that of richer regions. One reason is that *investment in poorer, capital-scarce regions has a higher return* due to decreasing returns to scale. Another reason is that *poorer regions are relatively successful in adopting new technologies* because of the technology gap between them and other regions. Either explanation is of course qualified in numerous ways. In addition, agglomeration benefits constitute a divergent force, driving poorer, more sparsely populated regions, and richer, more densely populated regions apart.

Table 14 Comparison of regional GDP Growth Over Period 1995-2001



Data source: national statistical institutes

The thesis seems to be roughly true when we compare real GDP growth of VMR with BMR ([Error! Not a valid link.](#)). The nominal figures (which are not provided here due to lack of space) would show that BMR well outperforms its southern neighbour. Also the latest numbers on GDP growth on national levels (since regional are not available yet, but the correlation between national growth is high) confirm that Slovakia strongly outpaces Austria and other EU-15 countries.

Similar development should be then also observed within the national economies and the two prominent regions Wien and Bratislava would be expected to record lower paces of growth. However when I compared growth of Wien region with the rest of the country we can see that both VMR and BMR offer a mixed picture (see [Error! Not a valid link.](#)) which supports the argument that the regions are prominent and the general patterns might not apply.

Common growth path. If the two regions are to form functionally integrated region than I suppose that their GDP growth, which represents one of the most synthetic economic indicators used nowadays, should be somehow related. The results of the correlation analysis shown in [Error! Not a valid link.](#) confirm that BMR and VMR have something in common in terms of GDP growth. Although both regions are more tied with their national rests, both VMR and BMR are more correlated mutually than with compared with the counterpart national rests (note that BMR correlated higher 0.383 and in the same direction with VMR than with NotVMR -0.175).


Table 15 Pearson Correlation, delta GDP 1995-2001, weighted

		VMR_deltaGDP P_Weighted	BMR_deltaGDP _Weighted	NotVMR_deltaGDP _Weighted	NotBMR_deltaGDP _Weighted	EU15_deltaGDP P_Weighted
VMR_deltaGDP _Weighted	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	1	0.383	0.707	0.3	0.73
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	.	0.454	0.116	0.564	0.099
	<i>N</i>	6	6	6	6	
BMR_deltaGDP _Weighted	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	0.383	1	-0.175	0.982	0.134
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	0.454	.	0.74	0	0.801
	<i>N</i>	6	6	6	6	6

Data sources: national statistical institutes, Austrian Chamber of Commerce (WKO).

Price levels. We can observe a clear trend of convergence of prices (see [Error! Not a valid link.](#)). Huge price and wage differences simply call for mutual trend and employment of cheaper Slovak labour by Austrian business. Noteworthy Slovak prices and wages are considered to be the lowest in the EU including former candidate countries - now EU members.

Table 16 Slovak vs. eurozone's consumer goods' price levels



Data source: Source: WIIW Database incorporating national statistics; WIIW forecasts. Own computation: [Purchasing power parity SKK/EUR] / [Average exchange rate SKK/EUR (ECU)]

Investment. From the **Error! Not a valid link.** we can read that Austrian investment in Slovakia has increased over 5 years around three-fold. We must add that it is often the case that restrictions at the labour market are bypassed by Austrian companies through investing in Slovakia. This is a very good example of the fact that how business tries to cope with administrative hindrances.

Table 17 Investment to Slovak Republic, total and Austrian

<i>Period</i>	<i>Commulative to 31.12 in Mil. USD</i>	<i>AT in Mil. USD</i>	<i>AT in %</i>
1998	2,036.7	381.0	18.7
1999	2,148.8	373.3	17.4
2000	3,496.3	529.4	15.1
2001	4,704.0	825.00	17.6
2002	6,372.7	1,193.3	18.7
Jun-03	8,786.9	1,244.0	14.2

Source: OWK

The Bratislava region has been the best investment area in Slovakia. By September 30, 2001, the Bratislava region absorbed 59.3% of all foreign direct investments (equity capital and reinvested profits) made in Slovakia. Similarly, the majority of companies selected Vienna as their business location in Austria, according to ABA. Investment outlook for Austria is optimistic, particularly considering Austria's tax reform package, which takes effect on January 1, 2005.

Recent greenfield investment activities in the region (Devinska Nova Ves, Lozorno) are primarily those that follow up Volkswagen's expansion. They provide a plethora of job opportunities, and the VW plant is likely to keep luring in new suppliers. VW itself has created 9,000 jobs over its 10-year presence in Slovakia ((Trend n. 24/2004, p. 53). The PZA greenfield investment in Trnava region must be also mentioned, the production should commence in 2006 providing around new 3,000 jobs.

Trade. Average growth over the period 1996- June 2003 represented 8.3% in exports, and 13.4% in imports (see [Error! Not a valid link.](#)) which is substantial growth and well above the nominal growth of both countries' GDPs. This points to a very vital trade cooperation between the regions. It is estimated that BMR accounts for more than half of the total trade figures.

Table 18 Trade flows between Austria and Slovak Republic

<i>Period</i>	<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>		<i>Balance</i>
	<i>in Mil. Euro</i>	<i>In %</i>	<i>in Mil. Euro</i>	<i>In %</i>	<i>in Mil. Euro</i>
1996	475	-	562	-	-87
1997	588	+1,2	701	+1,2	-113
1998	690	-1,5	657	+11,7	33
1999	669	-3,1	786	+19,6	-118
2000	761	+13,3	1042	+36,3	-281
2001	945	+23,1	1112	+6,7	-167
2002	1065	+12,6	1199	+7,8	-134
Jun-03	550	+12,5	662	+10,5	-112

Source: Austrian Ministry of Economics, Austrian Chamber of Commerce, Slovak ministry of Economics, own calculations.

There are quite significant disparities in employment structure in the two regions (see [Error! Not a valid link.](#)). The differences suggest that there is natural potential for goods/services exchange and convergence (shifts, restructuralization) might occur in near future in some areas. Together with different labour costs it shows us most probable areas of mutual trade.

We may note that more people are employed in public services in AT than SK. Different industry structure can be explained that VMR went through restructuralisation (deindustrialisation) already in the 70s while BMR is currently in this process (IT centres being established in BMR).

Table 19 Employment structure of the WMR & BMR economies by industries

<i>Industry branch</i>	<i>%</i>		
	<i>Wien (2002)</i>	<i>Bratislava (2001)</i>	<i>Difference (W-BA)</i>
Manufacturing	10.8	17.2	-6.4
Construction	6.3	6.2	0.1
Trade and repair	14.1	19.4	-5.3
Hotels, restaurants	4.3	2.3	2
Telecommunications	7.9	9.3	-1.4
Banking, insurance	5	4.2	0.8
Public services	31.5	19.2	12.3
Other business services	16.3	21.1	-4.8

Source: OWK

Labour market

Vienna labour market is characterized by the discrepancy between supply and demand for qualifications. The number of in-commuters to Vienna is very high which is also a result of improving transport infrastructure and public transport services when the catchment areas have expanded extensively. The foreign national make up around 18% of the resident population, the highest in Austria (Vienna City Administration, 61).

Access to Austrian labour market for Slovaks has been very restricted. Austria tends, in general, to pursue migration and integration policies based on a principle of exclusion. Immigration, access to citizenship and access to the labour market are controlled by a (partly highly restrictive) system of quotas (Vienna City Administration, 72).

Bratislava will continue to attract people from the rest of Slovakia both due to its relative affluence and existing job opportunities, and as a temporary transit place for moving further (South-) West (to Vienna/Austria, Germany, Italy). Now around 150 thousand persons commute daily to Bratislava City (of which about 70 thousand for work) and the number of commuters will probably increase. However there is also an outward trend potential observed as according to census data from 2001, out of 238,199 economically active persons in Bratislava, over 55% are commuting to work while 41.4% of Bratislava households own a car. As of Jan 2003 only 4,700 Slovaks worked in Austria (2.3% of total foreign workforce) officially. It is estimated that more Slovaks work in AT unofficially. Many Slovak students are enrolled in Austria's universities (around 1,000 in 2000/01) which again creates potential for their future employment in VMR.

The free cross-border movement of labour cannot be realistically expected in the forecasting period due to restrictions on the Austrian side. Some easing of cross-border labour market restrictions can be expected in the year 2007 at the earliest. Border controls, though gradually removed for goods trade, will thus continue to hamper an efficient cross-border co-operation.

Unlike the rest of the regions in the Slovak Republic and also in the adjacent regions of Austria, the labour market within the studied region has its specifics mainly at a high share of the qualified population, whereas out of the total number of inhabitants older than 15 years, only 8,3% have a primary education. The share of the population with a university education is 17,3% in the nation and is almost 24,6% in Bratislava County. More than 38% of the entire academically educated population is concentrated in the region. Around 9% of the permanent residents of Bratislava are of other than Slovak nationality. In 2001, 61,4% of inhabitants were in productive age and 50.4% were economically active.

The labour market of the BVMR is very fragmented and not integrated and no major improvements are expected in near future particularly due to restrictive policies on Austrian side and need of highly-qualified workforce.

Conclusion

Since 1989, separated for more than 40 years, both parts of the area have started a process of fastpaced regional integration. The removal of obstacles boosted trade and foreign direct investment, increased international ties, profoundly restructured both regional

economies and placed the cross-border region on a slow path of convergence. Statistical data show that the ties between the two regions, for instance in terms of goods and services exchange, investment and economic development are strengthening. Convergence is taking place almost in all areas.

It seems that development is far from taking its potentials and institutional development is not matching the requirements of the economy and people. Institutional obstacles – particularly on the labour market – remain, and they artificially slow down the convergence. Policy makers should address cross-boarder integration more actively through a well-designed and implemented metropolitan governance. Space both for the national and regional/local institutional cooperation is now favourable – both countries are EU members and part of a single market, political governance is decentralised (also fiscally) and municipalities enjoy considerable independence.

The whole EU accession process of Slovakia has impacted regional development both financially (cross-boarder support funds) and by concrete initiatives to establish partnerships, communication, networking, exchanges of experiences - however these are the assets that are more difficult to measure and record.

Overall, the paper gives a rather clear picture that the VBMR is prominent in majority of socio-economic and political characteristics and may within Europe well qualify for “the area of excellence” with vast future prospects. As already said, to which extent and by which speed this can materialise further depends also on institutional setting provided.

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The Role of Information Technology in Social Development

In the last 10 years a dedicated expression try to labeling an entire domain from the technological area, an expression that intend to include under the some title various and distinct components, as microprocessors, mobile-phone, web-TV, friendly-using-interface, radio-connectivity, computer networks and so on. Obviously, it's about *The New Information Technology*. Even, some components are more technologically than others, and of course, even some elements are newer than other.

Behind all these aspects there are the complex "technique of integration at very large scale" and its direct products *the microprocessors*. "The New Information Technology" is strictly related with the microprocessors and with their consequences. Not with the entire applicability of the microprocessor, but with a very important one: the computers. The technological dimension of this area was progressive extended with some contents that are not strictly technically elements (as dedicated software, computer mediated communication and so on). Thus, the social, economical and cultural implications of NIT have become a main and distinct dimension of the phenomenon. For this, some approaches try to promote an alternative expression, *The New Information and Communication Technology*. The technologically contents were overtaken by them social functionality. Nowadays, NIT or NICT are mainly related with the computer-mediated-environment. From this point forward, I'll use the simplified form, IT (information technology), and I'll include booth, the social and the technological dimensions.

The IT has gained a main role in the structure and functionality of the present social reality. The *digitalization of the every-day life* is, more than an abstract expression, a contemporary fact. It is based booth, into a continuous increased number of involved persons and into engagement of complex social processes. The global network of computer's networks named with a generic term *Internet* represents one of the most relevant manifestations of this domain. More than a product or a fashion, the Internet is accepted nowadays as main component of our social reality. But of course, *not for the entire social reality*.

The access to the "Net", as a core activity of IT social utilization, is a complex problem. For a part of population is just a banal procedure. For another part is just a dream. For others is a "nightmare". And for the rest of 4 or 5 billions (more or less) is nothing. This can be a very strange statistics... Who doesn't know about IT, about junk e-mail, about java script, or html format? Lesser than those who know about TV, about McDonalds or about Blue Jeans.

For "us", to start talking on messenger, to reply to some e-mail, to customize a search engine, to download some mp3 files and to burn some CD with "stuff from Net" has a very common sense. We made them frequently, without significant difficulties. But we are just a part of the ensemble. Maybe, a lucky one (or maybe not). Actually, we can use the IT and we do it. There is also another part that wants to use it but they can't. Nevertheless, the IT is an

expensive technology. And it cannot be accessed without an adequate infrastructure. Maybe they are an unlucky part of the ensemble (or maybe not). Anyway, another part access the IT under a direct pressure, generated by the social context: the organization's criteria, the employment, the educational access and so on. If their interest for this is just a contextual answer, than is sure that is not a comfortable situation. Usually, this approaching generates *techno-phobia* as a mental scheme with all its consequences.

These 3 distinct perspectives define the "IT user's world", a continuing growing world, but smaller than the *entire world* with around 4 to 5 billions (more or less). There are a lot of discussions, analyses, and theoretically approaching of the advantages of the Knowledge Based Society, the Information Capitalism and the Cross-Cultural Life Styles... available for all Net users or potential users. Some persons are not so close for this potentiality. And the Knowledge Based Society isn't a private goal, only for the ones (at least on the declarative level).

At the end of the last millennium there was developed another concept related with this problem: *the digital exclusion*. The social evolution, the economical development and the cultural profile are the main dimensions that can facilitate or reduce the public access to IT. In some cases these main conditions can be changed (or adjusted) in other case don't. All the policies concerning the enlargement of IT infrastructure admit that the specific growing models are not the same around the Globe. The contribution of the IT to the social development can be a very important one, if there will be considered some particularly aspects. First, the economical dimension cannot be defined as the first condition in IT using. It's a very important one, but is not so complex (all the time) as the societal dimension. The mentality, the believes, the social values, the education, the information, the cultural model and so on define a more complex dimension of the phenomenon. More than the technically access or the involved costs, the social representation of these components have a core determination for them acceptance or denying.

The IT has a complex role on the social development, as a support, as a frame, as a model, and so on. Thus there has been elaborated a large series of institutional programs focused on the development of the technical structures, the enlargement of social utilization, the optimization of social added values and so on. The main objectives of these projects (generally called "national strategies for informatization of society") are related to the youth education in digital age, a cheaper, faster and more secured Internet access, e-commerce, health on-line, e-participation for people with disabilities, e-democracy and so one.

These are just some complementary conditions to develop an adequate technological infrastructure but this is not enough for a consistent development of a "knowledge based society". Over the technical aspects there are involved persons, with a very detailed personal profile, defined by specific social and cultural conditions. With other words, there are involved cultural models, national specifications, personal values, social behaviors, models for interactions and relations, and so on.

All these manifestation are specific components of our society, with complex implication in social development. The new social resources assured by the Information Technology cannot be denied, and we'll have to analyze them and to use in an adequate way with the specificity of the involved social areas. In this context, the digitalization as a trend and a fact generate a new Knowledge Based Society as a specific model of social organization. We can now delimited new social resources – related with the ICT support of various activities –, and for these it's necessary to develop some dedicated model of using.

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MARIANA DAN, ADRIAN DAN

Housing the Poor: Homeless population in Romania.

A preliminary assessment

Housing access versus housing exclusion

Adequate housing access and provision is a fundamental pre-condition in order that every individual to achieve other fundamental rights. Housing exclusion most probably represent the most serious form of social exclusion. Not to have adequate housing and/or access thereto is tantamount to **extreme poverty**, which means persistent lack of means and opportunities, and is a form of **severe social exclusion**. Access to housing is (the) key to social inclusion²⁵⁵.

The current study is trying to assess with a high accuracy the number of homeless people in urban Romania. There is an implicit supposition that the homeless phenomenon could be neglected in rural area, being more an accident than a massive reality. By homeless we understood here the “roofless” (see table 1 below, the cell no.1), other homeless categories being reflected in our study in a less manner. The survey was carried out by a research team of RIQL²⁵⁶ in March 2004. The methodology of research is described in the methodology paragraph, and the instrument (questionnaire) is presented in the annex.

Short introduction on the housing exclusion and homelessness phenomenon

Adequate housing refers to the basic fact that is a must that every individual has to have a home/ domicile, as well as housing quality and comfort provided by that particular dwelling (m²/ person, average number of persons/ room and dwelling, phonic isolation, heating and thermo-isolation, access to public utilities etc.) and neighbourhood quality (shopping places, parks and green space, street infrastructure and communication facilities etc.). The dwellings which do not meet some basic conditions mentioned above inadequate housing conditions, in extreme cases we can talk about in-human conditions affecting all the spheres of individual's life. The literature in this field describes this situation as being liked by the homelessness phenomenon.

In the last ten years among EU countries there are evidences of significant progress in supporting access to adequate housing and alleviation of situation of homeless/ roofless people. By developing new programs and new approaches to this social problem also the

255 Romanian Government, 2002, *The National Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Plan*.

256 The study was carried out within the project „*Housing diagnosis: lack of housing and precarious housing conditions*”, commissioned by C.A.S.P.I.S. (Romanian Anti-Poverty Commission and Social Inclusion Promotion), and funded by AMTRANS/ MEC program (2003-2004). The research team was composed by: Adrian Dan (coordinator), Bogdan Voicu, Mariana Dan, Malina Voicu, Monica Constantinescu, Dana Nitulescu, Cristina Bajenaru and Marius Strambeanu.

theoreticians were stimulated to tackle and handle this subject in a more systematic a detailed manner. That leads into developing new dimensions within the analysis of homelessness phenomenon. If five years ago the theoretical developments around “homeless” described this issue more or less in dualistic way - in terms of “roofless” and “housing exclusion” (inadequate housing conditions), in recent years were defined new analytical dimensions²⁵⁷, more adequate for supporting a more focalized (new) policies and programs that tackle this social problem. Also, it seems that become more and more important to tackle the causes of homelessness in an integrate manner, both from “individual” and “structural” perspective.

The definitions that underline “individual” causes are blaming the victim – they are without home because of personal failure and non-adaptation to particular social conditions. The definitions that underline “structural” causes are looking behind individual causes, underlining the marginalizing economic, political and social context in particular situations, including here economic and social obstacles (created by the social system) which are obstructing the access of some individuals to the community life (Neale, 1997, apud Edgar, 2004).


Edgar et.al. (2004) asserts that is more productive to talk about a “continuum of homeless”:

„Having a home can be understood as:

- having an adequate dwelling (or space) over which a person and his/her family can exercise exclusive possession (physical domain);
- being able to maintain privacy and enjoy relations (social domain) and
- having legal title to occupation (legal domain).”

By intersecting these three domains results seven categories of persons in difficulty by housing dimension – from “roofless” to people living in inadequate condition according with the standards developed in a particular community/ society (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

Figure 1: The Domains of Homelessness and Housing Exclusion



Source: Edgar et.al., 2004, Figure 1, p.7.

One of the main objectives of the research carried out by this particular study was to estimate the homeless people (roofless) in Romania. In the next sections we will focused mainly on the people included in the cell 1 represented in Table 1, and accidentally the people

²⁵⁷ Bill Edgar, Henk Meert and Joe Doherty, *Third Review of Statistics on Homelessness in Europe. Developing an Operational Definition of Homelessness*, FEANTSA 2004.

included in the cell 2. All other categories are detailed in a broader study carried out by the team mentioned in the footnote 2.

Table 1: Seven theoretical domains of homelessness

		Conceptual Category	Physical Domain	Legal Domain	Social Domain
<i>Homelessness</i>	1	Rooflessness	No dwelling (roof)	No legal title to a space for exclusive possession	No private and safe personal space for social relations
	2	<i>Houselessness</i>	Has a place to live, fit for habitation	No legal title to a space for exclusive possession	No private and safe personal space for social relations
<i>Housing exclusion</i>	3	Insecure and Inadequate housing	Has a place to live (not secure and unfit for habitation)	No security of tenure	Has space for social relations
	4	Inadequate housing and social isolation within a legally occupied dwelling	Inadequate dwelling (unfit for habitation)	Has legal title and/or security of tenure	No private and safe personal space for social relations
	5	Inadequate housing (secure tenure)	Inadequate dwelling (dwelling unfit for habitation)	Has legal title and/or security of tenure	Has space for social relations
	6	Insecure housing (adequate housing)	Has a place to live	No security of tenure	Has space for social relations
	7	Social isolation within a secure and adequate context	Has a place to live	Has legal title and/or security of tenure	No private and safe personal space for social relations

Source: Edgar et.al., 2004, Table 1, p.8.

Romania in the CEE context

There are not so many data and studies regarding the homelessness phenomena in CEE countries. According with some figures provided in 2003 by FEANTSA (*European Federation of National Agencies Working with Homeless People/ Fédération Européen des Agences Nationales Travaillant avec Sans Abri*) it seems that Romania has the smallest homeless population among CEE countries:

- Poland (2002) has an estimated of 80.000 homeless;
- Czech Republic – around 100.000 homeless;
- Estonia reported around 1.000 homeless (mainly street children);
- Bulgaria reported that there are no homeless people in the country, but around 300.000 are threatened because are living in completely inadequate housing conditions.
- In Romania (as we will see further on) the number of homeless people (roofless) is not so big in comparison with Poland and Czech Republic and other Western Societies), but if we add the dimension of “inadequate housing”, then the situation become disquiet.

The survey on homeless people

In order to shape a global picture about the homeless people in Romania and other issues related to the homelessness phenomenon it was set up a methodology as comprehensive as possible in the circumstances in which we had not relevant information in this field. The main supposition was that the homeless people are located in urban area, then we decided to focus our research on the all urban City/ Town Public Councils, supposing that the local authorities know with a good accuracy the numbers of people living in the street and people evicted, and also some other important information regarding housing quality. The instrument used was an auto-filled questionnaire delivered by regular mail to all 281 City/ Town Public Councils, with the support of CASPIS and county agencies of CASPIS. The questionnaire had to be a very short and comprehensive one (it has only 20 questions), trying to collect factual data about some specific topics:

- roofless people;
- total number of people evicted in the city/ town in the last three years as a consequence of un-payment of spending associated with private public utilities consumption or restitution of nationalized dwellings to the former owners, and what had happened with this individuals/ families;
- the current number of social housing administered by City Hall;
- the total number of requests regarding social housing from 1990 up to present and how many were solved;
- number of households receiving heating allowance in 2003;
- number of households living in blocks of flats with more than three months debts in payment of public utilities consumption
- if the centralized public heating system in the city is still working
- number of households disconnected from the public heating system from economic reasons (low incomes/ purchasing power);
- number of dwellings with risk of flooding etc.
- the number and capacity of shelters for homeless people in their city/ town

A secondary objective of this survey was to identify all shelters for homeless people (according with our possibilities and depending by mutual support of public authorities in filling in our questionnaire with a maximum accuracy) and providers for services for this group, in order to develop in the near future a new research/ study exclusively focalized upon this group and trying to answer to a basic question “why and how they are becoming homeless”.

The main results of the study regarding the homeless (roofless) people

The questionnaires were delivered by CJASPIS to all local councils from urban area: in a first stage to 268 towns and cities²⁵⁸, according with 2002 Census; in a second stage were added other 13 new localities which became towns after 2002 Census; per total we distributed one questionnaire to each local council from the 281 officially registered. From the total of 281 unities we received back 226 questionnaires (81,4%), the others 52 having not the necessary will to cooperate with the research staff, even if we made significant efforts. Unfortunately 4 of the 41 Counties/ Judets (*Satu Mare, Harghita, Dolj* and *Hunedoara*) are not at all represented in our research, because they did not cooperate. Also Bucharest is not included in the research because of total lack of cooperation. In the next table is presented this particular situation:

Table 2. The 48 Urban Localities that did not give us any feedback

Judet/ County	City/ Town	Population	Judet/ County	City/ Town	Population
BIHOR	Nucet	2394	HUNEDOARA	Aninoasa	5119
	Oradea	206527		Calan	13099
BISTRITA NASAUD	Nasaud	10639		Deva	69390
BUCURESTI	Bucuresti (6 districts)	1921751		Geoagiu	6005
BUZAU	Buzau	133116		Hateg	10935
	Nehoiu	11643		Hunedoara	71380
	Pogoanele	7788		Orastie	30852
	Ramnicu Sarat	38805		Petrila	21254
CALARASI	Budesti	9709		Simeria	25908
	Fundulea	6692		Uricani	45447
DAMBOVITA	Moreni	20931		Vulcan	13905
DOLJ	Bailesti	20081	IASI	Harlau	11271
	Calafat	18890		Pascani	42172
	Craiova	302622	ILFOV	Targu Frumos	13619
	Filiasi	18848		Buftea	20328
GORJ	Novaci	6113	MEHEDINTI	Vanju mare	6937
HARGHITA	Baile Tusnad	1728	SATU MARE	Carei	23268
	Balan	7902		Negresti Oas	13956
	Borsec	2864		Satu mare	115630
	Cristuru Secuiesc	9672		Tasnad	9649
	Gheorgheni	20018	TULCEA	Babadag	10136
	Miercurea ciuc	41852		Isaccea	5427
	Odorheiu Secuiesc	36926		Sulina	4624
	Toplita	15880	VALCEA	Babeni	9518
	Vlahita	7043			
TOTAL POPULATION of the 48 cities			3.488.870		
TOTAL without Bucharest			1.567.119		

²⁵⁸ The total population of the 268 cities and towns was in March 2002 of 11.457.139 inhabitants (this result was computed adding the total number of inhabitants from all cities, figures obtained from an official file of detailed data provided by the National Institute for Statistic - INS). On the other hand, in another document provided by INS „2002 Census – the analysis of preliminary data”, the total number of inhabitants of the 268 cities was 11.436.736. In our further analysis we used the first figure, considering the difference between the two figures as being neglected for our purposes.

Counting all the homeless people reported / estimated by the local authorities (226 localities) resulted that at the moment of March 2004 was 4.725 (see annex A). In order to complete the information and to assess as accurate as possible the number of homeless people we decided to include in our analysis also the localities that did not send back any information and decided to use three alternative / complementary scenarios in order to estimate the number of homeless.

- A) A classical cluster analysis
- B) To set up some particular clusters of localities only by number of inhabitants;
- C) To set up a ratio roofless/ inhabitant according with the clusters set up at the point B.

A) **The cluster analysis** used a set of indicators in order to predict the number of homeless people in the missing localities that have similar characteristics. We used as predictors the following indicators:

- the share of social/ public dwellings in the total stock of dwellings in that particular locality;
- average floor/ dwelling;
- ration between total number of dwelling units and inhabitants;
- the share of salaried people in the total of population (as development level indicator);
- urbanization level (as development level indicator);

Doing the statistical analyses²⁵⁹ we decided to use some scenarios with 9 up to 14 clusters:

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (cluster analysis)

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Average	Standard Deviation
Homeless (225 localities)	225	0	834	4725	21,00	90,837
cluster 9	282	0	834	5777	20,49	82,575
cluster 10	282	0	834	5779	20,49	82,574
cluster 11	282	0	758	5230	18,54	75,042
cluster 12	282	0	695	4775	16,93	68,789
cluster 13	282	0	834	5724	20,30	82,565
cluster 14	282	0	834	5724	20,30	82,565
Valid N (listwise)	225					

Note: Bucharest was not included in the analysis

It seems that the data are consistent for the scenarios with 9 and 10 clusters, and 13 and 14 clusters, the figures being highly appropriate. Based on this figures, we can say that the number of homeless – excepting Bucharest – is around 5.700 – 5.800 people.

But, the analysis is based on the supposition that all the data provided by local authorities are highly accurate. What it happen if we cannot rely very much in these data? Then the estimation is wrong, more precisely we assume that could be rather underestimated than overestimated.

²⁵⁹ In doing the cluster analysis we get an important support from our colleague Bogdan Voicu, and we would kindly thank him for the entire support and feedback.

B) To set up some clusters of localities by number of inhabitants²⁶⁰. According with these clusters we calculated the average number of (potential) roofless people (column A in Table 4); this number was multiplied with the total number of localities (which did not give us feedback) from each cluster, and the results are presented in the column B, Table 4. Bucharest is a special case, and for this reason we used the estimation made by “*Medicines Sans Frontières*” of around 5.000 roofless. Following this method and making some calculations resulted that the approximate number of roofless people in the cities presented in the table 2 is around 6.100. Of course this is a very roughly estimation (possible a not very reliable one). *Our aim was to take into account other factors for a more accurate estimation, like level of economic and social development in that locality, global housing situation, social capital and strengthening of kinship relations etc. Because this was not possible, we are trying just to validate this methodology and have an approximate picture regarding roofless people in Romania.*

Table 4. Estimate number of roofless in localities that did not give any feedback

(Cluster of) Localities with ... (Number)	Average number of roofless in this cluster	Estimated no. of roofless in specific clusters	Roofless/ inhabitant in the clusters of localities included in the research	Estimated no. of roofless considering column C and clusters of localities
	A	B	C	D
Less than 5.000 inhabitants (4)	3	(4 x 3) 12	0,00169229004	19,65
Between 5.001 and 10.000 inhabitants (14)	2,85	(14 x 2,85) 39,9	0,00037644712	39,97
Between 10.001 and 20.000 inhabitants (12)	15,81	(12 x 15,81) 189,72	0,00117200063	190,83
Between 20.001 and 30.000 inhabitants (7)	16	(7 x 16) 112	0,00064580688	98,03
Between 30.001 and 50.000 inhabitants (6)	8,19	(6 x 8,19) 49,14	0,00022377710	52,82
Between 50.001 - 75.000 inhabitants (2)	5,23	(2 x 5,23) 10,46	0,00008440138	11,88
Between 100.001 - 130.000 inhabitants	16,83	(1 x 16,83) 16,83	0,00015734759	18,19
Between 130.001 - 150.000 inhabitants	385,67	385,67	0,00261411032	347,98
Between 200.001 - 250.000 inhabitants	122	122	0,00054296911	112,14
Between 250.001 - 350.000 inhabitants	170	170	0,00055204018	167,06
More than 350.000 inhabitants	BUCHAREST	5000		5000
TOTAL		6108		6059

²⁶⁰ 1st cluster – Up to 5.000 inhabitants; 2nd cluster - Between 5.001 and 10.000 inhabitants; 3rd - Between 10.001 and 20.000 inhabitants; 4th - Between 20.001 and 30.000 inhabitants; 5th - Between 30.001 and 50.000 inhabitants; 6th - Between 50.001 and 75.000 inhabitants; 7th - Between 75.001 and 100.000 inhabitants; 8th - Between 100.001 and 130.000 inhabitants; 9th - Between 130.001 and 160.000 inhabitants; 10th - Between 160.001 and 200.000 inhabitants; 11th - Between 200.001 and 250.000 inhabitants; 12th - Between 250.001 and 350.000 inhabitants; 13th - Over 350.000 inhabitants.

C) To set up a ratio roofless/ inhabitant according with the clusters set up at the point A. The total number of roofless from the clusters of localities fixed up was divided with the total number of inhabitants of these localities and the result was “coefficient”. This value (see column C, Table 4), was then multiplied with the number of inhabitants from the localities that are missing (see these localities in table 1; exception is again Bucharest, for this city using the “*Medicines Sans Frontières*” estimation). Following this method resulted that the approximate number of roofless people is 6059 (see column D, Table 4), a figure very closed to the ones calculated at the point A.

According with this computation, we could estimate that in Romania, in the urban area (but we could extend this inference to whole Romania), in March 2004 were around 10.800 roofless²⁶¹. We also have to strongly take into account that the figure estimated is highly dependent by some local/ particular factors, like the will/ capacity of local authorities to accurate estimate the roofless people in their administrative area and the “definition” of roofless people²⁶² (what we and they understood by “roofless”).

Looking at the data and especially at the missing information we thought that the number of roofless is misestimate in some cities with more than 50.000 inhabitants – cities that reported that they do not have at all roofless people (see table 5).

Table 5. Cities with more than 60.000 inhabitants which reported that there are no roofless in their city

Category of city (cluster)	No. of inhabitants in the city (March 2002)	City	Estimated number of roofless according with “roofless/ inhabitant” and city cluster
A	B	C	D
<i>Between 50.001 and 75.000 inhabitants</i>	61512	1. Sf.Gheorghe	40
	63305	2. Zalău	
	66369	3. Alba Iulia	
	69183	4. Barlad	
	69587	5. Giurgiu	
	70046	6. Călărași	
	70267	7. Vaslui	
<i>Between 75.001 and 100.000 inhabitants</i>	83985	8. Resita	25
	89429	9. Târgoviste	
	96562	10. Tg Jiu	
<i>Between 100.001 and 130.000 inhabitants</i>	104035	11. Drobeta Turnu Severin	51
	106138	12. Suceava	
	115344	13. Botosani	
<i>Between 160.001 and 200.000 inhabitants</i>	168756	14. Pitesti	134
<i>Between 250.001 and 350.000 inhabitants</i>	283901	15. Brasov	157
	317651	16. Timisoara	
TOTAL	1.836.070		582

²⁶¹ According with the calculation, between 10.781 and 10.830 roofless.

²⁶² In the questionnaire we provided a comprehensive definition of “roofless people” in order that this concept to have the same significance/ meaning for every Municipality.

In order to rectify this presumptive error we made the decision to apply to these cities the same principle developed in the scenario B. in this new situation the estimated number of roofless is presented in the column D of table 4: 582 roofless. Adding this new figure to the total number of roofless (10.800) the new figure is roughly 11.400.

A complementary method of computing of figures previously presented – and eventually this new inference could confirm our logic – could be represented by calculating a ratio between the total number of roofless estimated by the Local Authorities from the 226 cities and the total number of inhabitants of these cities (minus the 12 “new comers cities”; here also Bucharest is excluded). Consequently, we have:

$$\frac{4725_Roofless}{7.551.816_inhab'} = 0,00062528$$

Let's consider this new figure as „roofless coefficient”. If we multiply this one with the total number of urban inhabitants, the new figure is:

$$9.535.388 \text{ inhab's} \times 0,00062528 = \mathbf{5.962 \text{ roofless}}$$

Adding to this figure the estimated number of roofless for Bucharest – 5.000 roofless – then the (new) final figure for urban roofless is around 11.000 (more precisely (10.962), closed enough to previous figure calculated in another way (we are aware that this could be just a coincidence). This could be considered as the first method of control/ validation of the figures estimated.

Reviewing all the computations made, we could see that:

1. According with the calculation in scenario B (see table 3), the number of roofless in (urban) Romania is between 10.780 and 10.830.
2. If we consider that the cities with over 50.000 inhabitants are wrong when they reported “0” roofless, then we can add another 582 people, which lead to a new figure of around 11.400.
3. According with the indicator “estimated number of roofless/ inhabitants”, the figure is around 11.000 roofless people.

These three (complementary) methods of computation give us the possibility to draw up a first conclusion:

The number of roofless in (urban) Romania is at least 10.800 and could be a little bit higher than 11.400 (with an intuitive maximum of 25%).

In the next lines we will compare/ complete our inferences and analyses with parallel data collected in another study undertaken by CASPIS during October 2003 – February 2004. CASPIS tried to make a global estimation of homeless people (they used a similar definition like ours for „roofless”) and evicted people in all the 41 counties plus Bucharest (it was also an implicit inference that the homeless are located in urban area). The estimation was done „from the office” by the local representatives of CASPIS (CJASPIS), more or less according with empiric data, and in many cases (our inference) using the „institutional folklore”. As a general comment, we think that our methodology is more appropriate, at least taking into consideration the “principle of decentralization”–local authorities know better their realities than the more centralized (county) authorities as CJASPIS is. The estimation made by CASPIS is presented in the table 6:

Table 6. County level CJASPIS estimation of homeless/ roofless and evicted people

County	City	No. of families evicted in 2003 (CJASPIS estimation)	No. of roofless (CJASPIS estimation, X.'03 – II.'04))		No. of roofless (our estimation - AMTRANS) III.'04	No. of roofless following the rule of the biggest figure estimated in the column B or C
		A	B		C	D
Alba		n.a.	n.a.		11	11
Arad		22	100		313	313
Argeş		n.a.	n.a.		58	58
Bacău	Bacau	31	17	36	174	31 10 2 20
	Moinesti	10	15			
	Comanesti	2	4			
	Buhusi	20	0			
Bihor		3	250		161	250
Bistriţa - Năsăud		40	30		42	42
Botoşani		2	150		34	150
Braşov		n.a.	n.a.		6	6
Brăila		n.a.	n.a.		158	158
Buzău		20	0		374	374
Caraş - Severin	Resita	n.a.	658		63	763
	Restul	n.a.	105			
Călăraşi		n.a.	2000		3	3
Cluj		n.a.	n.a.		753	753
Constanţa		n.a.	n.a.		281	281
Covasna		n.a.	n.a.		24	24
Dâmboviţa		0	0		16	16
Dolj		63	0		227	227
Galaţi		n.a.	150*		100	350
		n.a.	200**			
Giurgiu		3	n.a.		0	0
Gorj		n.a.	n.a.		807	807
Harghita		175	52		67	67
Hunedoara		50	0		167	167
Ialomiţa		0	0		9	9
Iaşi		n.a.	n.a.		238	238
Ilfov		0	0		13	13
Maramureş		n.a.	n.a.		864	864
Mehedinţi		0	0		0	0
Mureş		23	10		169	169
Neamţ		n.a.	n.a.		65	65
Olt		8	n.a.		13	13
Prahova		11	n.a.		117	117
Satu Mare		36	n.a.		53	53
Sălaj		n.a.	n.a.		13	13
Sibiu		97	38		225	225
Suceava		0	852		0	852
Teleorman		2	46		41	46
Timiş		15	50		50	50
Tulcea		n.a.	n.a.		43	43
Vaslui		n.a.	n.a.		168	168
Vâlcea		n.a.	n.a.		71	71
Vrancea		n.a.	15		32	32
Bucureşti		n.a.	5000		5000	5000
TOTAL		633	9742		11023	13035

* Street children

** Elderly

Within the research undertaken by CASPIS only 22 counties from the 41 made an estimation of roofless and evicted people, the others 19 considering that it is too difficult to estimate this because of a wide variety of reasons. The total number of roofless estimated by CASPIS (see column B, table 6) is roughly 9.750, but here are some important doubts: *Calarasi* county/ city with a CASPIS estimation of 2.000 roofless, and *Suceava* county/ city with an estimation of 852 roofless – both of them having in our AMTRANS research a “0” estimation. On the other hand is the case of Buzau county/ city which estimates “0” roofless for CASPIS and 374 for AMTRANS, and also other cases in which the CASPIS estimation is significantly smaller than AMTRANS one (relevant cases – see table 6 – Arad, Dolj, Hunedoara, Mures and Sibiu county). Applying the rule of counting the biggest number estimated in the two studies (AMTRANS and CASPIS), and computing all the figures by counties, then rise up **a new figure around 13.000 roofless** (see column D, table 6).

We can observe that the CASPIS estimation is disadvantaged because of lack of data in almost half of the counties. Also another potential disadvantage comes from the global estimation done by CASPIS at county level. This leads in our opinion in considering that AMTRANS estimation, made at locality level (a smaller administrative unity) is more accurate. Anyway the data could be viewed as being complementary and consequently we could estimate the number of roofless people following the rule/ method above mentioned. If we are taking into consideration the number of families evicted (as AMTRANS study reveal) we will have a new element which help us to correct the previous figures.

Talking about evicted people, we can say that our estimation (AMTRANS) is more accurate than CASPIS estimation (see table 7):

Table 7. Number of evicted families during 2001 – March 2003 in the 226 cities of AMTRANS research

Eviction because of ...		2001	2002	2003	March 2004	Total
... incapacity of family to pay the housing expenses	Number of Localities	n.a.	42	52	16	
	Number of Families evicted	n.a.	357	470	54	881
... restitution of dwelling to the former owner (nationalized house)	Number of Localities	37	40	57	28	
	Number of Families evicted	340	546	602	273	1761
Other reasons*	Number of Localities	15	18	22	12	
	Number of Families evicted	248	202	207	184	841
Total evicted families		588	1105	1279	511	3483

* Other reasons include: houseless people (without a legal contract with the owner); people evicted from the, blocks of flats for single people'; demolition of the former dwelling; they lost the house because of a mortgage; natural disasters; flats illegal occupied.

Forced eviction, even if it is a very difficult moment for any family confronted with such a situation, do not necessary means that the family will experience homelessness for sure (roofless, more precisely). From the total of 3.483 families evicted during 2001 – March 2004, only 342 became roofless, all of this living in 20 localities (see table 8).

Table 8. Families evicted that became roofless

City	Families evicted that became roofless	Estimation of roofless individuals (AMTRANS)	Average number of roofless individuals after eviction ($A \times 3$) ²⁶³	The <i>new estimation</i> of roofless individuals (taking into account the evicted)
	A	B	C	D
Arad	100	300	300	300
Iasi	46	200	138	200
Predeal	45	0	135	135
Zărnesti	34	0	102	102
Băile Herculane	30	20	90	90
Bacău	28	110	84	110
Ocnele Mari	14	17	42	42
Busteni	10	0	30	30
Lugoj	10	50	30	50
Mioveni	8	35	24	35
Rovinari	3	800	9	800
Drăgășani	3	1	9	9
Rm Vâlcea	3	45	9	45
Cisnădie	2	0	6	6
Pâncota	1	7	3	7
Odobesti	1	8	3	8
Săveni	1	6	3	6
Făgăras	1	0	3	3
Tândărei	1	1	3	3
Oltenita	1	0	3	3
TOTAL	342	1600	1026	1984

If $B > C$, then $R_{\text{OOFLESS}} = B$

If $C > B$, then $R_{\text{OOFLESS}} = C$

Analysing the data presented in the table 7 we can see that some of the figures advanced by some local authorities are wrong, because in several cases the number of people evicted that became roofless is higher than the number of total roofless initially estimated. This could be or not an error, because not necessarily the families that became roofless continued to stay in the same locality – they could migrate to other localities (but on the other hand when the local authorities sustain that these families after eviction are living in the street, that could mean that are highly visible in that locality).

Taking into account that a family in Romania has in average 3 members²⁶⁴ we could identify another 958 roofless ($\text{Total}_D - \text{Total}_C$, table 7)²⁶⁵. If we are adding this new number of roofless individuals (in this situation because their family was evicted) at our initial estimation of 11.000 – 11.400 individuals, then the new final figure is around 12.000 – 12.400 roofless.

²⁶³ See footnote 9.

²⁶⁴ According with 2002 Census data, the average family dimension in Romania is 2,89 individuals, for urban area being 2,79. Taking into account that generally the families in (housing) risk of eviction are confronting poverty and the number of family members is usually bigger than average, we could approximate that the average number of these families is at least equal with 3.

²⁶⁵ Another possible control method is to multiply the 342 evicted families with 3 (average number of individuals/ family) and the figure is 1026, very closed to the previous figure (958). Coincidence?

Concluding after analysing all these complicated methods and inferences, we could estimate with a satisfying accuracy that the number of roofless people in Romania is between 11.000 and 13.000.

Appendix: Number of roofless/ homeless people estimated by Local Councils Authorities

City cluster	Nr. Of inhabitants at 2002 Census	City/ Town	No. of roofless/ homeless people	Total roofless in cities cluster	Average per city
"New born" towns with less than 5000 inhabitants	99	Săliste	0	8	3,0
	99	Sarivăsag	0		
	99	Darabani	0		
	99	Sângeorgiu de Pădure	0		
	99	Corbeanca	0		
	99	Berceni	0		
	99	Miercurea Mirajului	0		
	99	Glimboca	0		
	99	Sântana	0		
	99	Pâncota	7		
	99	Roznov	0		
	99	Sighetul Marmatiei	0		
	99	Săcuieni	1		
Towns with less than 5000 inhabitants	2839	Vascău	7	59	3,0
	2891	Băile Govora	0		
	3578	Ocnele Mari	17		
	3607	Beresti	0		
	4090	Făurei	0		
	4116	Ocna Sibiului	35		
	4462	Solca	0		
	4608	Băile Olănești	0		
	4673	Baia de Arieș	0		
Cities with 5.001 to 10.000 inhabitants	5017	Slănic Moldova	0	154	2,85
	5100	Ghimbav	0		
	5213	Azuga	5		
	5216	Cavnic	0		
	5273	Ticleni	0		
	5374	Copsa Mică	0		
	5566	Negru Vodă	0		
	5617	Baia de Aramă	0		
	5625	Predeal	0		
	5760	Rupea	0		
	5785	Bălcești	0		
	6026	Băile Herculane	20		
	6213	Abrud	0		
	6310	Sebis	0		
	6390	Piatra Olt	0		
	6418	Deta	0		
	6567	Lehliu gară	0		
	6813	Horezu	8		
	6828	Brezoi	0		
	7108	Techirghiol	0		
	7110	Slănic	3		
	7201	Făget	0		
	7279	Teiusi	0		
	7340	Însurăței	0		
	7483	Mihăilești	0		
	7617	Tg Bujor	0		
	7661	Fieni	2		
	7714	Buzias	0		
	8039	Cehu Silvaniei	2		
	8096	Câmpeni	0		
	8139	Odobesti	8		
	8154	Nădlac	0		
	8177	Săveni	6		

City cluster	Nr. Of inhabitants at 2002 Census	City/ Town	No. of roofless/homeless people	Total roofless in cities cluster	Average per city
	8341	Chisinău Cris	3		
	8411	Dumbrăveni	0		
	8418	Bicaz	0		
	8598	Călimănești	0		
	8607	Zlatna	0		
	8648	Stei	4		
	8731	Tg. Cărbunesti	0		
	8828	Tâlmăciu	0		
	8905	Întorsura Buzăului	1		
	8991	Panciu	3		
	9046	Victoria	0		
	9172	Anina	0		
	9371	Siret	0		
	9440	Iernut	0		
	9480	Huedin	32		
	9482	Eforie	50		
	9518	Băbeni	0		
	9611	Plopieni	4		
	9614	Baraolt	0		
	9726	Curtici	0		
	9921	Negrești	3		
Cities with 10.001 to 20.000 inhabitants	10082	Hârsova	50	1075	15,81
	10129	Seini	0		
	10216	Ineu	0		
	10220	Otopeni	0		
	10224	Sângeorz Băi	0		
	10226	Titu	0		
	10317	Valea lui Mihai	12		
	10374	Busteni	0		
	10376	Alesd	10		
	10596	Bumbesti Jiu	0		
	10626	Topoloveni	4		
	10866	Agnita	2		
	10888	Basarabi	0		
	10892	Costesti	15		
	10930	Beclean	0		
	10985	Beius	0		
	11113	Jimbolia	0		
	11246	Lipova	10		
	11277	Jibou	11		
	11341	Ianca	4		
	11485	Boldesti Scăieni	0		
	11568	Sovata	0		
	11686	Bolintin Vale	0		
	11741	Strehaia	0		
	11767	Otelul Rosu	2		
	11854	Mărăsești	0		
	11867	Darabani	0		
	11876	Urlati	0		
	12015	Videle	4		
	12223	Drăgănești Olt	0		
	12497	Rovinari	800		
	12515	Tândărei	1		
	12525	Sinaia	10		
	12802	Scornicești	0		
	12881	Oravita	0		
	12938	Sân Nicolau Mare	0		
	12967	Orsova	0		
	13131	Ovidiu	0		
	13296	Vălenii de Munte	0		
	13360	Tg Lăpuș	0		
	13372	Comarnic	0		
	13598	Tg Ocna	0		
	13912	Moldova Nouă	0		
	14222	Dărmănești	20		
	14259	Avrig	0		

City cluster	Nr. Of inhabitants at 2002 Census	City/ Town	No. of roofless/ homeless people	Total roofless in cities cluster	Average per city
	15227	Pucioasa	0		
	15436	Râsnov	6		
	15526	Ocna Mures	0		
	15539	Zimnicea	0		
	15547	Găiesti	0		
	15615	Cisnădie	0		
	15755	Mizil	0		
	15837	Gura Humorului	0		
	16036	Simleul Silvaniei	0		
	16465	Vatra Dornei	0		
	16626	Baia Sprie	10		
	16887	Viseul de Sus	20		
	16927	Bocsa	0		
	16927	Bocsa	10		
	17089	Urziceni	0		
	17175	Marghita	15		
	17407	Ludus	10		
	17677	Adjud	15		
	18137	Salonta	0		
	18199	Breaza	4		
Cities with 20.001 to 30.000 inhabitants	18961	Cernavodă	0	384	16
	18980	Buhusi	30		
	19979	Băicoi	0		
	20153	Câmpulung Moldovenesc	0		
	20457	Corabia	0		
	20465	Târgu Secuiesc	10		
	20654	Tg Neamt	0		
	20758	Blaj	1		
	20783	Drăgășani	1		
	21194	Bals	0		
	22848	Motru	0		
	23796	Comănești	5		
	24030	Gherla	147		
	24204	Moinesti	5		
	24256	Codlea	0		
	25332	Zărnești	0		
	25929	Cugir	10		
	26537	Târnăveni	6		
	26865	Câmpia Turzii	3		
	27032	Borsa	0		
Cities with 30.001 to 50.000 inhabitants	27217	Oltenita	0	172	8,19
	27680	Sebes	0		
	27759	Rădăuți	0		
	28294	Caransebes	31		
	28881	Aiud	0		
	29582	Husi	165		
	29899	Fălticeni	0		
	30044	Săcele	0		
	30187	Turnu Măgurere	7		
	31073	Dorohoi	15		
	31873	Rosiori	20		
	32287	Sighisoara	3		
	32400	Năvodari	0		
	32626	Curtea de arges	4		
	33197	Fetesti	0		
	34603	Caracal	3		
	35759	Făgăras	0		
	35849	Mioveni	35		
	36023	Reghin	0		
	38285	Câmpulung	0		
	38478	Dej	5		
	38758	Câmpina	1		
	40037	Mangalia	10		
	41246	Budești	0		
	42012	Tecuci	0		
	43867	Medgidia	0		

City cluster	Nr. Of inhabitants at 2002 Census	City/ Town	No. of roofless/homeless people	Total roofless in cities cluster	Average per city
	44571	Lugoj	50		
	45447	Petrosani	19		
Cities with 50.001 to 70.000 inhabitants	50591	Alexandria	10	68	5,23
	51681	Onesti	4		
	52677	Slobozia	8		
	55203	Medias	15		
	55770	Turda	16		
	61512	Sf.Gheorghe	0		
	63305	Zalău	0		
	66369	Alba Iulia	0		
	69183	Barlad	0		
	69483	Roman	15		
	69587	Giurgiu	0		
	70046	Călărași	0		
Cities with 70.001 to 100.000 inhabitants	70267	Vaslui	0	40	8
	79171	Slatina	10		
	81467	Bistrita	30		
	83985	Resita	0		
	89429	Târgoviste	0		
Cities with 100.001 to 130.000 inhabitants	96562	Tg Jiu	0	101	16,83
	103219	Focsani	6		
	104035	Drobeta Turnu Severin	0		
	105499	Piatra Neamt	50		
	106138	Suceava	0		
	107656	Rm Vâlcea	45		
Cities with 130.001 to 160.000 inhabitants	115344	Botosani	0	1157	385,67
	137976	Baia Mare	834		
	149577	Tg Mures	150		
Cities with 160.001 to 200.000 inhabitants	155045	Sibiu	173	410	136,67
	168756	Pitesti	0		
	172824	Arad	300		
Cities with 200.001 to 250.000 inhabitants	175921	Bacău	110	244	122
	216929	Brăila	154		
Cities with 250.001 to 350.000 inhabitants	232452	Ploiesti	90	850	170
	283901	Brasov	0		
	298584	Galati	100		
	317651	Timisoara	0		
	318027	Cluj	550		
	321580	Iasi	200		
Total			4722	4722	

There are numerous reasons for focusing on family once bodily subjectivities are under scrutiny. Usually, I would do with a reference to the position of family in the framework initially sketched by Parsons. However, I do not need to; I can ask a married artist, go through her artworks and let her speak.

M.K.: So, you told me last time, you had two different periods of production, before the wedding and motherhood and after. The rupture was spoken about last time already and I found it amusing, well, amusing?, rather very interesting, that you had had such a remarkable breakage in private life which got reflected into, into your production to the extent that you were shifting away all you had produced before, yeah, as the topics you have been covering afterwards seem to you much more up to date and for you also more indicating, giving more evidence than the former ones. Is the breakage really that important there?

Gabika Binderová: Well of course it is, like, even when you approach it from the physiological point of view it is, like, you are making an interview, now, for instance, I am thirty, thus I am a relatively young woman and the breakage of the, of the maturation is, it would be almost the same if you asked someone else working in a completely different field, it is simply a hormonal change, everything physiological has changed, so it's pretty normal to switch away from the former.

M.K.: I expect you have changed the topics you are covering too; saw quite a number of bodily representations in your pieces. Is it connected with the change; did you do it before or only afterwards? I know I am avoiding the term “breakage”, as it's so radical, but...

G.B.: Yes, it's exactly, as a manifestation, as the very interest in interpretations of my own body and the very interest in it, as if I needed to get into it much more, I needn't be in... Yeah, this is really interesting, because before I did not want men to be gallant to me, I wanted to align, to drink with them as much as they can, that's what I wanted before, simply to be as, that's the interesting part, that maybe before I had the feeling I wanted to be level-headed, emancipated. Despite of my laughing at it beforehand, but I behaved that way and now, now I simply do things which, which I don't hesitate calling a feminist arts, but in life I do, do things in a more feminine manner, that now I want them to let me enter first [laughter].

There is a couple of worthy conclusions or at least directions of interest, maybe even dimensions to be drawn from the interview (...besides the impressive arts of question formulating). Firstly, the breakage is universal. People who get married and have children (this may be connected with maturation itself, but because of the personal character of the interview, this wasn't solved) should feel about the same, whether male, female, feminist, or not. Secondly, the change is ultimately linked to the body. It is only after the breakage the


body comes in the picture as if the family life rendered it problematic. Similarly, it is through bodily representations one can express the breakage.²⁶⁶

This paper will concentrate on the latter. I will analyze contents of the cycle and focus on the role of body, messages it conveys and the technique of its representation.

1. 1+1

Despite of my putting stress on a particular cycle (more concretely the housework cycle – see the subtitle of this paper), I find it fruitful not to set limits too definitely. Let me start, therefore, with a different series – *1+1* taken from the *Kunst-fu* arts book issued by Gabika and her husband Erik, as this relates to both discussed dimensions.

Figure 1 (1+1, installation, 2002)



1+1 combines bed, shelf, cabinet, stockings, objects and pictures; for my purposes here just as for reasons of clarity, I will not work with all its parts (shelf, stockings) as they do not touch my topic directly. Thus, I will focus on three parts of the installation: the cabinet, the bed and the pictures.

G.B.: So far I've mentioned the change happening, so the next thing I definitely felt , when I started living this family life is that we weren't prepared for it. And hence you start feeling your body suddenly, because it gets barriers and borders and other embodiments [laughter] are approaching you and it's pleasant at the beginning, you long for it, know, it's also like when a baby nestles close to you and needs you all the time, you long for it, but then it gets out of hand, as if it was constricting you, and then you start

²⁶⁶This is due to the author's attitude to arts, which will be covered later on, and I do not even try to generalize this yet.

feeling it and then I started feeling it and I felt a need to express my embodiment in a way, as I had a feeling I don't have a place. Again, I can say there are reasons for this, that, I don't know, a young family, we lived in one room and it was fine, yeah, and I was making space for those people around me and had a feeling from time to time that I was suffocating, you know. Well, I don't know, when we look back now, the bed, but it wasn't only the bed, it was also the cabinet, where, where cloths of a partner are pushing into your part of the cabinet, and it's a completely different principle then, no, I can't generalize now, but at our place it is as, yeah, he is the strong masculine principle, simply, things that are completely in ... er ..., he has the power over it, but I don't, over the chaos which overwhelms it, the part. And ...felt... I needed to separate it.

The embodiment thus does not refer to the sheer facticity of having a body, it also refers to having a place for the body, a kind of elementary bodily privacy. The subject and the body cannot be separated or treated apart, the borders are formed by other bodily subjectivities. In *1+1* this is shown in a twofold manner: 1) The cabinet (Figure 2) Gabika is speaking about was cut-across and redone in a manner that kept the actual position of the content. Then after, she transcribed the respective position of the content by a thin layer of plastic. Thus, even after a removal of trousers, shirts, sweaters, underwear and things (that Gabika called “chaos”), the interaction (the “pushing”, “overwhelming”, the “control over”) between parts of respective partners is envisaged in the form and material of the cabinet (check the tracks on Figure 3.); the notion of inter-subjectivity is expressed in an indirect way.

Figure 2 (1+1, installation, 2002)



Figure 3 (1+1, installation, 2002)



2) More solid representations can be found on the bed (Figure 4), on another piece of furniture of the young family's flat. On this bed, two people had been sleeping for years; it had been used to the extent they left tracks. What Gabika did was that she tried to get them solid.

Just as the Figure 4., Figure 5 represents an explicit or direct attempt to solidify the space between two bodies, two subjectivities. Though sometimes constricting, the duality obviously has a creative effect – not only from the point of view of making arts. There is no “1” anymore, there is just “1+1”. Strangely enough, “1” gets more definitive only in a situation of “1+1”. Therefore, just as there is no disembodied subject, there is no solipsistic subject.²⁶⁷

Figure 4 (1+1, installation, 2002)



Figure 5 (1+1, installation, 2002)



2. Housework

Gabika Binderová considers arts as a means of therapy. How can such a self-centered approach be accommodated with the communicative dimension of arts?

G.B.: I rarely feel like doing something not connected to something I am going through. As – as I noted last time, (...) for me personally, even if it's not always [laughter] appreciated by curators who want to write texts about my work, it is actually a form of therapy; it is a form of, that I really need to somehow solve the situation caused by something difficult stemming from you being an artist living a family life (...). Simply, as if you always were in this society, as it is and a woman, artist, mother, simultaneously handicapped by, in fact, it's as if it was not a good credit to have this all. So, in fact I solve it all by expressing in it the topic I work on.

Once again, it might be an art therapy for me, I shouldn't say this: why should I “spit” pieces to the audience, when I make use of them as a means of therapy? But it's always counted on someone might be solving the same and it's gonna be the same for him, I, really, the arts manipulates the spectator often, it counts with him a priori, but I don't, I just expect that there's someone with the same out there, too.

²⁶⁷Family life could be thus approached as the second lacanian “mirror phase”.

Already at this moment, I would say the author's work is characteristic by both inner and outer tension: not only a tension inspires artistic performance, it is depicted in pieces, but the author approaches arts itself in a “unsettled” manner, too. Which forms does the tension take in the *Housework* cycle ? Which means of representation does Gabika choose; which objects conduct the tension?

Thematically, from the above defined criteria – following the moments of tension – the cycle could be divided into two parts. The first one (Figure 6 to Figure 9) deals with the character of housework or family life in general and their perception by the author; the second (Figure 10 and 11) then aims at the position of an embodied subject within such a framework.

a)

Figure 6 (housework, installation, 2002-3)



Firstly, housework / family life are permanent, endless and inescapable.²⁶⁸ *Super Stable Dust Layer* (Figure 6) – the surface of a shelf, objects covered by a thin layer of fake plush – simply cannot be swept by hyper weak hair of the brushes (Figure 7). Never ending story, never ending effort. The same message gets conveyed in *The Cross* (Figure 8); however, it asks about motivation, questions attitude.

Figure 7 (housework, installation, 2002-3)



²⁶⁸Why using housework for a symbol of family life? Check the interview excerpt below Figure 1.

Gibson's *Passion of Christ* is an incredibly conservative piece. By celebrating the willing acceptance of torture, the movie celebrates the self-sacrifice which brought forth (for the rest of us) the promise of a transcendent reward. Hence, a crucifixion and a cross directly deify (for some of us a rather suspicious) meekness. Gabika puts a cross-positioned nude female body on an apron. Guess then what does the permanent, endless and inescapable housework require?

Figure 8 (housework, installation, 2002-3)



b)

Figure 9 (housework, installation, 2002-3)



M.K.: You had *Nočná mora*²⁶⁹, the apron, there was an installation of you standing almost naked next to the stove holding a chicken in a gloved hand. Could you please tell me something about it, how and why did you make it?

G.B. ...So the housework ...there is an ambivalence between all that you have to manage, normally, normally I should “function” as a woman, who is, attractive for her partner in a way, and remain a sexual object, but on the other hand, you have to manage lots of housework, which as if withdraws from your sexuality. It was kind of a junction of these two, in fact – besides of this apron, there were aprons, where there were these little depictions on the front part of me doing housework, but doing it naked. (...) it's an expression of a certain state that comes, and simply you don't know how to cope with it, and it's not possible to do so, no way, the two positions are so difficult to manage that one has to suffer or you cheat on both of them, when you look around, there's a mess around here and I cheat on it [laughter] or you don't do it at all. I would like it back, all the desires, and simply managing the sexual life as I did before, but it's not true, there's no way since then, it's a problem, it's a real problem and that's why there are all these aprons.

Fig 10 (housework, installation, 2002-3)



The last two pieces indicated two more questions or notes concerning Gabika's work: firstly, what is the character of the competition between family life and sexuality, what is the character of the tension eventually?

G.B. You want to stay a sexual object, but you have to solve the things in a conventional manner, which means, you have to adopt a role assigned to you by the society, and in this

²⁶⁹The English equivalent of the *Nočná mora* (title of the piece on Figure 9) is *Nightmare*. In Slovak, it's a wordplay – Nora is the mark of traditional stoves.

society it is not possible to indulge, (...) these are the things you have to regulate within this society, so these are barriers for a woman, that you have to subdue and move along.

M.K. Sure. You are all the time constructing a dichotomy: yeah, I want to be a sexual object and I have to solve things as there are these barriers all around me, (...) so you're putting natural sexuality in opposition to all assigned roles, to all the roles one has to cope with and still, isn't it possible to say that being a sexual object is just a role, too? (...) I would like to ask whether (...) desire and passion are really authentic 'cause your pieces seem to say so. (...)

G.B. I am strongly motivated by various desires, they are leading me, maybe other women do not feel it this way, but I do. (...) Well, I guess I cannot reply this quickly as I do consider it that much a part of me that I do not think about it. (...) But all those things, between what you know to be natural now, (...) and something brought by the society, you make the decision, chose something: yes, I do accept this from the society, I don't accept this, that's the way I do it for instance, but you feel the strong opposition all the time. Personally, I never know how to settle the opposition, but u know, the very place of the opposition is the origin of my works.

Although claiming a desire authentic does not sound very compelling to me, there is a point in the approach: Gabika assigns quiet an important role to desire and passion in her life; she speaks about desire in general, not about sexual desire solely. Here, she directly opposes Freud. The body hence figures as a mediator (not the source), the spot where the desire and its oppression can be observed. From this perspective, the modality of the desire does not really matter. In other words, if it was the Freudian desire Gabika was speaking about in terms of “leading”, it would mean there is no desire but the sexual one and its concealed forms.

Secondly, and this draws from what has been said, one can notice a specific mode of depicting body here. Despite of putting so much stress on the body, it never figures “live” in Gabika's work – a body enters installations already represented (ie. usually, on the picture). Austrian feminist artist Valie export uses the same subversive technique: it denounces the identification of woman with an image – a representation – by making it the very surface of representation (or the object in a more material sense of the word).²⁷⁰ Woman and representation have a double-edged relationship: “her symbolical function consists in guaranteeing perfection of the phallogocentric system of representation [man as a subject, observing, active element vs. woman as an image, representation, passive, “gazed at element” - M.K.] on one hand, and, in epitomizing the opposite of the fantasy - the character that makes the ideal collapse - on the other. (...) Female body serves as a metaphor of object reality within representation, whereas it is depicted as constructive power destroying the image on one hand, and subject destroyed by being represented.”²⁷¹ Body as object of cultural attention

²⁷⁰Check www.urban-infill.com/valie_export.htm for her pieces. Unfortunately, some of the most famous and outspoken (Windshields, 1990) are missing there.

²⁷¹Rose, Jacqueline: *Woman as Symptom* (1979) In J.R.: *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*. Verson, London 1986. s. 216-33. Quoted from *Aspekt*..2/1997.s.73

is a substituted and absent body. Representations of body can be hence generally approached as an affirmation of a split between the spirit and the body.

Nevertheless, such an interpretation does not hold water in case when body is not only the object of representation but it is its means too. Gabika's bodily representations follow the same pattern: in installations, with the exception of the *Nightmare* piece, body always figures already represented. A good albeit not self-evident example is depicted in Figure 10: pictures showing Gabika making houseworks – as she has spoken about it above – make the front part for housework aprons.²⁷² Body representations are hence encountered in contexts that, Gabika argues, are anti-sexual. The sexual object pervades areas where it is originally pushed out from.

3. Conclusion

In this text, I conducted a preliminary analysis of an arts cycle *Housework* by Gabika Binderová focusing on her depictions of body, embodiment and subjectivities. I found it fruitful to concentrate on moments of tension in author's pieces just as in the interview with her. In this manner, I could not only check author's attitude to arts generally and her technique, but describe and analyze her pieces and their contents from a well defined point of view. Such an approach would enable for a more theoretical analysis, which was not, however, the topic of this paper.

²⁷²This aspect is, I admit, rather difficult to notice on figures I – making an overview – opted for. In case of interest, more suggestive pieces can be found at http://www.artgallery.sk/vystavyvstupte.php?ArtGallery_Session=36ab45e9945e83a88cbfe9360c6692ff&getGaleria=474&getStrana=1000

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